GREATER  EUROPEAN 
GOVERNMENTS 


BY 

A.  LAWRENCE  LOWELL 

PRESIDENT  OF  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


CAMBRIDGE 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1918 


."^54 


COPYRIGHT,  1918 
HARVAiU)  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


JF5j 


^5y 


PREFACE 

To  take  a  second  exposure  on  a  photographic  plate,  in 
order  to  make  the  picture  more  accurate,  is  apt  to  have 
the  opposite  effect.  Attempting  to  bring  a  description 
of  social  conditions  or  political  institutions  up  to  date 
is  more  often  undertaken,  but  hardly  with  greater 
success;  and  when  it  is  done  in  a  hurry  the  defects  are 
increased.  Yet  the  demand  for  a  book  dealing  in  a 
moderate  compass  with  the  governments  of  the  prin- 
cipal belligerents  in  Europe  came  so  suddenly  that  it 
could  be  met  only  by  using  existing  material  with  such 
few  additions  and  corrections  as  seemed  of  primary 
importance.  This  volume  is  an  abridgment  of  the 
author's  "  Government  of  England  "  which  was  pub- 
lished ten  years  ago,  and  of  his  "  Governments  and 
Parties  in  Continental  Europe  "  published  more  than 
twenty  years  ago.  Until  this  war  the  general  traits  of 
the  political  systems  therein  portrayed  had  altered 
little;  and  although  some  changes  that  have  occurred 
since  the  war  have  been  incorporated,  there  has  been 
no  attempt  to  cover  the  conditions  brought  about  by 
the  war.  The  object  has  been  to  show  how  those 
governments  operate  normally  in  time  of  peace,  not 
how  they  have  adjusted  themselves  to  intense  military 
stress. 

While  it  is  believed  that  all  important  alterations  that 
have  taken  place  in  the  governments  of  the  countries 


Ul 


>.i037.i: 


iv  PREFACE 

described  since  the  original  publication  have  been  re- 
ferred to  in  the  notes  or  embodied  in  the  text,  doubtless 
some  minor  ones  have  been  passed  unheeded;  and 
the  lack  of  time  has  prevented  a  revision  and  carrying 
down  to  the  present  day  of  the  authorities  cited  in  the 
notes.  The  purpose  of  the  book  is  to  serve  an  immediate 
end:  that  of  giving  to  the  members  of  the  War  Aims 
Course  in  the  Students'  Army  Training  Corps,  and  to 
the  many  people  in  this  country  who  take  for  the  first 
time  an  interest  in  foreign  nations,  a  picture  of  the 
principal  governmental  systems  in  Europe. 

The  writer  desires  to  thank  the  Macmillan  Company 
for  the  permission  to  use  extracts  from  the  "  Govern- 
ment of  England  ";  and  Dean  Henry  A.  Yeomans  of 
Harvard  College  for  revising  the  chapters  on  France 
and  Italy. 

Cambridge,  Massachusetts 
November  5,  1918 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET 

PAGE 

Sources  of  the  English  Constitution 3 

The  Relation  of  Law  and  Custom 4 

Powers  of  the  Crown 5 

Legislative  Power 5 

Executive  Power 7 

Wide  Extent  of  the  Royal  Power 9 

Powers  of  the  Crown  exercised  by  Ministers lo 

The  King  can  do  no  Wrong ii 

The  Nature  of  Modern  Responsibility 13 

The  King  must  Follow  the  Advice  of  Ministers 14 

For  What  Acts  Ministers  are  Responsible 15 

Utility  of  Monarchy 17 

Nature  of  the  Cabinet 19 

The  Need  of  Unity  and  Secrecy  in  the  Cabinet 20 

The  Prime  Minister 22 

The  Cabinet  and  the  Ministry 22 

The  Executive  Departments 23 

The  Permanent  Civil  Service 24 

Appointment  by  Competitive  Examination 26 

Lay  Chief  and  Expert  Subordinate 27 

The  Relation  between  Them 27 

CHAPTER  II 

ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT 

The  Reform  Acts 29 

The  Act  of  1918 30 

The  Constituencies :  Boroughs  and  Counties 30 

The  Universities 31 

The  Franchise:  Parliamentary  for  Men 32 

The  Local  Franchise  for  Men 32 

The  Franchise  for  Women 33 

Candidates  and  Elections 34 

V 


vi  CONTENTS 

The  Commons'  House 35 

The  Speaker 35 

The  Committees 36 

The  Committee  of  the  Whole 37 

Select  Committees 38 

Standing  or  Grand  Committees 40 

Procedure  on  Public  Bills      41 

Procedure  on  Money  Bills 42 

The  Budget 45 

The  PubUc  Accounts 45 

Framing  Legislative  Questions • 47 

Private  Members'  Bills 49 

The  Cabinet's  Control  of  Legislation 50 

The  Commons'  Control  over  Administration 51 

Criticism  and  Censure 52 

Parliament  the  Inquest  of  the  Nation 54 

Private  Bill  Legislation 55 

The  House  of  Lords 57 

The  Powers  of  the  House  of  Lords 59 

TheActofiQii 60 

The  Cabinet  and  the  Country     61 


CHAPTER  III 

ENGLAND:  PARTY 

Parties  during  the  War 6$ 

Parties  in  Modern  Government 64 

Party  and  the  Parliamentary  System 64 

Party  Votes  in  Parliament 66 


CHAPTER  IV 

ENGLAND:  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

The  Areas  of  Local  Government 69 

Borough  Councils 71 

The  Mayor 73 

The  Permanent  Officials 73 

Their  Position 74 

Benefits  of  their  Influence  ,    ,    ,    .    , 76 


CONTENTS  VU 

CHAPTER  V 
ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE 

The  British  Empire 77 

Proportion  of  Races 77 

Distribution  of  the  European  Elements 78 

Revenue 79 

Forms  of  Colonial  Government 80 

The  Self-Governing  Colonies 80 

Colonial  Federations 82 

The  Relation  to  England 82 

The  Crown  Colonies 85 

India 86 

The  Civil  Service  of  India 87 

India  is  not  a  Nation 88 

The  Native  States 89 

Egypt 90 

Imperial  Federation 9° 


CHAPTER  VI 

FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS 

Origin  of  Parliamentary  Government 93 

Parliamentary  Government  on  the  Continent 97 

The  French  Constitution 98 

History  of  its  Creation 99 

The  Constitutional  Laws loi 

Amendments 102 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies 104 

Scrutin  de  Liste  and  Scrutin  d'Arrondissement 105 

The  Chamber  a  Tumultuous  Body 107 

The  Senate 108 

Its  Functions no 

Its  Actual  Influence m 

The  President  of  the  Republic nS 

His  Personal  Authority 117 

The  Conseil  d'Etat 119 

The  Ministers     1 20 

Their  Responsibility  to  the  Chambers 121 

Their  Enormous  Power 121 


viii  CONTENTS 

Local  Government      122 

The  Prefect 1 24 

The  General  Council 125 

The  Arrondissement  and  the  Canton 127 

The  Commune 128 

Paris 130 

Legislative  Powers  of  the  Executive 131 

Decrees  and  Ordinances 131 

Appropriations I33 

Judicial  Powers  of  the  Executive I34 

Early  Royal  Power  in  England 13 5 

The  Judicial  System  in  England i35 

The  Administrative  System 13  7 

The  Royal  Power  in  France i37 

The  Judicial  System  in  France 138 

The  Administrative  System i39 

Doctrine  of  the  Separation  of  Powers 140 

The  Administrative  Courts i43 

The  Court  of  Conflicts I47 

The  State  of  Siege 148 

Effect  on  the  Executive i49 


CHAPTER  VII 

FRANCE:  PARTIES 

Parties  in  Popular  Government 151 

The  Parliamentary  System  and  Parties 152 

Many  Groups  in  France I55 

The  Lack  of  Political  Consensus 158 

French  Political  Opinions  Theoretical 161 

Effects  of  French  Pohtical  Mechanism 164 

The  Method  of  Electing  Deputies 164 

The  Committees  in  the  Chambers 167 

Interpellations 172 

Jealousy  and  Distrust  of  the  Ministers 178 

Results  of  the  Condition  of  Parties 181 

The  Cabinet  a  Coalition  and  therefore  Weak 182 

Political  Use  of  Offices 184 

Deputies  and  their  Committees 185 

The  Deputies  and  their  Constituents 188 

Prospects  of  the  Republic 189 


CONTENTS  IX 

CHAPTER  VIII 

ITALY 

The  Union  of  Italy ^97 

TheStatuto iqS 

The  King 200 

The  Ministers     201 

The  Senate 202 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies 204 

The  Administrative  System 208 

Contrast  between  Theory  and  Practice 210 

The  Ordinance  Power 211 

The  Civil  Service 213 

Local  Government     214 

The  Judicial  System 216 

The  Courts  and  the  Officials 217 

Administrative  Law 218 

Administrative  Courts 220 

Weakness  of  the  Judicial  System 222 

The  Church 223 

Church  and  State 224 

The  Monastic  Orders 226 

The  Pope 227 

The  Law  of  the  Papal  Guarantees 228 

Difficulty  of  the  Question 230 

CHAPTER  IX 

GERMANY:  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE 

Former  Subdivision  of  Germany     233 

The  Growth  of  Prussia 234 

The  Germanic  Confederation 235 

The  Attempt  at  Union  in  1848-49 236 

Bismarck 238 

The  Constitutional  Conflict 238 

The  North  German  Confederation 240 

The  Constitution  of  the  Empire 242 

Nature  of  the  Confederation 243 

The  Privileges  of  Prussia 245 

Privileges  of  the  Other  States 248 

The  Empire  and  the  Old  Confederation 249 


X  CONTENTS 

The  Reichstag 251 

The  Committee  System 253 

The  Powers  of  the  Reichstag     254 

The  Right  of  Dissolution 255 

Interpellations 256 

The  Bundesrath 257 

Character  of  the  Bundesrath 259 

Its  Internal  Organization 262 

Powers  of  the  Bundesrath 264 

Privacy  of  Meetings 267 

Actual  Influence  of  the  Bundesrath 268 

The  Kaiser 269 

His  Powers  as  Kaiser  and  King 270 

TheChanceUor 272 

His  Functions 274 

His  Substitutes 275 

The  Judiciary 276 

The  Reichsgericht 276 

Character  of  the  Federal  System 277 


CHAPTER  X 

GERMANY:  THE  SEVERAL  STATES 

Prussia:  The  Constitution  and  the  King 279 

The  Ministers  and  the  Bureaucracy 280 

The  Landtag 282 

The  Three-Class  System  of  Election 283 

Prussian  Local  Government 286 

Bavaria 286 

Wurtemberg,  Baden,  and  Hesse 288 

Saxony      289 

The  Small  Monarchies 291 

The  Two  Mecklenburgs 293 

Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck 293 

Alsace-Lorraine 295 

The  Act  of  1911 297 


CONTENTS  XI 

CHAPTER  XI 
GERMANY:  COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM 

The  Position  of  the  Chancellor 299 

Why  not  Responsible  to  the  Reichstag        301 

Parties  in  Germany 302 

Parties  in  the  Landtags 304 

Class  Strife  an  Obstacle  to  Popular  Government 305 

The  Growth  of  Discontent      307 

Democracy  would  Involve  Organic  Changes 308 

CHAPTER  XII 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

Austria:  Provinces  and  Races 310 

The  Constitution 312 

The  Emperor 313 

The  Reichsrath 313 

The  Provinces 315 

The  Race  Question 316 

Hungary:  The  Races 318 

The  King 320 

The  Parliament 321 

The  Dual  Monarchy 322 

The  Delegations    .    .    .  ' 323 

The  Customs  Union 325 

The  Joint  Ministers 325 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina     327 

The  Character  of  the  Union 328 


GREATER  EUROPEAN 
GOVERNMENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

ENGLAND:    CROWN  AND  CABINET 

Sources  oj  the  English  Constitution 

The  English  constitution  —  speaking,  of  course,  of  its 
form,  not  its  content  —  differs  from  those  of  most  other 
European  nations  more  widely  in  method  of  expression  than 
in  essential  nature  and  legal  effect.  They  have  been  created 
usually  as  a  result  of  a  movement  to  change  fundamentally 
the  political  institutions  of  the  country,  and  the  new  plan 
has  naturally  been  embodied  in  a  document;  but  since  the 
Restoration  England  has  never  revised  her  frame  of  gov- 
ernment as  a  whole,  and  hence  has  felt  no  need  of  codifying 
it.  The  national  political  institutions  are  to  be  found  in 
statutes,^  in  customs  which  are  enforced  and  developed  by 
the  courts  and  form  a  part  of  the  common  law,  and  in 
customs  strictly  so  called  which  have  no  legal  vaHdity  what- 
ever and  cannot  be  enforced  at  law.  These  last  are  very 
appropriately  called  by  Professor  Dicey  the  conventions  of 
the  constitution.  The  two  chief  peculiarities  of  the  Eng- 
lish constitution  are:  first,  that  no  laws  are  ear-marked  as 
constitutional  —  all  laws  can  be  changed  by  Parhament, 
and  hence  it  is  futile  to  attempt  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between 
those  laws  which  do  and  those  which  do  not  form  a  part  of 
the  constitution;  second,  the  large  part  played  by  cus- 
tomary rules,  which  are  carefully  followed,  but  which  are 

'  Boutmy  in  his  Etudes  de  droit  constitutionel  (ist  ed.,  p.  9)  adds  treaties  or 
quasi-treaties  (the  Acts  of  Union),  and  solemn  agreements  such  as  the  Bill 
of  Rights.     But  all  these  are  in  legal  effect  simply  statutes. 

3 


4       GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

entirely  devoid  of  legal  sanction.  Customs  or  conventions 
of  this  kind  exist,  and  in  the  nature  of  things  must  to  some 
extent  exist,  under  all  governments.  In  the  United  States 
where  they  might,  perhaps,  be  least  expected,  they  have 
transformed  the  presidential  electors  into  a  mere  machine 
for  registering  the  popular  vote  in  the  several  states,  and 
this  is  only  the  most  striking  of  the  instances  that  might  be 
cited. ^  England  is  peculiar,  not  because  it  has  such  con- 
ventions, but  because  they  are  more  abundant  and  all- 
pervasive  than  elsewhere.  The  most  familiar  of  them  is,  of 
course,  the  rule  that  the  king  must  act  on  the  advice  of  his 
ministers,  while  they  must  resign  or  dissolve  Parliament 
when  they  lose  the  confidence  of  the  majority  in  the  House 
of  Commons.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to  make  a  precise 
list  of  the  conventions  of  the  constitution,  for  they  are  con- 
stantly changing  by  a  natural  process  of  growth  and  decay; 
and  while  some  of  them  are  universally  accepted,  others  are 
in  a  state  of  uncertainty. 

The  Relation  of  Law  and  Custom 

The  relation  between  law  and  custom  in  the  English  gov- 
ernment is  characteristic.  From  the  very  fact  that  the  law 
consists  of  those  rules  which  are  enforced  by  the  courts,  it 
follows  that  the  law  —  including,  of  course,  both  the  stat- 
utes and  the  common  law  —  is  perfectly  distinct  from  the 
conventions  of  the  constitution;  is  quite  independent  of 
them,  and  is  rigidly  enforced.  The  conventions  do  not  ab- 
rogate or  obliterate  legal  rights  and  pri\ileges,  but  merely 
determine  how  they  shall  be  exercised.  The  legal  forms  are 
scrupulously  observed,  and  are  as  requisite  for  the  validity 
of  an  act  as  if  custom  had  not  affected  their  use.  The 
power  of  the  crown,  for  example,  to  refuse  its  consent  to 
'  Bryce,  American  Commonwealth,  ch.  xxxiv. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  5 

bills  passed  by  the  two  houses  of  Parliament  is  obsolete, 
yet  the  right  remains  legally  unimpaired.  The  royal  assent 
is  given  to  such  bills  with  as  much  solemnity  as  if  it  were 
still  discretionary,  and  without  that  formality  a  statute 
would  have  no  validity  whatever.  The  most  notable  ex- 
ample of  this  is  the  way  in  which  the  actual  exercise  of  the 
royal  power  has  been  transferred  from  the  king  to  Parlia- 
ment. The  House  of  Commons  gradually  drew  his  authority 
under  its  control;  but  it  did  so  without  seriously  curtailing 
the  legal  powers  of  the  crown,  and  thus  the  king  legally 
enjoys  most  of  the  attributes  that  belonged  to  his  predeces- 
sors, although  the  exercise  of  his  functions  has  passed  into 
other  hands.  If  the  personal  authority  of  the  monarch  has 
become  a  shadow  of  its  former  massiveness,  the  government 
is  still  conducted  in  his  name,  and  largely  by  means  of  the 
legal  rights  attached  to  his  ofi&ce.  With  a  study  of  the 
crown,  therefore,  a  description  of  English  government  most 
fittingly  begins. 

Powers  of  the  Crown 

The  authority  of  the  English  monarch  may  be  considered 
from  different  points  of  view,  which  must  be  taken  up  in 
succession;  the  first  question  being  what  power  is  legally 
vested  in  the  crown;  the  second,  how  much  of  that  power 
can  practically  be  exercised  at  all;  the  third,  how  far  the 
power  of  the  crown  actually  is,  or  may  be,  used  in  accord- 
ance with  the  personal  wishes  of  the  king,  and  how  far  its 
exercise  is  really  directed  by  his  ministers;  the  fourth,  how 
far  their  action  is  in  turn  controlled  by  Parliament. 

Legislative  Power 

All  legislative  power  is  vested  in  the  King  in  Parliament; 
that  is,  in  the  king  acting  in  concert  with  the  two  houses. 
Legally,  every  act  requires  the  royal  assent,  and,  indeed,  the 


6  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\'ERNMENTS 

houses  can  transact  business  only  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
crown,  which  summons  and  prorogues  them,  and  can  at  any 
moment  dissolve  the  House  of  Commons.  But  it  is  impor- 
tant to  note  that  by  itself,  and  apart  from  Parliament,  the 
crown  has  to-day,  within  the  United  Kingdom,  no  inherent 
legislative  power  whatever.  This  was  not  always  true,  for 
legislation  has  at  times  been  enacted  by  the  crown  alone 
in  the  form  of  ordinances  or  proclamations;  but  the  prac- 
tice may  be  said  to  have  received  its  death-blow  from  the 
famous  opinion  of  Lord  Coke,  "  that  the  King  by  his  procla- 
mation cannot  create  any  offence  which  was  not  an  offence 
before,  for  then  he  may  alter  the  law  of  the  land."  ^  The 
English  crown  has,  therefore,  no  inherent  power  to  make 
ordinances  for  completing  the  laws,  such  as  is  possessed  by 
the  chief  magistrate  in  France  and  other  continental  states. 
This  does  not  mean  that  it  cannot  make  regulations  for  the 
conduct  of  affairs  by  its  own  servants,  by  Orders  in  Council, 
for  example,  estabUshing  regulations  for  the  management 
of  the  army,  or  prescribing  examinations  for  entrance  to  the 
civil  service.  These  are  merely  rules  such  as  any  private 
employer  might  make  in  his  own  business,  and  differ  en- 
tirely in  their  nature  from  ordinances  which  have  the  force 
of  law,  and  are  binding  quite  apart  from  any  contract  of 
employment. 

Power  to  make  ordinances  which  have  the  force  of  law 
and  are  binding  on  the  whole  community  is,  however,  fre- 
quently given  to  the  crown  ^  by  statute,  notably  in  matters 
affecting  public  health,  education,  etc.,  and  the  practice  is 
constantly  becoming  more  and  more  extensive,  until  at  pres- 
ent the  rules  made  in  pursuance  of  such  powers  —  known 
as  "  statutory  orders  "  —  are  published  every  year  in  a 

'  Coke's  Reports,  xii.  76. 

^  Or  more  strictly  to  the  Crown  in  Council. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  7 

volume  similar  in  form  to  that  containing  the  statutes. 
Some  of  these  orders  must  be  submitted  to  Parliament,  but 
go  into  effect  unless  within  a  certain  time  an  address  to  the 
contrary  is  passed  by  one  of  the  houses,  while  others  take 
effect  at  once,  or  after  a  fixed  period,  and  are  laid  upon  the 
tables  of  the  houses  in  order  to  give  formal  notice  of  their 
adoption. 

Executive  Power 

The  crown  is  at  the  head  of  the  executive  branch  of  the 
central  government,  and  carries  out  the  laws,  so  far  as 
their  execution  requires  the  intervention  of  any  national 
public  authority.  In  fact  all  national  executive  power, 
whether  regulated  by  statute,  or  forming  strictly  a  part  of 
the  prerogative,  that  is  the  ancient  inherent  royal  authority, 
is  exercised  in  the  name  of  the  crown,  and  by  its  authority, 
except  when  directly  conferred  by  statute  upon  some  officer 
of  the  crown,  and  in  this  case,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  exercised 
by  that  officer  as  a  servant  of  the  crown,  and  under  its 
direction  and  control.  Legally  some  of  the  executive  pow- 
ers are  indeed  vested  in  the  Crown  in  Council  —  that  is,  in 
the  king  acting  with  his  Privy  Council  —  but  as  the  Coun- 
cil has  no  independent  authority,  and  consists,  for  prac- 
tical purposes,  of  the  principal  ministers  appointed  by  the 
crown,  even  these  powers  may  be  said  to  reside  in  the  crown 
alone. 

All  national  public  officers,  except  some  of  the  officials  of 
the  houses  of  Parliament,  and  a  few  hereditary  dignitaries 
whose  duties  are  purely  ceremonial,^  are  appointed  directly 
by  the  crown  or  by  the  high  state  officials  whom  it  has 
itself  appointed;  and  the  crown  has  also  the  right  to  remove 
them,  barring  a  small  number  whose  tenure  is  during  good 

^  Such  as  the  hereditary  Earl  Marshal  and  Grand  Falconer. 


8       GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

behavior.  Of  these  last  by  far  the  most  important  are 
the  judges,  the  members  of  the  Council  of  India,  and  the 
Controller  and  Auditor  General,  no  one  of  whom  has  any 
direct  part  in  the  executive  government  of  the  kingdom.^ 
Now  the  right  to  appoint  and  remove  involves  the  power 
to  control;  and,  therefore,  it  may  be  said  in  general  that 
the  whole  executive  machinery  of  the  central  government 
of  England  is  under  the  direction  of  the  crown. 

The  crown  furthermore  authorizes  under  the  sign  manual 
the  expenditure  of  public  money  in  accordance  with  the 
appropriations  made  by  Parliament,  and  then  expends  the 
money.  It  can  grant  charters  of  incorporation,  with  powers 
not  inconsistent  with  the  law  of  the  land,  so  far  as  the  right 
to  do  so  has  not  been  limited  by  statute.  The  crown  grants 
all  pardons,  creates  all  peers,  and  confers  all  titles  and 
honors.  As  head  of  the  Established  Church  of  England 
it  summons  Convocation  with  a  license  to  transact  business 
specified  in  advance.  It  virtually  appoints  the  archbishops, 
bishops  and  most  of  the  deans  and  canons,  and  has  in  its 
gift  many  rectorships  and  other  livings.  As  head  of  the 
army  and  navy  it  raises  and  controls  the  armed  forces  of 
the  nation,  and  makes  regulations  for  their  government, 
subject,  of  course,  to  the  statutes  and  to  the  passage  of  the 
Annual  Army  Act.  It  represents  the  empire  in  all  ex- 
ternal relations,  and  in  all  dealings  with  foreign  powers. 
It  has  power  to  declare  war,  make  peace,  and  conclude 
treaties,  save  that,  without  the  sanction  of  Parliament,  a 
treaty  cannot  impose  a  charge  upon  the  people,  or  change 
the  law  of  the  land,  and  it  is  doubtful  how  far  without 

^  On  the  power  of  removal  from  an  oflFice  held  during  good  behavior,  and 
on  the  effect  of  the  provision  that  the  three  classes  of  officers  mentioned 
above  may  be  removed  upon  the  address  of  both  houses  of  Parliament,  see 
Anson,  Law  and  Custom  oj  the  Constitution,  ii.  213-215.  The  references  to 
Anson  are  to  the  3d  ed.  of  vol.  i.  (1897);  the  2d  ed.  of  vol.  ii.  (1896). 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  9 

that  sanction  private  rights  can  be  sacrificed  or  territory 
ceded.* 

Just  as  Parliament  has  often  conferred  legislative  au- 
thority upon  the  crown,  so  it  has  conferred  executive  power 
in  addition  to  that  possessed  by  virtue  of  the  prerogative. 
Statutes  of  this  kind  have  become  very  common  during  the 
last  half  century  in  relation  to  such  matters  as  local  govern- 
ment, pubhc  health,  pauperism,  housing  of  the  working- 
classes,  education,  tramways,  electric  hghting  and  a  host  of 
other  things.  Even  without  an  express  grant  of  authority, 
supervisory  powers  have  often  been  conferred  upon  the 
crown  by  means  of  appropriations  for  local  purposes  which 
can  be  appHed  by  the  government  at  its  discretion,  and 
hence  in  accordance  with  such  regulations  as  it  chooses  to 
prescribe.  This  has  been  true,  for  example,  of  the  subsidies 
in  aid  of  the  local  police,  and  of  education.  By  such  methods 
the  local  authorities,  and  especially  the  smaller  ones,  have 
been  brought  under  the  tutelage  of  the  crown  to  an  extent 
quite  unknown  in  the  past. 

Wide  Extent  of  the  Royal  Power 

All  told,  the  executive  authority  of  the  crown  is,  in  the 
eye  of  the  law,  very  wide.  "  It  would  very  much  surprise 
people,"  as  Bagehot  remarked  in  his  incisive  way,  "  if  they 
were  only  told  how  many  things  the  Queen  could  do  without 
consulting  ParHament.  .  .  .  Not  to  mention  other  things, 
she  could  disband  the  army  (by  law  she  cannot  engage 
more  than  a  certain  number  of  men,  but  she  is  not  obliged 
to  engage  any  men) ;  she  could  dismiss  all  the  officers,  from 
the  General  Commanding-in-Chief  downwards;    she  could 

^  Cf.  Anson,  Law  and  Custom,  ii.  297-299;  Dicey,  Law  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, p.  393.  Heligoland  was  ceded  to  Germany  by  treaty  in  1890,  subject 
to  the  assent  of  Parliament,  which  was  given  by  53-54  Vic,  c.  32. 


lO      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

dismiss  all  the  sailors  too;  she  could  sell  ofif  all  our  ships 
of  war  and  all  our  naval  stores;  she  could  make  a  peace  by 
the  sacrifice  of  Cornwall,  and  begin  a  war  for  the  conquest 
of  Brittany.  She  could  make  every  citizen  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  male  or  female,  a  peer;  she  could  make  every 
parish  in  the  United  Kingdom  a  '  university  ' ;  she  could 
dismiss  most  of  the  civil  servants;  she  could  pardon  all 
offenders.  In  a  word,  the  Queen  could  by  prerogative  up- 
set all  the  action  of  civil  government  within  the  govern- 
ment." ^  We  might  add  that  the  crown  could  appoint 
bishops,  and  in  many  places  clergymen,  whose  doctrines 
were  repulsive  to  their  flocks;  could  cause  every  dog  to  be 
muzzled,  every  pauper  to  eat  leeks,  every  child  in  the  pub- 
lic elementary  schools  to  study  Welsh;  and  could  make  all 
local  improvements,  such  as  tramways  and  electric  light, 
well-nigh  impossible. 

Powers  of  the  Crown  Exercised  hy  Ministers 

Since  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Hanover  the  new 
powers  conferred  upon  the  crown  by  statute  have  probably 
more  than  made  up  for  the  loss  to  the  prerogative  of  powers 
which  have  either  been  restricted  by  the  same  process  or 
become  obsolete  by  disuse.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
prerogative,  as  it  existed  at  that  time,  has  remained  legally 
vested  in  the  crown,  and  can  be  exercised  to-day;  but  it 
is  no  longer  used  in  accordance  with  the  personal  wishes  of 
the  sovereign.  By  a  gradual  process  his  authority  has  come 
more  and  more  under  the  control  of  his  ministers,  until  it 
is  now  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  cabinet,  which  is 
responsible  to  Parliament  and  through  Parliament  to  the 
nation.  The  cabinet  is  to-day  the  mainspring  of  the  whole 
political  system,  and  the  clearest  method  of  explaining  the 

1  English  Constitution,  2d  ed.  (Amer.),  Introd.,  p.  31. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  II 

relations  of  the  different  branches  of  the  government  to  each 
other  is  to  describe  in  succession  their  relations  with  the 
cabinet. 

The  King  can  Do  no  Wrong 

The  doctrine  that  "  the  King  can  do  no  wrong  "  had  its 
beginnings  as  far  back  as  the  infancy  of  Henry  III,  and  by 
degrees  it  grew  until  it  became  a  cardinal  principle  of  the 
constitution.  Legally  it  means  that  he  cannot  be  adjudged 
guilty  of  wrong-doing,  and  hence  that  no  proceedings  can 
be  brought  against  him.  He  cannot  be  prosecuted  crimi- 
nally, or,  without  his  own  consent,  sued  civilly  in  tort  or  in 
contract  in  any  court  in  the  land.^  But  clearly  if  the  gov- 
ernment is  to  be  one  of  law,  if  public  officers  like  private 
citizens  are  to  be  subject  to  the  courts,  if  the  people  are  to 
be  protected  from  arbitrary  power,  the  servant  who  acts  on 
behalf  of  the  crown  must  be  held  responsible  for  illegal 
conduct  from  the  consequences  of  which  the  king  himself 
is  free.  Hence  the  principle  arose  that  the  king's  command 
is  no  excuse  for  a  wrongful  act,  and  this  is  a  firmly  estab- 
lished maxim  of  the  Common  Law  in  both  civil  and  crimi- 
nal proceedings.^    To  prevent  royal  violations  of  the  law, 

1  If  a  person  has  a  claim  against  the  crown  for  breach  of  contract,  or 
because  his  property  is  in  its  possession,  he  may  bring  a  Petition  of  Right, 
and  the  crown  on  the  advice  of  the  Home  Secretary  will  order  the  petition 
indorsed  "  Let  right  be  done,"  when  the  case  proceeds  like  an  ordinary  suit. 

2  Anson,  ii.  4,  5,  42,  43,  278,  279,  476-480.  But  a  servant  of  the  crown 
is  not  liable  on  its  contracts,  for  he  has  made  no  contract  personally,  and 
he  cannot  be  compelled  to  carry  out  the  contracts  of  the  crown.  Gidley  v. 
Lord  Palmerston,  3  B.  &  B.,  284.  The  rule  that  the  sovereign  cannot  be 
sued  has  been  held  to  prevent  a  possessory  action  against  a  person  wrong- 
fully in  the  possession  of  land  as  agent  of  the  crown:  Doe  d.  Legh.  v.  Roe, 
8  M.  &  W.,  579.  It  would  seem  that  in  such  a  case  the  courts  might  have 
held  that  as  the  king  could  do  no  wrong,  the  wrongful  act,  and  consequently 
the  possession,  was  not  his;  in  other  words,  that  the  agency  could  not  be 
set  up  as  a  defense  to  the  wrongful  act.  Compare  United  States  i*.  Lee,  106 
U.  S.,  196,  where  land  had  been  illegally  seized  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States. 


12      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

however,  it  is  not  enough  to  hold  liable  a  servant  who  exe- 
cutes unlawful  orders,  if  the  master  still  has  power  to  commit 
offenses  directly.  A  further  step  must  be  taken  by  restrain- 
ing the  crown  from  acting  without  the  mediation  of  a 
servant  who  can  be  made  accountable;  and  for  this  reason 
Edward  IV  was  informed  that  he  could  not  make  an  arrest 
in  person.!  But,  as  the  kings  and  queens  are  not  likely  to 
be  tempted  into  personal  assaults  and  trespasses,  the  prin- 
ciple that  they  can  act  only  through  agents  has  had  little 
importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  UabiHty  at  law, 
although  it  is  a  matter  of  vital  consequence  in  relation  to 
their  political  responsibility. 

The  doctrine  that  the  king  can  do  no  wrong  appHes  not 
only  to  legal  offenses,  but  also  to  pohtical  errors.  The 
principle  developed  slowly,  as  a  part  of  the  long  movement 
that  has  brought  the  royal  authority  under  the  control  of 
pubUc  opinion;  not  that  the  process  was  altogether  con- 
scious, or  the  steps  deliberately  planned,  but  taking  con- 
stitutional history  as  a  whole,  we  can  see  that  it  tended  to 
a  result,  and  in  speaking  of  this  it  is  natural  to  use  terms 
implying  an  intent  which  the  actors  did  not  really  possess. 
To  keep  the  crown  from  actual  violations  of  law  was  not 
always  easy,  but  it  was  far  more  difficult  to  prevent  it  from 
using  its  undoubted  prerogatives  to  carry  out  an  unpopular 
policy.  Parliament  could  do  something  in  a  fitful  and  in- 
termittent way  by  refusing  supplies  or  insisting  upon  the 
redress  of  particular  grievances,  but  that  alone  was  not 
enough  to  secure  harmony  between  the  crown  and  the  other 
political  forces  of  the  day.    There  could,  in  the  nature  of 

1  Coke,  Inst.  (4th  ed.),  ii.  186-187.  "  Hussey  Chief  Justice  reported,  that 
Sir  John  Markham  said  to  King  E.  I.  that  the  King  could  not  arrest  any 
man  for  suspition  of  Treason,  or  Felony,  as  any  of  his  Subjects  might,  be- 
cause if  the  King  did  wrong,  the  party  could  not  have  his  Action."  E.  I.  is 
a  mistake  for  E.  IV. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  1 3 

things,  be  no  appropriate  penalty  for  royal  misgovernment. 
In  the  Middle  Ages,  indeed,  a  bad  king  or  a  weak  king  might 
lose  his  throne  or  even  his  life;  but  in  more  settled  times 
such  things  could  not  take  place  without  a  violent  convul- 
sion of  the  whole  realm  —  a  truth  only  too  well  illustrated 
by  the  events  of  the  seventeenth  century.  An  orderly  gov- 
erimient  cannot  be  founded  on  the  basis  of  personal  rule 
tempered  by  revolution.  Either  the  royal  power  must  be 
exercised  at  the  personal  will  of  the  monarch,  or  else  other 
persons  who  can  be  made  accountable  must  take  part  in  his 
acts  of  state. 

The  Nature  of  Modern  Responsibility 

The  effort  to  fasten  upon  a  particular  person  the  actual 
responsibility  for  each  pubhc  act  of  the  crown  by  compel- 
ling some  officer  to  put  his  approval  of  it  on  record,  has 
been  superseded  by  the  general  principle  that  the  respon- 
sibility must  always  be  imputed  to  a  minister.  Although 
ignorant  of  the  matter  at  the  time  it  occurred,  he  becomes 
answerable  if  he  retains  his  post  after  it  comes  to  his  knowl- 
edge; and  even  though  not  in  office  when  the  act  was  done, 
yet  if  he  is  appointed  in  consequence  of  it,  he  assumes  with 
the  office  the  responsibility  for  the  act.  This  happened  to 
Sir  Robert  Peel  in  1834.  Believing,  as  every  one  at  that 
time  did  believe,  that  the  king  had  arbitrarily  dismissed 
Lord  Melbourne's  cabinet,  he  said,  "  I  should  by  my  ac- 
ceptance of  the  office  of  First  Minister  become  technically, 
if  not  morally,  responsible  for  the  dissolution  of  the  preced- 
ing government,  although  I  had  not  the  remotest  concern 
in  it."  ^  The  rule  is  so  universal  in  its  operation  "  that  there 
is  not  a  moment  in  the  king's  life,  from  his  accession  to  his 
demise,  during  which  there  is  not  some  one  responsible  to 
1  Mahon  and  Cardwell,  Memoirs  by  Sir  Robert  Peel,  ii.  31. 


14      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Parliament  for  his  public  conduct."  ^  A  minister  is  now 
politically  responsible  for  everything  that  occurs  in  his 
department,  whether  countersignature  or  seal  is  afiixed  by 
him  or  not;  and  all  the  ministers  are  jointly  responsible 
for  every  highly  important  political  act.  A  minister  whose 
policy  is  condemned  by  Parliament  is  no  longer  punished, 
he  resigns;  and  if  the  affair  involves  more  than  his  personal 
conduct  or  competence,  if  it  is  of  such  moment  that  it  ought 
to  have  engaged  the  attention  of  the  cabinet,  his  colleagues 
resign  with  him.  Thus  punitive  responsibiUty  has  been 
replaced  by  political  responsibiUty,  and  separate  has  been 
enlarged  to  joint  responsibility. 

The  King  must  Follow  the  Advice  of  Ministers 

The  ministers,  being  responsible  to  Parliament  for  all  the 
acts  of  the  crown,  are  obliged  to  refrain  from  things  that 
they  cannot  justify,  and  to  insist  upon  actions  which  they 
regard  as  necessar>\  In  short,  the  cabinet  must  carry  out 
its  own  policy ;  and  to  that  poUcy  the  crown  must  submit. 
The  king  may,  of  course,  be  able  to  persuade  his  ministers 
to  abandon  a  policy  of  which  he  does  not  approve,  but  if  he 
cannot  persuade  them,  and,  backed  by  a  majority  in  Parlia- 
ment, they  insist  upon  their  views,  he  must  yield.  It  is 
commonly  said  that  he  must  give  his  ministers  his  confi- 
dence, but  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  he  must 
follow  their  advice.  With  the  progress  of  the  parliamentary 
system  this  custom  has  grown  more  and  more  settled,  the 
ministers  assuming  greater  control,  and  the  crown  yield- 
ing more  readily,  not  necessarily  from  any  dread  of  the 
consequences,  but  from  the  force  of  habit. 

*  Todd,  Pari.  Government  in  England,  ad  ed.,  i.  266. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  1 5 

For  What  Acts  Ministers  are  Responsible 

There  is  one  matter  in  which  the  crown  cannot  really 
be  bound  by  the  advice  of  ministers,  and  that  is  in  the  selec- 
tion of  a  premier.  It  would  be  obviously  improper,  not  to 
say  absurd,  that  the  king  in  the  selection  of  a  new  prime 
minister  should  be  obliged  to  follow  the  opinion  of  the 
one  who  has  just  resigned  in  consequence  of  a  change  of 
party  in  the  House  of  Commons.  There  is  usually  one 
recognized  leader  of  the  Opposition,  and  when  that  is  the 
case  the  crown  must  entrust  the  formation  of  the  new  min- 
istry to  him.  This  was  illustrated  in  1880.  Mr.  Gladstone 
had,  some  years  before,  retired  from  the  leadership  of  the 
Liberals  in  Parliament,  and  the  Queen,  after  their  success 
at  the  general  election,  sent  for  Lord  Hartington,  then 
leading  them  in  the  House  of  Commons;  but  she  found 
that  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  had  really  led  the  party  in  the 
country  to  victory,  was  the  only  possible  head  of  a  Liberal 
government.^ 

If  the  party  that  has  obtained  a  majority  in  Parliament 
has  no  recognized  leader,  the  crown  may  entrust  the  forma- 
tion of  a  ministry  to  any  one  of  its  chief  men  who  is  willing 
to  undertake  the  task;  or  if,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the 
parties  have  become  more  or  less  disintegrated,  so  that  only 
a  coalition  ministry  can  be  formed,  the  crown  can  send  for 
the  head  of  any  one  of  the  various  groups.  Not  to  speak 
of  earUer  days,  when  the  king  had  more  freedom  than  at 
present  in  the  formation  of  his  cabinets,  it  happened  several 
times  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Victoria  that  the  question  who 
should  be  prime  minister  was  determined  by  her  personal 
choice.  Such  opportunities,  however,  are  likely  to  be  less 
common  in  future,  for  it  is  altogether  probable  that  a  party 

1  Cf.  Motley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  book  ii,  ch.  vii. 


1 6      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

will  prefer  to  choose  its  own  leader  rather  than  to  leave  the 
selection  to  the  crown. 

At  the  present  day  all  persons  whose  offices  are  considered 
political  are  appointed  in  accordance  with  the  advice  of  the 
Prime  Minister.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  sovereign 
may  not  urge  his  own  views,  perhaps  with  success,  and  on 
one  occasion,  at  least,  the  Queen  secured,  it  is  said,  a  place 
in  the  cabinet  for  a  former  minister  whom  the  incoming 
premier  had  either  forgotten  or  meant  to  leave  out.  It 
does  mean,  however,  that  if  the  minister  insists  upon  his 
advice  it  must  be  accepted.  In  short,  the  ministers  direct 
the  action  of  the  crown  in  all  matters  relating  to  the  gov- 
ernment. The  king's  speech  on  the  opening  of  Parliament 
is,  of  course,  written  by  them;  and  they  prepare  any  answers 
to  addresses  that  may  have  a  political  character.  All  official 
letters  and  reports  to  the  king,  and  all  communications 
from  him,  must  pass  through  the  hands  of  one  of  their 
number. 

Since  the  king  can  do  no  wrong,  he  can  do  neither  right 
nor  wrong.  He  must  not  be  praised  or  blamed  for  political 
acts;  nor  must  his  ministers  make  public  the  fact  that  any 
decision  on  a  matter  of  state  was  actually  made  by  him.^ 
His  name  must  not  be  brought  into  poUtical  controversy 
in  any  way,  or  his  personal  wishes  referred  to  in  argument, 
either  within  or  without  Parhament.^ 

1  Disraeli's  opponents  were  right  for  criticizing  him  for  letting  it  be  known 
that  it  was  the  Queen  who  had  decided  whether  to  accept  his  resignation 
or  to  dissolve  in  1868:  Hans.  3d  Ser.,  cxci.  1705,  1724,  1742,  1788,  1794, 
1800,  1806,  181 1.  There  was  no  objection  to  allowing  her  to  decide  if  he 
pleased  —  that  is,  he  might  accept  her  opinion  as  his  own  —  but  he  ought 
to  have  assumed  in  pubhc  the  sole  responsibility  for  the  decision. 

2  In  1876  Mr.  Lowe  in  a  public  speech  e.xpressed  his  belief  that  the  Queen 
had  urged  previous  ministers  in  vain  to  procure  for  her  the  title  of  Empress 
of  India.  The  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  he  was  forced  to  make  an  apology,  which  was  somewhat  abject, 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  1 7 

Utility  of  Monarchy 

According  to  the  earlier  theory  of  the  constitution  the 
ministers  were  the  counsellors  of  the  king.  It  was  for  them 
to  advise  and  for  him  to  decide.  Now  the  parts  are  ahnost 
reversed  and  the  sovereign  is  not  usually  consulted  about 
matters  of  domestic  legislation  and  policy  until  the  opinion 
of  the  cabinet  has  taken  shape.  For  although  he  is  informed 
in  general  terms  of  what  is  done  at  cabinet  meetings,  and 
sometimes  discusses  with  a  minister  the  proposed  measures 
relating  to  his  department,  yet  a  matter  is  commonly  talked 
over  and  agreed  upon  by  the  ministers  before  it  is  submitted 
to  him  for  approval.  In  this  way  "  the  sovereign  is  brought 
into  contact  only  with  the  net  results  of  previous  inquiry 
and  deliberation,"  ^  and  the  views  of  the  cabinet  are  "  laid 
before  "  him  ''  and  before  Parliament,  as  if  they  were  the 
views  of  one  man."  ^  To-day  the  social  and  ceremonial 
functions  of  the  crown  attract  quite  as  much  interest  as 
ever;  but  as  a  political  organ  it  has  receded  into  the  back- 
ground, and  occupies  pubHc  attention  far  less  than  it  did 
formerly,  while  the  spread  of  democracy  has  made  the 
masses  more  and  more  famiHar  with  the  actual  forces  in 
public  life. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  government  of  England  is  incon- 
ceivable without  the  parUamentary  system,  and  no  one 
has  yet  devised  a  method  of  working  that  system  without 
a  central  figure,  powerless,  no  doubt,  but  beyond  the  reach 
of  party  strife.  Some  countries  that  had  no  kings  have  felt 
constrained  to  adopt  monarchs  who  might  hold  a  sceptre 
which  they  could  not  wield;  and  one  nation,  disliking  kings, 

the  Queen  through  the  Prime  Minister  having  denied  the  truth  of  his  state- 
ment. Hans.  3d  Ser.,  ccxxviii.  2023  et  seq.;  and  ccxxix.  52-53. 

1  Gladstone,  Gleanings  of  Past  Years,  i.  85. 

*  Morley,  Life  of  Walpole,  p.  155. 


1 8      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

has  been  forced  to  set  up  a  president  with  most  of  the  attri- 
butes of  royalty  except  the  title.  If  the  English  crown  is 
no  longer  the  motive  power  of  the  ship  of  state,  it  is  the 
spar  on  which  the  sail  is  bent,  and  as  such  it  is  not  only  a 
useful  but  an  essential  part  of  the  vessel. 

To  many  countries  the  visible  symbol  of  the  state  is  the 
flag;  but  curiously  enough  there  is  no  British  national  flag. 
Different  banners  are  used  for  different  purposes;  the  king 
uses  the  Royal  Standard;  ships  of  war  carry  at  the  peak 
the  White  Ensign;  naval  reserve  vessels  fly  the  Blue  En- 
sign, and  merchantmen  the  Red  Ensign;  while  the  troops 
march,  and  Parliament  meets,  under  the  Union  Jack;  and 
all  of  these  are  freely  displayed  on  occasions  of  pubUc  re- 
joicing. Each  of  the  self-governing  colonies  has,  moreover, 
its  own  flag,  which  consists  of  the  Union  Jack  with  some 
distinctive  emblem  upon  it.  The  crown  is  thus  the  only 
visible  symbol  of  union  in  the  Empire,  and  this  has  un- 
doubtedly had  no  inconsiderable  effect  upon  the  reverence 
felt  for  the  throne. 

Whatever  the  utility  of  the  crown  may  be  at  the  present 
time,  there  is  no  doubt  of  its  universal  popularity.  A  gen- 
eration ago,  when  the  Queen,  by  her  seclusion  after  the  death 
of  Prince  Albert,  neglected  the  social  functions  of  the  court, 
a  number  of  people  began  to  have  serious  doubts  on  the 
subject.  This  was  while  republican  ideals  of  the  earlier 
type  still  prevailed,  and  before  men  had  learned  that  a  re- 
public is  essentially  a  form  of  government,  and  not  neces- 
sarily either  better  or  worse  than  other  forms.  The  small 
republican  group  in  England  thought  the  monarchy  useless 
and  expensive;  but  people  have  now  learned  that  republics 
are  not  economical,  and  that  the  real  cost  of  maintaining 
the  throne  is  relatively  small.  ^    So  that  while  the  benefits 

1  Hans.  4th  Ser.,  xciv.  1500.  The  Civil  List  of  Edward  VII  was  fixed 
at  his  accession  at  £543,000,  to  which  must  be  added  about  £60,000  of 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  I^ 

derived  from  the  crown  may  not  be  estimated  more  highly, 
or  admitted  more  universally  than  they  were  at  that  time, 
the  objections  to  the  monarchy  have  almost  entirely  dis- 
appeared, and  there  is  no  republican  sentiment  left  to-day 
either  in  Parliament  or  the  country. 

Nature  of  the  Cabinet 

The  conventions  of  the  constitution  have  limited  and 
adjusted  the  exercise  of  all  legal  powers  by  the  regular 
organs  of  the  state  in  such  a  way  as  to  vest  the  main  au- 
thority of  the  central  government  —  the  driving  and  the 
steering  force  —  in  the  hands  of  a  body  entirely  unknown 
to  the  law.  The  members  of  the  cabinet  are  ahnost  always 
the  holders  of  pubhc  offices  created  by  law;  but  their  pos- 
session of  those  offices  by  no  means  determines  their  activity 
as  members  of  the  cabinet.  They  have,  indeed,  two  func- 
tions. Individually,  as  officials,  they  do  the  executive  work 
of  the  state  and  administer  its  departments;  collectively 
they  direct  the  general  policy  of  the  government. 

The  essential  function  of  the  cabinet  is  to  coordinate  and 
guide  the  political  action  of  the  different  branches  of  the 
government,  and  thus  create  a  consistent  policy.  Bagehot 
called  it  a  hyphen  that  joins,  a  buckle  that  fastens,  the  ex- 
ecutive and  legislative  together;  and  in  another  place  he 
speaks  of  it  as  a  committee  of  Parliament  chosen  to  rule 
the  nation.  More  strictly,  it  is  a  committee  of  the  party 
that  has  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  minor- 
ity is  not  represented  upon  it;  and  in  this  it  differs  from 
every  other  parliamentary  committee.  The  distinction  is 
so  obvious  to  us  to-day,  we  are  so  accustomed  to  govem- 

revenues  from  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster,  and  also  the  revenues  from  the 
Duchy  of  Cornwall  which  go  to  the  heir  apparent  as  Duke  of  Cornwall. 
Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  List,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  v.  607. 


20      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

ment  by  party  wherever  popular  institutions  prevail,  that 
we  are  apt  to  forget  the  importance  of  the  fact. 

The  cabinet  is  selected  by  the  party,  not  directly,  but 
indirectly,  yet  for  that  very  reason  represents  it  the  better. 
Direct  election  is  apt  to  mean  strife  within  the  party,  re- 
sulting in  a  choice  that  represents  the  views  of  one  section 
as  opposed  to  those  of  another,  or  else  in  a  compromise 
on  colorless  persons;  while  the  existing  indirect  selection 
results  practically  in  taking  the  men,  and  all  the  men,  who 
have  forced  themselves  into  the  front  rank  of  the  party  and 
acquired  influence  in  Parliament.  The  minority  is  not  rep- 
resented in  the  cabinet;  but  the  whole  of  the  majority  is 
now  habitually  represented,  all  the  more  prominent  leaders 
from  every  section  of  the  party  being  admitted.  In  its 
essence,  therefore,  the  cabinet  is  an  informal  but  permanent 
caucus  of  the  parliamentary  chiefs  of  the  party  in  power  — 
and  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  chiefs  of  the  party  are 
all  in  Parliament.  In  fact  the  continental  practice  whereby 
ministers  are  allowed  to  address  the  legislature,  whether 
they  have  seats  in  it  or  not,  being  unknown  in  England, 
every  member  of  the  cabinet,  and  indeed  of  the  ministry, 
must  have  a  seat  in  one  or  other  House  of  Parliament. 

The  Need  of  Unity  and  Secrecy  in  ilie  Cabinet 

Parliamentary  government  in  its  present  highly  developed 
form  requires  a  very  strong  cohesion  among  the  members 
of  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and,  therefore, 
absolute  harmony,  or  the  appearance  of  harmony,  among 
their  leaders.  Party  cohesion,  both  in  the  House  and  in  the 
cabinet,  is,  indeed,  an  essential  feature  of  the  parliamentary 
system;  ^  but  since  men,  however  united  on  general  princi- 

'  This  is  true  in  normal  times;  but  early  in  this  war  a  cabinet  of  both 
parties  was  formed,  which  for  the  time  suspends  the  ordinary  working  of  the 
parliamentary  system. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  21 

pies,  do  not  by  nature  think  alike  in  all  things,  differences 
of  opinion  must  constantly  arise  within  the  cabinet  itself.' 
Sometimes  they  are  pushed  so  far  that  they  can  be  settled 
only  by  a  division  or  vote,  but  this  is  exceptional,  for  the 
object  of  the  members  is,  if  possible,  to  agree,  not  to  obtain 
a  majority  of  voices  and  override  the  rest.^  The  work  of 
every  cabinet  must,  therefore,  involve  a  series  of  compro- 
mises and  concessions,  the  more  so  because  the  members 
represent  the  varying  shades  of  opinion  comprised  in  the 
party  in  power. 

Men  engaged  in  a  common  cause  who  come  together  for 
the  purpose  of  reaching  an  agreement  usually  succeed,  pro- 
vided their  differences  of  opinion  are  not  made  public.  But 
without  secrecy  harmony  of  views  is  well-nigh  unattainable; 
for  if  the  contradictory  opinions  held  by  members  of  the 
cabinet  were  once  made  pubhc  it  would  be  impossible  after- 
wards to  make  the  concessions  necessary  to  a  compromise 
without  the  loss  of  public  reputation  for  consistency  and 
force  of  character.  Moreover,  a  knowledge  of  the  initial 
divergence  of  views  among  the  ministers  would  vastly  in- 
crease the  difficulty  of  rallying  the  whole  party  in  support 
of  the  poHcy  finally  adopted,  and  would  offer  vulnerable 
points  to  the  attacks  of  the  Opposition.  Secrecy  is,  there- 
fore, an  essential  part  of  the  parHamentary  system.  In  fact, 
by  a  well-recognized  custom,  it  is  highly  improper  to  refer 
in  Parliament,  or  elsewhere,  to  what  has  been  said  or  done 
at  meetings  of  the  cabinet,  although  reticence  must  at  times 
place  certain  members  in  a  very  uncomfortable  position. 

1  One  cannot  read  Mr.  Morley's  Life  oj  Gladstone  without  being  struck 
by  the  frequency  of  such  dififerences.  One  feels  that  in  his  twenty-five  years 
of  life  in  the  cabinet  Gladstone  must  have  expended  almost  as  much  effort 
in  making  his  views  prevail  with  his  colleagues  as  in  forcing  them  through 
Parliament. 

2  In  Gladstone's  cabinet  of  1880-1885  the  practice  of  counting  votes  was 
complained  of  as  an  innovation.     Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  iii.  5. 


22      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Prime  Minister 

At  the  meetings  of  the  cabinet  the  Prime  Minister  as 
chairman  is  no  doubt  merely  primus  inter  pares.  His 
opinion  carries  peculiar  weight  with  his  colleagues  mainly 
by  the  force  it  derives  from  his  character,  abiUty,  experi- 
ence and  reputation;  but  apart  from  cabinet  meetings  he 
has  an  authority  that  is  real,  though  not  always  the  same 
or  easy  to  define. 

Matters  of  exceptional  importance  ought  to  be  brought 
to  his  attention  before  they  are  discussed  in  the  cabinet; 
and  any  differences  that  may  arise  between  any  two  min- 
isters, or  the  departments  over  which  they  preside,  should 
be  submitted  to  him  for  decision,  subject,  of  course,  to  a 
possible  appeal  to  the  cabinet.  He  is  supposed  to  exercise 
a  general  super\dsion  over  all  the  departments.  Nothing  of 
moment  that  relates  to  the  general  poHcy  of  the  govern- 
ment, or  that  may  affect  seriously  the  efi&ciency  of  the  serv- 
ice, ought  to  be  transacted  without  his  ad\dce. 

Unless  the  Prime  Minister  is  a  peer  he  represents  the  cabi- 
net as  a  whole  in  the  House  of  Commons,  making  there  any 
statements  of  a  general  nature.  The  other  ministers  usually 
speak  only  about  matters  in  which  they  are  directly  con- 
cerned. But  the  Prime  Minister  must  keep  a  careful  watch 
on  the  progress  of  all  government  measures;  and  he  is  ex- 
pected to  speak  not  only  on  all  general  questions,  but  on 
all  the  most  important  government  bills. 

The  Cabinet  and  the  Ministry 

The  ministry  is  composed  of  an  inner  part  that  formulates 
the  policy  of  the  government,  and  an  outer  part  that  fol- 
lows the  lines  laid  down;  the  inner  part,  or  cabinet,  contain- 
ing the  more  prominent  party  leaders,  who  are  also  holders 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  23 

of  the  principal  offices  of  state,  while  the  outer  part  consists 
of  the  heads  of  the  less  important  departments,  the  parlia- 
mentary undersecretaries,  the  whips  and  the  officers  of  the 
royal  household.  All  of  these  persons  are  strictly  in  the 
ministry,  and  resign  with  the  cabinet;  but  the  officers  of 
the  household  have,  as  such,  no  political  functions,  and 
do  not  concern  us  here.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
ministers  outside  of  the  cabinet  are  the  parliamentary 
undersecretaries,  who  have  two  distinct  sets  of  duties, 
one  administrative  and  the  other  parliamentary.  Their 
administrative  duties  vary  very  largely,  mainly  in  accord- 
ance with  personal  considerations.  Some  of  them  are  really 
active  in  their  departments,  doing  work  which  might  fall 
upon  the  parliamentary  chief,  or  upon  the  permanent 
undersecretary,  while  others  have  little  or  no  administra- 
tive business;  but  in  any  case  the  real  object  of  their 
existence  is  to  be  found  on  the  parliamentary  side.^ 

The  Executive  Departments 

Although  in  origin  and  legal  organization  the  departments 
of  state  are  very  unUke,  yet  the  growth  of  custom,  and  the 
exigencies  of  parliamentary  fife,  have,  for  practical  purposes, 
forced  almost  all  of  them  into  something  very  near  one 
common  type.  Whatever  the  legal  form  of  the  authority 
at  their  head,  the  actual  control  is  now  in  nearly  every  case 
in  the  hands  of  a  single  responsible  minister.  Sometimes  he 
is  called  a  secretary  of  state;  sometimes  the  chairman  of  a 
board ;  sometimes  by  a  peculiar  title,  Hke  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer,  who  is  the  minister  of  finance,  or  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  who  is  the  minister  of  the  navy. 

*  It  may  be  noted  that  the  chief  secretary  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ire- 
land is  not  a  parliamentary  undersecretary,  but  the  real  head  of  the  Irish 
OfiSce,  unless  the  Viceroy  is  in  the  cabinet. 


24      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

He  is  usually  assisted  by  one  or  more  parliamentary  subor- 
dinates, and  is  always  supported  by  a  corps  of  permanent 
non-political  officials,  who  carry  on  the  work  of  the  office. 

The  Permanent  Civil  Service 

The  history  of  the  permanent  civil  service  would  be  one 
of  the  most  instructive  chapters  in  the  long  story  of  English 
constitutional  development,  but  unfortunately  it  has  never 
been  written.  The  nation  has  been  saved  from  a  bureau- 
cracy, such  as  prevails  over  the  greater  part  of  Europe,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  from  the  American  spoils  system  on  the 
other,  by  the  sharp  distinction  between  political  and  non- 
political  officials.  The  former  are  trained  in  Parhament,  not 
in  administrative  routine.  They  direct  the  general  policy 
of  the  government,  or  at  least  they  have  the  power  to  direct 
it,  are  entirely  responsible  for  it,  and  go  out  of  office  with 
the  cabinet;  while  the  non-political  officials  remain  at  their 
posts  without  regard  to  party  changes,  are  thoroughly  fa- 
miliar with  the  whole  field  of  administration,  and  carry  out 
in  detail  the  policy  adopted  by  the  ministers  of  the  day. 

If  it  were  not  for  three  or  four  ministers,  such  as  the  Irish 
Law  Officers,  who  are  expected  to  get  themselves  elected  to 
Parliament  if  they  can,  but  whose  tenure  of  their  positions 
does  not  depend  upon  their  doing  so,  one  might  say  that  the 
public  service  is  divided  into  political  officers  who  must  sit 
in  Parliament,  and  non-political  officers  who  must  not.  The 
keeping  out  of  politics,  and  the  permanence  of  tenure  must, 
in  the  long  run,  go  together;  for  it  is  manifest  that  office 
can  be  held  regardless  of  party  changes  only  in  case  the 
holders  do  not  take  an  active  part  in  bringing  those  changes 
to  pass;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  doomed  to  lose 
their  places  on  a  defeat  at  the  polls  of  the  party  in  power, 
they  will  certainly  do  their  utmost  to  avert  such  a  defeat. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  25 

In  England  the  abstinence  and  the  permanence  have  been 
attained,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  they  are  both  secured 
by  the  force  of  opinion  hardening  into  tradition,  and  not 
by  the  sanction  of  law.  Although  all  officeholders,  not 
directly  connected  with  the  conduct  of  elections,  have  now 
a  legal  right  to  vote,  and  are  quite  at  liberty  to  do  so,  it  is 
a  well-settled  principle  that  those  who  are  non-political  — 
that  is,  all  who  are  not  ministers  —  must  not  be  active  in 
party  politics.  They  must  not,  for  example,  work  in  a 
party  organization,  serve  on  the  committee  of  a  candidate 
for  Parliament,  canvass  in  his  interest,  or  make  speeches  on 
general  politics.  All  this  is  so  thoroughly  recognized  that 
one  rarely  hears  complaints  of  irregular  conduct,  or  even  of 
actions  of  a  doubtful  propriety.  In  1874,  when  the  acts 
imposing  penalties  upon  their  taking  an  active  part  at  elec- 
tions were  repealed,^  it  was  perfectly  well  understood  that 
they  would  not  be  permitted  to  go  into  party  politics,  and 
that  the  government  was  entitled  to  make  regulations  on 
the  subject.2  Those  regulations  are  still  in  force,^  and  it  is 
only  by  maintaining  them  that  the  civil  servants  can  con- 
tinue to  enjoy  both  permanence  of  tenure  and  the  right  to 
vote. 

Permanence  of  tenure  in  the  English  civil  service,  like  the 
abstinence  from  party  politics,  is  secured  by  custom,  not 
by  law,  for  the  officials  with  whom  we  are  concerned  here 
are  appointed  during  pleasure,  and  can  legally  be  dismissed 

*  Electioneering  by  civil  servants  has  been  the  subject  of  legislation.  An 
Act  of  1 710  (9  Anne,  c.  10,  §  44)  rendered  liable  to  fine  and  dismissal  any 
post-office  official  who  "  shall,  by  Word,  Message,  or  Writing,  or  in  any  other 
Manner  whatsoever,  endeavour  to  persuade  any  Elector  to  give  or  dissuade 
any  Elector  from  giving  his  Vote  for  the  Choice  of  any  Person  ...  to  serve 
in  Parliament."     Cf.  Eaton,  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  p.  85. 

"^  In  fact  in  1874  the  bill  was  amended  so  as  to  make  this  clear.  Hans. 
3d  Ser.,  ccxix.  797-800. 

^  Cf.  Hans.  4th  Ser.,  xvi.  1218;  liii.  1131. 


26  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\'ERNMENTS 

at  any  time  for  any  cause.  Now,  although  the  removal, 
for  partisan  motives,  of  officials  who  would  be  classed  to-day 
as  permanent  and  non-pohtical,  has  not  been  altogether  un- 
known in  England,  yet  it  was  never  a  general  practice. 

The  habit  of  discharging  these  officials  on  party  grounds 
never  having  become  estabHshed,  it  was  not  unnatural  that 
with  the  growth  of  the  parliamentary  system  the  line  be- 
tween the  changing  political  chiefs  and  their  permanent 
subordinates  should  be  more  and  more  clearly  marked,  and 
this  process  has  gone  on  until  at  the  present  day  the  dis- 
missal of  the  latter  on  poKtical  grounds  is  practically  un- 
heard of,  either  in  national  or  local  administration. 

Appointment  by  Competitive  Examination 

As  early  as  1834,  examinations  for  appointment  to  the 
civil  service  began  to  be  used,  and  these  were  gradually 
extended  and  assumed  a  competitive  form.  An  order  in 
Council  of  June  4,  1870,^  which  is  still  the  basis  of  the  sys- 
tem of  examinations,  provides  that  (except  for  offices  to 
which  the  holder  is  appointed  directly  by  the  crown, 
situations  filled  by  promotion,  and  positions  requiring  pro- 
fessional or  other  pecuhar  qualifications,  where  the  ex- 
aminations may  be  wholly  or  partly  dispensed  with)  no 
person  shall  be  employed  in  any  department  of  the  civil 
service  until  he  has  been  tested  by  the  Ci\'il  Service  Com- 
missioners, and  reported  by  them  qualified  to  be  admitted 
on  probation.^  It  provides  further  that  the  appointments 
named  in  Schedule  A,  annexed  to  the  Order,  must  be  made 
by  open  competitive  examination;  and  this  list  has  been 
extended  from  time  to  time  until  it  covers  the  greater  part 

1  Com.  Papers,  1870,  xix.  i,  p.  vii. 

2  §§  2,  7,  and  Schedule  B.  Cf.  Orders  in  CouncU,  Aug.  19,  1871,  §  i;  Sept. 
IS,  1902. 


ENGLAND:  CROWN  AND  CABINET  27 

of  the  positions  where  the  work  does  not  require  peculiar 
qualifications,  or  is  not  of  a  confidential  nature,  or  of  a  dis- 
tinctly inferior  or  manual  character  like  that  of  attendants, 
messengers,  workmen,  etc. 

Lay  Chief  and  Expert  Subordinate 

Leslie  Stephen,  I  think,  remarks  somewhere  that  the 
characteristic  feature  of  the  English  system  of  government 
is  a  justice  of  the  peace  who  is  a  gentleman,  with  a  clerk 
who  knows  the  law;  and  certainly  the  relationship  between 
the  titular  holder  of  a  public  post,  enjoying  the  honors,  and 
assuming  the  responsibility,  of  office,  and  a  subordinate, 
who,  without  attracting  attention,  supplies  the  technical 
knowledge  and  largely  directs  the  conduct  of  his  chief, 
extends  throughout  the  English  government  from  the 
Treasury  Bench  to  the  borough  council. 

The  Relation  between  Them 

The  theoretical  relation  between  the  political  chief  and 
his  permanent  subordinate  is  a  sunple  one.  The  poHtical 
chief  furnishes  the  lay  element  in  the  concern.  His  function 
is  to  bring  the  administration  into  harmony  with  the  general 
sense  of  the  community  and  especially  of  Parliament.  He 
must  keep  it  in  accord  with  the  views  of  the  majority  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  conversely  he  must  defend  it 
when  criticized,  and  protect  it  against  injury  by  any  ill- 
considered  action  of  the  House.  He  is  also  a  critic  charged 
with  the  duty  of  rooting  out  old  abuses,  correcting  the 
tendency  to  red  tape  and  routine,  and  preventing  the  depart- 
ment from  going  to  sleep  or  falling  into  ruts;  and,  being  at 
the  head,  it  is  for  him,  after  weighing  the  opinion  of  the  ex- 
perts, to  decide  upon  the  general  policy  to  be  pursued.  The 
permanent  officials,  on  the  other  hand,  are  to  give  their  ad- 


28      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

\ice  upon  the  questions  that  arise,  so  as  to  enable  the  chief 
to  reach  a  wise  conclusion  and  keep  him  from  falling  into 
mistakes.  When  he  has  made  his  decision  they  are  to  carry 
it  out;  and  they  must  keep  the  department  running  by 
doing  the  routine  work.  In  short  the  chief  lays  down  the 
general  policy,  while  his  subordinates  give  him  the  benefit 
of  their  advice,  and  attend  to  the  details. 

The  smooth  working  of  a  system  of  this  kind  e\adently 
depends  upon  the  existence  of  mutual  respect  and  confidence 
between  the  minister  and  the  permanent  undersecretary. 
The  permanent  undersecretary  ought  to  feel,  and  in  fact 
does  feel,  a  temporary  allegiance  to  his  chief,  although  of  a 
different  political  party.  He  gives  his  advice  frankly  until 
the  chief  has  reached  a  decision,  and  then  he  carries  that 
out  loyally.  The  minister  on  his  part  seeks  the  advice  of 
the  undersecretary  on  all  questions  that  arise,  making  al- 
lowance for  bias  due  to  preconceived  political  or  personal 
conviction. 

A  good  minister  must  be  a  good  administrator,  but  he 
must  look  to  results,  and  not  suppose  that  he  knows  as  much 
about  the  technical  side  of  the  work  as  his  permanent  sub- 
ordinate. For,  as  Bagehot  quotes  Sir  George  Cornewall 
Lewis,  "  It  is  not  the  business  of  a  Cabinet  Minister  to 
work  his  department.  His  business  is  to  see  that  it  is 
properly  worked."  ^  If  he  attempts  to  go  beyond  his  prov- 
ince, to  be  dogmatic  and  to  interfere  in  details,  he  will 
cause  friction  and  probably  come  to  grief. 

1  The  English  Constitulion,  ist  ed.,  p.  240. 


CHAPTER  II 

ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT 

The  Reform  Acts 

The  story  of  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  has  often  been  told; 
how,  before  its  passage,  members  were  elected  to  the  House 
of  Commons  by  many  constituencies  which  contained  very 
few  voters;  how  in  some  cases  these  voters  were  the  owners 
of  land  in  old  chartered  boroughs  which  retained  their 
privileges  although  they  had  ceased  altogether  to  be  in- 
habited; and  how  the  act  swept  away  these  abuses,  together 
with  many  local  electoral  customs,  and  regulated  the  fran- 
chise on  more  nearly  uniform  principles.  The  conditions  it 
estabUshed  remained  in  force  until  1867-68,  when  other 
statutes  enlarged  the  franchise  and  redistributed  the  seats 
—  a  process  that  was  repeated  in  1884-85.  These  latter 
acts  brought  in  a  very  rough  approximation  to  equal  elec- 
toral districts,  and  extended  the  franchise  to  almost  all  men 
who  occupied  the  same  premises  for  a  year.  But  the  quali- 
fications were  cumbrous,  being  based  upon  some  relation 
to  land,  and  including  not  only  the  owners  but  persons 
technically  classed  as  occupiers,  householders  and  lodgers. 
The  provisions  worked  injustice  in  many  cases,  and  allowed 
men  to  vote  in  a  number  of  different  constituencies  at  the 
same  election.  There  had  long  been  a  demand  for  a  revision 
of  the  election  laws,  and  a  loud  cry  for  the  inclusion  of 
women.  Finally  the  war  made  it  clear  that  soldiers  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  vote,  which  they  could  not  do  under  laws 
that  made  the  franchise  depend  upon  actual  occupation. 

30 


30  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Act  of  1Q18 

The  ministers  at  this  time  belonged  to  both  the  great 
parties,  and  the  reform  bill  they  brought  in  was  not,  as  is 
usual,  a  party  measure.  It  was  the  result  of  compromises 
made  in  a  conference  of  members  from  both  sides  of  the 
House  of  Commons;  and  hence,  while  it  introduced  uni- 
versal suffrage  based  only  upon  residence,  it  contained  also 
some  provisions  sHghtly  favoring  trade  and  education. 

The  Constituencies :  Boroughs  and  Counties 

The  new  act,^  which  received  the  royal  assent  on  February 
6,  1918,  changed  not  only  the  franchise  but  also  the  con- 
stituencies. These  still  preserve  the  old  distinction  between 
boroughs  and  counties,  the  considerable  towns  being  sep- 
arate constituencies  by  themselves  or  cut  into  electoral 
divisions;  and  it  may  be  noted  that  while  a  number  of 
boroughs  continue  to  elect  two  members  as  an  undivided 
district,  all  the  rest  of  the  constituencies,  in  boroughs  and 
counties,  are  single-member  districts.  The  new  act  rear- 
ranged the  constituencies  afresh  with  a  view  to  making 
them  as  nearly  equal  in  population  as  possible.^  There  is 
in  fact  only  one  glaring  inequality,  that  of  Ireland,  which 
retains  its  former  number  of  seats,  and  is  heavily  over- 
represented  pending  a  measure  of  home  rule  that  is  expected 
to  change  radically  its  representation  in  Parliament.  The 
number  of  members  in  the  House  was  raised  by  the  act 
from  670  to  709,  and,  apart  from  the  university  members, 
486  of  them  are  allotted  to  England,  35  to  Wales,  71  to 
Scotland  and  loi  to  Ireland. 

^  8  Geo.  V,  c.  64,  and  for  the  constituencies  in  Ireland,  c.  65. 
*  Cf.  c.  64,  Schedule  9,  and  c.  65. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  3 1 

The  Universities 

Beside  the  seats  allotted  to  boroughs  and  counties  there 
are  a  few  reserved  for  the  universities.  They  have,  indeed, 
been  increased  by  the  act.  The  two  members  each  of  Ox- 
ford, Cambridge  and  Dublin,  the  one  for  London,  and  the 
two  elected  by  the  four  Scotch  universities,  have  been  re- 
tained; and  there  have  been  added,  one  member  for  the 
university  of  Wales,  two  for  the  English  provincial  univer- 
sities as  a  group,  another  for  those  in  Scotland,  and  one  each 
for  Queen's  at  Belfast  and  the  National  university  of  Ire- 
land. These  members  are  elected  by  all  holders  of  a  degree 
from  the  university,^  whether  men  or  women;  ^  and,  where 
more  than  one  member  is  to  be  elected  by  a  university  con- 
stituency, the  principle  of  minority  representation  is  in- 
troduced by  allowing  each  voter  to  cast  only  one  vote, 
according  to  the  system  of  preferential,  transferable  voting.' 
The  House  of  Lords  wanted  proportional  representation  for 
many  other  seats,  as  a  protection  against  popular  waves  of 
impulse.  To  this  the  Commons  would  not  agree;  and  finally 
a  compromise  was  reached  whereby,  apart  from  the  uni- 
versity constituencies,  it  was  provided*  that  the  crown  may 
appoint  commissioners  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  choice, 
by  proportional  representation,  of  one  hundred  members  in 
constituencies  to  be  formed  by  combining  existing  districts 
into  groups  electing  from  three  to  five  members.  The 
scheme  is  to  take  effect  if  approved  by  both  Houses  of 
ParUament. 

1  §  2  except  honorary  degrees.  There  are  special  provisions  for  the  Scotch 
universities  and  for  that  of  Dublin. 

^  For  women  see  §  4.  As  in  other  cases  women  must  be  thirty  years  of 
age.  Women  who  have  qualified  for  a  degree  by  residence  and  examination 
can  vote  although,  as  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  the  university  does  not 
confer  degrees  upon  them. 

3  §  20.  *  §  20  (2). 


32      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Parliamentary  Franchise  for  Men 

For  boroughs  and  counties  the  old  qualifications  for 
voters  were  swept  away,  and  the  suffrage  extended  to  all 
men  who  for  six  months  prior  to  the  biennial  registration 
reside  in  the  constituency  or  in  an  adjoining  borough  or 
county.  This  established  complete  manhood  suffrage  for 
residents;  but  one  of  the  compromises  in  the  act  was  the 
retention,  to  a  certain  extent,  of  a  representation  of  business 
interests  also.  It  took  the  form  of  allowing  a  man  to  vote 
in  a  constituency  where  he  carries  on  his  business,  profession 
or  trade,  although  not  a  resident,  if  he  occupies  land  or 
premises  of  the  annual  value  of  ten  pounds.^  He  cannot, 
however,  vote  in  more  than  one  constituency  of  any  kind 
besides  the  one  in  which  he  resides.^  Provision  is  also  made 
for  voting  by  mail  in  the  case  of  persons  unavoidably  absent 
from  the  election;  and  for  soldiers,  sailors,  merchant  sea- 
men and  fishermen  who  may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
vote  by  proxy. ^  Moreover,  soldiers  and  sailors  in  active 
military  service  who  have  attained  the  age  of  nineteen  may 
vote,  although  the  age  for  other  men  is  twenty-one.^ 

The  Local  Franchise  for  Men 

The  right  to  vote  for  local  governing  bodies  has  always 
differed  from  the  parliamentary  franchise,  and  has  not  been 
the  same  for  all  local  bodies.  The  act  sought  to  simphfy  this 
also;  but  objection  was  raised  to  a  complete  extension  of 
manhood  suffrage  to  local  elections,  on  the  ground  that  the 

1  8  Geo.  V,  c.  64,  §  I. 

^  Id.,%  8.  This  includes  the  universities.  The  act  also  provides  that  at 
a  general  election  the  voting  shall  take  place  everywhere  on  the  same  day 
(§  21),  thereby  abolishing  a  practice  that  was  alleged  to  have  been  abused 
for  party  purposes. 

'  Id.,  §  23.  *  Id.,  §  5. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  33 

costs  of  local  government  fall  on  the  rate  payers  alone;  and 
that,  as  the  rates  are  assessed  only  on  the  occupiers  of  land 
and  buildings,  they  ought  to  be  the  voters.  The  act  pro- 
vided, therefore,  that  the  local  franchise  shall  be  limited  to 
occupiers,  as  owners  or  tenants,  of  any  land  or  premises 
within  the  area.^  The  persons  excluded  are  mainly  servants 
and  bachelors  living  in  the  parental  home;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  men  are  included,  as  before,  who  reside  outside  the 
area  but  carry  on  their  occupation  on  their  own  account 
within  it. 

The  Franchise  for  Women 

The  right  of  women  to  vote  which  had  not  been  acquired 
by  violence,  was  achieved  by  women's  work  in  the  war. 
There  was  a  general  desire  to  extend  the  franchise  to  them, 
but  it  was  not  thought  wise  to  create  an  electorate  prepon- 
derately  feminine,  which  would  be  the  result  of  extending 
the  franchise  to  women  on  the  same  terms  as  to  men.  To 
avoid  this  their  right  to  vote  was  limited  in  two  ways,  by 
age  and  by  requiring  them  to  be  occupiers.  The  act  pro- 
vides,2  therefore,  that  a  woman  shall  be  entitled  to  be  a  par- 
liamentary elector  if  she  is  thirty  years  old,  and  occupies  any 
dwelling,  or  any  other  land  or  premises  of  the  annual  value 
of  five  pounds,  or  is  the  wife  of  such  an  occupier.  In  local 
government  elections  she  is  entitled  to  vote  as  a  man  would 
be  if  she  is  an  occupier  in  her  own  right ;  she  is  also  entitled 
to  vote  if  thirty  years  old  and  the  wife  of  a  man  occupying 
premises  in  which  they  both  reside.  Thus  a  woman  cannot 
vote  for  Parliament  unless  she  is  thirty  years  old  and  an 
occupier  in  her  own  right  or  that  of  her  husband;  but  she 
can  vote  in  local  matters  if  twenty-one,  provided  she  is  an 

1  Except  furnished  lodgings.   8  Geo.  \,  c.  64,  §  3. 
^  Id.,  §  4. 


34      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

occupier  in  her  own  right,  the  reason  being  that  in  certain 
cases  she  already  had  this  last  privilege. 

The  act  has  doubled  the  parliamentary  electorate,  in- 
creasing the  voters  from  eight  millions  to  sixteen  millions, 
chiefly  by  the  addition  of  women.  What  the  effect  upon 
politics  will  be  no  one  yet  knows,  and  it  is  useless  to  attempt 
to  predict.  That  it  will  bring  about  some  change  in  the 
method  of  electioneering  and  the  proceedings  of  candidates 
there  can  be  Httle  doubt. 

Candidates  and  Elections 

In  fact  the  act  itself  contains  provisions  that  touch  upon 
the  position  of  candidates.  An  enlarged  electorate  would 
naturally  involve  increased  expense,  especially  since  the 
laws  against  corrupt  practices  limited  the  amount  a  candi- 
date might  spend  to  a  fixed  sum  for  each  registered  voter  in 
the  constituency.  This  is  reduced  for  each  voter  to  seven 
pence  in  a  county  and  five  pence  in  a  borough,  in  addition 
to  certain  personal  expenses  and  fees  of  the  candidate  ^  —  a 
reduction  not  far  from  proportionate  to  the  increase  of  the 
electorate.  It  leaves  the  total  expenditure  of  the  candi- 
date nearly  what  it  was  before;  but  the  act  also  provides 
that  the  charges  of  the  returning  officer  for  the  erection  of 
polling  booths  and  the  attendants  thereat,  which  were 
formerly  paid  by  the  candidates,  shall  be  defrayed  by  the 
public  treasury. 2  Fearing  that  the  reduction  in  cost  might 
multiply  needlessly  futile  candidates  the  act  obliges  each 
of  them  to  deposit  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  to  be  for- 
feited if  he  fails  to  receive  one-eighth  of  the  votes  cast.^  It 
may  be  observed  that  the  restrictions  upon  the  cost  of 

1  8  Geo.  V,  c.  64,  Schedule  4. 

'  Id.,  §  29. 

"  Id.,  §§  26,  27. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  35 

elections  do  not  touch  the  practice  known  as  nursing  con- 
stituencies, that  is,  seeking  the  favor  of  the  voters  by  spend- 
ing money  on  pubhc  objects  well  in  advance  of  the  election. 
In  191 1  the  House  of  Commons,  by  inserting  an  appro- 
priation in  its  vote  of  supply  introduced  the  payment  of  its 
members.  In  the  same  year  a  statute  reduced  the  term  of 
Parliament  from  seven  to  five  years.  ^ 

The  Commons'  House 

Even  the  arrangement  of  seats  in  the  House  is  not  with- 
out its  bearing  upon  political  Hfe;  and  although  a  small 
matter,  it  affords  another  illustration  of  the  principle  that 
an  institution  which,  instead  of  being  deliberately  planned, 
is  evolved  slowly,  will  develop  in  harmony  with  its  environ- 
ment, or  force  its  environment  into  harmony  with  itself. 
The  front  bench  at  the  upper  end  of  the  aisle,  close  at  the 
right  hand  of  the  Speaker,  is  called  the  Treasury  Bench,  and 
is  reserved  for  the  ministers;  the  corresponding  bench  on 
the  other  side  being  occupied  by  the  former  ministers  of  the 
party  now  in  Opposition.  Behind  these  two  benches  sit  for 
the  most  part  men  whose  fidelity  to  their  respective  parties 
is  undoubted,  members  whose  allegiance  is  less  absolute 
generally  preferring  seats  below  the  gangway  on  either  side. 

The  Speaker 

The  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  occupies  a  highly 
honorable  and  important  position,  but  in  some  respects  the 
custom  of  his  election  is  peculiar.  If  only  one  person  is 
nominated,  he  is  called  to  the  chair  without  a  vote.  If  more 
than  one,  they  are  voted  upon  successively,  a  majority  being 
required  for  election. ^  The  proposer  and  seconder  are  al- 
ways private  members,  for  it  is  considered  more  fitting  that 
'  1-2  Geo.  V,  c.  13,  §  7.  2  jyjay^  p   j.j 


36     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  ministers  should  not  be  prominent  in  the  matter.^  The 
Speaker  is,  however,  always  selected  by  the  government  of 
the  day,  and  a  new  Speaker  is  always  taken  from  the  ranks 
of  the  party  in  power.  Sometimes  the  election  is  not  un- 
contested, and  this  happened  when  Mr.  Gully  was  chosen 
in  1895.  ^^t  although  the  Speaker  may  have  been  opposed 
when  first  chosen,  and  although  he  is  elected  only  for  the 
duration  of  the  Parliament,  it  has  now  become  the  invari- 
able habit  to  reelect  him  so  long  as  he  is  willing  to  serve. 
The  Speaker  is  purely  a  presiding  officer.  He  has  nothing 
to  do  with  appointing  any  committees,  or  guiding  the  House 
in  its  work.  He  is  not  a  leader  but  an  umpire,  otherwise 
he  could  not  remain  in  the  chair  through  changes  of  party. 
As  an  umpire,  however,  his  powers  are  very  great,  and  in 
some  cases  under  the  modern  changes  in  the  standing  orders 
they  are  autocratic.  Moreover,  from  his  decision  on  those 
matters,  or  on  any  points  of  order,  there  is  no  appeal.^ 
The  House  can  suspend  or  change  its  own  rules  by  a  simple 
majority  vote,  but  it  cannot  in  a  concrete  case  override  the 
Speaker's  construction  of  them.^ 

The  Committees 

No  great  representative  assembly  at  the  present  day  can 
do  all  its  work  in  full  meeting.  It  has  neither  the  time,  the 
patience  nor  the  knowledge  required.    Its  sittings  ought  not 

'  Cf.  ibid.,  p.  150,  note  3. 

2  But  the  Speaker  himself  may  submit  a  question  to  the  judgment  of  the 
House.     May,  p.  331. 

^  The  action  of  the  Speaker  can  be  brought  before  the  House  only  by  a 
motion  made  at  another  time  after  due  notice,  but  this  is,  of  course,  almost 
useless  for  the  purpose  of  reversing  the  ruling  complained  of:  Hans.  3d  Ser., 
cclviii.  10,  14.  On  the  occasion  when  Speaker  Brand  made  this  ruling 
he  intimated  that  a  member  making  on  the  spot  a  motion  to  disagree  with 
it  would  be  guilty  of  disregarding  the  authority  of  the  chair,  and  liable  to 
suspension  under  the  standing  orders.    Ibid.,  p.  9. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  37 

to  be  frittered  away  in  discussing  proposals  that  have  no 
chance  of  success;  while  measures  that  are  to  be  brought 
before  the  whole  body  ought  to  be  threshed  out  beforehand, 
their  provisions  carefully  weighed  and  put  into  precise  lan- 
guage, objections,  if  possible,  met  by  concession  and  com- 
promise, or  brought  to  a  sharp  difference  of  principle.  In 
short,  they  ought  to  be  put  into  such  a  shape  that  the  assem- 
bly is  only  called  upon  to  decide  a  small  number  of  perfectly 
definite  questions.  To  enable  it  to  do  so  inteUigently  it  may 
be  necessary  also  to  collect  information  about  doubtful 
facts.  Modern  assemblies  have  sought  to  accomplish  these 
results  mainly  by  committees  of  some  kind;  and  in  England 
where  the  parliamentary  form  of  goverrmient  has  reached 
a  higher  development  than  anywhere  else,  the  chief  instru- 
ment for  the  purpose  is  that  informal  joint  committee  of 
the  houses,  known  as  the  cabinet.  But  unless  Parhament 
were  to  be  very  nearly  reduced  to  the  role  of  criticizing  the 
ministers,  and  answering  yes  or  no  to  a  series  of  questions 
propounded  by  them,  it  must  do  a  part  of  its  work  through 
other  committees. 

The  Committee  of  the  Whole 

The  most  important  committee,  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole,  is  not  in  this  sense  a  committee  at  all.  It  is  simply 
the  House  itself  acting  under  special  forms  of  procedure; 
the  chief  differences  being  that  the  chairman  of  committees 
presides,  and  that  the  rule  of  the  House  forbidding  a  mem- 
ber to  speak  more  than  once  on  the  same  question  does  not 
apply.  But  the  fact  that  a  member  can  speak  more  than 
once  makes  it  a  real  convenience  for  the  purpose  for  which  it 
is  chiefly  used,  that  is,  the  consideration  of  measures  in  de- 
tail, such  as  the  discussion  and  amendment  of  the  separate 
clauses  of  a  bill,  or  the  debates  upon  different  items  of  ap- 


38      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

propriations.  The  Committee  of  the  Whole  has  had  a  long 
history.'  It  is  called  by  different  names  according  to  the 
subject  matter  with  which  it  deals.  For  ordinary  bills  it 
is  called  simply  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  When  en- 
gaged upon  appropriations  it  is  called  Committee  of  the 
Whole  on  Supply,  or  in  common  parlance  the  Committee  of 
Supply.  When  providing  money  to  meet  the  appropriations 
it  is  called  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 

Select  Committees 

Of  the  real  committees  the  most  numerous  are  the  select 
committees  whose  normal  size  is  fifteen  members.  They 
are  usually  appointed,  in  part  at  least,  by  the  Committee  of 
Selection,  which  is  chosen  by  the  House  at  the  beginning  of 
each  session,^  but  whose  members  are  in  fact  designated  by 
an  understanding  between  the  leaders  of  the  two  great 
parties  in  the  house.  The  object  is  to  secure  an  impartial 
body  for  the  selection  of  other  committees  of  all  kinds,  and 
so  far  is  this  object  attained  that  in  the  memoir  of  Sir  John 
Mowbray  who  was  its  chairman  continuously  for  thirty- 
two  years,  we  are  told  that  divisions  in  the  committee  are 
rare,  and  never  on  party  lines.^ 

The  sessional  select  committees  are  the  Committee  on 
Public  Accounts,^  which  goes  through  the  report  of  the 
Auditor  and  Comptroller  General,  considers  in  detail  ob- 
jections to  the  legality  of  any  expenditures  by  the  public 
departments,  examines  witnesses  thereon,  and  reports  to 
the  House;  the  Committee  on  Public  Petitions,  appointed 
to  inspect  the  numerous  petitions  presented  to  the  House;  ^ 

1  Redlich,  Recht  und  Technik  des  Englischen  Parliamenlarismus,  pp.  474- 

478. 

2  Standing  Orders  (relative  to  private  business),  p.  98. 
'  Seventy  Years  at  Westminster,  pp.  267  et  seq. 

*  S.  O.,  p.  75-  '  S.  0.,  pp.  76-80. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  39 

and  the  Committee  on  the  Kitchen  and  Refreshment  Rooms 
which  has  importance  for  the  members  of  the  House,  though 
not  for  the  general  pubhc. 

The  other  select  committees  are  created  to  consider  some 
special  matter  that  is  referred  to  them,  either  a  bill,  or  a  sub- 
ject upon  which  the  House  wishes  to  institute  an  inquiry.' 
In  either  case  the  chief  object  of  the  committee  is  to  obtain 
and  sift  information.^  Select  committees  are  the  organs, 
and  the  only  organs,  of  the  House  for  collecting  evidence  and 
examining  witnesses;  and  hence  they  are  commonly  given 
power  to  send  for  persons,  papers  and  records.  They  sum- 
mon before  them  people  whose  testimony  they  wish  to 
obtain.  They  keep  minutes,  not  only  of  their  own  proceed- 
ings, but  also  of  all  evidence  taken  before  them;  and  these, 
together  with  the  report  of  their  conclusions,  are  laid  before 
the  House  ^  and  published  among  the  parliamentary  papers 
of  the  session.  The  fact  that  men  with  all  shades  of  opinions 
sit  upon  these  committees,  and  have  an  opportunity  to  ex- 
amine the  witnesses,  lifts  their  reports,  and  still  more  the 
evidence  they  collect,  above  the  plane  of  mere  party  docu- 
ments, and  gives  them  a  far  greater  permanent  value. 

^  The  question  often  arises  whether  inquiry  shall  be  conducted  by  a  com- 
mittee of  the  house,  or  by  a  commission  appointed  by  the  government. 
When  the  matter  is  distinctly  political  a  committee  of  the  house  is  the 
proper  organ;  but  when  the  judgment  of  outside  experts  is  needed  the  other 
alternative  is  obviously  preferable,  several  members  of  Parliament  being 
often  included  in  such  cases.  Naturally  enough,  the  ministry  and  the  mem- 
bers chiefly  interested  in  pushing  an  inquiry  do  not  always  agree  about 
the  matter.  One  instance  of  a  dispute  on  this  point  was  that  in  relation  to 
the  grievances  of  post-office  employees.  Another  famous  example  occurred 
upon  the  charges  made  by  The  Times  against  Parnell  in  connection  with 
the  forged  Pigott  Letters. 

*  May,  pp.  469-470. 

'  S.  O.,  pp.  59-61,  63. 


40  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\^ERNMENTS 

Standing  or  Grand  Committees 

As  the  pressure  for  time  in  the  House  of  Commons  grew 
more  intense,  select  committees  that  collected  information 
were  not  enough.  Something  was  needed  that  would  save 
debate  in  the  House,  and  for  this  purpose  resolutions  were 
adopted  on  Dec.  i,  1882,  for  setting  up  two  large  committees 
on  bills  relating  to  law  and  to  trade,  whose  deliberations 
should  take  the  place  of  debate  in  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole.  As  distmguished  from  select  committees,  which 
expire  when  they  have  made  a  report  upon  the  special  mat- 
ters committed  to  their  charge,  they  were  made  standing 
bodies,  lasting  throughout  the  session.  They  consist  of  not 
less  than  sixty  nor  more  than  eighty  members  of  the  House, 
appointed  by  the  Committee  of  Selection,  which  has  power 
to  discharge  members  and  substitute  others  during  the 
course  of  the  session.  In  order  to  secure  the  presence  of 
persons  who  may  throw  light  on  any  particular  bill,  the  same 
committee  can  also  appoint  not  more  than  fifteen  additional 
members  for  the  consideration  of  that  bill. 

With  a  view  to  enlarging  the  legislative  capacity  of  Par- 
liament a  select  committee  on  Procedure  in  the  House  of 
Commons  reported  on  May  25,  1906,  in  favor  of  increasing 
the  number  of  standing  committees  from  two  to  four,  and 
making  the  reference  of  bills  to  them  the  normal,  instead  of 
an  exceptional,  procedure.  The  plan  was  adopted  in  the 
following  year,  and  hence  all  bills,  except  money  bills  and 
bills  for  confirming  provisional  orders,  are  now  referred  to 
one  of  the  standing  committees,  unless  the  House  otherwise 
order  on  a  motion  to  be  decided  without  amendment  or 
debate.  The  bills  are  distributed  among  the  committees  by 
the  Speaker. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  4.I 

The  object  of  the  change  was  to  give  a  better  chance  of 
enactment  for  measures  which  there  is  not  time  to  debate  in 
Committee  of  the  Whole;  and  the  provision  that  the  House 
may  vote  not  to  send  a  bill  to  a  standing  committee  was  de- 
signed chiefly  for  the  great  party  measures  of  the  govern- 
ment which  must  always  be  debated  in  the  House  itself. 

Procedure  on  Public  Bills 

A  public  bill,  when  presented,  is  read  a  first  time,  and  in 
the  case  of  goverimient  bills,  this  is  an  occasion  for  a  speech 
explaining  its  object,  and  a  debate. 

The  next  step,  and,  except  on  great  party  measures,  the 
first  occasion  for  a  debate,  is  the  second  reading.  This  is  the 
proper  stage  for  a  discussion  of  the  general  principles  of  the 
bill,  not  of  its  details,  and  amendments  to  the  several  clauses 
are  not  in  order. 

After  the  second  reading  a  bill,  until  1907,  went  normally 
to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole,  with  or  without  instruc- 
tions, and  now  it  goes  there  if  the  House  so  decides.  When 
the  order  of  the  day  for  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  is 
reached  the  Speaker  leaves  the  chair,  and  the  House  goes 
into  committee  without  question  put.^  This  is  the  stage  for 
consideration  of  the  bill  in  detail,  and  the  clauses  are  taken 
up  one  after  another,  the  amendments  to  each  clause  being 
disposed  of  in  their  order.  Then  new  clauses  may  be  pro- 
posed, and  finally  the  bill  is  reported  back  to  the  House. 

Normally  a  bill  goes  either  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
or  to  a  standing  committee,  but  after  it  has  been  read  a  sec- 
ond time  a  motion  may  be  made  to  refer  it  to  a  select  com- 
mittee. Such  a  reference  simply  adds  a  step  to  the  journey 
of  the  bill,  for  when  reported  it  goes  to  a  standing  committee 
or  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.    A  standing  committee, 

1  S.  O.,  p.  51.     Adopted  in  1888. 


42      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\TRNMENTS 

on  the  other  hand,  is,  as  already  explained,  a  substitute  for 
the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  It  deals  with  the  bill  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  way,  reporting  it  back  to  the  House  amended 
or  unchanged. 

WTien  a  bill  has  been  reported  from  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  with  amendments,^  and  when  it  has  been  reported 
from  a  standing  committee  whether  amended  or  not,^  it  is 
considered  by  the  House  in  detail,  upon  what  is  known  as 
the  report  stage.  The  object  is  to  give  the  House  an  op- 
portunity to  review  the  work  done  in  committee,  and  see 
whether  it  wishes  to  maintain  the  amendments  there 
adopted. 

The  next,  and  now  the  last,  stage  of  a  bill  in  the  House  of 
Commons  is  the  third  reading.  Like  the  second  reading, 
this  raises  only  the  question  whether  or  not  the  House  ap- 
proves of  the  measure  as  a  whole.  Verbal  amendments 
alone  are  in  order,  and  any  substantial  alteration  can  be 
brought  about  only  by  moving  to  recommit. 

Leaving  out  of  account  the  first  reading,  which  rarely 
involves  a  real  debate,  the  ordinary  course  of  a  public  bill 
through  the  House  of  Commons  gives,  therefore,  an  oppor- 
tunity for  two  debates  upon  its  general  merits,  and  between 
them  two  discussions  of  its  details,  or  one  debate  upon  the 
details  if  that  one  results  in  no  changes,  or  if  the  bill  has  been 
referred  to  a  standing  committee. 

Procedure  on  Money  Bills 

The  procedure  in  the  case  of  financial  measures  differs  in 
important  respects  from  that  followed  in  passing  other  bills. 
With  some  exceptions  all  the  national  revenues  are  first  paid 
into  the  Consolidated  Fund,  and  then  drawn  out  of  it  to 
meet  the  expenditures  of  the  government.     The  financial 

1  S.  O.,  p.  39-  '  S.  O.,  p.  50. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  43 

work  of  Parliament  turns,  therefore,  upon  the  processes  of 
getting  money  into  and  out  of  that  fund.  The  second 
process  comes  first  in  the  order  of  parliamentary  business, 
and  its  nature  is  fixed  by  two  standing  orders,  which  date 
from  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth  century.  One  of 
them,  adopted  in  1707,  provides  that  the  House  will  not 
proceed  upon  any  petition  or  motion  for  granting  money  but 
in  Committee  of  the  Whole  House; '  the  other,  that  it  will 
not  receive  any  petition,  or  proceed  upon  any  motion,  for  a 
grant  or  charge  upon  the  public  revenue  unless  recom- 
mended from  the  crown.^ 

This  last  rule,  first  adopted  by  a  resolution  in  1706,  and 
made  a  standing  order  in  1713,^  was  designed  to  prevent  im- 
provident expenditure  on  private  initiative.  It  has  proved 
not  only  an  invaluable  protection  to  the  Treasury,  but  a 
bulwark  for  the  authority  of  the  ministry.^  Its  importance 
has  been  so  well  recognized  that  it  has  been  embodied  in 
the  fundamental  laws  of  the  self-governing  colonies;^  while 
some  foreign  countries,  like  France  and  Italy,  that  have 
copied  the  forms  of  parliamentary  government,  without 

1  S.  0.,p.  67. 

'  S.  O.,  p.  66.  May  (p.  527)  points  out  that  these  two  rules,  together  with 
S.  O..  p,  68,  adopted  in  1715,  that  the  House  will  receive  no  petition  for  com- 
pounding a  revenue  debt  due  to  the  crown  without  a  certificate  from  the 
proper  officer  stating  the  facts,  were  for  more  than  a  century  the  only  stand- 
ing orders  of  the  House. 

^  Todd,  Pari.  Government  in  England,  2d  ed.,  i.  691. 

*  As  an  illustration  of  the  fact  that  the  rise  of  the  authority  exerted  by 
ministers  over  Parliament  was  contemporary  with  the  loss  by  the  king  of 
personal  legislative  power,  Todd  (ii.  390)  remarks  that  this  rule  was  first 
adopted  in  1706,  and  the  last  royal  veto  was  given  in  1707. 

*  E.  g.,  British  North  Amer.  Act,  §  54.  Commonwealth  of  Australia 
Constitution  Act,  §  56. 

After  the  government  of  India  was  transferred  from  the  East  India 
Company  to  the  crown,  in  1856,  the  rule  was  extended  to  motions  for  a 
charge  upon  the  Indian  revenue.     S.  O.,  p.  70. 


44      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

always  percei\'ing  the  foundation  on  which  they  rest,  have 
suffered  not  a  little  from  its  absence. 

As  grants  of  money  can  be  taken  up  only  in  Committee  of 
the  Whole,  and  only  on  the  recommendation  of  the  crown, 
—  that  is,  of  a  minister  —  the  House  resolves  itself,  early 
in  the  session,  into  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  Supply,  to 
consider  the  estunates  submitted  by  the  government. * 

Certain  fixed  charges,  such  as  the  interest  on  the  national 
debt,  the  royal  ci\il  list,  and  the  salaries  of  the  judges,  are 
payable  by  statute  out  of  the  ConsoKdated  Fund,  and  hence 
do  not  require  an  annual  vote  of  Parliament,  or  come  before 
the  Committeee  of  Supply.  The  estimates  for  the  rest  of  the 
expenditures  for  the  coming  year,  known  as  the  supply  serv- 
ices, are  divided  into  three  parts,  relating  to  the  army,  the 
navy,  and  the  civil  services.  The  last  of  the  three  is  divided 
into  classes,  and  all  of  them  are  di\dded  into  grants  or  votes, 
which  are  in  turn  subdi\dded  into  subheads  and  items. 
Each  grant  is  the  subject  of  a  separate  vote  in  Committee  of 
Supply,  and  amendments  may  be  moved  to  omit  or  reduce 
any  item  therein. 

But  the  committee  merely  passes  and  reports  to  the  House 
resolutions  in  favor  of  those  grants,  and  the  money  cannot 
be  paid  out  of  the  Consolidated  Fund  without  the  authority 
of  a  statute.  The  next  step  is  taken  in  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole  on  Ways  and  Means,  where  on  the  motion  of  a 
minister  another  resolution  is  passed,  that  to  make  good  the 
supply  already  voted,  the  sum  required  be  granted  out  of 
the  Consolidated  Fund.  This  in  turn  must  be  reported  to 
and  confirmed  by  the  House.^    A  bill  called  a  Consolidated 

1  S.  0.,  p.  14  provides  that  the  Committees  of  Supply  and  Ways  and 
Means  shall  be  set  up  as  soon  as  the  address  in  reply  to  the  king's  speech  has 
been  agreed  to. 

»  On  the  procedure  in  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  on  Report 
from  Committee  of  Supply  and  of  Ways  and  Means,  see  May,  pp.  588  d  seq. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  45 

Fund  Bill  is  then  brought  in  to  give  effect  to  the  resolution. 
The  bill,  with  the  separate  grants,  annexed  in  a  schedule, 
goes  through  the  ordinary  stages;  but  the  tune  spent  upon 
it  is  short,  because  its  only  object  being  to  authorize  the 
issue  of  money  to  cover  the  supply  already  voted,  no  amend- 
ment can  be  moved  to  reduce  the  amount,  or  change  the 
destination,  of  the  grants.^ 

The  Budget 

So  much  for  the  process  of  getting  money  out  of  the  Con- 
solidated Fund.  That  of  getting  money  into  the  fund  goes 
on  at  the  same  time,  but  independently.  It  is  usually  early 
in  April  that  the  Chancellor  introduces  his  budget  in  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means.  In  an  elaborate  speech  he 
reviews  the  finances  of  the  past  year,  comparing  the  results 
with  the  estimates,  and  deahng  with  the  state  of  trade  and 
the  national  debt.  He  then  refers  to  the  estimates  already 
submitted,  and  coming  to  the  gist  of  his  speech,  and  the  part 
of  it  that  is  awaited  with  curiosity,  he  explains  how  he  pro- 
poses to  raise  the  revenue  required  to  meet  the  ex^^enditures. 
The  budget  speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  is 
followed  by  a  general  discussion  of  the  questions  he  has 
raised;  and  either  at  once,  or  on  subsequent  days,  by  de- 
bates and  votes  upon  the  resolutions  he  has  brought  in. 
The  resolutions  when  adopted  are  reported  to  the  House  for 
ratification,  but  as  in  the  case  of  supply,  they  have  no  legal 
effect  until  enacted  in  the  form  of  a  statute. 

The  Public  Accounts 

The  whole  initiative,  as  regards  both  revenue  and  ex- 
penditure, hes  with  the  government  alone.  The  House  has 
merely  power  to  reject  or  reduce  the  amounts  asked  for, 

'  May,  p.  526;  Ilbert,  Manual,  §  245,  note. 


46     GREATER  EUROPE-\X  GOVERNMENTS 

and  it  uses  that  power  ven*  little.  Financially,  its  work  is 
rather  supervision  than  direction;  and  its  real  usefulness 
consists  in  securing  publicity  and  criticism  rather  than  in 
controlling  expenditure.  It  is  the  tribunal  where  at  the 
opening  of  the  financial  year  the  ministers  must  explain  and 
justify  ever\-  detail  of  their  fiscal  poHcy.  and  where  at  its 
close  they  must  render  an  account  of  their  stewardship. 
This  last  duty  is  highly  important.  The  House  receives 
ever}-  year  reports  of  the  administration  of  the  finances 
from  three  independent  bodies,  or,  to  be  more  accurate,  it 
receives  two  distinct  sets  of  accounts  and  one  report.  As 
soon  as  possible  after  the  close  of  the  financial  year,  the 
Treasury  submits  the  Finance  Accounts,  which  cover  all 
receipts  paid  into,  and  all  issues  out  of,  the  ConsoUdated 
Fund,  gi\'ing  the  sources  from  which  the  revenue  was  de- 
rived and  the  purpose  for  which  the  issues  were  made. 

Meanwhile  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General  —  who 
holds  his  ofiice  during  good  beha\-ior,  with  a  salar\'  paid 
by  statute  directly  out  of  the  ConsoKdated  Fund,  and  who 
considers  himself  in  no  sense  a  servant  of  the  Treasury',  but 
an  officer  responsible  to  the  House  of  Commons  ^  —  ex- 
amines the  accounts  of  the  several  departments.  This  is 
a  matter  requiring  much  time,  and  it  is  not  until  the  open- 
ing of  the  next  regular  session  that  he  presents  what  are 
known  as  the  Appropriation  Accounts,^  covering  in  great 
detail  the  actual  expenditures  in  all  the  supply  ser\'ices, 
with  his  reports  and  comments  thereon.^ 

^  See  his  e\'idence  before  the  Com.  on  Nat.  E-xpend.,  Com.  Papers,  1902, 
vii.  15,  Qs.  764-769,  831. 

*  Thus  the  Parliamentar>'  Papers  for  1903  contain  the  Finance  Accounts 
for  the  financial  year  ending  March  31,  1903,  and  the  far  more  elaborate 
Appropriation  Accounts  for  the  year  ending  March  31,  1902. 

*  He  presents  also  separate  accounts  of  the  Consolidated  Fund  services, 
and  other  matters,  with  reports  upon  them. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  47 

His  accounts  and  reports  are  referred  to  the  Committee 
of  Public  Accounts,  which  consists  of  eleven  members  of  the 
House  chosen  at  the  beginning  of  the  session/  and  includes 
the  Financial  Secretary'  of  the  Treasur}',  some  one  who  has 
held  a  similar  office  under  the  opposite  party,  and  other  men 
interested  in  the  subject.  It  inspects  the  accounts  and  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor  General's  notes  of  the  reason  why 
more  or  less  than  the  estimate  was  spent  on  each  item. 
It  inquires  into  the  items  that  need  further  explanation, 
examining  for  the  purpose  the  auditing  officers  of  the  depart- 
ments, and  other  persons;  and  it  makes  to  the  House  a  re- 
port or  series  of  reports,  which  refer  in  detail  to  the  cases 
where  an  excess  grant  must  be  made  by  ParKament,  or  a 
transfer  between  grants  in  the  militar}-  departments  must  be 
approved. 

Framing  Legislative  Questions 

For  the  purpose  of  collective  action  ever\-  body  of  men  is 
in  the  phght  of  M.  Xoirtier  de  \'Lllefort  in  "  Monte  Cristo," 
who  was  completely  paralyzed  except  for  his  eyes.  Like 
him  it  has  only  a  single  faculty,  that  of  sa\ing  Yes  or  No. 
Indi\-idually  the  members  may  express  the  most  involved 
opinions,  the  most  complex  and  divergent  sentiments,  but 
when  it  comes  to  voting,  the  body  can  vote  only  Yes  or  No. 
Some  one  makes  a  motion,  some  one  else  moves  an  amend- 
ment, perhaps  other  amendments  are  superimposed,  but  on 
each  amendment  in  turn,  and  ffiially  on  the  main  question, 
the  body  simply  votes  for  or  against. 

'  S.  0.,  p.  75.  For  a  brief  histon-  of  the  system  of  audit,  and  the  Ia\-ing 
of  accounts  before  Pariiament,  see  the  memorandum  by  Lord  \Velb\-.  Rep. 
Com.  on  Nat.  Expend.,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  vii.  15,  App.  13.  See  also  the 
description  by  Hatschek.  in  his  EtigUsches  Staatsrecht  (pp  495-500),  of  the  in- 
troduction into  England  of  double  entr>-  and  the  French  system  of  keeping 
the  national  accounts. 


48      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Obviously,  therefore,  it  is  of  vital  importance  to  know 
who  has  power  to  ask  the  question.  In  small  bodies  that 
have  limited  functions  and  an  abundance  of  time,  the  mem- 
bers are  free  to  propose  any  questions  they  please;  but  in 
large  assemblies,  all  of  whose  proceedings  are  of  necessity 
slower,  this  freedom  is  curtailed  by  lack  of  time,  especially 
if  the  range  of  activities  is  wide.  Hence  the  legislatures  of 
all  great  states  have  been  constrained  to  adopt  some  process 
for  restricting  or  sifting  the  proposals  or  bills  of  their  mem- 
bers. The  most  common  device  is  that  of  referring  the  bills 
to  committees,  which  can  practically  eliminate  those  that 
have  no  serious  chance  of  success,  and  can  amend  others, 
putting  them  into  a  more  acceptable  form.  In  such  cases 
the  committees  enjoy,  if  not  the  exclusive  privilege  of  pro- 
posing questions  to  the  legislature,  at  least  the  primary 
right  of  framing  the  questions  that  are  to  be  submitted,  and 
this  gives  them  a  momentous  power. 

The  cabinet  has  been  said  to  be  a  committee,  and  the  most 
important  committee  of  the  House  of  Commons;  but  it  is 
really  far  more.  Unlike  an  ordinary  committee,  it  does  not 
have  the  bills  of  members  referred  to  it.  On  the  contrary  it 
has  the  sole  right  to  initiate,  as  well  as  to  frame,  the  meas- 
ures it  submits  to  the  House;  and  these  comprise,  in  fact, 
almost  all  the  important  bills  that  are  enacted.  By  far  the 
greater  part  of  legislation  originates,  therefore,  exclusively 
with  the  ministers.  The  system  of  a  responsible  ministr}- 
has  obstructed  the  growth  of  committees;  because,  in  the 
case  of  government  measures,  the  chief  function  of  such 
committees,  that  of  sifting  bills  and  putting  them  into 
proper  shape,  is  performed  by  the  cabinet  itself;  and  also 
because,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter,  the  authority  of  the 
cabinet  would  be  weakened  if  other  bodies,  not  necessarily 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  49 

in  accord  with  it,  had  power  to  modify  its  proposals.  In 
this  connection  it  may  be  observed  that  in  the  domain  of 
bills  for  private  and  local  objects,  to  which  the  responsibihty 
of  the  cabinet  does  not  extend,  there  has  developed  a  most 
elaborate  and  complete  set  of  committees,  to  which  all  such 
bills  are  referred. 

Private  Members^  Bills 

Private  members  are  free  to  bring  their  public  bills  be- 
fore the  House,  unfettered  by  any  committee,  provided  they 
can  find  a  chance  to  do  so  in  the  extremely  meagre  allow- 
ance of  time  at  their  disposal.  In  short  the  Commons  have 
solved  the  question  of  time  by  giving  most  of  it  to  the  gov- 
erimient,  and  leaving  the  private  members  to  scramble  for 
the  rest  by  drawing  lots  for  it. 

A  private  member  must  be  very  fortunate  in  the  ballot, 
or  he  must  have  a  number  of  friends  interested  in  the  same 
bill,  to  get  it  started  with  any  prospect  of  success;  and 
even  then  there  is  scarcely  a  hope  of  carrying  it  through 
if  a  single  member  opposes  it  persistently  at  every  point. 
Only  ten  or  fifteen  such  bills  are  enacted  a  year,  and  of  these 
only  a  couple  provoke  enough  difference  of  opinion  to  lead 
to  a  division  during  their  course  in  the  House.' 

All  the  sittings  not  reserved  for  private  members  are  at 
the  disposal  of  the  government,  which  can  arrange  the  order 
of  business  as  it  pleases.^ 

^  Although  the  time  at  the  disposal  of  private  members  has  not  changed 
much  of  late  years,  the  number  of  these  bills  enacted,  and  especially  of  those 
enacted  against  opposition,  has  diminished  sensibly.  In  the  decade  from 
1878  to  1887  about  twenty-three  such  bills  were  passed  a  year,  and  on  four 
or  five  of  these  divisions  took  place. 

»  S.  O.,  p.  s. 


50     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Cabinet's  Control  of  Legislation 

The  responsibility  of  the  ministers  for  the  legislation  they 
propose  is  a  comparatively  recent  matter.^  By  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century  it  had  begun  to  be  recognized,  and 
at  the  present  day,  the  ministers  would  treat  the  rejection  of 
any  of  their  important  measures  as  equivalent  to  a  vote  of 
want  of  confidence.^  Moreover,  the  government  is  respon- 
sible not  only  for  introducing  a  bill,  but  also  for  failing  to  do 
so.  At  a  meeting  in  the  autumn  the  cabinet  decides  upon  the 
measures  it  intends  to  bring  forward,  and  announces  them  in 
the  king's  speech  at  the  opening  of  the  session.  Amend- 
ments to  the  address  in  reply  are  moved  expressing  regret 
that  His  Majesty  has  not  referred  to  some  measure  that  is 
desired,  and  if  such  an  amendment  were  carried  it  would 
almost  certainly  cause  the  downfall  of  the  ministry. 

Following  upon  the  responsibility  for  the  introduction 
and  passage  of  all  important  measures  has  come  an  in- 
creasing control  by  the  ministers  over  the  details  of  their 
measures.  It  was  formerly  maintained  that  the  House 
could  exercise  a  great  deal  of  freedom  in  amending  bills, 
without  implying  a  loss  of  general  confidence  in  the  cabinet.^ 
But  of  late  amendments  carried  against  the  opposition  of 
the  Treasury  Bench  have  been  extremely  rare.  This  does 
not  mean  that  the  debates  on  the  details  of  bills  are  fruit- 
less. On  the  contrary,  it  often  happens  that  the  discussion 
exposes  defects  of  which  the  government  was  not  aware, 

1  Cf.  Todd,  Pari.  Government  in  England,  ii.  368.  Ilbert,  Legislative 
Methods  and  Forms,  pp.  82,  216. 

2  The  only  cases  where  a  government  bill  has  been  rejected  by  the  House 
of  Commons  for  more  than  a  score  of  years  are  those  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill 
in  1886,  on  which  the  cabinet  dissolved  Parliament,  and  an  insignificant  bill 
on  church  buildings  in  the  Isle  of  Man,  which  was  defeated  in  a  thin  House 
in  1897. 

»  Cf.  Todd,  Pari.  Government  in  England,  ii.  370-372. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  5 1 

or  reveals  an  unsuspected  but  widespread  hostility  to  some 
provision;  and  when  this  happens  the  minister  in  charge 
of  the  bill  often  declares  that  he  will  accept  an  amendment, 
or  undertakes  to  prepare  a  clause  to  meet  the  objection 
which  has  been  pointed  out.^  But  it  does  mean  that  the 
changes  in  their  bills  are  made  by  the  ministers  themselves 
after  hearing  the  debate,  and  that  an  amendment,  even  of 
small  consequence,  can  seldom  be  carried  without  their  con- 
sent. This  is  the  natural  outcome  of  the  principle  that  the 
cabinet  is  completely  responsible  for  the  principal  public 
measures,  and  hence  must  be  able  to  control  all  their  pro- 
visions so  long  as  it  remains  in  office. 

The  Commons^  Control  over  Administration 

If  the  relations  between  the  cabinet  and  the  House  of 
Commons  in  legislative  matters  have  changed,  their  rela- 
tions in  executive  matters  have  been  modified  also.  If 
the  cabinet  to-day  legislates  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  House,  it  administers  subject  to  its  constant  super- 
vision and  criticism.  In  both  cases  the  relation  is  funda- 
mentally the  same.  In  both  the  English  system  seems  to 
be  approximating  more  and  more  to  a  condition  where  the 
cabinet  initiates  everything,  frames  its  own  policy,  submits 
that  policy  to  a  searching  criticism  in  the  House,  and  adopts 
such  suggestions  as  it  deems  best;  but  where  the  House, 
after  all  this  has  been  done,  must  accept  the  acts  and  pro- 

'  The  minister  often  says  that  he  will  consider  whether  he  can  meet  the 
views  that  have  been  expressed;  and  then  on  the  report  stage  he  brings  up 
a  compromise  clause.  An  interesting  example  of  this  occurred  on  July  23, 
1906,  when  the  Opposition  complained  that  sufficient  time  had  not  been 
given  for  debating  the  educational  council  for  Wales,  the  provisions  pro- 
posed having  been  profoundly  changed  since  it  had  been  last  before  the 
House.  The  government  replied  that  the  changes  had  been  made  to  meet 
objections  raised  by  the  Opposition  itself.    Hans.  4th  Ser.,  clxi.  741  et  seq. 


52      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

posals  of  the  government  as  they  stand,  or  pass  a  vote  of 
censure  and  take  the  chances  of  a  change  of  ministry  or  a 
dissolution. 

The  House  of  Commons  does  not  often  pass  votes  ask- 
ing for  executive  action  in  the  future,  but  its  members 
criticize  the  conduct  of  the  government  in  the  past  freely 
and  constantly.  The  opportunities  for  doing  so  are,  indeed, 
manifold.  There  is  first  the  address  in  answer  to  the  king's 
speech  at  the  opening  of  the  session;  then  the  questions 
day  by  day  give  a  chance,  if  not  for  direct  criticism,  at 
least  for  calling  the  ministers  to  account;  then  there  are 
the  motions  to  adjourn;  the  private  members'  motions; 
the  debates  on  going  into  the  Committees  of  Supply  and 
Ways  and  Means;  the  discussions  in  the  Committee  of 
Supply  itself;  the  debates  on  the  Consolidated  Fund  Reso- 
lutions, on  the  Appropriation  Bill,  and  on  the  Budget;  and, 
finally,  the  formal  motions  of  want  of  confidence. 

Criticism  and  Censure 

But  first  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  individual 
criticism  by  members,  and  collective  censure  by  vote  of  the 
House.  The  former,  whether  coming  from  the  seats  behind 
the  Treasury  Bench,  or  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  floor, 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  caution  to  the  ministers,  an  expression 
of  personal  opinion  that  is  likely  to  find  more  or  less  of  an 
echo  outside  of  Parliament.  It  does  not  in  itself  imperil 
the  position  of  the  government  at  the  moment,  although  the 
errors  of  the  ministers  pointed  out  in  this  way  go  into  the 
great  balance  of  account  on  which  the  nation  renders  its 
verdict  at  the  next  general  election.  But  a  collective  cen- 
sure by  vote  of  the  House  may  mean  immediate  resignation. 
Now  the  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  implies  the  alter- 
nation in  power  of  two  parties  holding  different  views  upon 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  53 

the  questions  of  the  day.  If  it  does  not  imply  this;  if  the 
fall  of  one  cabinet  is  followed  by  the  appointment  of  another 
with  a  similar  policy;  then  public  Hfe  will  revolve  about 
the  personal  ambitions  and  intrigues  of  leading  poUticians, 
—  a  condition  that  has  caused  much  of  the  discredit  now 
attached  to  the  parHamentary  system  in  some  continental 
states.  But  if  a  change  of  ministry  involves  the  transfer  of 
power  to  an  Opposition  with  quite  a  different  programme, 
it  is  clear  that  the  change  ought  not  to  take  place  until  the 
nation  has  declared,  either  at  the  polls,  or  through  its  rep- 
resentatives in  the  House  of  Commons,  that  it  wishes  that 
result.  The  ministers  ought,  therefore,  to  stand  or  fall 
upon  their  general  policy,  upon  their  whole  record,  or  upon 
some  one  question  that  in  permanent  consequence  out- 
weighs everything  else,  not  upon  a  particular  act  of  sec- 
ondary importance.  Moreover  the  judgment  ought  to  be 
given  after  mature  deliberation,  not  in  the  heat  of  a  debate 
upon  some  political  blunder  brought  suddenly  to  the  notice 
of  the  House.  The  Opposition  can  at  any  time  claim  to 
move  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  and  within  reasonable 
limits  the  cabinet  will  always  assign  a  day  for  the  purpose. 
But  this  is  quite  a  different  matter  from  the  criticism  of 
particular  acts.  Whatever  the  precise  form  of  any  motion 
may  be,  if  the  the  object  is  to  turn  the  ministry  out,  every 
member  goes  into  one  or  the  other  lobby,  according  to  his 
desire  that  the  cabinet  shall  stand  or  fall.  The  judgment  of 
the  House  is  passed  not  upon  any  one  act  or  question  of 
poHcy,  but  distinctly  upon  the  record  of  the  ministry  as  a 
whole;  and  a  defeat  must  be  immediately  followed  by 
resignation  or  dissolution. 

From  a  survey  of  the  various  methods  by  which  the  min- 
isters can  be  called  to  account  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
it  is  clear  that  the  opportunities  to  air  grievances,  to  sug- 


54     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

gest  reforms,  and  to  criticize  the  government  for  both  large 
matters  and  small,  for  their  general  policy  and  their  least 
administrative  acts,  are  many  and  constant.  For  the  ob- 
ject they  serve,  that  of  turning  a  searchlight  upon  the  gov- 
ernment, and  keeping  the  public  informed  of  its  conduct, 
they  are  abundant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opportunities 
to  pass  judgment  by  a  definite  vote  upon  particular  acts  of 
the  ministers,  as  distinguished  from  their  conduct  as  a 
whole,  have  diminished  very  much,  and  there  is  a  marked 
tendency  to  make  a  definite  expression  of  opinion  on  such 
matters  by  vote  of  the  House  more  and  more  difficult.  Such 
a  tendency  is  entirely  in  accord  with  the  true  principle  of 
parliamentary  government.  There  ought  to  be  the  fullest 
opportunity  for  criticism ;  but  the  cabinet  must  be  free  not 
only  to  frame  its  own  policy,  but  also  to  carry  that  policy 
out,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  shackled,  or  thrust  out,  so  long 
as  its  conduct  of  affairs  is  on  the  whole  satisfactory  to  the 
nation. 

Parliamenl  the  Inquest  of  the  Nation 

The  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  can  develop  in  a 
normal  and  healthy  way  only  in  case  the  legislative  body 
is  divided  into  two  parties,  and  under  those  conditions  it  is 
the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  system  that  Parliament 
cannot  support  the  cabinet  on  one  question  and  oppose  it 
on  another.  The  programme  of  the  ministers  must  be  ac- 
cepted or  rejected  as  a  whole,  and  hence  the  power  of  initia- 
tive, both  legislative  and  executive,  must  rest  entirely  with 
them.  This  is  clearly  the  tendency  in  Parliament  at  the 
present  day.^    The  House  of  Commons  is  finding  more  and 

1  Redlich  ends  his  book  on  the  procedure  of  the  House  of  Commons  with 
the  remark  (p.  800),  that  the  rules  of  a  legislative  body  are  the  political 
manometer,  which  measures  the  strain  of  forces  in  the  parliamentary  ma- 
chine, and  thereby  in  the  whole  organism  of  the  state. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  55 

more  difficulty  in  passing  any  effective  vote,  except  a  vote 
of  censure.  It  tends  to  lose  all  powers  except  the  power  to 
criticize  and  the  power  to  sentence  to  death.  Parliament 
has  been  called  the  great  inquest  of  the  nation,  and  for  that 
purpose  its  functions  have  of  late  been  rather  enlarged  than 
impaired.  Nor  are  the  inquisitors  confined  to  any  one  sec- 
tion of  the  House,  for  while  that  part  is  played  chiefly  by 
the  Opposition,  the  government  often  receives  a  caution 
from  its  own  supporters  also.  If  the  parliamentary  system 
has  made  the  cabinet  of  the  day  autocratic,  it  is  an  autoc- 
racy exerted  with  the  utmost  publicity,  under  a  constant 
fire  of  criticism;  and  tempered  by  the  force  of  public  opinion, 
the  risk  of  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  and  the  prospects 
of  the  next  election. 

Private  Bill  Legislation 

If  the  direction  of  important  legislation  of  a  public  char- 
acter lies  almost  altogether  in  the  hands  of  the  ministers, 
special  laws  affecting  private  or  local  interests  are  not  less 
completely  outside  of  their  province.  Private  bill  procedure 
has  both  a  legislative  and  a  judicial  aspect.  The  final  aim 
being  the  passage  of  an  act,  a  private  bill  goes  through  all 
the  stages  of  a  public  bill,  and  the  records  of  its  progress 
appear  in  the  journals  of  the  House.  But  the  procedure  is 
also  regarded  as  a  controversy  between  the  promoters  and 
opponents  of  the  measure,  and  this  involves  an  additional 
process  of  a  judicial  character. 

The  committee  stage  of  the  bill,  for  the  consideration  of 
its  provisions  in  detail,  is  devolved  upon  a  private  bill  com- 
mittee. Here  takes  place  the  judicial  process,  or  trial  of  the 
controversy  between  conflicting  interests,  which  presents 
the  peculiar  feature  of  the  English  procedure.  All  opposed 
private  bills  are  referred  under  the  rules  to  the  Committee 


56  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\'ERXMENTS 

of  Selection,  which  divides  them  into  groups  and  refers  each 
group  to  a  committee,  consisting  of  a  chairman  and  three 
members  not  locally  or  otherwise  interested,  whom  it  ap- 
points for  the  purpose.' 

The  hearing  of  the  parties  before  the  committee  follows 
the  pattern  of  a  trial  in  a  court  of  law,  even  to  the  standing 
of  the  counsel  employed.  The  proceedings  are  strictly 
judicial  in  form,  the  barristers  examining  and  cross-examin- 
ing the  witnesses  and  making  the  arguments  in  the  ordinary 
way.  Moreover,  if  either  party  has  vexatiously  subjected 
the  other  to  expense,  the  committee  can  award  costs  Uke 
a  court  of  law,  and  this  is  occasionally  done.^ 

The  English  system  of  private  bill  legislation  has  its  de- 
fects, but  they  are  far  more  than  outweighed  by  its  merits. 
The  curse  of  most  representative  bodies  at  the  present  day 
is  the  tendency  of  the  members  to  urge  the  interests  of  their 
locaUties  or  their  constituents.  It  is  this  more  than  any- 
thing else  that  has  brought  legislatures  into  discredit,  and 
has  made  them  appear  to  be  concerned  with  a  tangled  skein 
of  private  interests  rather  than  with  the  pubhc  welfare.^  It 
is  this  that  makes  possible  the  American  boss,  who  draws 
his  resources  from  his  profession  of  private  bill  broker. 
Now  the  very  essence  of  the  English  system  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  tends  to  remove  private  and  local  bills  from  the 
general  field  of  political  discussion,  and  thus  helps  to  rivet 

1  S.O.P.B.pp.  98, 103, 105-106,  io8, 110-113, 116-117,  208.  Until  a  few 
years  ago  there  was  a  paid  referee  who  could  sit  on  the  committee  with  an 
advisory  voice  but  no  vote.  May,  p.  728.  There  were  formerly  two  paid 
referees,  and  later  only  one.  The  procedure  is  slightly  different  in  the  case 
of  railway,  canal,  divorce,  police  and  sanitary  bills,  but  the  principle  is  sub- 
stantially the  same. 

*  May,  pp.  781-782. 

'  For  a  careful  study  from  this  point  of  view  of  a  fairly  good  legislative 
body,  by  one  of  its  members  well  fitted  to  observe,  see  an  article  by  Francis 
C.  Lowell,  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  Lxxix.  366-377.  March,  1897. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  57 

the  attention  of  Parliament  upon  public  matters.  A  min- 
istry stands  or  falls  upon  its  general  legislative  and  ad- 
ministrative record,  and  not  because  it  has  offended  one 
member  by  opposing  the  demands  of  a  powerful  company, 
and  another  by  ignoring  the  desires  of  a  borough  council. 
Such  a  condition  would  not  be  possible  unless  Parliament 
was  willing  to  leave  private  legislation  in  the  main  to  small 
impartial  committees,  and  abide  by  their  judgment. 

The  House  of  Lords 

The  upper  house  of  the  British  Parliament  contains  sev- 
eral kinds  of  members,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that 
every  peer  has  not  a  right  to  sit,  and  all  the  members  are 
not  in  the  same  sense  peers. 

First  there  are  the  peers  with  hereditary  seats.  They 
consist  of  the  peers  of  England  created  before  the  union 
with  Scotland  in  1707,  the  peers  of  Great  Britain  created 
between  that  time  and  the  union  with  Ireland  in  1801,  and 
the  peers  of  the  United  Kingdom  created  thereafter.  Their 
titles  in  the  order  of  their  rank  are  those  of  dukes,  mar- 
quises, earls,  viscounts  and  barons.  At  present  they  are 
about  five  hundred  and  fifty  in  number,  and  they  increase 
continually,  for  the  crown,  that  is  the  ministry  of  the  day, 
has  unlimited  power  to  create  hereditary  peers  of  the  United 
Kingdom.' 

When  the  union  with  Scotland  was  made  the  Scotch  peers 
were  much  more  numerous  in  proportion  to  population  than 
the  English;  and  therefore,  instead  of  admitting  them  all 
to  the  House  of  Lords,  it  was  provided  that  they  should 

»  At  one  time  the  House  of  Lords  held  that  a  Scotch  peer  could  not  be 
given  an  hereditary  seat  as  a  peer  of  Great  Britain;  but  this  decision  was 
afterwards  reversed.  A  peer  so  created  can  still  vote  for  representatives  as 
a  Scotch  peer.    Pike,  Constitutional  History  of  the  House  of  Lords,  pp.  361-363. 


58      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\ERNMENTS 

elect  sixteen  representatives  of  their  order  for  the  duration 
of  each  Parliament.  No  provision  was  made  for  the  creation 
of  new  Scotch  peers,  so  that  with  the  dying  out  of  families, 
and  the  giving  of  hereditary  seats  to  Scotch  peers  by  creat- 
ing them  peers  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  number  of  those 
who  do  not  sit  in  the  House  has  greatly  diminished. 

The  same  problem  arose  upon  the  union  with  Ireland  a 
hundred  years  later;  but  in  this  case  the  Irish  peers  were 
empowered  to  elect  twenty-eight  of  their  number  repre- 
sentatives for  Hfe,  and  it  was  provided  that  one  new  Irish 
peerage  might  be  created  for  every  three  that  became  ex- 
tinct until  the  number  ^  fell  to  one  hundred,  a  limit  above 
which  it  cannot  be  raised.^  There  is  another  difference  be- 
tween the  Scotch  and  Irish  peers.  The  former  are  wholly 
excluded  from  the  House  of  Commons,  but  the  latter  can 
be  elected  by  any  constituency  in  Great  Britain. 

The  only  spiritual  peers  in  the  House  of  Lords  to-day  are 
the  English  bishops,  for  the  established  church  of  Scotland 
is  Presbyterian  in  form,  and  the  Irish  Anglican  bishops  lost 
their  seats  when  their  church  was  disestablished  in  1869. 
All  the  English  bishops,  moreover,  do  not  have  seats,  be- 
cause as  the  sees  were  increased  it  was  not  thought  wise  to 
enlarge  the  representation  of  the  church;  and,  therefore, 
it  was  provided  that  the  Archbishops  of  Canterbury  and 
York,  the  Bishops  of  London,  Durham  and  Winchester, 
and  of  the  rest  only  the  twenty  seniors  in  the  order  of  in- 
cumbency, should  have  seats  in  the  House. 

The  House  of  Lords  is  not  only  a  legislative  chamber  but 
also  the  highest  court  of  appeal  for  the  United  Kingdom. 
When  it  acts  as  a  court  only  those  members  who  hold,  or 
have  held,  high  judicial  office  take  part;    but  there  are 

1  Exclusive  of  those  having  hereditary  seats  under  other  titles. 
*  The  number  is  now  less  than  one  hundred. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  59 

rarely  enough  of  these  for  a  court  of  last  resort,  and  hence 
four  additional  judges  are  provided  by  the  appointment  of 
Lords  of  Appeal  in  Ordinary  for  life.  It  may  be  added  that 
the  presiding  officer  of  the  House  is  the  Lord  Chancellor, 
who  fills  at  the  same  time  the  highest  judicial  ofiice  in  the 
Kingdom. 

The  Powers  of  the  House  of  Lords 

Save  for  an  ancient  custom,  rigidly  insisted  upon  by  the 
Commons,  that  the  Peers  must  not  initiate  or  amend  bills 
to  raise  or  spend  money,  the  House  of  Lords  had  the  same 
legislative  rights  as  the  other  chamber  until  recent  events 
brought  a  crisis  in  its  history.  It  had  always  been  in  the 
habit  of  amending  the  measures  of  the  cabinet,  sometimes 
very  freely.  In  fact  the  Lords  were  bolder  in  the  twenty 
years  preceding  191 1  than  they  had  formerly  been.  In  1893 
they  rejected  Mr.  Gladstone's  Home-Rule  Bill,  and  at  the 
succeeding  general  election  in  1895  the  people  appeared  to 
ratify  their  action  by  returning  a  Unionist  majority  to  Par- 
liament. This  emboldened  the  Lords  to  claim  a  right  of 
appeal  from  the  cabinet  and  the  majority  in  the  Commons  to 
the  electorate  —  a  right,  it  was  said,  to  demand  a  sort  of 
referendum.  That  might  have  been  well  enough  had  not  the 
House  of  Lords  always  acted  with  one  of  the  great  parties  in 
the  state  and  opposed  the  other.  While  the  Conservatives 
were  in  power  it  was  docile,  but  when  the  Liberals  came  into 
office  in  1906  it  rejected  or  mutilated  a  series  of  government 
measures. 

Finally,  in  1909,  the  expense  of  old  age  pensions  caused 
the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  to  propose  heavy  taxes 
on  the  unearned  increment  —  that  is  the  increase  in  value  — 
of  land,  and  on  undeveloped  land  in  or  near  cities,  together 
with  a  supertax  on  incomes  and  an  increase  of  the  death 
duties.    The  Conservatives  were  exasperated,  and  when  the 


6o  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\'ERNMENTS 

finance  bill  came  before  the  Lords  they  voted  "  that  this 
House  is  not  justified  in  giving  its  consent  to  this  Bill  until 
it  has  been  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  country." 
The  Liberal  cabinet  accepted  the  challenge,  dissolved  Par- 
liament, and,  although  it  lost  seats  at  the  election  in  Janu- 
ary, 1910,  it  obtained  a  majority  in  the  new  House  of 
Commons,  and  the  finance  bill  passed  into  law. 

The  Act  of  igii 

The  Liberals  were  not  satisfied.  They  had  made  up  their 
minds  to  restrict  the  power  of  the  Lords,  and  a  government 
bill  was  brought  in  for  the  purpose.  Finding  that  the  Lords 
were  certain  to  reject  it  the  cabinet  again  dissolved  ParHa- 
ment,  and  at  the  election  in  December,  1910,  was  again 
victorious.  The  Commons  passed  the  bill;  the  Lords  still 
hesitated,  but  a  threat  to  create  peers  enough  to  turn  the 
scale  brought  many  of  them  round.  A  majority  of  the 
Lords  voted  in  its  favor  and  it  became  law  on  August  18, 
1911.^ 

In  substance  the  act  provides  that  if  a  bill  to  raise  or 
expend  money,  which  has  been  passed  by  the  Commons  and 
sent  to  the  Lords  at  least  a  month  before  the  end  of  the 
session,  is  not  passed  by  them  without  amendment  within 
one  month  it  shall  become  an  act  on  receiving  the  royal 
assent;  ^  and  that  if  any  other  public  bill  passed  by  the 
Commons  in  three  successive  sessions  is  not  passed  by  the 
Lords  without  amendments,  or  with  such  amendments  as 
the  Commons  accept,  it  shall  become  an  act  on  receiving 
the  royal  assent,  provided  two  years  have  elapsed  between 
the  first  and  last  vote  in  the  Commons.     On  the  questions 

^  1-2  Geo.  V,  c.  13. 

*  Provisions  dealing  with  the  raising  and  expenditure  of  money  by  local 
authorities  are  not  included. 


ENGLAND:  PARLIAMENT  6l 

whether  a  bill  is  a  money  bill  or  not,  and  whether  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act  have  been  complied  with,  the  decision  of 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  final.  Over  money 
bills,  therefore,  the  power  of  the  Lords  is  virtually  abolished, 
while  on  other  bills  it  can  propose  amendments  and  can 
delay  action  for  two  years. 

Restricting  the  power  of  the  Lords  was  to  be  followed  by 
a  reorganization  of  the  composition  of  their  house.  The 
problem,  however,  of  constructing  an  upper  chamber  strong 
enough  to  be  useful,  and  not  so  strong  as  to  hamper  a  min- 
istry responsible  only  to  the  Commons,  is  not  a  simple 
matter.  The  subject  has  been  carefully  considered  by  a  com- 
mission, but  as  yet  no  action  has  been  taken  by  ParHament. 

The  Cabinet  and  the  Country 

We  have  now  considered  the  relation  of  the  cabinet  to  the 
administrative  service,  to  the  House  of  Commons,  and  to  the 
House  of  Lords.  There  remains  to  be  touched  upon  its 
relation  to  the  country. 

If  the  predominance  of  the  House  of  Commons  has  been 
lessened  by  a  delegation  of  authority  to  the  cabinet,  it  has 
been  weakened  also  by  the  transfer  of  power  directly  to  the 
electorate.  The  two  tendencies  are  not,  indeed,  uncon- 
nected. The  transfer  of  power  to  the  electorate  is  due  in 
part  to  the  growing  influence  of  the  ministers,  to  the  recogni- 
tion that  policy  is  mainly  directed,  not  by  Parliament,  but 
by  them.  The  cabinet  now  rules  the  nation  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  Parliament;  and  for  that  very  reason 
the  nation  wishes  to  decide  what  cabinet  it  shall  be  that 
rules.  No  doubt  the  ministry  depends  for  its  existence  upon 
the  good  pleasure  of  the  House  of  Commons;  but  it  really 
gets  its  commission  from  the  country  as  the  result  of  a  gen- 
eral election. 


62      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  passing  of  political  power  from  the  House  of  Com- 
mons to  the  people  is  shown  by  many  unmistakable  signs, 
and  by  none  more  clearly  than  by  the  frequent  reference  in 
Parliament  itself  to  the  opinions  of  the  "  man  in  the  street." 
He  is  said  to  fear  this,  or  be  shocked  by  that,  or  expect  the 
other;  and  the  House  is  supposed  to  pay  some  regard  to  his 
views.  Then  there  is  the  fact  that  Parliament  is  no  longer 
the  only  place  where  the  party  leaders  make  notable 
speeches.  In  short,  the  predominance  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons as  the  great  forum  for  the  discussion  of  public  ques- 
tions has  been  undermined  by  the  rise  and  growth  of  the 
platform.  It  has  now  become  a  settled  custom  for  the  cab- 
inet ministers  and  the  leaders  of  the  parliamentary  Opposi- 
tion to  make  a  business  of  speaking  during  the  late  autumn 
and  the  spring  recess;  and  the  habit  tends  to  magnify  their 
power,  for  they  are  the  only  persons  who  have  fully  the  ear 
of  the  public.  Frequent  public  addresses  by  the  men  in 
whom  the  whole  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  national 
affairs  is  concentrated,  and  by  those  who  will  be  responsible 
when  the  next  change  of  ministry  occurs,  cannot  fail  to 
educate  the  voters,  and  quicken  their  interest  in  all  the 
poHtical  issues  of  the  day.  The  rulers  of  the  country,  and 
those  who  both  have  been  and  will  be  her  rulers,  fight  at 
close  range  across  a  table  for  six  months  of  the  year,  and 
during  the  rest  of  the  time  they  carry  on  the  ceaseless  war 
by  public  speaking.  As  in  the  Athenian  democracy,  the 
citizens  witness  a  constant  struggle  among  rival  statesmen 
for  supremacy,  but  in  England  they  are  merely  spectators 
until  a  general  election  summons  them  to  give  their  verdict. 
One  can  hardly  conceive  of  a  system  better  calculated  to 
stimulate  interest  in  politics  without  instability  in  the 
government. 


CHAPTER  III 

ENGLAND:  PARTY 

Parties  during  the  War 

A  FEW  months  after  this  war  broke  out  a  coalition  cabinet 
was  formed.  Both  parties  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  during  the  war  there  has  been  a  truce  in  the 
usual  party  struggles.  The  ministry  and  the  front  opposi- 
tion bench  have  not  been  fighting  across  the  table,  and, 
therefore,  the  whole  working  of  parliamentary  institutions 
has  undergone  a  change.  To  sustain  the  government  in 
its  colossal  task,  new  ofl&ces  have  been  created,  with 
ministers  to  conduct  special  departments  of  the  miHtary 
service.  A  war  cabinet  of  four  members,  some  of  them 
without  departmental  duties,  has  been  set  up.  What  its 
functions  really  are,  how  great  is  its  influence  in  poUcy  and 
administration,  cannot  yet  be  accurately  stated.  Nor  for  our 
present  purpose  is  it  needful  to  attempt  to  do  so;  for  these 
are  not  normal  times,  and  the  object  of  this  book  is  to  de- 
scribe the  regular,  the  habitual,  the  natural  working  of  the 
English  form  of  government,  and  that  is  bound  up  with  the 
interaction  of  the  political  parties  and  of  their  leaders  on  the 
two  front  benches.  When  the  war  is  over,  the  currents  of 
public  life  will  return  to  peaceful  channels;  not,  indeed, 
to  precisely  the  same  condition  as  before  the  war — the  shoclc 
has  been  too  great  for  that  —  but  to  a  normal  political 
activity  of  some  kind.  Parties  may  well  be  formed  on  a  new 
basis,  with  new  lines  of  cleavage,  but  there  is  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  they  will  permanently  disappear;  and,  there- 
fore, the  value  of  a  study  of  the  working  of  parties  under  the 
English  parliamentary  system  permanently  endures. 

63 


64      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Parties  in  Modern  Government 

Experience  has  shown  that  democracy  in  a  great  country, 
where  the  number  of  voters  is  necessarily  large,  involves 
the  existence  of  political  parties;  and  it  would  not  be  hard 
to  demonstrate  that  this  must  in  the  nature  of  things  be 
the  case. 

But  if  political  parties  have  become  well-nigh  universal 
at  the  present  time,  they  are  comparatively  new  in  their 
modern  form.  No  one  in  the  eighteenth  century  foresaw 
party  government  as  it  exists  to-day,  enfolding  the  whole 
surface  of  public  life  in  its  constant  ebb  and  flow.  The  ex- 
pression, ''  His  Majesty's  Opposition,"  said  to  have  been 
coined  by  John  Cam  Hobhouse  before  the  Reform  Bill,^ 
would  not  have  been  understood  at  an  earlier  period;  and 
it  embodies  the  greatest  contribution  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury to  the  art  of  government  —  that  of  a  party  out  of 
power  which  is  recognized  as  perfectly  loyal  to  the  institu- 
tions of  the  state,  and  ready  at  any  moment  to  come  into 
office  without  a  shock  to  the  political  traditions  of  the 
nation. 

Party  and  the  Parliamentary  System 

In  England  the  party  system  is  no  more  in  accord  with 
the  strictly  legal  institutions,  with  King,  Lords  and  Com- 
mons, than  it  is  elsewhere;  but  it  is  in  absolute  harmony 
with  those  conventions,  which,  although  quite  unknown  to 
the  law,  make  up  the  actual  working  constitution  of  the 
state.  It  is  in  harmony  with  them  because  they  were  created 
by  the  warfare  of  parties,  were  evolved  out  of  party  life. 
It  is  based  upon  party,  and  by  the  law  of  its  nature  tends  to 
accentuate  party.     Ministers  perceived  that  their  security 

1  Cf.  Revaew  of  his  unpublished  "  Recollections  of  a  Long  Life,"  in  the 
Edinburgh  Review,  April,  1871,  p.  301. 


ENGLAND:  PARTY  65 

depended  upon  standing  together,  presenting  a  united  front, 
and  prevailing  upon  their  friends  to  do  the  same.  The 
leaders  of  the  Opposition  learned  also  that  their  chance  of 
attaining  to  power  was  improved  by  pursuing  a  similar 
course.  In  this  way,  two  parties  are  arrayed  against  one 
another  continually,  while  every  member  of  Parliament 
finds  himself  powerfully  drawn  to  enlist  under  one  banner 
or  the  other,  and  follow  it  on  all  occasions.  He  cannot  con- 
sider measures  simply  on  their  merits,  but  must  take  into 
account  the  ultimate  effect  of  his  vote.  As  soon  as  men 
recognize  that  the  defeat  of  a  government  bill  means  a 
change  of  ministry,  the  pressure  is  great  to  sacrifice  per- 
sonal opinions  on  that  bill  to  the  greater  principles  for 
which  the  party  stands;  and  the  more  fully  the  system 
develops,  the  clearer  becomes  the  incompatibility  between 
voting  as  the  member  of  Parliament  pleases  on  particular 
measures,  and  maintaining  in  power  the  party  he  approves. 
In  short,  the  action  of  the  House  of  Commons  has  tended 
to  become  more  and  more  party  action,  with  the  ministers, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  gradually  drawing  the  initiative 
in  legislation,  and  the  control  over  procedure,  more  and 
more  into  their  own  hands.  In  fact,  so  far  as  Parliament  is 
concerned,  the  machinery  of  party  and  of  government  are 
not  merely  in  accord;  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
The  party  cabal  has  become  the  Treasury  Bench.  The 
ministers  are  the  party  chiefs,  selected  not  artificially  but 
by  natural  prominence,  and  the  majority  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  which  legislates,  appropriates  money,  supervises 
and  controls  the  administration,  and  sustains  or  discards 
ministers,  is  the  party  itself  acting  under  the  guidance  of 
those  chiefs.  The  parhamentary  system,  as  it  has  grown 
up  spontaneously  in  England,  is  in  its  origin  and  nature 
goverrmient  by  party,  sanctioned  and  refined  by  custom. 


66      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Party  Votes  in  Parliatnent 

Since  the  cabinet  may  be  overturned  at  any  moment,  so 
that  its  very  life  depends  upon  incessant  warfare,  it  must 
try  to  keep  its  followers  constantly  in  hand;  and  since  every 
defeat,  however  trivial,  even  if  not  fatal,  is  damaging,  it 
must  try  to  prevent  any  hostile  votes  —  an  effort  which 
explains  in  part  the  much  larger  average  attendance  at 
divisions  to-day  than  in  the  first  half  of  the  last  century. 
Thus  from  the  side  both  of  the  private  member  and  the 
responsible  minister  there  is  a  pressure  in  the  parliamentary 
system  towards  more  strict  party  voting.  A  democracy 
prefers  broad  contrasts,  sharply  defined  alternatives,  clearly 
marked  issues  and  the  frank  opposition  of  party  leaders. 
It  understands  better  the  struggle  between  the  two  front 
benches  than  the  particular  bearing  of  the  measures  de- 
bated. Unless  matters  of  local  interest  are  involved  —  and 
these  the  English  practice  almost  eliminates — a  democ- 
racy is  prone  to  support  the  party,  with  comparatively 
little  regard  for  matters  of  detail. 

In  Parliament  contentious  legislation  is  in  ordinary  times 
conducted  in  the  main  by  one  party  and  opposed  by  the 
other,  and  hence  the  proportion  of  party  votes  is  nearly 
constant.  In  Congress  this  is  by  no  means  true,  and  the 
number  of  such  votes  depends  largely  upon  the  presence  of 
some  question  on  which  the  parties  happen  to  be  sharply 
divided.  On  other  subjects  party  hnes  are  less  strictly 
drawn.  In  short,  in  England  the  parties  frame  the  issues; 
in  America  at  the  present  day  the  issues  do  not,  indeed,  make 
the  parties,  but  determine  the  extent  of  their  opposition  to 
each  other  in  matters  of  legislation.  In  general  the  statistics 
for  Congress  show  that  whereas  during  the  middle  of  the 
last  century  the  amount  of  party  voting  there  was  at  least 


ENGLAND:  PARTY  67 

as  great  as  in  Parliament,  and  while  in  particular  sessions 
the  English  maximum  has  been  exceeded,  yet  on  the  aver- 
age, party  hnes  are  now  drawn  distinctly  less  often  than 
in  the  House  of  Commons.^ 

It  is  often  said  that  in  State  legislatures  the  boss,  or  the 
caucus,  dictates  the  action  of  the  party  on  pending  meas- 
ures, and  then  carries  it  into  effect  by  a  party  vote,  so  that 
legislation  is  really  the  work  of  the  machine.  That  this  is 
an  error  is  proved  by  the  statistics.  It  is  not  true,  because 
in  the  first  place  the  machine  rarely  controls  more  than  a 
part  of  the  members  of  the  party,  and  in  the  second  place 
the  machine  meddles  Httle  with  general  legislation.  It 
knows  that  an  attempt  to  dictate  to  its  followers  on  such 
questions  would  only  weaken  its  authority;  and  hence  it 
confines  its  attention  to  the  distribution  of  spoils,  to  laws 
that  bear  upon  electoral  machinery,  and  to  such  bills,  pubHc 
or  private,  as  affect  directly  the  persons  from  whom  it  draws 
its  revenue.  It  has,  indeed,  been  pointed  out  that  the  very 
position  of  the  boss  depends  upon  the  fact  that  parties  exist 
for  public  objects,  while  he  exists  for  private  ones ;  ^  and 
this  is  so  well  recognized  that  great  corporations  desiring  to 
obtain  either  selfish  legislation,  or  protection  against  un- 
scrupulous attack,  have  subscribed  impartially  to  the 
campaign  funds  of  both  political  parties.  That  is  the  aspect 
of  public  fife  which  provokes  an  outcry  from  reformers. 
Parties  in  America  are  not,  as  a  rule,  despotic  on  public 
questions,  because  they  have  little  cohesion;  but  their 
influence,  or  rather  the  influence  of  the  machine,  or  of  the 
individual  politician,  is  freely  exerted  in  things  quite  apart 

1  For  an  elaborate  collection  of  statistics,  see  the  writer's  tables  in  the 
Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association  for  1901,  and  for  a  brief  sum- 
mary his  Government  of  England,  ii.  72-92. 

2  "  The  American  Boss,"  by  Judge  Francis  C.  Lowell,  in  the  Atlantic 
Monthly,  September,  1900. 


68      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

from  those  issues  of  public  policy  which  form  the  only 
rational  ground  for  party  activity.  In  short,  the  boss  is 
not  a  prime  minister  who  directs  policy,  but  an  electioneer- 
ing agent  and  a  private  bill  and  office  broker. 

A  comparison  of  England  and  America  shows,  therefore, 
that  the  influence  of  party  upon  legislation  is,  on  the  whole, 
much  greater  in  England,  but  that  it  is  more  closely  con- 
fined to  public  measures. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ENGLAND:    LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 
The  Areas  of  Local  Government 

The  whole  country  is  divided  into  counties  *  and  county 
boroughs,  the  larger  towns  being  for  administrative  pur- 
poses counties  by  themselves.^  Each  of  these  divisions  is 
governed  by  a  single  body  called  the  council,  composed  of 
representatives  popularly  elected  by  wards,  and  of  addi- 
tional members,  called  aldermen,  chosen  by  the  council 
itself.  The  details  are  slightly  different  in  the  counties  and 
county  boroughs,  but  the  general  principles  are  the  same; 
and  in  the  latter  the  county  powers  are  simply  vested  in 
the  same  council  that  governs  the  borough  in  other  respects. 
The  county  is  subdivided  into  boroughs  and  urban  and 
rural  districts,  each  of  which  is  governed  by  a  council 

1  This  is  properly  called  the  administrative  county  to  distinguish  it  from 
the  ancient  county  or  county  at  large,  from  which  it  differs  by  the  exclusion 
of  the  county  boroughs,  and  by  the  changes  in  boundaries  made  in  conse- 
quence of  the  Acts  of  1888  and  1894.  The  county  at  large  still  exists  for 
elections  to  Parliament,  and  in  some  cases  for  judicial  purposes  and  for  the 
militia,  although  as  a  general  rule  these  last  two  matters  follow  the  changes 
made  in  the  administrative  county.  (51-52  Vic,  c.  41,  §  59.)  There  are  in 
England  and  Wales  only  fifty-two  counties  at  large,  but  in  consequence  of 
divisions  for  purposes  of  local  government  there  are  sixty-two  administrative 
counties,  only  half  a  dozen  of  which  now  coincide  in  area  with  the  counties 
at  large. 

^  This  privilege  was  intended  for  boroughs  which  had,  or  should  there- 
after attain,  a  population  of  50,000,  although  some  smaller  places  were  in- 
cluded in  the  list  because  they  were  already  counties  by  themselves.  (51-52 
Vic,  c  41,  §§  31,  54,  and  Sched.  3;  cf.  Wright  and  Hobhouse,  Local  Gov- 
ernment, 2d  ed.,  pp.  24-26.) 

6q 


70      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

formed  on  the  same  plan  as  a  county  council,  save  that  in 
the  district  councils  there  are  no  additional  members,  or 
aldermen,  elected  by  the  council  itself.^  The  functions  of 
these  councils  differ  very  much,  those  of  the  boroughs  being 
the  most,  and  those  of  the  rural  districts  the  least,  exten- 
sive. For  that  very  reason  the  boroughs  and  urban  dis- 
tricts, and  of  course  the  county  boroughs,  although  usually 
di\dded  into  wards  for  electoral  purposes,  can  hardly  be 
said  to  be  subdi\dded  for  local  government,  the  powers  of 
urban  parishes  being  insignificant.  The  rural  districts, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  divided  into  parishes  which  possess 
real  functions,  and  were  intended,  at  least,  to  take  an  active 
part  in  local  administration;  those  with  more  than  three 
hundred  inhabitants  having  elected  councils,  and  the  rest 
transacting  their  business  in  mass  meeting.^ 

The  metropolis  does  not  fall  into  this  system  of  local 
government,  but  is  organized  on  a  plan  of  its  own.  The 
City  of  London,  with  its  ancient  limits,  retains  its  old  insti- 
tutions, independently  of  the  vast  town  that  has  grown  up 
around  it;  while  the  rest  of  the  metropolitan  area  is  under 
a  county  council,  created  at  the  same  time,  and  on  the  same 
general  pattern,  as  other  county  councils.  The  territory 
over  which  it  rules  was  di\dded  in  1899  into  boroughs,  with 
councils  to  which  the  powers  of  the  former  parish  vestries 
have  been  transferred ;  ^  and  thus  London  is  treated  as  a 
borough  of  the  second  degree. 

'  56-57  Vic,  c.  73,  §§  23-24. 

2  In  the  past  there  have  been  many  kinds  of  parishes  (Odgers,  pp.  44-48. 
Wright  and  Hobhouse,  pp.  1-8.  Redlich  and  Hirst,  Local  Government,  ii.  161- 
170),  but  now  there  are  only  two  of  any  real  importance,  the  poor-law  or 
civil,  and  the  ecclesiastical,  parish.  By  two  distinct  series  of  acts  the  par- 
ishes of  both  kinds  have  been  so  changed  that  in  most  cases  the  ecclesiastical 
no  longer  coincides  with  the  civil  parish.  The  former  is  under  its  own  vestry 
and  churchwardens,  who  have  now  no  civil  powers. 

'  62-63  Vic,  c.  14. 


ENGLAND:  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  7 1 

Cutting  athwart  this  checkerboard  of  local  areas  the  only 
important  cross  division  remaining,  that  of  the  poor-law 
unions,  covers  the  whole  country  with  another  network  of 
lines.  The  members  of  the  board  which  rules  the  union 
are  still  called  guardians,  and  in  the  urban  parts  of  a  union 
they  are  separately  elected,  while  in  the  rural  parts  they 
are  simply  the  members  of  the  rural  district  council  elected 
there. 

Described  in  this  way  the  scheme  of  English  local  govern- 
ment may  not  seem  complex,  but  in  fact  it  is  less  simple 
than  it  appears,  because  there  are  in  many  places  divers 
peculiarities  and  exceptions,  under  ancient  local  customs 
and  special  local  acts,  which  mar  the  symmetry  of  the  plan. 

Borough  Councils 

All  the  larger  boroughs,  and  many  of  the  smaller  ones, 
are  divided  into  wards,  among  which  the  seats  in  the  council 
are  apportioned.^  As  a  rule  —  although  by  no  means  an 
invariable  one  —  each  ward  is  represented  by  three  council- 
lors; and  since  they  serve  for  three  years,  one  of  them  re- 
tiring each  year,  the  voters  in  a  ward  are  usually  called  upon 
to  elect  only  a  single  representative  at  the  annual  election. 
As  in  the  case  of  Parliament,  no  poll  is  held  unless  more 
candidates  are  nominated  than  there  are  seats  to  be  filled, 
and  hence  an  opponent  does  not  come  forward  unless  he 
means  to  conduct  a  serious  fight.  The  result  is  that  in  many 
a  ward  there  is  no  contest,  especially  when  the  sitting  mem- 
ber is  ready  to  stand  again.  The  number  of  uncontested 
seats  varies,  of  course,  a  great  deal.  In  one  hundred  and 
three  boroughs  and  urban  districts,  large  and  small,  taken 

*  The  division  into  wards  is  based  upon  local  taxation  as  well  as  popula- 
tion, and  thus  a  certain  weight  is  given  to  property.  45-46  Vic,  c.  50,  §  30 
(10).  For  the  relations  of  population  and  property  in  the  wards  of  Glasgow 
see  Bell  and  Paton,  Glasgow,  p.  63. 


72      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOXTRNMENTS 

at  random  at  the  elections  of  1899,  decidedly  less  than  half 
the  seats  in  the  aggregate  were  contested,  while  in  thirteen 
of  these  places  there  was  not  a  single  contest. 

The  borough  council  is  not  composed  of  representative 
members  alone.  It  consists  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and 
councillors  sitting  together  as  a  single  body.  The  aldermen 
are  in  number  one  third  as  many  as  the  councillors;  but 
although  selected  in  a  different  way,  and  holding  office  for 
a  different  term,  they  are  from  a  legal  point  of  view  simply 
members  of  the  council  like  the  rest.  They  are  chosen  for 
six  years  instead  of  three,  one  half  of  them  going  out  every 
third  year.  They  are  elected  by  the  council  itself  on  No- 
vember 9,  that  is  immediately  after  one  third  of  the  council 
has  been  renewed  by  the  popular  election  of  that  year.^ 

While  the  aldermen  have  no  important  legal  powers  not 
enjoyed  by  the  other  members  of  the  council,  their  influence 
is  much  greater,  for  they  are  the  members  who  have  served 
longest,  and  they  hold  most  of  the  chairmanships  upon  the 
committees.  In  some  towns,  indeed,  these  posts  are  re- 
served exclusively  for  them,  and  everywhere  one  is  struck 
by  the  fact  that  they  are,  on  the  whole,  the  leading  figures  in 
the  council.  The  influence  naturally  conceded  in  a  body 
of  this  kind  to  seniority  and  experience  is  enhanced  in  an 
English  borough  council  by  the  fact  that  as  a  general  rule, 
apart  from  a  change  of  party  in  the  council,  retiring  alder- 
men are  reelected  so  long  as  they  are  willing  to  serve.^ 

1  Formerly,  the  aldermen  voted  in  the  election  for  aldermen,  and  this 
gave  them  in  some  cases  a  power  to  retain  the  majority  of  the  council  in 
the  hands  of  their  own  political  party  after  the  majority  of  popularly  chosen 
councillors  had  passed  to  the  other  party.  In  1910  their  right  to  vote  for 
aldermen  was  taken  away  by  statute.    (10  Edw.  VII  and  i  Geo.  V,  c.  19.) 

2  It  is  not  an  invariable  rule.  In  Carlisle  and  Oldham,  for  example,  an 
alderman  is  not  reelected,  on  the  principle  that  after  serving  his  term  of 
six  years  he  ought  to  go  back  to  his  constituents  for  approval.  But  this 
is  not  considered  by  most  observers  to  work  well. 


ENGLAND:  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT       73 

This  may  not  be  in  accord  with  the  strict  theory  of  repre- 
sentative government,  but  it  has  substantial  advantages. 
It  insures  the  presence  in  the  governing  body  of  men  of  long 
experience;  and  in  fact  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find  in  a 
town  council  a  few  men  who  have  served  there  continu- 
ously for  twenty-five  or  thirty  years,  or  even  more. 

The  Mayor 

The  first  business  of  the  council  at  the  meeting  on  the 
ninth  of  November  is  the  election  of  a  mayor,  for  the  term 
of  one  year,  from  among  the  aldermen,  councillors  or  per- 
sons qualified  to  be  such.  The  mayor  is  a  justice  of  the 
peace  for  the  borough  during  his  term  of  office,  and  for  one 
year  thereafter;  but  this  is  the  only  duty  of  importance 
that  he  performs  apart  from  the  council,  of  which  he  is 
both  a  member  and  the  chairman. 

The  Permanent  Officials 

Behind  the  council  and  its  committees,  little  seen  by  the 
public,  but  carrying  the  main  burden  of  the  public  work, 
stand  the  permanent  ofiicials.  When  a  vacancy  occurs  in 
the  position  of  a  town  clerk  or  borough  surveyor,  for  exam- 
ple, it  is  the  general,  although  not  invariable,  habit  to  ad- 
vertise for  a  successor;  and  this  is  sometimes  done  even  in 
cases  where  the  councillors  have  really  made  up  their  minds 
to  promote  a  subordinate  already  in  the  service  of  the 
borough.  If  a  promotion  of  that  kind  is  not  made,  and  a 
clerk,  engineer  or  other  ofiicer  is  appointed  from  outside,  a 
man  is  usually  selected  who  is  employed  in  a  similar  public 
office  elsewhere  —  either  at  the  head  of  a  department  in  a 
smaller  place,  or  as  a  subordinate  in  a  larger  one.  In  this 
way  municipal  service  tends  to  become  a  career  by  itself. 
A  town  clerk,  for  example,  must  always  be  a  solicitor  or 


74     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

barrister  by  profession,  and  occasionally  a  person  in  private 
practice  is  selected,  but  it  is  far  more  common  to  take  a  man 
who  is  already  engaged  in  municipal  work,  and  has  there- 
fore had  experience  in  the  particular  class  of  duties  he  is 
called  upon  to  perform.  In  short,  a  town  clerk  usually 
enters  the  public  service  as  a  young  man  in  a  subordinate 
capacity,  often  as  an  articled  clerk  in  a  town  clerk's  office, 
and  works  his  way  up.  It  is  rare  that  a  solicitor  is  put  into 
one  of  the  higher  posts  in  a  borough  from  private  life,  and 
rarer  still  that  a  town  clerk,  or  one  of  his  assistants,  goes 
back  into  private  practice.  The  same  thing  is  true  of  the 
engineers.  It  is  not  common  to  appoint  a  borough  engineer 
on  account  of  his  reputation  in  general  practice;  or  for  a 
man  who  has  seen  service  as  an  engineer  of  a  town  to  go  back 
into  any  other  kind  of  work.  In  short,  municipal  engineer- 
ing tends  to  become  a  distinct  profession.  The  officials 
abstain  wholly  from  party  politics,  and  although  party 
motives  may  have  affected  the  choice  of  a  man,  they  never 
lead  to  his  discharge  if  the  majority  in  the  council  happens 
to  change.  In  short,  there  are  no  spoils,  or  rather  nothing 
of  the  practice  that  renders  spoils  a  blight  —  that  is,  the 
removal  of  officeholders  to  make  room  for  partisans.  So 
long  as  an  English  borough  official  does  his  work  well,  he  is 
retained  regardless  of  party. 

Their  Position 

It  is  often  said  that  the  council  determines  the  general 
policy  to  be  pursued,  while  the  officials  carry  it  out  in  de- 
tail,^ and  this  describes,  no  doubt,  the  legal  situation,  but 

^  Redlich  and  Hirst  {Local  Government  in  England,  i.  350-351),  who  have 
dwelt  upon  the  importance  of  the  officials  more  than  any  one  else,  repeat  this 
statement  in  a  slightly  different  form;  and  although  they  point  out  that  it  is 
not  accurate,  they  seem  to  regard  it  as  more  nearly  so  than  it  appears  to 
the  writer. 


ENGLAND:  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  75 

it  is  very  far  from  expressing  the  actual  influence  of  the 
officials  upon  the  administration  of  the  borough.     In  the 
first  place  no  sharp  line  can  be  drawn  between  policy  and 
details;  and  then  an  official  who  has  in  any  degree  the  con- 
fidence of  his  committee  will  always  influence  them  very 
largely  about  the  general  policy  of  his  department.     His 
position  is  like  that  of  a  permanent  undersecretary  of  state. 
The  members  of  the  council,  like  the  ministers,  assume  the 
responsibility  for  what  is  done.     They  are  expected  to 
shield  the  official  from  blame,  and  naturally  take  the  credit 
for  good  management.    He  enjoys,  therefore,  with  a  large 
share  of  real  power,  freedom  from  attack,  and  a  permanent 
tenure  of  office  in  consideration  of  self-effacement.     It  is 
not  inaccurate  to  say  that  in  general  the  chairman  of  a  com- 
mittee plays  a  part  not  unlike  that  of  a  minister,  with  the 
official  as  his  permanent  undersecretary.    The  official  im- 
presses his  views  on  the  chairman,  who  in  turn  impresses 
them  on  the  committee,  and  this  body  carries  them  through 
the  council.    Thus  the  motive  force  behind  the  council  is 
to  be  found  mainly  in  the  permanent  officials,  whose  power, 
being  unseen,  is  little  understood  by  the  public.     In  fact 
the  writer,  after  studying  a  number  of  English  cities,  was 
led  to  imagine  that  the  excellence  of  municipal  government 
was  very  roughly  proportional  to  the  influence  of  the  per- 
manent officials.    That  influence,  be  it  observed,  is  by  no 
means  confined  to  matters  where  purely  expert  know^ledge 
is  required.     A  very  small  fraction  of  the  time  of  a  town 
clerk  is  devoted  to  questions  of  law,  or  of  a  surveyor  to  engi- 
neering problems.     By  far  the  greater  part  of  their  w^ork 
is  administrative,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the 
administration  of  a  typical  English  borough  is  conducted 
by  the  officials. 


76     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Benefits  of  their  Influence 

The  merits  of  English  municipal  government  have  been 
commonly  attributed  to  the  concentration  of  power  in  the 
hands  of  the  council,  but  in  its  essence  the  system  is  virtu- 
ally that  of  management  by  committees;  and  such  a  sys- 
tem, by  its  very  nature  removed  in  details  from  public 
observation,  is  singularly  open  to  abuse.  There  is  probably 
no  method  of  government  that  in  bad  hands  lends  itself 
more  readily  to  inefficiency  and  corruption  than  adminis- 
tration by  committees,  and  none  that  is  less  sensitive  to 
healthy  criticism.  But  it  works  ver}'  well  where,  as  in  the 
English  borough  councils,  the  committee  acts  under  the 
guidance  of  upright  and  capable  experts.  Under  these 
circumstances  the  officials,  who  really  administer  the  city, 
find  support,  protection,  and  permanence  of  tenure;  while 
at  the  same  time  they  are  prevented  from  becoming  bureau- 
cratic, and  are  kept  in  touch  with  public  opinion. 


CHAPTER  V 

ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE 
The  British  Empire 

The  dependencies  of  England  are  scattered  over  the  whole 
face  of  the  earth  in  almost  every  habitable  latitude,  while 
there  are  scarcely  ten  consecutive  degrees  of  longitude  in 
which  she  does  not  have  a  foothold.  Including  Egypt,  her 
six  most  important  possessions  lie  in  five  different  conti- 
nents with  no  means  of  communication  between  them  but 
a  long  sea  voyage.  Outside  of  the  British  Isles  with  their 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  square  miles,  she  holds  no 
land  in  Europe  of  other  than  a  military  significance;  but  she 
has  nearly  four  millions  of  square  miles  in  North  America, 
as  much  more  in  Africa,^  over  three  millions  in  Australasia, 
and  nearly  two  millions  in  Asia,  besides  innumerable  islands 
and  small  bits  of  coast  dotting  the  map  of  the  world. 

Proportion  of  Races 

The  population  of  the  empire  is  as  diverse  as  its  geog- 
raphy. Only  a  small  fraction  of  it  is  of  European  origin, 
and  that  fraction  is  far  smaller  than  it  was  a  hundred  and 
fifty  years  ago,  for  by  the  annexation  of  huge  territories 
the  number  of  Asiatics  and  Africans  under  British  rule  has 
been  multipHed  enormously,  while  the  people  of  European 
race  in  the  dependencies  are  only  about  four  times  as  many 
as  they  were  at  that  time.    In  fact,  the  ratio  of  the  people 

^  Including  Egypt  and  the  Sudan;  but  not  including  the  captured  Ger- 
man colonies. 

77 


78      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  European  stock  in  the  rest  of  the  empire  to  those  in  the 
British  Isles  is  Httle,  if  any,  larger  than  it  was  in  1775.  The 
revolt  of  the  American  colonies  did  not,  as  some  people 
believed  at  the  time,  prevent  England  from  building  up  a 
great  empire,  but  it  has  so  far  prevented  that  empire  from 
being  in  large  part  Anglo-Saxon.  The  British  dominions, 
including  Egj^Dt  and  the  Sudan,  but  not  including  the 
captured  German  colonies,  contain  a  total  population  of 
about  four  hundred  and  fifty  millions;  of  which  the  people 
of  European  descent  number  about  sixty  millions;  the 
natives  of  India  over  two  hundred  and  ninety-five  milhons; 
African  races  of  all  kinds,  from  Egypt  to  the  Cape,  some 
sixty- two  millions;  the  rest  being  Chinese,  Singalese,  Ma- 
lays and  aboriginal  races  of  various  kinds. 

Distribution  of  the  European  Elements 

Of  the  skty  millions  of  people  of  European  stock,  over 
forty-five  millions  live  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  less 
than  fifteen  millions  elsewhere.  Nor  are  these  last  gaining 
at  such  a  rate  of  speed  as  to  make  it  probable  that  they  will 
soon  overtake  the  mother  country.  Moreover,  the  fifteen 
millions  of  European  origin  in  the  colonies  are  by  no  means 
wholly  of  British  extraction.  Apart  from  streams  of  foreign 
immigrants  who  will  soon  become  intermingled  with  and 
assimilated  by  the  people  among  whom  they  live,  there  are 
certain  old  stocks,  original  settlers  or  ancient  inhabitants, 
like  the  French  Canadians,  the  Cape  Dutch  and  the  Mal- 
tese, who  have  not  lost  their  language  or  their  traditions. 
They  number  some  three  millions,  leaving  not  much  more 
than  a  dozen  millions  of  English-speaking  subjects  outside 
the  British  Isles. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  79 

Revenue 

Unlike  the  outlying  portions  of  most  of  the  great  empires 
in  the  past,  the  dependencies  of  England  are  not  tributaries. 
Normally  each  colony,  whether  self-governing  or  not,  is 
self-supporting.  It  contributes  nothing  to  the  imperial 
treasury,  and  the  mother  country  defrays  no  part  of  the 
cost  of  its  administration.  India,  for  example,  maintains 
the  British  troops  stationed  there,  and  pays  both  the  sal- 
aries of  EngHsh  officials  in  her  service  and  their  retiring 
pensions  after  they  leave;  but  although  this  may  be  an 
advantage  to  England,  the  money  is  spent  solely  on  the 
government  of  India  and  in  principle  at  least  for  her  benefit. 
In  time  of  peace,  no  more  troops  are,  in  fact,  kept  at  the 
expense  of  the  country  than  are  deemed  to  be  needed  for 
its  defence  and  for  the  preservation  of  order.  Occasionally 
England  advances  money  to  one  of  the  colonies  to  be  repaid 
later,  but  she  never  extorts  a  loan  from  them. 

Of  late  years  the  self-governing  colonies  have,  indeed, 
undertaken  to  maintain  ships  of  war,  but  they  are  de- 
signed chiefly  for  the  protection  of  their  own  coasts,  and 
are  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  cost  of  the  British 
navy. 

So  far  from  regulating  trade  during  the  last  half  century 
for  her  own  benefit,  England  in  granting  self-government  to 
her  larger  white  colonies  allowed  them  to  raise  their  revenues 
as  they  saw  fit,  and  they  have  set  up  protective  tariffs 
against  her  manufactures.  Recently  they  have,  indeed, 
given  a  preference  in  rates  to  English  goods,  although  some- 
times merely  by  raising  their  duties  still  more  against  other 
nations.  The  profit  that  England  derives  from  her  depend- 
encies does  not  come  in  the  form  of  tribute,  but  of  enlarged 
opportunities  for  her  citizens.    Much  discussion  has  taken 


8o  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\^RNMENTS 

place  on  the  question  whether  trade  follows  the  flag/  but 
whether  it  does  so  directly  or  not,  there  can  be  Httle  doubt 
that  the  control  of  an  immense  empire  has  had  an  indirect 
effect  in  the  past. 

Forms  of  Colonial  Government 

There  are  now  three  distinct  t\pes  of  colonial  government 
to  be  found  in  the  British  Empire:  those  of  the  self-govern- 
ing colonies,  the  crown  colonies,  and  what  for  want  of  a 
better  generic  term  may  be  called  the  protectorates,  that 
is,  the  states  that  are  administered  more  or  less  completely 
by  England  through  the  form  of  advice  to  the  native  rulers. 
This  is  not  wholly  the  official  classification,  because  some 
of  the  dependencies  are  not  under  the  Colonial  Office,  and 
hence  are  regarded  as  distinct  from  the  rest.  India,  for 
example,  being  in  charge  of  the  India  Office,  is  not  called  a 
colony,  and  yet  the  method  of  administration  is  essentially 
similar  to  that  of  a  crown  colony  so  far  as  the  connection 
with  the  parent  state  is  concerned.  Eg>^pt,  also,  is  not 
classed  as  a  colony  at  all,  because  nominally  not  a  British 
possession,  and  practically  administered  by  the  Foreign 
Office.2  But  if  we  disregard  the  question  from  which  comer 
of  the  great  building  on  Downing  Street  a  dependency  is 
ruled,  and  look  merely  to  the  actual  forms  of  government, 
we  find  that  they  fall  very  comfortably  under  one  or  other 
of  these  three  heads. 

The  Self -Governing  Colonies 

Before  the  eighteenth  century  was  far  advanced  a  single 
type  of  government  had  become  prevalent  in  most  of  the 

1  There  is  an  interesting  study  of  the  question  in  Alleyne  Ireland's  Tropi- 
cal Colonisation. 

*  So  the  African  protectorates,  ruled  under  the  Foreign  Jurisdiction  Acts, 
are  classed  here  as  crown  colonies. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  8 1 

important  British  colonies,  both  on  the  mainland  of  North 
America  and  in  the  West  Indies.  It  was  that  of  a  governor 
appointed  by  the  crown,  and  a  legislature  with  a  popular 
branch  elected  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  colony  and  pos- 
sessing the  power  of  the  purse.  For  any  people  with  English 
political  traditions  that  was  the  natural  form  to  adopt.  It 
is  the  type  followed  by  the  United  States  for  the  government 
of  her  territories.  As  a  temporary  expedient,  while  a  ter- 
ritory is  too  thinly  settled  to  be  admitted  to  statehood,  the 
plan  has  worked  well  in  the  American  republic;  but  as  a 
permanent  system  in  a  community  mature  enough  to  have 
a  will  of  its  own  the  plan  has  grave  defects.  It  involves 
dissensions  between  the  ruling  powers  with  no  arbiter  to 
whom  both  feel  bound  to  submit;  and  in  fact  the  history 
of  the  British  colonies  in  the  eighteenth  century  is  full  of 
bickerings  between  the  governor  and  the  legislature.^  These 
disputes  harrowed  the  ground  in  which  the  seeds  of  the 
American  revolution  were  planted. 

The  first  serious  attempt  to  study  the  effects  of  this  form 
of  colonial  government  was  made  after  the  Canadian  Re- 
bellion of  1837.  Lord  Durham  was  sent  out  as  High  Com- 
missioner, and  in  his  famous  report  he  pointed  out  the  evils 
of  the  plan,  suggesting  as  a  remedy  that  the  governor  of 
each  province  should  entrust  the  administration  to  such 
men  as  can  command  a  majority  in  the  Assembly,  and 
thus  establish  ministerial  responsibihty  on  the  English 
pattern. 

A  decade  later,  his  suggestion  was  carried  out  by  Lord 
Elgin  who  became  Governor  of  Canada  in  1847 ;  ^.nd  within 
ten  years  it  was  applied  to  the  principal  AustraUan  colonies 
also.    In  fact  it  has  been  extended  to  every  British  colony 

'  Cf.  Greene,  The  Provincial  Governor;  Egerton,  Short  History  of  British 
Colonial  Policy. 


82      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

as  soon  as  it  contained  a  sufficiently  large  population  of 
European  stock. 

Colonial  Federations 

A  sequel  to  the  grant  of  responsible  ministries  has  been 
the  formation  of  confederations  in  the  three  great  groups  of 
self-governing  colonies.  In  each  case  the  initiative  has  come 
from  the  colonies  themselves,  the  action  of  the  mother 
country  being  almost  entirely  confined  to  embodying  in  an 
Act  of  Parliament  the  plans  already  agreed  upon  by  them. 
The  British  North  American  Act  of  1867  ^  brought  together 
in  the  Dominion  of  Canada  the  provinces  of  Ontario, 
Quebec,  Nova  Scotia,  and  New  Brunswick,  and  later  all 
the  other  habitable  parts  of  British  North  America  joined 
the  union,  except  Newfoundland  and  its  dependency  Lab- 
rador. A  generation  later  all  the  Australasian  colonies, 
except  New  Zealand,  were  brought  together  by  the  Common- 
wealth of  Australia  Act  of  1900;  ^  and  finally  the  South 
African  colonies  were  united  under  a  federal  constitution 
in  1909.^  These  federations  differ  a  good  deal  in  details, 
but  each  of  them  has  a  federal  ministry  responsible  to  a 
federal  parhament,  and  provincial  ministries  responsible  to 
assemblies  for  the  province  or  state. 

The  Relation  to  England 

The  organization  and  internal  government  of  these  con- 
federations do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  book;  but 
it  may  be  observed  that  their  formation  has  not  been  with- 
out effect  on  the  relation  of  the  colonies  to  the  mother 
country.  Instead  of  deahng  with  a  dozen  and  a  half  com- 
munities, many  of  them  very  small,  while  the  largest  has 
scarcely  more  than  two  million  people,  she  deals  mainly 

1  30-31  Vic,  c.  3.         -  63-64  Vic,  c  12.  ^9  Edw.  VII,  c  9. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  83 

with  three  federations,  one  of  which  contains  four  and  a  half 
and  another  over  seven  million  inhabitants.  She  comes 
into  contact  with  national  instead  of  provincial  opinion, 
and  this  of  itself  tends  to  lessen  the  part  she  plays  in  their 
domestic  affairs. 

The  influence  of  England  over  her  self-governing  colonies 
is  now  exerted  through  four  channels:  the  royal  governor, 
the  right  to  veto  legislation,  the  control  of  foreign  relations, 
and  the  appeals  from  the  colonial  courts  to  the  Judicial 
Committee  of  the  Privy  Council. 

The  governor  in  a  self-governing  colony  has  two  functions. 
He  is  an  officer  of  the  mother  country  appointed  to  guard 
her  rights  and  exercise  a  great  part  of  the  control  she  still 
retains  over  the  colony;  and  he  is  also  the  chief  magistrate 
of  the  colony  for  its  own  internal  government.  According 
to  this  distinction  it  is  commonly  said  that  in  matters  that 
affect  other  parts  of  the  empire  or  foreign  countries  he  must 
use  his  own  discretion,  or  seek  instructions  from  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  in  England,  while  in  matters  that  affect  only 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  colony  he  must  follow  the  advice 
of  his  ministers  there.  The  first  part  of  the  statement  is 
not,  however,  perfectly  accurate.  A  protective  tariff,  for 
example,  affects  very  seriously  both  the  rest  of  the  empire 
and  foreign  nations,  yet  it  is  well  settled  that  the  governor 
cannot  on  that  account  refuse  his  assent  to  it.  His  position 
as  the  representative  of  England  is  sometimes  a  delicate 
one,  and  his  chief  usefulness  lies  rather  in  his  moral  influence 
than  in  his  legal  authority. 

The  veto  is  not,  as  in  England,  virtually  obsolete,  for  some 
acts  passed  by  the  self-governing  colonies  have  usually  been 
killed  in  this  way  every  year.^    Nor  is  it  used  only  to  defeat 

*  Com.  Papers,  1901,  xlvi.  7,  gives  a  list  of  recent  cases  where  this  has 
occurred. 


84      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

measures  prejudicial  to  other  parts  of  the  empire  or  to 
foreign  countries,  although  that  is,  of  course,  its  main  object 
at  the  present  day.  Not  very  long  ago  acts  regulating  elec- 
tions and  the  franchise  in  Newfoundland  and  Natal  were 
refused  assent.  But  it  may  be  observed  that  the  extent 
to  which  the  veto  has  been  used  for  bills  relating  chiefly  to 
domestic  affairs  is  inversely  proportional  to  the  size  of  the 
colony. 

The  actual  relation  of  England  to  the  self-governing 
colonies  may  not  be  easy  to  classify  in  the  terms  used  by 
publicists  when  they  discuss  sovereignty;  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  as  regards  foreign  nations  the  British  Empire 
has  been  treated  as  a  single  power,  and  that  power  is  Eng- 
land. In  order,  however,  to  satisfy  colonial  opinion  it  is  the 
habit  when  a  really  important  question  arises  —  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States,  for  example  - —  to  appoint 
a  commission  containing  colonial  members.  But  the  situa- 
tion is  not  wholly  comfortable,  and  would  be  much  more 
difhcult  were  it  not  that  the  remoteness  of  these  colonies 
saves  them  to  a  great  extent  from  complications  with  other 
countries.  If  the  grant  of  self-government  has  reduced 
greatly  the  control  of  England  over  the  colonies  inhabited 
by  people  of  her  own  race,  it  has  also  removed  almost 
altogether  the  friction  that  existed  formerly  and  has  al- 
lowed a  strong  imperial  sentiment  to  grow  up.  The  diminu- 
tion of  power  has  been  followed  by  an  increase  of  loyalty. 
Other  conditions  have  promoted  this  feeling,  not  least  among 
them  a  change  of  attitude  toward  these  colonies  in  England 
itself.  One  has  heard  nothing  for  many  years  on  either  side 
of  the  ocean  about  eventual  independence.  In  its  place 
one  finds  speculation  about  possible  means  of  drawing  the 
parts  of  the  empire  closer  together. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  85 

The  Crown  Colonies 

A  colony  can  be  governed  by  its  own  people,  or  it  can  be 
governed  by  the  mother  country,  but  under  ordinary  con- 
ditions it  cannot  be  governed  successfully  by  a  combination 
of  the  two,  and  hence  the  English  dominions  over  sea  are 
sharply  separated  into  two  groups:  one  that  of  the  self- 
governing  colonies,  which  have  tended  towards  more  and 
more  complete  control  of  their  own  affairs;  the  other  that 
of  the  crown  colonies,  which  have  tended  to  lose  the  rem- 
nants of  self-government  that  they  possessed.  Of  the  old 
type,  with  an  assembly  wholly  elected,  and  a  governor 
whose  ministers  are  not  responsible  to  the  legislature,  only 
three  examples  remain.  They  are  Bermuda,  Bahamas,  and 
Barbados,  the  first  and  last  having  the  oldest  representative 
bodies  in  the  British  Empire  except  the  House  of  Commons. 
The  pecuhar  conditions  in  those  islands,  that  have  made 
possible  the  survival  of  institutions  which  have  perished 
elsewhere,  need  not  be  examined  in  detail.  Suffice  it  to  say 
that  they  are  peculiar,  although  not  the  same  in  each  case. 

The  rest  of  the  crown  colonies  may  be  divided  into  three 
classes.  First,  the  Leeward  Islands,  British  Guiana,  Malta, 
Mauritius,  and  Fiji,  where  the  legislative  body  includes 
elected  members  who  are,  however,  in  a  minority.^  Where 
the  population  contains  any  considerable  number  of  Euro- 
peans, or  other  educated  people,  this  has  the  advantage  of 
bringing  the  governor  and  his  advisers  into  official  contact 

1  British  Guiana  has  a  curious  constitution  derived  from  the  Dutch.  In 
the  Court  of  Policy,  which  deals  with  ordinary  legislation,  the  government 
has  a  bare  majority;  but  the  Combined  Court  that  levies  the  taxes  is  formed 
by  adding  other  elected  members.  For  the  method  of  controlling  this  body, 
see  Ireland,  Tropical  Colonisation,  pp.  45-51,  65-66. 

C>'prus  alone  has  a  legislative  body  containing  both  elected  and  appointed 
members  with  the  former  in  a  majority.  This  is  normally  the  case  in  Ja- 
maica also;  but  there  the  majority  can  be  turned  into  a  minority  at  any  time. 


86     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

with  an  enlightened  local  opinion  which,  in  the  absence 
of  \dolent  dissensions,  is  Hkely  to  have  great  weight.  The 
second  class  of  crown  colonies  is  the  most  numerous  of  all, 
and  consists  of  those  where  the  legislative  body  is  wholly 
appointed.  This  is  true,  for  example,  of  the  remaining 
British  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  and  Central  America, 
of  Ceylon  and  of  most  of  the  colonies  on  the  tropical  coasts 
of  Africa.!  It  is  ahnost  a  necessity  where  the  proportion  of 
European  residents  is  minute,  or  where  they  do  not  truly 
represent  the  local  industries.  Fmally,  in  purely  military 
stations  like  Gibraltar  and  St.  Helena,  and  in  half  explored 
tracts  like  some  of  those  in  the  interior  of  Africa,  the  gov- 
ernor has  no  legislative  council  whatever. 

India 

The  Governor-General,  or  Viceroy,  of  India  and  the  Czar 
of  Russia  were  sometimes  said  to  be  the  two  great  autocrats 
of  the  modern  world.  But,  save  in  the  case  of  a  man  of 
rare  capacity  and  force,  an  autocrat,  especially  if  like  the 
viceroy  he  comes  for  a  few  years  to  a  strange  land,  must 
be  largely  under  the  influence  of  ad\dsers  who  are  thor- 
oughly familiar  with  the  work  to  be  done;  and  this  is  the 
more  true  when  those  advisers,  including  his  own  private 
secretary,  belong  to  a  great  organization  with  a  strong 
esprit  de  corps.  The  governors  of  Bombay  and  Madras, 
like  the  viceroy  himself,  are  English  noblemen  appointed 
directly  by  the  crown,  but  they  must  obey  his  orders,  their 
legislative  power  is  limited,  and  all  laws  made  by  them  re- 
quire his  consent.2     Hence  their  authority  is  not  very  great 

1  In  Hong  Kong  and  the  Straits  Settlements  the  Legislative  Councils 
are  wholly  appointed,  but  in  each  case  a  couple  of  members  are  nominated 
by  the  chambers  of  commerce  or  other  bodies. 

*  Ilbert,  The  Government  of  India,  pp.  190-191,  221-222,  225. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  87 

and  they,  too,  are  surrounded  by  members  of  the  civil  serv- 
ice. The  lieutenant-governors,  or  chief  commissioners,  at 
the  head  of  the  other  provinces,  are  appointed  by  the  vice- 
roy, and  are  regularly  selected  from  the  civil  service;  for 
which,  indeed,  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  administrative 
and  judicial  posts  of  higher  grade  in  India  are  reserved. 

The  Civil  Service  of  India 

Except  for  a  number  of  seats  in  the  high  courts  and  in 
the  councils  of  the  various  governors,  and  for  special  serv- 
ices, organized  and  recruited  separately,  like  engineering, 
forestry,  poHce,  and  education,  it  may  be  said  that  almost 
all  the  offices  of  government  involving  any  serious  responsi- 
bility are  held  by  members  of  the  civil  service  of  India.^ 
From  their  ranks  are  taken  the  collector  magistrates  in 
the  several  districts,  who  carry  on  the  actual  government 
throughout  the  country,  and  have  charge  of  almost  every 
branch  of  the  administration,  ruHng,  on  the  average,  over 
nearly  a  million  of  people  apiece.^  A  few  of  the  principal 
subordinates  in  the  districts  are  also  members  of  the  serv- 
ice, the  other  offices,  mainly  of  a  lower  grade,  being  filled 
by  natives  of  the  country.  Thus  the  government  of  India 
is  really  in  the  hands  of  about  eleven  hundred  Englishmen, 
of  whom  a  couple  of  hundred  are  military  ofiicers  or  uncove- 
nanted  civilians,  while  all  the  rest  belong  to  the  great  corps 
of  the  civ-il  service.^  Its  members  go  to  India  at  not  over 
twenty-four  years  of  age,  and  after  spending  twenty-five 
years  there  they  are  entitled  to  retire  with  a  liberal  pension. 
Such  a  body  of  men,  drawn  for  the  most  part  from  one 

1  Ilbert,  pp.  126-128,  238-240,  276-277;  Lowell  and  Stephens,  Colonial 
Civil  Service,  pp.  50-53. 

^  The  corresponding  officer  in  the  non-regulation  provinces  is  styled 
Deputy  Commissioner. 

»  Lowell  and  Stephens,  pp.  56-57. 


88      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

source,  nurtured  by  the  English  universities,  spending  their 
vigorous  years  in  a  common  and  highly  responsible  work 
in  an  Oriental  land,  are  well  fitted  to  develop  traditions 
without  bureaucratic  rigidity.  They  do  not  conceive  of 
their  mission  as  ruling  India  for  the  benefit  of  England, 
and,  in  fact,  without  recognizing  any  conflict  of  interest 
between  the  two,  their  first  care  is  the  welfare  of  India  as 
they  understand  it. 

The  Indian  Councils  Act  of  1892,  or  rather  the  regula- 
tions made  thereunder,  introduced  a  trace  of  representation 
into  the  general  government  of  India.  They  provided  that 
in  the  legislative  councils  of  the  chief  provincial  governors 
a  part  of  the  members  should  be  appointed  on  the  nomina- 
tion of  municipal  and  district  councils,  of  landowners,  man- 
ufacturers, and  tradesmen;  others  being  appointed  by  the 
governor  "  in  such  manner  as  shall  in  his  opinion  secure 
a  fair  representation  of  the  different  classes  of  the  com- 
munity." Although  the  legislative  councils  so  constituted 
have  Uttle  actual  power,  they  not  only  debate  proposed 
changes  in  the  laws,  but  can  also  discuss  the  annual  financial 
statement,  and  ask  questions  after  the  manner  practised  in 
the  House  of  Commons.  All  this  gives  serious  native  opinion 
some  chance  to  make  itself  heard  by  the  rulers,  and  provides 
a  valuable  means  of  obtaining  information.^ 

India  is  not  a  Nation 

The  people  of  India  are  not  a  nation,  but  a  conglomerate 
of  many  different  races  and  religions,  often  side  by  side  in 
the  same  place  yet  unmixed  and  sharply  separate.  It  is 
this,  as  Seeley  pointed  out  in  his  "  Expansion  of  England," 
that  has  enabled  the  British  to  conquer  and  hold  the  coun- 

*  The  Indian  Congress,  of  which  we  have  heard  so  much  of  late  years,  is 
an  unoflacial  body. 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  89 

try.  If  the  inhabitants  should  act  together,  and  were  agreed 
in  wanting  independence,  they  could  get  it.  In  short,  if 
they  were  capable  of  national  self-government,  the  Eng- 
lish would  live  on  a  volcano,  and  their  occupation  would 
be  brief.  The  Mutiny  was  suppressed  because  it  was  not 
universal.  The  Sikhs  helped  to  put  down  the  Sepoys;  and 
so  long  as  large  sections  of  the  people  distrust  one  another 
more  than  they  do  the  Enghsh,  disaffection  has  little  chance 
of  achieving  any  notable  result. 

The  Native  States 

The  whole  of  India  is  not  under  direct  British  adminis- 
tration. Scattered  all  over  the  peninsula  are  tracts  of 
country  under  native  rulers,  although  subject  to  the  over- 
lordship  of  the  English  crown.  Lee- Warner  styles  the  re- 
lation one  of  subordinate  union,  and  certainly  it  is  very  far 
from  an  international  connection  between  sovereign  states, 
because  the  government  of  India  exercises  in  several  ways 
a  paramount  authority,  not  only  for  its  own  security,  but 
also  for  the  protection  of  the  native  ruler's  own  subjects. 
Speaking  generally,  the  native  states  are  protected  against 
both  external  foes  and  rebellion  at  home,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  their  diplomatic  intercourse  with  one  another  and 
with  foreign  powers  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Indian  govern- 
ment. They  have  military  obligations,  also,  which  vary  a 
good  deal  according  to  the  special  treaties  made  with  them. 
Quite  apart  from  military  necessities,  moreover,  they  must 
permit  the  construction  of  roads,  railways,  telegraphs,  and 
irrigation  works  within  their  limits.  The  instrument 
through  which  the  control  of  the  native  states  is  carried  on 
is  the  resident,  whom  the  prince  is  bound  to  receive,  and 
to  whose  advice  he  must  listen.  He  need  not  always  follow 
it,  but  the  admonitions  of  the  resident  count  for  much  in 


90     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  long  run.  By  pressure  of  this  kind,  and  by  interven- 
tion in  flagrant  cases,  the  bands  of  thugs,  and  barbarous 
customs  like  infanticide  and  suttee,  have  been  aboHshed  in 
the  native  states,  which  have  indeed  tended  in  many  ways 
to  follow  at  a  distance  the  example  of  British  India. 

Egypt 

The  other  recent  example  of  preserving  the  local  ruler 
and  controlling  him  by  means  of  an  English  adviser,  that  of 
Egypt,  is  better  known.  Although  in  theory  the  occupa- 
tion by  England  is  still  temporary,  Eg}^t  is  really  her 
permanent  possession,  the  gateway  to  the  East  which  she 
cannot  surrender.  Although  the  ministers  of  state  are 
Egyptians,  behind  each  of  them  stands,  as  adviser  or  under- 
secretary, a  British  officer  whose  suggestions  he  must  obey; 
while  above  them  all,  as  adviser  to  the  Khedive,  the  Eng- 
lish Agent  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  is  the  real  ruler 
of  the  country.  Considering  the  difhculties  encountered, 
the  various  interests  involved,  and  the  temporary  nature  of 
the  first  occupation,  the  administration  of  Egypt  must  be 
regarded,  in  spite  of  criticisms  of  detail,  as  one  of  the  most 
signal  achievements  of  Engfish  skill  in  the  management  of 
dependent  states. 

Imperial  Federation 

No  change  of  political  sentiment  in  England  within  a 
generation  has  been  more  marked  than  that  toward  the 
colonies.  The  fatalistic  indifference  that  was  widespread 
fifty  years  ago  has  been  replaced  by  an  almost  universal 
desire  to  draw  closer  the  bonds  that  connect  the  mother 
country  with  her  grown-up  children,  as  orators  are  fond  of 
calling  them.  What  imperial  federation  means  is,  therefore, 
an  important  matter  for  consideration;  and  first  it  may  be 
observed  that  it  can  apply  only  to  the  self-governing  colo- 


ENGLAND:  THE  EMPIRE  9 1 

nies.    Dependencies  that  do  not  govern  themselves  might 
be  taxed  for  the  support  of  general  defence,  but  they  can 
obviously  take  no  part  in  the  government  of  the  empire. 
If  they  cannot  rule  themselves,  they  certainly  cannot  rule 
other  people,  and  to  go  through  the  form  of  having  them  do 
so  would  be  worse  than  illusory.    If  India,  for  example,  or 
the  West  Indies,  should  appoint  delegates  to  an  imperial 
council,  they  would  be  merely  agents  of  the  English  min- 
istry, and  would  reduce  the  representatives  of  the  self- 
governing  colonies  to  an  insignificant  fragment  of  the  body. 
India  and  the  crown  colonies  must  continue  to  be  ruled  by 
England,  or,  what  is  probably  less  desirable,  by  the  federa- 
tion as  a  whole,  and  they  can  take  no  real  part  in  the  united 
government.     Nearly  three  hundred  and  seventy  millions 
of  British  subjects  can,  therefore,  have  no  active  share  in 
the  federation,  which  would  be  practically  confined  to  the 
United  Kingdom  with  forty-five  millions  of  people,  and 
British  North  America,  Australasia,  and  the  Cape,  with 
about  fifteen  millions  among  them.     It  would  thus  be  a 
combination  between  one  large  state  in  Europe,  and  a  num- 
ber of  small  ones  at  great  distances,  containing  in  all  only 
about  one  third  of  her  population.    These  conditions  must 
be  borne  in  mind  in  discussing  the  possible  forms  of  closer 
union;   for  while  the  ratio  of  inhabitants  in  different  parts 
of  the  empire  will,  no  doubt,  change,  a  long  time  must 
elapse,  as  already  observed,  before  the  population  of  all 
self-governing  colonies  added  together  can  equal  that  of 
the  British  Isles. 

As  in  the  classic  case  of  the  Greeks,  the  tie  that  binds  the 
self-governing  colonies  to  the  parent  state  is  based  mainly 
upon  sentiment.  It  is  fortified,  also,  by  common  citizen- 
ship, and  by  a  naval  protection  on  the  part  of  England  to 
which  the  colonies  make  only  a  trifling  contribution.    The 


92  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\^ERNMENTS 

granting  of  responsible  government  was  probably  the  only 
course  that  could  have  been  pursued  at  the  time,  but  al- 
though it  did  not  lead,  as  some  men  then  predicted,  to  sepa- 
ration, it  was  certainly  not  a  step  toward  federal  union.  It 
placed  the  colonies  in  a  position  with  which  they  do  not 
seem  to  be  dissatisfied.^  They  are  substantially  free  to 
manage  their  own  affairs  as  they  please,  while  on  foreign 
matters  that  affect  them,  their  opinions  have  great  weight, 
and  in  time  of  peace  they  have  the  protection  of  England's 
name  and  navy  almost  without  expense.  The  only  im- 
portant steps  towards  a  closer  poHtical  connection  have 
hitherto  been  a  series  of  consultations  with  the  colonial 
premiers  in  London.  But  the  vigorous  and  effective  part 
voluntarily  taken  by  the  colonies  in  this  war  has  made  it 
clear  that  they  must  hereafter  have  a  voice,  at  least,  in  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  Empire.  How  that  voice  shall  be 
uttered,  and  what  forms  a  closer  connection  will  take,  are 
problems  which  British  and  colonial  statesmen  must 
shortly  face;  but  they  are  far  from  simple,  and  their  solu- 
tion is  not  easy  to  foresee. 

1  Bernard  Holland,  in  his  Imperhim  et  Libertas  (pp.  297-298),  quotes 
figures  compiled  by  the  Imperial  Federation  Committee  in  1899  to  show  that 
the  self-governing  colonies,  with  close  upon  one  third  of  the  population  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  nearly  one  half  as  much  revenue,  contributed  less  than 
one  hundredth  of  the  cost  of  naval  defence.  According  to  the  figures  com- 
piled for  the  Colonial  Conference  of  1902,  the  average  naval  expenditure  per 
head  of  population  in  the  self-governing  colonies  was  ^d.,  while  for  the  United 
Kingdom  it  was  155.  \d.  In  the  same  way  the  military  expenditure  per  head 
was  25.  sd.  against  i^y.  i\d.    Com.  Papers,  1902,  Ixvi.  451,  p.  42. 


CHAPTER   VI 

FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS 

In  order  to  understand  the  government  of  a  countr>'  it  is 
not  enough  to  know  the  bare  structure  of  its  institutions. 
It  is  necessary  to  follow  the  course  of  poHtics;  to  inquire 
how  far  the  various  public  bodies  exercise  the  authority 
legally  vested  in  them;  and  to  try  to  discover  the  real 
sources  of  power.  It  is  necessary,  in  short,  to  study  the 
actual  working  of  the  system;  and  although  this  depends 
chiefly  upon  the  character,  the  habits,  and  the  traditions 
of  the  people,  it  is  also  influenced  in  no  small  measure  by 
details  —  like  the  method  of  voting,  the  procedure  in  the 
legislative  chambers,  and  other  matters — that  are  too  often 
overlooked  on  account  of  their  apparent  insignificance. 
Now  in  several  of  the  states  on  the  continent  of  Europe 
the  main  features  of  representative  government  have  been 
copied  directly  or  indirectly  from  English  models,  while 
the  details  have  grown  up  of  themselves,  or  are  a  survival 
from  earlier  tradition.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that 
the  two  are  more  or  less  inconsistent  with  each  other,  and 
that  this  want  of  harmony  has  had  a  pronounced  effect  on 
pubUc  life. 

Origin  of  Parliamentary  Government 

The  Middle  Ages  gave  birth  to  two  poHtical  ideas.  The 
first  of  these  was  a  division  of  the  people  into  separate 
classes  or  estates,  each  of  which  had  independent  poHtical 
functions  of  its  own.  The  second  was  representative  govern- 
ment, or  the  election  —  by  those  estates  whose  members 

93 


94  GREATER  EUROPE-\X  GO\'ERNMENTS 

were  too  numerous  to  assemble  in  a  body  —  of  deputies 
authorized  to  meet  together  and  act  for  the  whole  estate. 
The  number  of  these  estates,  and  the  number  of  separate 
chambers  in  which  their  representatives  sat,  varied  in  the 
different  countries  of  Europe;  ^  but  it  so  happened  that  in 
England  aU  the  political  power  of  the  estates  became  in 
time  vested  in  two  chambers.^  One  of  them,  the  House  of 
Lords,  contained  the  whole  body  of  peers,  who  were  the 
successors  of  the  great  feudal  vassals  of  the  crown;  while 
the  other,  the  House  of  Commons,  was  composed  of  the 
deputies  from  the  towns  and  counties,  who  had  gradually 
consolidated  into  a  single  house,  and  might  be  said  to  rep- 
resent all  the  people  who  were  not  peers. 

By  degrees  the  House  of  Commons  acquired  the  right  of 
originating  all  bills  for  raising  or  spending  money,  and 
hence  its  support  became  essential  to  the  crown.  But  its 
members  were  self-reliant,  and  on  the  whole  less  open  to 
court  influence  than  the  peers.  They  felt  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  support  the  poHcy  of  the  government,  or  to  vote  an 
appropriation  unless  they  understood  and  approved  the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  to  be  used ;  and  King  William  HI, 
during  his  wars  with  France,  found  them  by  no  means  as 
easy  to  manage  as  he  could  wish.  Hitherto  his  ministers 
had  been  selected  from  both  political  parties,  and  hence 
were  not  in  harmony  with  each  other,  and  were  unable  to 
exert  an  effective  influence  in  Parliament;  but  between 
1693  2.nd  1696  he  dismissed  the  Tories,  and  confided  all  the 

^  Thus  in  France,  and  in  most  continental  countries,  there  were  three, 
while  in  Sweden  there  were  four:  the  clergj-,  the  nobles,  the  cities,  and  the 
peasants.  The  existence  of  only  two  Houses  in  England  might  almost  be 
called  an  accident.    (Cf.  Freeman,  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,  p.  93.) 

*  In  1664  Convocation,  which  was  the  ecclesiastical  chamber,  discon- 
tinued the  practice  of  voting  separate  taxes  on  the  clerg>',  and  thus  the 
clergy  definitely  ceased  to  be  an  estate  of  the  realm.  (See  Hal  lam.  Const . 
Hist,  of  England,  ch.  xvL) 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  95 

great  offices  of  state  to  the  Whigs,  who  had  a  majority  in 
the  Commons.  The  result  was  that  the  House  which  had 
been  turbulent  became  docile;  and  the  ministers  by  win- 
ning its  confidence  were  able  to  guide  it,  and  obtain  the 
appropriations  that  were  required.  This  was  the  origin 
of  the  practice  of  selecting  the  ministers  from  the  leaders 
of  the  majority  in  Parliament  —  a  practice  which  at  a 
later  time  crystallized  into  a  principle  of  the  British  con- 
stitution.' But  of  course  men  who  held  the  most  important 
offices,  and  at  the  same  time  led  the  House  of  Commons, 
were  certain  not  to  be  mere  tools  in  the  hands  of  the  king. 
They  were  sure  to  try  to  carry  out  their  own  policy,  and 
when  the  sceptre  of  William  had  passed  into  the  hands  of 
the  first  two  Georges,  who  were  foreigners  and  took  little 
interest  in  English  politics,  the  ministers  exercised  the  royal 
power  as  they  pleased,  and  became  in  fact  the  custodians 
of  the  prerogatives  of  the  crown.  The  subordination  of 
the  king  to  his  ministers  is,  indeed,  the  inevitable  result 
of  the  system ;  for  so  long  as  the  latter  retain  their  influence 
over  the  House,  and  can  direct  its  votes,  they  can  hold  their 
offices  and  administer  them  according  to  their  own  views. 
If  the  king  attempts  to  dismiss  them  they  can  block  the 
wheels  of  government,  by  inducing  Parliament  to  withhold 
supplies;  and  if,  on  the  other  hand,  they  cease  to  be  the 
leaders  of  the  House,  and  a  different  party  with  new  leaders 
gets  a  majority,  the  king  finds  himself  obliged  to  send  for 
these  and  entrust  the  government  to  them.  The  system 
which  had  been  devised  in  order  that  the  king  might  con- 
trol the  House  of  Commons  became,  therefore,  the  means  by 
which  the  House  of  Commons,  through  its  leaders,  controlled 
the  king,  and  thus  all  the  power  of  the  House  of  Commons 
and  of  the  crown  became  vested  in  the  same  men,  who 
'  Macaulay,  History  of  England,  ch.  xx. 


96      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

guided  legislation  and  took  charge  of  the  administration  at 
the  same  time. 

The  House  of  Lords,  meanwhile,  was  losing  ground.  It 
had  no  right  to  initiate  or  amend  money  bills,  and,  what 
was  far  more  important,  it  had  no  influence  on  the  forma- 
tion or  the  policy  of  the  cabinet.  The  ministers  were,  in- 
deed, often  peers,  but  they  were  not  selected  because  they 
belonged  to  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Lords,  nor  did 
they  resign  when  that  body  voted  against  them.  Like 
their  colleagues  from  the  other  House,  they  represented 
the  majority  in  the  Commons,  and  were  solidly  in  accord 
with  it.  The  House  of  Lords,  therefore,  found  itself  con- 
fronted by  the  combined  power  of  the  crown  and  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  this  it  was  unable  to  resist.  In 
fact  the  power  to  create  new  peers  furnished  the  crown, 
or  rather  the  ministers  acting  in  its  name,  with  a  weapon 
always  ready  to  break  an  obstinate  resistance;  and  at  the 
time  of  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  a  threat  of  this  kind  was 
enough  to  compel  submission.  The  upper  house  thus 
gradually  lost  authority,  and  when  it  attempted  to  exert 
it  again  on  the  plea  that  it  was  reserving  questions  for  the 
decision  of  the  people,  it  was  shorn  of  much  of  its  power 
by  the  Act  of  191 1. 

The  ministers  remain  in  office  only  so  long  as  they  con- 
tinue to  be  the  leaders  of  the  lower  house  and  are  able  to 
control  the  majority.  When  this  condition  has  changed, 
a  vote  is  sometimes  passed  to  the  effect  that  the  ministers 
have  ceased  to  possess  the  confidence  of  the  House;  but 
such  an  express  declaration  is  rarely  used  at  the  present 
day;  and  a  hostile  vote  on  any  matter  of  considerable  im- 
portance is  treated  as  a  proof  that  the  government  has  no 
longer  the  support  of  a  majority.  After  such  a  vote,  there- 
fore, the  ministers  resign,  and  if  there  is  a  normal  division 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  97 

into  two  parties  the  crown  sends  for  the  leader  of  the  Op- 
position, and  entrusts  him  with  the  formation  of  a  cabinet. 
The  defeated  ministers  have,  however,  one  other  alterna- 
tive. If  they  think  that  the  House  of  Commons  has  ceased 
to  be  in  harmony  with  the  opinion  of  the  nation,  they  can 
dissolve  Parliament  in  the  name  of  the  crown,  and  try  the 
chance  of  a  new  election.  Thus  in  the  English  parliamen- 
tary system  the  direction  of  the  legislature,  and  the  control 
of  the  executive,  is  in  the  hands  of  the  leaders  of  the  major- 
ity in  the  House  of  Commons.  For  their  exercise  of  power 
these  leaders  are  directly  responsible  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, which  can  call  them  to  account  at  any  time;  while 
the  House  itself  is  responsible  to  the  people,  which  gives 
its  verdict  whenever  the  end  of  the  term  of  Parhament  or 
a  dissolution  brings  about  a  general  election. 

Parliamentary  Government  on  the  Continent 

Turning  now  from  the  consideration  of  English  forms  of 
government  to  those  in  use  on  the  Continent,  we  find  that 
the  main  features  of  the  British  constitution  have  been  very 
generally  imitated.  In  fact,  the  plan  of  two  chambers  — 
one  of  which  issues  from  an  extended  suffrage  and  has  the 
primary  control  of  the  purse,  and  of  a  cabinet  whose  mem- 
bers appear  in  the  chambers  and  are  jointly  responsible  to 
the  more  popular  one,  resigning  on  an  adverse  vote  — 
has  spread  widely  over  Europe.  These  features  of  the  par- 
liamentary system  are  striking,  and  have  become  famous, 
while  the  procedure  in  the  House  of  Commons,  which  en- 
ables the  system  to  work  smoothly,  has  attracted  far  less 
attention,  and  has  been  followed  very  little.  This  is  pecul- 
iarly true  of  France,  where  the  principle  of  cabinet  respon- 
sibiUty  has  been  adopted  to  the  fullest  extent,  but  where 
there  exist  at  the  same  time  several  practices  that  help  to 


98      GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

twist  parliamentary  government  out  of  the  British  form. 
More  curious  still  is  the  fact  that  these  very  practices  have 
been  bhndly  copied  by  other  countries  which  intended  to 
imitate  the  English  system. 

A  description  of  the  French  government  must  begin  with 
its  structure,  with  the  legal  composition  and  powers  of  the 
different  political  bodies.  This  will  occupy  the  present 
chapter.  In  the  next,  the  actual  working  of  the  system 
will  be  considered,  especially  in  regard  to  the  character  of 
political  parties;  and  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  explain  the 
pecuKarities  that  are  found  by  a  reference  to  the  condition 
of  the  people,  and  to  those  parts  of  the  political  machinery 
that  seem  to  have  a  marked  effect.  In  other  words,  we 
shall  begin  with  the  skeleton,  and  then  take  up  the  muscles 
and  nerves. 

The  French  Constitution 

The  first  thing  one  looks  for  in  a  modem  goverimient  is 
the  constitution;  but  although  the  French  Republic  has 
a  written  constitution,  it  differs  in  two  very  important 
respects  from  those  to  which  we  are  accustomed.  It  is  not 
comprised  in  any  one  document,  but  in  a  series  of  distinct 
laws,  and  it  contains  few  provisions  limiting  the  functions 
of  the  different  bodies,  or  prescribing  fundamental  rights 
which  the  state  is  enjoined  to  respect.  This  is  a  departure 
not  only  from  American,  but  also  from  the  earHer  French 
usage,  for  previous  constitutions  in  France  have  been  long 
documents  and  have  contained  elaborate  bills  of  rights; 
although  the  absence  of  practical  guarantees  has  made  their 
effectiveness  depend  upon  the  good  pleasure  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  present  constitution  is  very  different,  and 
barely  provides  for  the  organization  of  the  powers  of  the 
state,  without  even  speaking  of  such  important  matters  as 
a  yearly  budget  or  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  judges.    It  does 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  99 

little  more  than  establish  the  main  framework  of  the  gov- 
ernment by  declaring  what  the  chief  organs  of  public  life 
shall  be,  leaving  them  almost  entirely  free  to  exercise  their 
authority  as  they  see  fit.  The  reason  for  such  a  departure 
from  French  traditions  is  to  be  found  in  the  circumstances 
of  the  case.  The  earlier  constitutions  in  France  were  at- 
tempts to  frame  an  ideal  system,  but  the  present  one  re- 
sulted from  an  immediate  need  of  providing  a  regular 
government  of  some  sort  that  could  rule  the  country  for 
the  time,  and  it  was  drawn  up  by  men  who  had  no  belief  in 
its  inherent  perfection.  To  understand  this  it  is  necessary 
to  glance  at  the  history  of  the  period. 

History  of  its  Creation 

The  rapid  series  of  defeats  suffered  by  the  French  armies 
at  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  in  1870,  destroyed  the  totter- 
ing authority  of  the  Emperor,  and  when  the  news  of  the 
surrender  of  Napoleon  III  at  Sedan  reached  Paris  an  insur- 
rection broke  out  on  the  fourth  of  September.  A  repubhc 
was  at  once  proclaimed;  but  this  was  no  time  to  debate 
plans  for  a  constitution,  and  so  long  as  the  war  lasted  the 
country  was  ruled  by  the  self-elected  Government  of  the 
National  Defense.  When  the  war  was  over,  a  National 
Assembly  with  indefinite  powers  was  chosen  by  universal 
suffrage.  The  member  of  this  body  who  commanded  the 
most  general  public  confidence  was  Thiers,  the  historian, 
and  former  minister  of  Louis  Philippe.  To  him  the  As- 
sembly entrusted  the  executive  power,  and  in  August,  1871, 
it  gave  him  the  title  of  President,  without,  however,  fixing 
any  term  for  the  duration  of  the  office.  Thiers  was  con- 
stantly urged  to  introduce  the  parliamentary  system  by 
allowing  his  ministers  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  his 
acts,  but  this  he  refused  to  do,  saying  that  the  position  in 


lOO     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

which  it  would  place  him,  although  perfectly  consistent 
with  the  dignity  of  an  hereditary  king,  was  for  him,  a  little 
bourgeois,  entirely  out  of  the  question.^  He  held  himself, 
however,  personally  responsible  to  the  Assembly  for  the 
conduct  of  his  government,  took  part  in  the  debates  on  the 
measures  he  proposed,  and  declared  that  he  was  ready  to 
resign  at  any  time,  if  the  majority  wanted  him  to  do  so.'' 
This  state  of  things  continued  for  nearly  two  years,  when  a 
hostile  vote  forced  Thiers  to  retire.  His  successor.  Marshal 
MacMahon,  was  elected  for  a  term  of  seven  years,  and  as 
the  new  President  was  not  a  member  of  the  Assembly,  his 
cabinet  became  responsible  in  the  parliamentary  sense. 
But  although  the  chief  magistrate  now  held  office  for  a 
fixed  period,  and  was  freed  from  the  caprices  of  an  uncer- 
tain majority,  still  there  was  no  constitution  and  no  per- 
manent organization  of  the  government.  The  situation 
was,  in  fact,  a  provisional  one,  prolonged  abnormally  by 
the  strange  condition  of  politics.  The  monarchists  formed 
a  majority  of  the  Assembly,  but  they  were  hopelessly  di- 
vided into  two  sections  —  the  Legitimists,  whose  candidate 
was  the  Comte  de  Chambord,  and  the  Orleanists,  who  fol- 
lowed the  Comte  de  Paris.  At  one  moment  it  seemed  not 
impossible  that  the  Comte  de  Chambord  might  become 
king,  and  some  of  his  supporters  opened  negotiations  for  the 
purpose;  but  these  were  brought  to  nothing  by  obstinacy 
of  the  prince  himself,  who  was  a  true  scion  of  his  race, 
and  would  not  yield  one  jot  of  his  pretensions.     He  even 

^  The  law  of  Aug.  31,  1871,  declared  that  the  President  as  well  as  the 
ministers  should  be  responsible  to  the  Assembly.  See  Dupriez,  Les  Minislres 
dans  les  Principaux  Pays  d^ Europe  el  d'Amerique,  ii.  320. 

*  The  law  of  March  13,  1873,  abolished  the  right  of  the  President  to  take 
part  in  debate,  and  while  allowing  him  to  address  the  Assembly,  ordered  the 
sitting  to  be  suspended  immediately  after  his  speech.  This  was,  of  course,  an 
attempt  to  reduce  the  personal  influence  of  Thiers.     (Dupriez,  ii.  321-322.) 


I 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  lOI 

refused  to  accept  the  tricolor  flag  that  means  so  much 
to  Frenchmen,  and  clung  doggedly  to  the  ancient  white 
standard  of  his  house. 

The  Constitutional  Laws 

Under  such  circumstances  a  monarchy  was  out  of  the 
question,  and  so  this  assembly  of  monarchists  at  last  set 
to  work  to  organize  a  republic ;  or,  rather,  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  monarchists,  feeling  that  a  republic  was,  for  the  time 
at  least,  inevitable,  joined  with  the  minority  to  establish 
a  government  on  the  only  basis  possible.^  But  although 
the  republican  form  was  adopted,  the  institutions  that 
were  set  up  departed  essentially  from  the  ideas  which  the 
French  had  been  accustomed  to  associate  with  that  term. 
The  present  government,  like  all  political  systems  that  have 
been  created  suddenly  and  have  proved  lasting,  was  es- 
sentially a  compromise.  From  the  French  republican 
principles  there  was  borrowed,  besides  the  name,  little  more 
than  the  election  of  the  chief  magistrate,  while  from  the 
traditions  of  constitutional  monarchy  were  taken  the  irre- 
sponsibility of  the  head  of  the  state,  and  the  existence  of  a 
second  legislative  chamber.^  Now  it  was  natural  that  no 
one  should  feel  inclined  to  construct  an  ideal  system  on  a 
hybrid  foundation  of  this  kind.  Moreover  none  of  the  par- 
ties regarded  the  work  of  the  Assembly  as  final,  for  the 
monarchists  looked  forward  to  a  future  restoration  of  the 

'  Very  good  brief  descriptions  of  the  formation  of  the  Constitution  may 
be  found  in  Boz^rian's  Etude  sur  la  Revision  de  la  Constitution,  and  in  Pro- 
fessor Currier's  Constitutional  and  Organic  Laws  of  France.  The  latter, 
published  as  a  supplement  to  the  Annals  oj  the  American  Academy  of  Politi- 
cal Science  (March,  1893),  gives  a  translation  into  English  of  all  these  laws. 
See  also  an  article  by  Saleilles  on  the  "  Development  of  the  Present  Con- 
stitution of  France."    {Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  Sci.,  July,  1895.) 

'  Lebon,  Frankreich  (in  Marquardsen's  Handbuch  des  Oefenilichen 
Rechts),  p.  19. 


I02     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

throne,  while  their  adversaries  hoped  to  place  the  Republic 
before  long  on  a  more  secure  and  permanent  footing.  Hence 
the  Assembly  did  no  more  than  pro\'ide  for  the  immediate 
organization  of  the  government  in  as  brief  and  practical  a 
manner  as  possible.  It  passed  three  constitutional  laws, 
as  they  are  called,  which  are  in  the  form  of  ordinary  statutes, 
and  very  short  and  concise.  One  of  them,  that  of  February 
25,  1875,  provides  for  the  organization  of  the  powers  of  the 
state.  Another,  that  of  February  24,  1875,  deals  in  greater 
detail  with  the  organization  of  the  Senate.  And  the  third, 
dated  July  16,  1875,  fixes  the  relations  of  the  powers  of  the 
state  among  themselves. 

Amendments 

The  provisional  character  of  the  constitution  is  clearly 
seen  in  the  method  of  amendment.  It  has  been  the  habit 
in  France  to  make  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  constitu- 
ent and  legislative  powers,  the  former  being  withdrawn  to 
a  greater  or  less  extent  from  the  control  of  the  Parliament. 
But  in  this  instance  both  of  the  great  parties  wanted  to 
faciHtate  changes  in  the  fundamental  laws,  in  order  to  be 
able  to  carry  out  their  own  plans  whenever  a  favorable 
occasion  might  present  itself.^  A  departure  from  tradition 
was  therefore  made,  and  it  was  provided  that  the  constitu- 
tional laws  could  be  amended  by  a  National  Assembly, 
or  congress,  composed  of  the  two  branches  of  Parliament 
sitting  together,  which  should  meet  for  this  purpose  when- 
ever both  chambers  on  their  own  motion,  or  on  that  of  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  declared  the  need  of  revision.2 

^  Cf.  Borgeaud,  Etablissement  el  Revision  des  Constitutions,  pt.  iii,  liv.  ii, 
ch.  viii. 

*  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  8.  It  is  not  provided  whether  the 
Chambers  shall  declare  in  general  terms  that  there  is  a  need  of  revision,  or 
shall  specify  the  revision  to  be  made,  and  this  point  has  given  rise  to  lively 


I 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  IO3 

The  constitutional  laws  have  been  twice  amended  in  this 
way.  On  the  first  occasion  (June  21,  1879),  the  provision 
making  Versailles  the  capital  was  repealed,  and  thereupon 
a  statute  was  passed  transferring  the  seat  of  government 
to  Paris.^  On  the  second  occasion  (August  14,  1884), 
several  amendments  were  made.  Among  these  one  of  the 
most  notable  changed  the  provisions  relating  to  the  mode 
of  electing  senators,  and  another  declared  that  the  republi- 
can form  of  government  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  a  pro- 
posal for  revision  —  the  object  of  the  latter  being  to  prevent 
the  destruction  of  the  RepubHc  by  constitutional  means. 
The  device  of  providing  that  a  law  shall  never  be  repealed 
is  an  old  one,  but  I  am  not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  of 
any  avail. 

This  method  of  amendment  has  virtually  rendered  the 
Parliament  omnipotent;  for,  excepting  the  provision  about 
changing  the  republican  form  of  government,  there  is  no 
restriction  on  its  authority.  The  chambers  cannot,  it  is 
tme,  pass  an  amendment  to  the  constitutional  laws  in  the 
form  of  an  ordinary  statute,  but  if  they  are  agreed  they  can 
pass  it  by  meeting  as  a  National  Assembly.  The  power  of 
the  chambers  is  therefore  nearly  as  absolute  as  that  of  the 
British  ParUament.^  The  principle,  moreover,  that  the 
fundamental  law  cannot  be  changed  by  ordinary  statute 
is  devoid  of  legal  sanction,  for  if  the  chambers  should 
choose  to  pass  an  act  of  this  kind,  no  court  or  official  could 
legally  prevent  its  application. ^    But  while  the  constitution 

debates;  but  on  the  two  occasions  when  a  revision  was  actually  under- 
taken, the  Chambers  passed  identical  resolutions  specifying  the  articles  to  be 
amended.    (Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  74,  75;  Saleilles,  op.  cil.,  pp.  6,  7,  9.) 

1  Law  of  July  22,  1879.  This  act  provides,  however,  that  the  National 
Assembly  shall  meet  at  Versailles. 

*  Cf.  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  p.  11. 

»  Cf.  Laferriere,  Traile  de  la  Jurisdktion  Administrative,  i.  5. 


104     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

imposes  no  legal  restraint  on  the  Parliament,  it  would 
be  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  that  it  has  no  effect.  On  the 
contrar>',  it  has  such  moral  force  that  any  attempt  to  pass 
a  statute  that  clearly  violated  its  terms  would  awake  a 
strong  repugnance;  and  indeed  a  suggestion  by  the  president 
of  one  or  other  of  the  chambers  that  a  bill  would  be  un- 
constitutional has  more  than  once  suflficed  to  prevent  its 
introduction.!  Qn  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  formal 
amendments  can  be  made  only  in  joint  session,  and  only 
after  both  chambers  have  resolved  that  there  is  a  need  of 
re\asion,  has  some  influence  in  preventing  changes  in  the 
text  of  the  constitutional  laws,  because  the  Senate,  being 
the  more  conservative  body,  and  only  half  as  large  as  the 
other  House,  is  timid  about  going  into  joint  session,  not 
knowing  what  radical  amendments  may  be  proposed  there, 
and  fearing  to  be  swamped  by  the  votes  of  the  deputies. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  organs  of  the  state  in  succession, 
taking  up  first  the  Parhament  with  its  two  branches,  the 
Senate  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies;  then  turning  to  the 
President  as  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  Republic,  and 
finally  passing  to  the  ministers  as  the  connecting  link  be- 
tween the  Parliament  and  the  President,  and  the  control- 
Ung  factor  in  the  machinery  of  the  state. 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies 

The  composition  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  left  to 
ordinary  legislation,  except  that  the  constitutional  law  of 
February  25,  1875,  -^^t.  i,  provides  for  its  election  by  uni- 
versal suffrage.  By  statute  the  ballot  is  secret,  and  the 
franchise  extends  to  all  men  over  twenty-one  years  of  age 
who  have  not  been  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  in  conse- 
quence of  a  conviction  for  crime,  and  who  are  not  bank- 

^  Lebon,  Fnuikreich,  p.  23. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  IO5 

rupts,  under  guardianship,  or  in  active  military  or  naval 
service.'  To  be  eligible  a  candidate  must  be  twenty-five 
years  old  and  not  disqualified  from  being  a  voter.^  Mem- 
bers of  families  that  have  ever  reigned  in  France  are,  how- 
ever, excluded; '  and  in  order  to  prevent  as  far  as  possible 
the  use  of  pressure  the  law  forbids  almost  every  state 
official  to  be  a  candidate  in  a  district  where  his  position 
might  enable  him  to  influence  the  election.*  As  a  further 
safeguard  against  the  power  of  the  administration,  which 
is  justly  dreaded  by  the  French  Liberals,  it  is  provided  that 
all  public  servants  who  receive  salaries,  except  a  few  of  the 
highest  in  rank,  shall  lose  their  offices  if  they  accept  an 
election  to  Parliament,  and  that  a  deputy  who  is  appointed 
even  to  one  of  these  highest  offices,  unless  it  be  that  of 
minister  or  undersecretary,  shall  lose  his  seat.^ 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  elected  for  four  years,  and 
consists  at  present  of  six  hundred  and  two  members;  ten 
of  the  seats  being  distributed  among  the  various  colonies, 
and  six  allotted  to  Algiers,  while  the  remaining  deputies  are 
chosen  in  France. 

Scrutin  de  Lisle  and  Scrutin  d^ Arrondissement 

The  method  of  election  has  varied  from  time  to  time 
between  that  of  single  electoral  districts,  a  system  called 
the  scrutin  d'arrondissement,  and  that  of  the  scrutin  de  liste, 
which  consists  in  the  choice  of  all  the  deputies  from  each  de- 
partment on  a  general  ticket;  the  difference  being  the  same 

'  Arts.  I,  2,  and  5  of  the  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875.    Poudra  et  Pierre,  Droit 
Parlementoire,  §§  482-484,  498-514. 
'  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875,  Arts.  6,  7. 
'  Law  of  June  16,  1885,  Art.  4. 

*  Law  of  Nov.  30,  1875,  Art.  12. 

*  Id.,  Arts.  8,  9,  and  11.  A  deputy  appointed  to  one  of  these  offices  may, 
however,  be  reelected  (Art.  11). 


I06     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

that  exists  between  our  method  of  electing  congressmen 
each  in  a  separate  district,  and  our  method  of  choosing 
presidential  electors  on  a  single  ticket  for  the  whole  state. 
The  scrutin  d' arrondissement  or  single  district  system  pre- 
vailed from  1876  to  1885,  when  the  scrutin  de  lisle  was 
revived;  ^  partly,  no  doubt,  in  order  to  swamp  the  reaction- 
ary minority,  but  also  with  the  hope  of  withdrawing  the 
deputies  from  the  pressure  of  petty  local  interests,  which 
had  become  lamentably  strong,  of  getting  a  chamber  of 
broader  and  more  national  views,  and  of  forming  a  republi- 
can majority  that  would  be  more  truly  a  great  and  united 
party.  The  experiment  did  not  last  long  enough  to  produce 
any  sensible  effect  of  this  kind;  and  indeed  the  change 
seems,  on  the  whole,  to  have  resulted  in  an  increase  of  the 
power  of  the  local  politicians,  who  formed  themselves  into 
nominating  and  electoral  committees  for  the  department. 
At  the  general  elections  of  1885  the  Reactionaries  gained 
rather  than  lost  seats  in  spite  of  the  scrulin  de  lisle;  and 
the  disgust  of  the  Republicans  with  the  device  from  which 
they  had  hoped  so  much  was  brought  to  its  height  two  or 
three  years  later  by  General  Boulanger.  This  singular 
man  —  who,  after  enjoying  a  marvelous  popularity,  became 
in  a  short  time  an  object  of  contempt,  if  not  of  ridicule — had 
been  minister  of  war  in  one  of  the  recent  repubhcan  cabi- 
nets. He  was  forced  to  resign  on  account  of  his  enormous 
expenditure  on  the  army,  and  the  fear  that  he  would  plunge 
the  nation  into  a  war  with  Germany.  He  then  posed  as  the 
savior  of  the  country;  and,  being  at  the  height  of  his  repu- 
tation, he  made  use  of  the  scrutin  de  lisle  to  hold  a  plebiscite 
or  popular  vote  of  France  piecemeal.  Whenever  a  seat 
became  vacant  in  a  department  he  stood  as  a  candidate; 
and  if  elected  he  held  the  seat  only  until  a  vacancy  occurred 

'  Law  of  June  16,  1885. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  I07 

in  another  department,  when  he  resigned  to  appear  as  a 
candidate  again.  After  doing  this  in  several  large  depart- 
ments he  was  able  to  declare  that  a  considerable  part  of 
the  French  people  had  pronounced  themselves  for  him  — 
a  proceeding  which  would  have  been  impossible  if  the 
deputies  had  been  elected  in  five  hundred  and  seventy-six 
separate  districts.  His  success  at  the  by-elections  had  so 
frightened  the  Republicans  that  they  restored  the  scrutin 
d'arrondissemefti,  or  single  electoral  districts,  before  the 
general  election  of  1889  took  place. ^ 

The  Chamber  a  Tumultuous  Body 

Every  large  body  of  men,  not  under  strict  mihtary  dis- 
ciphne,  has  lurking  in  it  the  traits  of  a  mob,  and  is  hable  to 
occasional  outbreaks  when  the  spirit  of  disorder  becomes 
epidemic;  but  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies  is  espe- 
cially tumultuous,  and,  in  times  of  great  excitement,  some- 
times breaks  into  a  veritable  uproar.  Even  the  method  of 
preserving  order  lacks  the  decorum  and  dignity  that  one 
expects  in  a  legislative  assembly.  The  President  has  power 
to  call  a  refractory  member  to  order  and  impose  a  penalty 
in  case  he  persists;  but  instead  of  relying  on  this  alone,  he 
often  tries  to  enforce  silence  by  caustic  remarks.  The  writer 
remembers  being  in  the  Chamber  when  M.  Floquet  was 
presiding  —  the  same  man  who  had  fought  a  duel  with 
General  Boulanger  and  wounded  him  in  the  throat.     A 

*  Law  of  Feb.  13,  1889.  In  order  to  frustrate  more  effectually  Boulan- 
ger's  scheme,  a  law  of  July  17, 1889, provided  that  no  one  should  be  candidate 
in  more  than  one  district.  The  meaning  and  effects  of  these  laws  is  discussed 
by  Saleilles  {Ann.  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  Set.,  July,  1895,  pp.  19-37)-  A  measure 
providing  for  the  restoration  of  the  scrutin  de  lisle  with  an  arrangement  for 
proportional  representation  passed  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  191 2,  but 
was  rejected  by  the  Senate  in  the  following  March.  For  the  arguments  in 
its  favor,  see  "  Electoral  Reform  in  France,"  by  J.  W.  Garner,  American 
Political  Science  Review,  vii.  610-638  (Nov.,  1913). 


I08     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

deputy  who  had  just  been  speaking  kept  interrupting  the 
member  who  was  addressing  the  Chamber,  and  when  called 
to  order  made  some  remark  about  parUamentary  practice. 
The  President  cried  out,  "It  is  not  according  to  parlia- 
mentary practice  for  one  man  to  speak  all  the  time."  "  I 
am  not  speaking  all  the  time,"  said  the  deputy.  "  At  this 
moment  you  are  overbearing  everybody,"  answered  the 
President.  This  incident  is  related,  not  as  being  unusual 
or  humorous,  but  as  a  fair  sample  of  what  was  constantly 
occurring  in  the  Chamber.  Even  real  sarcasm  does  not 
seem  to  be  thought  improper.  Thus  in  a  later  debate  a 
deputy,  in  the  midst  of  an  unusually  long  speech,  was  con- 
tinually interrupted,  when  the  President,  Floquet,  ex- 
claimed, "  Pray  be  silent,  gentlemen.  The  member  who 
is  speaking  has  never  before  approached  so  near  to  the 
question."  ^  These  sallies  from  the  chair  are  an  old  tradi- 
tion in  France,  although,  of  course,  their  use  depends  on 
the  personal  character  of  the  President.  One  does  not,  for 
example,  find  them  at  all  in  the  reports  of  debates  during 
the  time  Casimir-Perier  was  presiding  over  the  Chamber. 
When  the  confusion  gets  beyond  all  control,  and  the  Presi- 
dent is  at  his  wits'  end,  he  puts  on  his  hat;  and,  if  this  does 
not  quell  the  disturbance,  he  suspends  the  sitting  for  an 
hour  in  order  to  give  time  for  the  excitement  to  subside. 

The  Senate 

The  French  Senate  consists  of  three  hundred  members; 
and,  by  the  constitutional  law  of  February  24,  1875,  two 
hundred  and  twenty-five  of  these  were  to  be  elected  for 
nine  years  by  the  departments,  while  seventy-five  were  ap- 
pointed for  life  by  the  same  National  Assembly  that  framed 
that  law.    The  life  senators  were  intended  to  be  a  perma- 

'  Journal  Officid  of  Nov,  18,  1893. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  IO9 

nent  feature  of  the  Senate,  and  it  was  provided  that  when 
any  one  of  them  died  his  successor  should  be  elected  for  life 
by  the  Senate  itself.  A  few  years  later,  however,  the  Re- 
publicans, thinking  such  an  institution  inconsistent  with 
democracy,  passed  the  amendment  to  the  constitutional  laws, 
to  which  a  reference  has  already  been  made.^  This,  while 
leaving  untouched  the  provisions  relating  to  the  existence 
and  powers  of  the  Senate,  took  away  the  constitutional 
character  from  those  regulating  the  election  of  senators, 
which  thus  became  subject  to  change  by  ordinary  legisla- 
tion. A  statute  was  then  passed  (December  9,  1884)  pro- 
viding that  as  fast  as  the  life  senators  died  their  seats  should 
be  distributed  among  the  departments,  so  that  at  present 
all  the  senators  are  elected  in  the  same  way.  There  are 
eighty-six  departments  in  France,  and  by  the  act  the  sena- 
tors are  apportioned  among  them  according  to  population. 
Life  senatorships  having  been  abolished,  the  number  of 
seats  belonging  to  a  department  varies  from  two  up  to  ten, 
while  the  territory  of  Belfort,  each  of  the  three  departments 
of  Algiers,  and  several  of  the  colonies,  are  represented  by 
one  senator  apiece.^  The  senators  so  elected  hold  office  for 
nine  years,  one  third  retiring  every  three  years.'  They  are 
chosen  in  each  department  of  France  by  an  electoral  college 
composed  of  the  deputies,  of  the  members  of  the  general 
council,  of  the  members  of  the  councils  of  the  arrondisse- 
ments,  and  of  delegates  chosen  by  the  municipal  councils  of 
the  communes.*  Before  1884  each  commune  elected  only 
one  delegate,*  but  by  the  law  of  that  year  the  number  of 
delegates  increases  with  the  size  of  the  communes,  though 
much  less  than  in  proportion  to  the  population.     These 

'  Const.  Law  of  .\ug.  14,  1884.  ^  Id.,  Art.  7. 

»  Law  of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Art.  2.  «  Id.,  Art.  6. 

•  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  4. 


no     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

communal  delegates  form  a  large  majority  of  the  electoral 
college,  and  hence  the  Senate  was  called  by  Gambetta  the 
Great  Council  of  the  Communes  of  France.^ 

A  senator  must  be  forty  years  old;  and  since  the  law  of 
1884  the  disqualifications  for  this  office  have  been  the  same 
as  for  that  of  member  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.'' 

lis  Functions 

The  legislative  power  of  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  is  the  same,  except  that  financial  bills  must  origi- 
nate in  the  latter;  ^  but  while  it  is  admitted  that  the  Senate 
may  reduce  proposals  for  taxes  and  appropriations,  there 
is  a  dispute  whether  it  can  increase  them  or  not,  and  debates 
on  this  point  are  constantly  recurring.  In  practice  the 
Chamber  has  sometimes  accepted  augmentations  thus  in- 
troduced, but  more  frequently  the  Senate  has  abandoned 
them.'*  The  Senate  has  two  pecuUar  functions.  First,  its 
consent  is  necessary  for  a  dissolution  of  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,^  a  provision  designed  as  a  safeguard  against  the 
President,  for  fear  that  he  might  dissolve  the  Chamber  in 
order  to  attempt  a  coup  d^eiat  during  its  absence;  and, 
second,  the  President  is  authorized,  with  the  approval  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  to  constitute  the  Senate  a  high 
court  to  try  any  one  for  an  attempt  on  the  safety  of  the 
state.^  This  power  has  been  used  more  than  once,  notably 
in  the  case  of  General  Boulanger,  who  failed  to  appear  for 
trial,  and  was  condemned  in  his  absence. 

1  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  p.  41. 

*  Law  of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Arts.  4,  5,  and  Provisions  Tetnporaires.  Law  of 
Dec.  26,  1887.     Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  63,  64,  67. 

^  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  8. 

♦  Dupriez,  ii.  430-432.  *  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  5. 

•  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  73,  Const.  Laws  of  Feb.  24,  1875,  Art.  9,  and 
July  16,  1875,  Art.  12.    The  procedure  was  regulated  by  a  law  of  Aug.  10, 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  III 

Its  Actual  Influence 

With  such  an  organization  and  powers,  an  American 
might  suppose  that  the  Senate  would  be  a  more  influential 
body  than  the  Chamber  of  Deputies;  but  in  reality  it  is  by 
far  the  weaker  body  of  the  two,  although  it  contains  at 
least  as  much  poHtical  abihty  and  experience  as  the  other 
house,  and,  indeed,  has  as  much  dignity,  and  is  composed 
of  as  impressive  a  group  of  men  as  can  be  found  in  any  legis- 
lative chamber  the  world  over.  The  fact  is  that  according 
to  the  traditions  of  the  parhamentary  system  the  cabinet 
is  responsible  only  to  the  more  popular  branch  of  the  legis- 
lature, and  in  almost  every  instance  where  a  cabinet  in 
France  has  resigned  on  an  adverse  vote  of  the  Senate,  the 
vote  was  rather  an  excuse  for  the  withdrawal  of  a  discredited 
ministry  than  the  cause  of  its  resignation. ^  A  case,  which 
occurred  during  the  year  1896,  is  the  only  one  where  the 
responsibility  of  the  ministers  to  the  Senate  was  fairly 
raised,  and  where  anything  like  a  real  contest  took  place 

1889.  By  the  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  1 2,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
can  impeach  the  ministers,  and  in  case  of  high  treason  the  President  of  the 
Republic.  The  impeachments  are  tried  by  the  Senate.  For  the  interpreta- 
tion put  upon  this  clause,  see  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  55-58. 

1  Dupriez  (ii.  453-454)  mentions  two  such  cases.  One  in  1876,  when 
the  cabinet,  disliking  a  bill  for  an  amnesty  passed  by  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties, proposed  in  the  Senate  a  compromise,  which  the  latter,  averse  to  any 
amnesty,  rejected.  The  ministers  thereupon  resigned,  but  they  had  really 
been  beaten  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  their  only  hope  of  restoring 
their  prestige  lay  in  forcing  through  the  compromise.  The  other  case  was 
in  1890,  when  the  Senate,  by  a  vote  condemning  the  economic  policy  of  the 
government,  brought  about  a  cabinet  crisis.  But  the  ministry  was  already 
divided  within  itself,  and  had  almost  broken  in  pieces  a  few  days  before. 
There  appears  to  have  been  a  third  instance  of  the  same  kind  in  1883.  In 
that  case  the  Fallieres  ministry  resigned  because  the  Senate  rejected  a  bill 
on  the  e-Tpulsion  of  members  of  families  that  had  reigned  in  France,  but  here 
again  the  cabinet  was  disunited  and  in  a  feeble  condition  before  the  vote  in 
the  Senate  took  place.    {Journal  Officiel,  Feb.  18  and  19,  1883.) 


112  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

between  the  chambers.  On  this  occasion  the  Senate  did 
certainly  force  a  united  and  vigorous  cabinet  to  resign,  but 
it  was  enabled  to  do  so  only  because  the  majority  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  was  highly  precarious,  for  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  if  the  cabinet  could  have  relied  on  the 
hearty  support  of  the  Chamber  it  would  have  defied  the 
Senate  as  it  had  already  done  two  months  before.^    It  has 

'  The  history  of  this  case  may  be  summarized  as  follows:  The  Chamber 
of  Deputies  when  elected  contained  a  decided  majority  of  Conservative 
Republicans,  and  for  two  years  the  successive  cabinets  represented  their 
views,  but  by  degrees  the  party  became  disintegrated,  and  in  October, 
1895,  a  Radical  cabinet  was  formed,  which  succeeded  in  obtaining  the 
support  of  a  majority.  Early  in  the  new  year  the  Minister  of  Justice,  not 
being  satisfied  that  the  Juge  d'Instruction,  who  was  holding  the  inquest  on 
the  southern  railroad  frauds,  was  sufficiently  zealous  in  discovering  the 
offenders,  took  the  case  out  of  his  hands  and  entrusted  it  to  another  magis- 
trate. On  February  1 1,  the  Senate,  which  was  strongly  conservative,  passed 
a  vote  censuring  this  act  as  an  interference  with  the  course  of  justice.  Two 
days  later,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  expressed  its  confidence  in  the  govern- 
ment; whereupon  the  Senate,  on  February  15,  repeated  its  former  vote. 
On  the  20th,  the  matter  was  again  brought  up  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
and  M.  Bourgeois,  the  head  of  the  cabinet,  declared  that  he  should  not 
resign  so  long  as  he  was  upheld  by  the  Chamber,  which  proceeded  to  re- 
affirm its  vote  of  the  week  before.  A  number  of  the  senators  who  had  been 
opposed  to  the  cabinet,  finding  that  it  would  not  yield,  read  in  the  Senate 
next  day  a  declaration  protesting  against  the  refusal  of  the  ministers  to  hold 
themselves  responsible  to  the  Senate  as  a  \nolation  of  the  Constitution,  but 
saying  that  while  as  senators  they  reserved  their  constitutional  right,  they  did 
not  wish  to  suspend  the  legislative  life  of  the  country.  The  Senate  thereupon 
adopted  an  order  of  the  day  approving  this  declaration,  and  thus  virtually 
gave  up  for  a  time  the  attempt  to  make  the  ministers  responsible  to  itself. 
(Journal  Officiel,  Feb.  12,  14,  16,  21,  and  22,  1896.) 

A  little  later  the  cabinet  brought  forward  a  bill  for  a  progressive  income 
tax,  and  succeeded  on  March  26  in  getting  the  Chamber  to  adopt  an  order 
of  the  day  approving  of  the  general  principle  involved.  The  order,  however, 
which  was  somewhat  equivocal,  was  only  carried  by  sixteen  votes,  and 
more  than  half  of  the  deputies  were  believed  to  be  opposed  in  their  hearts 
to  the  tax.  The  Senate  thought  its  opportunity  had  come,  and  again  passed 
a  vote  of  lack  of  confidence  in  the  ministr>',  this  time  on  the  subject  of 
foreign  affairs.     (Journal  Officiel,  April  4.)    The  result  was  no  better  than 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  II 3 

been  only  in  very  exceptional  cases,  that  the  upper  house 
has  upset  the  ministry.  Moreover  the  question  at  issue  in 
the  struggle  of  1896  was  not  whether  the  cabinet  is  re- 
sponsible to  the  Senate  to  the  same  extent  that  it  is  to  the 
other  chamber,  but  simply  whether  the  Senate  can  insist  on 
the  removal  of  a  ministry  to  which  it  is  peculiarly  hostile. 
No  one  has  ever  doubted  that  under  ordinary  circumstances 
the  ministers  are  responsible  only  to  the  Chamber  of  Dep- 
uties. The  majority  in  that  body  alone  is  considered  in  the 
formation  of  a  cabinet,  and  an  unfavorable  vote  there  on  any 
current  matter  of  importance  is  followed  by  a  change  of 
ministers,  while  a  similar  vote  in  the  Senate  is  not  regarded 
as  a  reason  for  resignation.^ 

before,  but  the  Senate  felt  the  strength  of  its  position,  and  was  not  to  be 
ignored.  On  April  21,  therefore,  it  took  a  bolder  step  by  a  resolution  to 
postpone  the  vote  on  the  credits  asked  for  Madagascar  "  until  it  had  before 
it  a  constitutional  ministry  having  the  confidence  of  the  two  Chambers." 
Instead  of  trying  to  continue  the  fight  Bourgeois  resigned,  declaring  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  that  as  the  representative  of  universal  suffrage  it 
ought  to  be  supreme,  but  that,  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  insuring  proper 
military  service  in  Madagascar  after  the  vote  of  the  Senate,  patriotism 
obliged  him  to  withdraw.  The  Radicals  in  the  Chamber  succeeded  in  carry- 
ing a  vote  affirming  once  more  the  preponderance  of  the  elect  of  universal 
suffrage,  and  urging  the  need  of  democratic  reforms;  but  a  few  days  later  a 
purely  Conservative  cabinet  presented  itself  to  the  Chamber,  and  obtained 
a  vote  of  confidence  by  a  majority  of  forty-three.  {Journal  Officiel,  April  22, 
24,  and  May  i.) 

The  outcome  of  the  affair  justified  the  belief  that  the  Chamber  would  not 
have  engaged  in  a  prolonged  struggle  to  support  the  cabinet;  that  while  un- 
willing to  turn  the  ministers  out  itself,  it  was  not  sorry  to  have  the  Senate 
do  so.  Had  the  deputies  been  so  thoroughly  in  earnest  as  to  force  a  dead- 
lock between  the  Chambers,  the  Senate  could  not  have  refused  its  consent 
to  a  dissolution,  and  would  certainly  have  been  obliged  to  give  way  if  the 
elections  had  resulted  in  a  victory  for  the  cabinet. 

'  Since  this  was  written  the  Briand  ministry  resigned  on  a  vote  in  the 
Senate  in  1913.  A  bill  to  reestablish  scrutin  de  lisle  with  a  provision  for 
proportional  representation  was  passed  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in 
July,  191 2.  It  was  not  debated  in  the  Senate  for  a  long  time,  and  not  until 
after  a  change  of  ministry.    The  new  Premier  declared  that  he  should  treat 


114     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

As  a  rule  the  Senate  does  not  decide  the  fate  of  the  min- 
istries, and  hence  cannot  control  their  policy.  The  result 
is  that  without  sinking  to  the  helplessness  of  the  EngUsh 
House  of  Lords,  it  has  become  a  body  of  secondary  impor- 
tance.^ At  one  time  it  stood  very  low  in  public  esteem,  on 
account  of  its  origin;  for  it  was  created  by  the  Reaction- 
aries in  the  National  Assembly,  and  was  regarded  as  a 
monarchical  institution ;  and  even  after  the  greater  part  of 
its  seats  were  occupied  by  RepubHcans,  it  was  suspected 
of  being  only  half-heartedly  in  favor  of  the  republican  form 
of  government.  Its  condemnation  of  Boulanger  increased 
its  popularity  by  making  it  appear  a  real  bulwark  of  the 
repubhc  against  the  would-be  dictator;  but  the  prejudice 
against  it  has  by  no  means  disappeared,  and  the  extreme 
Radicals  have  never  ceased  to  demand  its  aboUtion,  al- 
though conservative  feeling  in  France  will  doubtless  remain 
strong  enough  to  prevent  such  a  step.  How  great  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Senate  will  be  in  the  future  is  not  easy  to  fore- 
tell. Some  people  were  of  opinion  that  with  Hfe  members 
gone,  many  of  whom  had  been  distinguished  in  letters,  in 
science,  or  in  war,  it  would  lose  a  good  deal  of  its  prestige. 
To  some  extent  this  fear  has  been  realized.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  men  of  mark  are  still  elected,  and  now  that 
the  Senate  is  not  afraid  of  being  thought  lukewarm  or 
hostile  to  the  repubhc,  and  does  not  feel  its  existence  seri- 
ously threatened,  it  has  acquired  more  boldness  and  energy .^ 

the  adoption  of  the  bill  as  a  question  of  confidence,  and  when  the  Senate  on 
March  i8  voted  against  proportional  representation,  he  resigned.  His  action 
caused  surprise,  and  the  reasons  for  it  are  somewhat  obscure. 

1  In  his  Essays  on  Govenwiait  (ch.  i)  the  writer  has  tried  to  prove  that 
this  must  necessarily  be  the  condition  of  one  of  two  chambers  wherever  the 
cabinet  is  responsible  to  the  other;  and  that  the  cabinet  cannot  in  the  long 
run  be  responsible  to  both. 

^  Dupriez,  ii.  382-383.  The  present  position  and  the  probable  future 
of  the  Senate  are  discussed  by  Saleilles,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37-52. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  II5 

It  is  highly  improbable,  moreover,  that  it  will  become  utterly 
powerless,  so  long  as  the  deputies  are  divided  into  a  number 
of  political  groups  and  the  ministers  are  not  able  to  speak 
with  authority  as  the  leaders  of  a  great  and  united  party. 

Although  the  Senate  has  little  or  no  share  in  directing  the 
pohcy  of  the  cabinet,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  it  is  a 
useless  body.  On  the  contrary,  it  does  very  valuable  work 
in  correcting  the  over-hasty  legislation  of  the  other  cham- 
ber, and  in  case  of  disagreement  often  has  its  own  way  or 
effects  a  compromise.^ 

The  two  chambers  meeting  in  joint  session  form  what  is 
called  the  National  Assembly,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  has 
power  to  revise  the  constitutional  laws.  It  has  one  other 
function,  that  of  electing  the  President  of  the  Republic. 

The  President  of  the  Republic 

This  officer  is  chosen  for  seven  years,  and  is  reeligible; 
the  only  limit  on  the  choice  of  a  candidate  being  found  in 
the  constitutional  law  of  August  14,  1884,^  which  excludes 
all  members  of  families  that  have  ever  reigned  in  France  — 
a  provision  dictated  by  the  fear  that,  like  Napoleon  III,  a 
prince  might  use  the  presidency  as  a  step  to  the  throne. 
The  President  is  at  the  head  of  a  repubUc,  but  he  lives  and 
travels  in  a  style  that  is  almost  regal,  for  the  conception  of 
a  repubhc  as  severe,  simple,  and  economical  has  changed 
very  much  in  France  since  the  Second  Empire  taught  the 
nation  extravagance.' 

The  duties  of  the  President,  like  those  of  every  chief 
magistrate,  are  manifold.    He  is  the  executive  head  of  the 

'  Dupriez,  ii.  413-415. 
*  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  2. 

'  Cf.  G.  Channes,  Nos  Fautes,  Letter  of  Jan.,  1885;  Theodore  Stanton 
in  the  Arena,  Oct.,  1891. 


Il6     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

nation,  and  as  such  executes  the  laws,  issues  ordinances,^ 
and  appoints  all  the  officers  of  the  government. ^  He  has 
also  certain  functions  of  a  legislative  character,  but,  except 
for  the  right  of  initiative  in  legislation,  these  are  not  in  fact 
very  extensive.  He  has  no  veto  upon  the  laws,  and  al- 
though he  may  require  the  chambers  to  reconsider  a  bill, 
the  right  has  never  been  exercised.^  With  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  he  can  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,*  but 
this  power  has  also  fallen  into  disuse,  because  the  members 
of  his  cabinet  are  very  much  under  the  control  of  the 
deputies,  who  dread  the  risk  and  expense  of  an  election; 
and,  in  fact,  a  dissolution  has  not  taken  place  since  Presi- 
dent MacMahon's  unsuccessful  attempt  to  use  it  in  1877  as 
a  means  of  getting  a  chamber  in  sympathy  with  his  views. 
The  President  has  power  to  make  treaties;  but  treaties  of 
peace,  of  commerce,  those  which  burden  the  finances,  affect 
the  persons  or  property  of  French  citizens  in  foreign  coun- 
tries, or  which  change  the  territory  of  France  (in  other 
words,  all  the  more  important  ones),  require  the  ratification 
of  the  chambers.^  A  declaration  of  war  also  requires  their 
consent;^  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  government  managed 
to  wage  war  in  Tunis  and  Tonquin  without  any  such  con- 
sent, alleging  at  first  that  the  affair  was  not  a  war,  and 
afterwards  defending  itself  on  the  ground  that  the  Parha- 
ment  by  voting  credits  had  virtually  sanctioned  its  course.' 

1  For  the  nature  of  this  power,  see  infra. 

2  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  3. 

3  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  7;  Dupriez,  ii.  369.  It  is  not  likely 
to  be  used  unless  after  the  bill  has  passed  the  cabinet  that  favored  it  has 
resigned,  and  another  hostile  to  it  has  come  in. 

*  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Art.  5. 
»  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1875,  Art.  8. 
«  Id.,  Art.  9. 
'  See  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  46,  47. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  II7 

His  Personal  A  uthorily 

Unlike  the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  French 
President  is  not  free  to  use  his  powers  according  to  his  own 
judgment,  for  in  order  to  make  him  independent  of  the  fate 
of  cabinets,  and  at  the  same  time  to  prevent  his  personal 
power  from  becoming  too  great,  the  constitutional  laws 
declare  that  he  shall  not  be  responsible  for  his  official  con- 
duct, except  in  case  of  high  treason,  and  that  all  his  acts  of 
every  kind,  to  be  vaHd,  must  be  countersigned  by  one  of 
the  ministers; '^  and  thus,  like  the  British  monarch,  he  has 
been  put  under  guardianship  and  can  do  no  wrong.  When, 
therefore,  we  speak  of  the  powers  of  the  President,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  these  are  really  exercised  by  the  min- 
isters, who  are  responsible  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
The  President,  indeed,  is  not  usually  present  at  the  cabinet 
consultations  {conseils  de  cabinet)  in  which  the  real  pohcy 
of  the  government  is  discussed,  and  as  a  rule  he  presides 
only  over  the  formal  meetings  {conseils  des  ministres)  held 
for  certain  purposes  specified  by  law.-  He  has  power,  it  is 
true,  to  select  the  ministers,  and  in  this  matter  he  can  use 
his  own  discretion  to  some  extent,  but  in  fact  he  generally 
entrusts  some  one  with  the  formation  of  a  cabinet,  and 
appoints  the  ministers  this  man  suggests.^  His  duty  in  these 
cases  is  not,  however,  as  simple  as  that  of  the  EngHsh  King, 
because,  for  reasons  that  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chap- 
ter, there  is  usually  on  the  fall  of  a  cabinet  no  leader  of  a 
victorious  opposition  to  whom  he  can  turn.  A  good  deal 
of  tact  and  skill  is  sometimes  required  at  cabinet  crises,  and 

'  Const.  Law  of  Feb.  25,  1875,  Arts.  3  and  6. 

^  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  53;  Dupriez,  ii.  350-351  and  367-368,  states  that 
the  President  is  often  present  when  important  matters  are  discussed,  but 
cannot  influence  the  decision. 

'  Dupriez,  ii.  340. 


Il8  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\^ERNMENTS 

it  is  said  that  on  one  occasion  the  formation  of  a  ministry 
was  due  to  the  personal  influence  of  President  Carnot.^ 

Sir  Henry  Maine  makes  merry  over  the  exalted  office  and 
lack  of  power  of  the  President.  "  There  is,"  he  says,  "  no 
living  functionary  who  occupies  a  more  pitiable  position 
than  a  French  President.  The  old  kings  of  France  reigned 
and  governed.  The  Constitutional  King,  according  to  M. 
Thiers,  reigns,  but  does  not  govern.  The  President  of  the 
United  States  governs,  but  he  does  not  reign.  It  has  been 
reserved  for  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  neither 
to  reign  nor  yet  to  govern."  ^ 

At  first  sight  the  situation  does,  indeed,  appear  somewhat 
irrational.    When  the  head  of  the  state  is  designated  by  the 
accident  of  birth  it  is  not  unnatural  to  make  of  him  an  idol, 
and  appoint  a  high  priest  to  speak  in  his  name;  but  when 
he  is  carefully  selected  as  the  man  most  fit  for  the  place, 
it  seems  a  trifle  illogical  to  entrust  the  duties  of  the  office 
to  some  one  else.    By  the  constitution  of  Sieyes  an  orna- 
mental post  of  a  similar  character  was  prepared  for  the  First 
Consul,  but  Napoleon  said  he  had  no  mind  to  play  the  part 
of  a  pig  kept  to  fatten.    In  government,  however,  the  most 
logical  system  is  not  always  the  best,  and  the  anomalous 
position  of  the  President  has  saved  France  from  the  dan- 
ger of  his  trying  to  make  himself  a  dictator,  while  the  fact 
that  he  is  independent  of  the  changing  moods  of  the  cham- 
bers has  given  to  the  Republic  a  dignity  and  stability  it 
had  never  enjoyed  before.     It  is  a  curious  commentary  on 
the  nature  of  human  ambition,  that  in  spite  of  the  small 
power  actually  wielded  by  the  President  in  France,  the 
presidential  fever  seems  to  have  nearly  as  strong  a  hold  on 
public  men  as  in  this  country. 

1  See  "  France  under  M.  Constans,"  in  Murray's  Magazine  for  May,  1890. 

2  Popular  Government,  p.  250. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  II9 

The  Conseil  d'Etat 

Before  proceeding  to  consider  the  ministers,  there  is  one 
other  institution  which  claims  attention  on  account  of  its 
past  rather  than  its  present  position.  This  is  the  Conseil 
d'Etat  or  Council  of  State,^  a  body  whose  importance  has 
varied  a  great  deal  at  different  times.  Under  Napoleon  I, 
and  again  during  the  Second  Empire,  in  addition  to  the 
possession  of  executive  functions,  it  was  a  real  source  of 
legislation;  while  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration  and  the 
Monarchy  of  July  it  became  what  it  is  to-day,  a  council 
with  high  attributes,  but  very  little  authority.  Except  as  a 
court  of  administrative  justice,^  it  has  now  lost  most  of  its 
influence;  for,  although  it  must  be  consulted  before  certain 
classes  of  ordinances  can  be  issued,  and  may  be  consulted 
on  other  administrative  matters,  its  advice  need  never  be 
followed;  and  in  fact  the  habit  of  consulting  it  is  said  to 
have  become  little  more  than  a  mere  form.^  The  legislative 
functions  of  the  Council  have  faded  even  more  completely 
to  a  shadow,  as  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  while  the  gov- 
ernment or  either  of  the  chambers  may  seek  its  aid  in  the 
framing  of  statutes,  the  privilege  is  rarely  exercised  by 
the  ministers,  scarcely  at  all  by  the  Senate,  and  never  by 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 

The  members  of  the  Council  are  divided  into  several 
classes,  but  those  belonging  to  the  most  important  class, 

'  Aucoc,  Conferences  stir  le  Droit  Adm.,  liv.  ii,  ch.  i,  §  3;  Ducrocq,  Cours 
de  Droit  Adm.,  tit.  i,  ch.  i,  sec.  i,  §  iii;  Boeurf,  Resume  stir  le  Droit  Adm., 
ed.  of  1895,  p.  32  et  seq.;  cf.  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  96-98;  Dupriez,  ii. 
285-316,  passim,  and  pp.  481-492;  Goodnow,  Comparative  Administrative 
Law,  i.  107-113.  See  also  articles  entitled  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat  et  les 
Projets  de  Reforme,"  by  Varagnac,  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  15  and 
Sept.  15,  1892. 

^  For  its  functions  of  this  nature,  see  infra. 

'  "  La  R^fomie  Administrative  —  La  Justice,"  by  Vicomte  d'Avenel, 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  June  i,  1889,  pp.  597-598. 


I20     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

and  the  only  ones  who  can  vote  when  the  Council  sits  as  a 
court,  are  appointed  and  dismissed  at  will  by  the  President 
of  the  Republic.^ 

The  Ministers 

In  a  parhamentary  system  the  ministers  have  two  dis- 
tinct functions.  One  of  these  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
members  of  the  President's  Cabinet  in  the  United  States, 
and  consists  of  the  management  of  the  departments  of  the 
administration.  The  other  is  the  duty  of  representing  the 
government  in  the  legislature,  urging  the  adoption  of  its 
measures,  and  defending  its  policy  against  the  attacks  of  its 
adversaries.  These  two  functions  are  not  necessarily 
united;  and,  in  fact,  it  has  been  a  common  habit  in  some 
countries  to  appoint  ministers  without  portfolios,  as  it  is 
called,  that  is,  without  any  executive  duties  at  all,  in  order 
that  they  may  devote  their  whole  energy  to  the  battles  in 
ParUament.^  Although  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  such 
a  practice  in  France,  it  is  not  followed  to-day,  each  minister 
being  at  the  head  of  a  particular  branch  of  the  administra- 
tion. The  number  of  departments,  however,  and  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  public  business  among  them,  is  not  fixed  by 
law,  but  is  regulated  from  time  to  time  by  decree  of  the 
President  of  the  Republic.  The  number  of  ministers  is, 
therefore,  constantly  Hable  to  change  according  to  the  im- 
mediate needs  of  the  pubHc  service.  Before  the  war,  there 
were  twelve  departments  or  ministries:  those  of  the  In- 
terior; of  Justice;  of  Foreign  Afiairs;  of  Finance;  of  War; 

^  The  other  members  are  appointed  by  the  President  subject  to  certain 
conditions,  but  as  he  can  dismiss  any  of  them,  their  tenure  of  office  depends 
on  the  pleasure  of  the  cabinet,  and  in  fact  by  means  of  resignations  or  re- 
movals, most  of  the  councilors  were  changed  in  1879  in  order  to  make  the 
council  Republican.  —  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat,"  Varagnac,  Reviie  des  Deux 
Mondes,  Sept.  15,  1892,  p.  295. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  121 

of  the  Na\y;  of  Education  and  the  Fine  Arts;  of  Public 
Works;  of  Labor;  of  Commerce,  Industry,  and  Post  and 
Telegraphs;   of  Agriculture;  and  of  the  Colonies.' 

Their  Responsibility  to  the  Chambers 

The  constitutional  law  of  Februar>^  25,  1875  (Art.  6), 
declares  that  the  ministers  are  collectively  responsible  to 
the  chambers  for  the  general  policy  of  the  government,  and 
individually  for  their  personal  acts.  The  object  of  this 
clause  was,  of  course,  to  establish  the  parliamentary  sys- 
tem, and  in  fact  the  French  ministry  is  responsible  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  as  the  English  is  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  resigns  on  a  hostile  vote  on  any  matter  of  im- 
portance. Except,  indeed,  for  the  Ministers  of  War  and 
of  the  Xa\y,  who  are  usually  militar}-  men,  the  cabinet 
officers  are  almost  always  selected  from  among  the  members 
of  ParHament,  although  the  reason  for  this  practice  in 
England  does  not  apply  in  France,  because  the  ministers 
have  a  right  to  be  present  and  speak  in  either  chamber, 
whether  members  of  it  or  not.- 

Their  Erwrmous  Power 

But  in  order  to  understand  fully  the  position  of  the  French 
ministers,  and  their  relation  to  the  Parliament,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  realize  their  enormous  power,  and  this  is  due  largely 
to  three  causes  —  the  paternal  nature  of  the  government, 
the  centralization  of  the  state,  and  the  possession  by  the 

*  This  practice  virtually  exists  in  England,  because  some  of  the  offices 
held  by  the  ministers,  such  as  that  of  Firpt  Lord  of  the  Treasury,  and  that 
of  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster,  involve  little  or  no  administrative 
duties. 

'  Const.  Law  of  July  16,  1S75,  Art.  6.  In  practice  this  privilege  is  also 
accorded  to  their  undersecretaries.    Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  52. 


122     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

executive  of  authority  that  in  an  Anglo-Saxon  country 
would  be  lodged  with  the  legislature  or  the  courts  of  law. 

On  the  first  of  these  matters,  the  paternal  nature  of  the 
government,  there  is  no  need  to  dwell  at  length.    All  gov- 
erimients  are  growing  more  paternal  at  the  present  day, 
for  a  reaction  has  set  in  against  the  extreme  laissez-faire 
doctrines  preached  by  Adam  Smith,  John  Stuart  Mill,  and 
the  English  political  economists  of  the  earlier  school.    There 
is  a  general  tendency  to  restrain  the  liberty  of  the  individual 
and  subject  him  to  governmental  supervision  and  control. 
Such  control  and  supervision  are  traditional  in  France,  and 
far  exceed  anything  to  which  we  are  accustomed  in  this 
country.     All  trades  and  occupations  are  there  subject  to 
a  great  deal  more  police  inspection  than  with  us.     They 
require  more  generally  to  be  licensed,  and  are  regulated  and 
prohibited  by  the  administrative  officials  with  a  much  freer 
hand.    And  although  the  Hberty  of  the  press  and  the  right 
of  holding  public  meetings  have  been  substantially  realized 
under  the  republic,  the  right  of  association  was  very^  limited 
until  the  law  of  July  i,  1901,  for  no  society  of  more  than 
twenty  persons,  except   business  companies  and   associa- 
tions of  persons  pursuing  the  same  profession  or  trade, 
could  be  formed  without  the  permission  of  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior  or  the  prefect  of  the  department.^    It  is  easy 
to  see  how  much  power  all  this  paternalism  places  in  the 
hands  of  the  administration. 

Local  Government 

An  explanation  of  the  centralization  of  the  state  entails 
a  brief  survey  of  local  government;  and  here  we  meet  with 
a  deeply  rooted  French  tradition,  for  centralization  was 

'  Lebon,  Frankreich,  pp.  32-39;  Ducrocq,  tit.  ii,  ch.  iii;  ch.  iv,  §  iii. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 23 

already  great  under  the  old  regime,  and  although  the  first 
efTect  of  the  Revolution  was  to  place  the  administration  of 
local  affairs  under  the  control  of  independent  elected  bodies, 
the  pressure  of  foreign  war,  and  the  necessity  of  maintain- 
ing order  at  home,  soon  threw  despotic  power  into  the 
hands  of  the  national  government.  Under  Napoleon  this 
power  became  crystalhzed  in  a  permanent  form,  and  an 
administrative  system  was  estabUshed,  more  perfect,  more 
effective,  and  at  the  same  time  more  centralized  than  that 
which  had  existed  under  the  monarchy.^  The  outward 
form  of  the  Napoleonic  system  has  been  continuously  pre- 
served with  surprisingly  little  change,  but  since  1830  its 
spirit  has  been  modified  in  two  distinct  ways:  first,  by 
means  of  what  the  French  call  deconcentration,  that  is,  by 
giving  to  the  local  agents  of  the  central  government  a  greater 
right  of  independent  action,  so  that  they  are  more  free  from 
the  direct  tutelage  of  the  ministers;  second,  by  a  process  of 
true  decentrahzation,  or  the  introduction  of  the  elective 
principle  into  local  government,  and  the  extension  of  the 
powers  of  the  local  representative  bodies.  But  although  the 
successive  rulers  of  France  have  pursued  this  poHcy  rather 
steadily,  the  progress  of  local  self-government  has  been  far 
from  rapid. 2  One  reason  for  this  is  the  habit  of  looking  to 
the  central  authorities  for  guidance  in  all  matters.  Another 
is  a  fear  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  furnishing  its 
enemies  with  rallying-points  which  might  be  used  to  organ- 
ize an  opposition  —  a  fear  that  takes  shape  to-day  in  pro- 

'  For  a  short  but  vigorous  comment  on  Napoleon's  system,  see  G.  L. 
Dickinson,  Revolulioti  and  Reaction  in  Modern  France,  ch.  ii. 

*  On  the  subject  of  local  government,  I  have  used  Aucoc,  Conferences, 
3d  ed.;  Bocuf,  Risume,  ed.  of  1895;  Leroy-Beaulieu,  Adm.  Locale  en  France 
el  en  Angleterrc;  Lebon's  two  works  on  France;  Goodnow,  Conip.  Adm.  Law. 
There  is  a  popular  account  in  Block,  Entreliens  familiers  sur  I'Adm.  de  notre 
pays. 


124     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

visions  forbidding  the  local  elected  councils  to  express  any 
opinions  on  general  politics,  or  to  communicate  with  each 
other  except  about  certain  matters  specified  by  law.  A 
third  cause  of  the  feeble  state  of  local  self-government  is  to 
be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  Revolution  of  1789  destroyed 
all  the  existing  local  divisions  except  the  commune,  and 
replaced  them  by  artificial  districts  which  have  never  de- 
veloped any  great  vitality,  so  that  the  commune  is  the  only 
true  centre  of  local  life  in  the  republic.^  A  fourth,  and  per- 
haps the  most  potent  cause  of  all,  is  the  dread  of  disorder 
which  has  been  constantly  present  in  the  minds  of  French- 
men, and  has  made  them  crave  a  master  strong  enough  to 
cope  with  any  outbreak. 

The  Prefect 

France  is  divided  into  eighty-six  departments,  at  the 
head  of  each  of  which  is  a  prefect,  appointed  and  removed 
at  pleasure  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  but  in  reality 
nominated  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  office  is, 
indeed,  regarded  as  distinctly  political,  and  the  incumbent 
is  often  replaced  when  the  minister  changes.  The  prefect, 
who  is  by  far  the  most  important  of  the  local  officials,  oc- 
cupies a  double  position,  for  he  is  the  agent  of  the  central 
government  in  regard  to  those  matters  of  general  administra- 
tion which  are  thought  to  concern  the  whole  country,  and 
at  the  same  time  he  is  the  executive  officer  of  the  depart- 
ment for  local  affairs.  In  the  former  capacity  he  is  in  theory 
the  immediate  subordinate  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
but  since  his  duties  extend  to  all  branches  of  the  administra- 
tion, he  corresponds  in  practice  directly  with  any  minister 
in  whose  sphere  of  action  the  matter  with  which  he  is  called 

'  Most  of  the  existing  communes  were  in  fact  created  in  1789. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 25 

upon  to  deal  may  lie.  His  authority  as  the  agent  of  the 
central  government  is  not,  however,  the  same  in  all  cases. 
Sometimes  he  is  absolutely  subject  to  the  orders  of  the 
ministers.  This  is  true  when  he  executes  general  laws  and 
ordinances;  but  when,  for  example,  he  directs  the  police 
of  the  department,  or  supervises  the  subordinate  local 
bodies,  he  proceeds  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  his  acts 
can  be  overruled  by  the  central  government  only  in  case 
they  are  contrary  to  law,  or  give  rise  to  complaints  on  the 
part  of  the  persons  affected  by  them.  In  pursuance  of  the 
policy  of  deconcentration,  the  prefect  has  been  given  an 
independent  authority  of  this  kind  over  a  large  number  of 
subjects ;  and  he  was  intended  to  exercise  his  own  judgment 
in  regard  to  them,  but  the  influence  and  pressure  of  the 
deputies  has,  it  is  said,  induced  him  to  shirk  responsibility 
as  much  as  possible  by  referring  doubtful  questions  to  the 
ministers,  and  hence  the  centralization  has  not  been  dimin- 
ished as  much  as  was  expected.^  In  matters  of  general 
administration,  the  prefect  is  assisted  by  a  prefectorial 
council  of  three  or  four  members  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic;  but,  except  when  it  sits  as  an  ad- 
ministrative court,  the  functions  of  this  body  are  almost 
altogether  advisory,  and  their  use  has  become  scarcely 
more  than  a  form.^ 

The  General  Council 

As  the  executive  officer  for  local  affairs,  the  prefect  car- 
ries out  the  resolutions  of  the  General  Council.  This  is  the 
representative  assembly  of  the  department,  and  is  elected 
by  universal  suffrage,  one  of  the  members  being  chosen  in 

^  Channes,  Letter  of  October  i,  1884. 

*  V'icomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  R^forme  Administrative,"  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  June  i,  1889,  p.  596. 


126     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\TRNMENTS 

each  canton  for  six  years,  and  half  of  them  being  renewed 
every  three  years.  The  authority  of  the  body  is  jealously 
limited.  Its  competence  is  almost  entirely  confined  to  af- 
fairs that  are  deemed  to  have  a  strictly  local  interest/  and 
even  in  regard  to  these  its  powers  are  not  absolute,  for  its 
votes  on  certain  matters  can  be  annulled  by  the  President 
of  the  RepubHc,  and  its  budget,  that  is  the  annual  tax  levy 
and  list  of  appropriations,  is  not  valid  without  his  approval. 
Although  the  Council  has  the  right  of  final  decision  in  a  con- 
siderable class  of  subjects,  its  actual  power  over  them  is 
curtailed  in  a  variety  of  ways.  In  the  first  place  it  does  not 
carry  out  its  own  votes,  but  their  execution  is  entrusted  to 
an  agent  of  the  central  government,  the  prefect,  who  ap- 
points all  the  ofiicials,  manages  the  public  institutions,  and 
signs  the  orders  for  all  pa}Tnents  of  money;  the  direct  con- 
trol of  the  council  over  his  performance  of  these  duties  ex- 
tending only  to  the  election  of  a  standing  commission  which 
has  little  more  than  a  right  of  inspection. ^  In  the  second 
place,  the  prefect  has  an  opportunity  to  exert  a  great  deal 
of  influence  over  the  action  of  the  Council,  for  not  only  has 
he  a  right  to  address  it,  but  he  prepares  the  budget  and  all 
other  business,  and  in  fact  it  is  not  allowed  to  act  on  any 
matter  until  it  has  heard  his  report.'  Moreover,  the  Coun- 
cil is  only  permitted  to  sit  a  very  short  time.  It  has  two 
regular  sessions  a  year,  whose  duration  is  limited,  one  to  a 
month,  the  other  to  a  fortnight;  and  although  extra  ses- 
sions can  be  held  they  must  not  exceed  one  week  apiece. 

'  Its  functions  in  relation  to  the  general  administration  consist  in  ap- 
portioning certain  direct  taxes,  in  giving  its  advice  when  asked,  and  in  ex- 
pressing its  wishes  on  matters  not  connected  with  general  politics. 

^  The  Council  can  delegate  to  this  commission  a  somewhat  indefinite  class 
of  functions,  but  it  is  not  in  fact  a  body  of  much  importance.  Dupriez, 
ii.  467-468. 

^  Aucoc,  p.  282. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 27 

Finally  its  very  existence  is  insecure,  for  it  can  be  dissolved 
by  the  chief  of  the  state.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that 
in  matters  falling  within  its  province  the  General  Council 
cannot  do  everything  it  wants,  but  can  prevent  almost 
anything  it  docs  not  want.  Its  financial  resources  are  not 
large,*  and  its  attention  is  confined  for  the  most  part  to  the 
construction  of  roads,  subventions  to  railroads,  and  the 
care  of  schools,  insane  asylums,  and  other  institutions  of 
a  similar  character. 

At  one  time  a  hope  was  entertained  that  politics  might 
be  kept  out  of  the  general  councils,  but  it  has  not  been  ful- 
filled, the  departmental  elections  being  regularly  conducted 
on  party  Hnes.^  It  has  therefore  been  thought  best  to 
entrust  the  supervision  of  the  communes  largely  to  the  cen- 
tral government  and  its  representative  the  prefect,  rather 
than  to  the  councils  with  their  partisan  bias,  and  this,  of 
course,  deprives  the  latter  of  a  part  of  the  importance  they 
would  otherwise  possess.^ 

The  Arrondissement  and  the  Canton 

The  next  local  division  is  the  arrondissement.  This  is  a 
mere  administrative  district  without  corporate  personality, 
with  no  property,  revenues,  or  expenses  of  its  own,  and  al- 
though it  has  a  subprefect  and  an  elected  council,  neither 
of  them  has  much  power.  In  fact  it  has  been  proposed  to 
abolish  the  arrondissement  altogether. 

1  Almost  its  only  source  of  revenue  is  the  addition  of  a  limited  sum  to  the 
direct  state  taxes. 

2  Bozerian,  in  his  Elude  sur  la  Revision  de  la  Constitution  (pp.  89-90), 
attributes  this  to  the  fact  that  the  local  assemblies  take  part  in  the  elec- 
tion of  senators. 

'  By  the  law  of  1884  on  municipalities,  part  of  the  supervision  over  these 
bodies,  which  had  previously  been  in  the  hands  of  the  general  councils, 
was  withdrawn  and  given  to  the  prefect. 


128     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  canton,  which  is  the  next  subdi\'ision,  is  really  a 
judicial  and  military  rather  than  an  administrative  district, 
and  therefore  does  not  concern  us  here. 

The  Commune 

We  now  come  to  the  communes,  which  are  the  smallest 
local  entities,  but  differ  enormously  in  area  and  population. 
They  vary  in  size  from  twenty  acres  to  over  a  quarter  of  a 
million,  and  they  run  all  the  way  from  a  hamlet  with  a 
dozen  inhabitants  to  large  cities ;  yet  with  the  exception  of 
Paris,  Lyons,  and  Marseilles  they  are  all  governed  on  one 
plan.  The  oflEicer  in  the  commune  whose  position  corre- 
sponds to  that  of  the  prefect  in  the  department  is  the  mayor. 
He  acts  in  the  same  way  both  as  agent  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment, and  as  the  executive  head  of  the  district,  but 
whereas  in  the  prefect  the  former  character  predominates, 
the  mayor  is  chiefly  occupied  with  local  matters.  It  is 
largely  for  this  reason  that,  unlike  the  prefect,  he  is  not 
appointed  by  the  President,  but  since  1884  has  been  elected 
by  and  from  the  communal  council  for  the  length  of  its  own 
term.^  The  mayor  is,  however,  by  no  means  free  from  con- 
trol. So  far  as  he  acts  as  agent  of  the  central  government, 
he  is  absolutely  under  the  orders  of  the  prefect.  Nor  is  this 
all.  The  subject  of  communal  police,  which  includes  the 
public  health  and  other  matters  of  a  kindred  nature,  is 
considered  a  part  of  the  local  administration,  but  the  acts 
of  the  mayor  in  regard  to  it  can  be  annulled  by  the  prefect, 
who  has  also  power  in  many  cases  to  issue  direct  orders  of 
his  own.  Moreover  the  police  officials  require  to  be  con- 
firmed by  the  prefect,^  and  can  be  removed  only  by  him.^ 

^  The  ofl&ce  is  an  honorary  one,  as  the  mayor  receives  no  salary. 
^  Or  sub-prefect. 

'  The  mayor  is  not  free  from  control  in  regard  to  other  matters  of  local 
interest,  for  his  accounts  must  be  submitted  for  approval  to  the  prefect, 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 29 

But  even  these  extensive  powers  of  control  are  not  deemed 
enough,  and  it  is  provided  that  the  mayor  can  be  suspended 
from  office  for  a  month  by  the  prefect,  or  for  three  months 
by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  can  be  removed  alto- 
gether by  the  President  of  the  Republic. 

The  deliberative  organ  of  the  commune  is  the  communal 
council,  which  varies  in  size  from  ten  to  thirty-six  members, 
and  is  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for  four  years.  Its 
authority  extends  to  all  communal  affairs,  except  that  it 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  broad  subject  of  police,  although 
that  is  regarded  for  other  purposes  as  a  local  matter.  The 
statute  on  municipal  government  lays  down  the  general 
principle  that  the  decisions  of  the  council  on  local  affairs, 
when  legally  made,  are  conclusive  without  the  approval 
of  any  superior  administrative  official,  but  in  a  subsequent 
section  all  the  most  important  matters  are  specially  ex- 
cepted from  the  rule.  The  Hst  of  exceptions  includes  almost 
every  financial  measure,  the  construction  of  roads  and 
buildings,  and  the  sale  of  communal  property. ^  The  council 
has,  therefore,  very  much  less  power  than  might  at  first  be 
supposed;  and  in  order  to  guard  against  any  attempt  on 
its  part  to  exceed  these  slender  privileges,  the  prefect  is 
given  a  discretionary  authority  to  suspend  it  for  a  month, 
while  the  President  of  the  Republic  can  dissolve  it  entirely 
and  appoint  a  commission  with  limited  powers  to  rule  the 
commune  for  two  months,  when  a  new  election  must  take 
place. 

As  in  England,  so  also  in  France,  much  of  the  work  of 
local  administration  is  done  by,  and  much  of  the  credit  there- 
for is  due  to,  permanent  officials  httle  seen  by  the  pubhc; 

who  can  order  the  payment  of  any  expense  properly  authorized  if  the  mayor 
neglects  to  make  it. 

1  The  official  who  has  power  to  approve  the  budget  can  also  inscribe 
therein  certain  obligatory  expenses. 


I30  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

and  chief  among  them  to  the  secretary  of  the  mayor,  who  in 
small  communes  is  apt  to  be  the  village  schoolmaster  also.^ 

Paris 

The  general  laws  of  local  government  already  described 
do  not,  however,  cover  the  whole  field,  because  a  dread  of 
the  explosive  character  and  communistic  tendencies  of  the 
democracy  of  Paris  has  prevented  the  capital  from  enjoy- 
ing even  the  measure  of  liberty  granted  to  other  towns. 
The  city  has,  indeed,  a  municipal  council  composed  of  eighty 
elected  members  and  endowed  with  most  of  the  usual  pow- 
ers and  a  general  council  for  the  department  with  limited 
powers,  composed  of  these  same  eighty  reinforced  by  eight 
suburban  members;  but  the  executive  authority  is  entirely 
in  the  hands  of  the  central  government.  It  is  lodged  in  part 
with  the  mayors  of  the  twenty  arrondissements,  who  are 
appointed  directly  by  the  President  of  the  RepubUc;  but 
chiefly  with  two  prefects  appointed  in  the  same  way.  One 
of  these,  the  Prefect  of  the  Seine,  has  most  of  the  functions 
of  the  ordinary  prefect,  together  with  those  of  a  central 
mayor;  while  the  other,  the  Prefect  of  PoHce,  has  charge 
of  the  poHce,  and  is  directly  responsible  to  the  Minister  of 
the  Interior.2 

This  sketch  of  local  government  in  France  shows  how 
centralized  the  state  still  remains,  what  extensive  super- 
vision and  control  the  administration  keeps  in  its  own  hands, 
and  how  slight  is  the  measure  of  real  local  autonomy,  if 
measured  by  an  Anglo-Saxon  standard.     In  fact,  the  cen- 

1  The  Governments  of  European  Cities,  pp.  86-87,  90. 

2  In  Lyons  the  control  of  the  police  is  still  entrusted  to  the  Prefect  of  the 
Rhone;  in  Marseilles  it  is  in  charge  of  the  Prefect  of  the  Bouches-du-Rh6ne. 
In  all  cities  of  over  40,000  people  the  organization  of  the  police  is  fixed  by 
decree  of  the  chief  of  the  state,  although  the  members  of  the  force  are  ap- 
pointed as  in  other  communes. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  I3I 

tral  government  still  makes  itself  continually  and  actively 
felt  in  local  affairs,  and  this  is  for  the  ministers  a  great 
source  of  power,  but  also,  as  we  shall  see  later,  a  cause  of 
weakness. 

Legislative  Powers  of  the  Executive 

A  third  source  of  the  enormous  power  of  the  ministers 
in  France  is  the  possession  by  the  executive  of  authority 
that  in  an  Anglo-Saxon  country  would  be  lodged  with  the 
legislature  or  the  courts  of  law.  This  requires  an  explana- 
tion, for  it  involves  some  of  the  most  interesting  peculiarities 
of  French,  and,  indeed,  of  continental  pohtical  ideas. 

Decrees  and  Ordinances 

Let  us  take  first  the  legislative  authority  of  the  executive 
in  France.  When  an  English  or  an  American  legislator 
drafts  a  statute  he  tries  to  cover  all  questions  that  can  pos- 
sibly arise.  He  goes  into  details  and  describes  minutely 
the  operation  of  the  act,  in  order  that  every  conceivable 
case  may  be  expressly  and  distinctly  provided  for.  He  does 
this  because  there  is  no  one  who  has  power  to  remedy  de- 
fects that  may  subsequently  appear.  If  the  law  is  vague 
or  obscure,  it  can  receive  an  authoritative  interpretation 
only  from  the  courts  by  the  slow  process  of  litigation.  If 
it  is  incomplete,  it  must  remain  so  until  amended  by  a  sub- 
sequent enactment.  In  some  cases,  it  is  true,  an  officer  or 
board  is  given  by  statute  power  to  make  regulations.  The 
Local  Government  Board  and  our  boards  of  health  furnish 
examples  of  this;  but  such  cases  are  exceptional,  and  most 
Anglo-Saxons  feel  that  the  power  is  in  its  nature  arbitrary, 
and  ought  not  to  be  extended  farther  than  is  necessary. 
And  here  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  rules  issued 
by  the  head  of  a  department  for  the  guidance  of  his  subordi- 


132  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

nates  and  the  regulations  of  which  we  are  speaking.  The 
former  are  merely  directions  given  to  the  officials  for  the 
purpose  of  instructing  them  in  their  duties,  and  are  bind- 
ing on  no  one  else.  The  right  to  issue  them  must  belong,  to 
some  extent,  to  every  one  who  has  other  persons  under  his 
orders,  although  they  are  used  much  more  systematically 
in  France  than  in  the  United  States.  The  regulations  with 
which  we  are  concerned  here  are  of  quite  a  different  kind, 
for  they  are  binding  on  all  citizens  who  may  be  affected  by 
them,  and  have,  in  fact,  the  character  of  laws. 

In  America  the  authority  to  make  regulations  is  dele- 
gated by  the  legislature  cautiously,  and  apart  from  such  an 
express  delegation  no  officer  of  the  government  has  power 
to  issue  any  ordinances  with  the  force  of  law.  But  in  France 
all  this  is  very  different.  Statutes  that  do  not  concern  the 
rights  of  a  man  against  his  neighbor,  that  do  not,  in  other 
words,  form  a  part  of  the  Civil  Code,  are  often  couched  in 
general  terms,  and  enunciate  a  principle  which  the  execu- 
tive is  to  carry  out  in  detail.^  Sometimes  the  President  of 
the  Republic  is  expressly  given  power  to  make  regulations, 
but  even  without  any  special  authority  he  has  a  general 
power  to  make  them  for  the  purpose  of  completing  the 
statutes,  by  virtue  of  his  general  duty  to  execute  the  laws.^ 
Such  regulations  in  France  are  called  acts  of  secondary 
legislation,  and  the  ordinances  of  the  President  in  which 
they  are  contained  are  termed  decrets.  The  power  to  make 
them  is  not,  however,  confined  to  the  chief  of  the  state. 

1  Dupriez  (ii.  377),  after  remarking  this  difference  between  English  and 
French  legislation,  expresses  a  regret  that  the  French  Parliament  has  shown 
a  tendency  of  late  j^ears  to  go  more  into  details. 

2  On  the  power  to  issue  ordinances  in  France,  see  Aucoc,  Conferences, 
§§  52-57,  66,  91,  170;  Ducrocq,  Cours,  §§  61-66,  72-73.  109-110,  210-214; 
Goodnow,  i.  85-87.  Before  issuing  certain  classes  of  ordinances  the  Presi- 
dent must  consult  the  Council  of  State,  but  he  is  not  obliged  to  follow  its 
advice. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 33 

For  matters  of  inferior  gravity  the  laws  often  confer  a 
similar  authority  on  the  ministers,  the  prefects,  and  even 
the  mayors,  and  in  this  case  the  edicts  are  termed  arreles, 
to  distinguish  them  from  the  more  solemn  ordinances  of 
the  President.^  The  regulations  cannot,  of  course,  be  con- 
trary to  law,  or  in  excess  of  the  authority  of  the  official  who 
issues  them.  If  they  are  so,  and  infringe  private  rights,  a 
process  to  have  them  annulled  may  be  instituted  before  the 
administrative  courts,  and  in  certain  limited  cases  the  ordi- 
nary courts  can  also  refuse  to  apply  them.^ 

Appropriations 

So  much  for  the  power  of  the  executive  to  make  law,  but 
this  does  not  exhaust  its  encroachments  on  what  we  have 
learned  to  regard  as  the  province  of  the  legislature,  for  it 
is  less  strictly  held  to  the  appropriations  voted  by  the 
chambers  than  is  the  case  with  us.  The  virements  (that  is 
to  say,  the  use  for  one  purpose  of  appropriations  voted  for 
another),  which  were  an  abuse  under  the  Empire,  have, 
indeed,  been  abohshed,  except  as  between  different  items 
in  the  same  chapter  of  the  annual  budget;  but  certain 
chapters  are  designated  each  year  to  which  additions  can  be 
made  by  decree  of  the  President  issued  with  the  consent  of 
the  council  of  ministers.  Moreover,  in  urgent  and  unfore- 
seen cases  arising  when  Parliament  is  not  in  session,  the 
government  has  power  by  means  of  such  a  decree,  not  only 
to  incur  the  expenses  called  for  by  the  emergency,  but  also 
to  open  an  extraordinary  credit  on  its  own  authority  and 
borrow  the  money  that  it  needs.^ 

1  Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  23;  Aucoc,  Ducrocq,  ubi  cit. 

*  Laferriere,  Traite  de  la  Jiir.  Adm.,  liv.  iii,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii;  liv.  vi;  liv.  vii, 
ch.  i,  sec.  iv. 

^  In  both  cases  notice  of  the  decree  must  be  laid  before  the  Chambers 
within  fourteen  days  from  their  next  meeting.    (Lebon,  Frankreich,  p.  162.) 


134     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Judicial  Powers  of  the  Executive 

One  may,  perhaps,  be  pardoned  for  dwelling  at  some- 
what greater  length  on  the  judicial  powers  of  the  executive 
in  France,  both  because  they  are  so  Httle  understood  by 
English-speaking  people,  and  because  their  origin  may  be 
traced  to  a  tradition  which  has  its  roots  far  back  in  the  past. 

The  characteristic  difference  between  the  political  history 
of  England  and  that  of  France  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  Enghsh,  though  influenced  by  each  new  spirit  of  the 
age,  have  never  yielded  entirely  to  its  guidance,  while  the 
French  have  always  thrown  themselves  into  the  current, 
and,  adopting  completely  the  dominant  ideas  of  the  time, 
have  carried  them  to  their  logical  results.  Thus,  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  the  feudal  system  never  became  fully  de- 
veloped in  England  as  it  did  in  France.  Again,  when  ab- 
solute monarchy  came  into  vogue,  the  British  sovereign 
was  not  able  to  acquire  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  Bourbons. 
And,  lastly,  democracy  made  its  way  neither  so  rapidly  nor 
so  thoroughly  on  the  north  as  on  the  south  of  the  Channel. 
The  result  is  that  in  France  the  institutions  of  any  period 
have  been  adapted  almost  exclusively  to  the  wants  of  the 
time  in  which  they  were  produced,  and  in  the  succeeding 
age  it  has  been  thought  necessary  to  destroy  them  and 
devise  new  ones  more  in  harmony  with  the  new  conditions ;  ^ 

It  is  worth  while,  moreover,  to  note  in  passing  that  there  is  no  effective 
process  for  bringing  to  account  a  minister  who  exceeds  the  appropriations. 
He  can,  indeed,  be  impeached,  but  except  in  times  of  great  excitement  this 
would  not  be  done  if  the  money  had  been  expended  for  public  purposes;  and 
as  regards  civil  liability,  there  is  no  court  that  has  power  to  compel  him  to 
refund  the  sums  which  he  has  spent  illegally. 

'  This  is  the  more  striking  because  the  French  are  in  some  ways  more 
conservative  than  the  English,  as,  for  example,  in  their  retention  to  the 
present  day  of  nominally  public  executions.  M.  Lebon  truly  remarks 
{France  as  It  Is,  p.  86):  "  People  have  no  idea  of  the  spirit  of  routine  and 
conservatism  which  prevails  in  France." 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  I35 

whereas  in  England  there  has  been  no  need  of  such  sweep- 
ing changes,  and  it  has  been  possible  to  preserve  in  a 
modified  form  many  of  the  most  important  features  of  the 
government.  Hence  the  permanence  and  continuity  of  the 
political  system.^  Let  us  inquire  how  these  facts  have 
affected  the  development  of  judicial  and  administrative 
institutions  in  the  two  countries. 

Early  Royal  Power  in  England 

The  Norman  kings  of  England  strove  deliberately  to 
check  the  growth  of  the  feudal  system,  and  their  successors 
constantly  followed  the  same  policy.  Now  the  essence  of 
the  feudal  system  consisted  in  the  blending  of  public  and 
private  law  by  making  all  political  relations  depend  on  the 
tenure  of  land;  and,  in  fact,  according  to  the  strict  feudal 
theory,  no  man  had  direct  relations  with  any  superior  ex- 
cept his  immediate  overlord.  Every  great  vassal  of  the 
crown,  therefore,  had  jurisdiction  over  all  the  tenants  on 
his  estate,  which  he  exercised  by  holding  a  court  of  his 
own  for  the  administration  of  justice  among  them. 

The  Judicial  System  in  England 

The  English  kings  resisted  this  principle,  and  tried  to  bring 
their  power  to  bear  directly  on  all  the  people  of  the  realm. 
For  this  purpose  sheriffs  were  appointed  to  represent  the 
crown  in  the  counties,  and  what  was  of  more  permanent 
importance,  the  gravest  crimes,  actions  for  the  possession 
of  land,  and  subsequently  other  matters,  were  brought 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Curia  Regis}  As  early  as  the 
reign  of  Henry  I,  moreover,  royal  officers  were  commissioned 

'  Cf.  Freeman,  Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,  pp.  63-66. 
*  See  Pollock  &  Maitland,  History  of  English  Law,  vol.  i.  85-87,  and 
chs.  V  and  vi. 


136    GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERXMENTS 

to  travel  about  the  county  holding  court,  a  practice  which 
was  renewed  in  a  more  systematic  form  by  Henry  II,  and 
has  continued  with  short  interruptions  to  the  present  day.^ 
The  chief  object  of  the  early  kings  in  sending  out  the  itin- 
erant justices,  as  they  were  called,  was  no  doubt  financial; 
for  their  duties  consisted  in  assessing  taxes,  collecting  fines 
for  violation  of  the  law,  and  administering  justice,  which 
was  in  itself  a  source  of  no  small  profit  in  the  ^Middle  Ages.' 
The  functions  of  the  justices  in  the  collection  of  revenue 
grew,  however,  less  and  less  prominent,  but  their  adminis- 
tration of  justice  became  of  permanent  importance,  and  in 
regard  to  this  two  tendencies  were  at  work.     In  the  first 
place,  the  royal  judges  adopted  new  methods  of  procedure 
and  gradually  developed  the  trial  by  jury,  while  the  baronial 
courts  clung  to  tlie  ordeal  and  other  barbaric  forms  of 
trial.^     "  The  gladsome  light  of  jurisprudence,"  as  Coke 
called  it,  came  with  the  king's  courts,  and  hence  it  is  not 
surprising  that  they  supplanted  the  baronial  courts,  and  in 
time  drew  before  themselves  all  the  important  lawsuits.    In 
the  second  place,  the  commissions  which  had  at  first  been 
issued  to  high  oflicials.  barons,  and  knights,  became  con- 
fined to  regular  judges,  and  about  the  time  of  Edward  I 
were  given  only  to  the  members  of   the  royal  courts  at 
Westminster.-*     The  same  body  of  judges,  therefore,  ex- 

*  The  institution  of  traveling  judges  was  not  new.  It  had  been  used  by 
Charlemagne  (Hallam,  Middle  A^cs,  ch.  ii,  part  ii.  5),  and  a  similar  practice 
was  employed  by  .\lfred,  Edgar,  and  Canute  (Stubbs,  History  of  England, 
xi.  §§  127,  134).  On  the  itinerant  justices,  see  Stubbs,  lb.  xi.  127;  -xii.  141, 
145,  150;  -xiii.  163;  XA-.  235;  Gneist,  EnsHsche  Vcrfdssiingsgeschiclite,  pp.  148, 
224-228,  305  (note),  31S-319,  447-  Pollock  &  Maitland,  i.  134,  i49,  i79; 
Franqueville,  Le  Systeme  Judiciaire  de  la  Grande  Bretagne,  i.  149  et  seq. 
The  royal  duty  of  sending  the  justices  in  eyre  is  one  of  those  insisted  upon  in 
Magna  Charta,  §  18. 

«  Stubbs,  lb.,  xi.  127.         '  Cf.  Stubbs,  lb.,  xiii.  164;  Gneist,  lb.,  p.  142. 

*  Gneist,  lb.,  p.  318;  Stubbs,  7^.,  xv.  235. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  137 

pounded  the  law  in  all  parts  of  the  realm ;  and  hence  Eng- 
land, alone  among  the  countries  of  ICurope,  developed  a 
uniform  national  justice  called  the  common  law.'  The 
people  naturally  became  attached  to  this  law  and  boasted 
of  the  rights  of  Englislmien,  while  the  courts  that  were  the 
creators  and  guardians  of  the  law  became  strong  and 
respected. 

The  Administrative  System 

The  very  fact  that  the  judicial  branch  of  the  government 
became  so  highly  developed  made  the  centralization  of  the 
administration  unnecessary.  At  the  time  when  the  itin- 
erant justices  first  went  on  circuit,  administration  in  the 
modern  sense  was  of  course  unknown,  and  such  local  affairs 
as  needed  attention  were  regulated  by  the  shire  moots  and 
other  local  meetings.^  The  sherifT,  indeed,  represented 
the  crown;  but  his  powers  were  curtailed  more  and  more, 
until,  apart  from  his  command  of  the  military  forces  of  the 
county,  he  became  little  more  than  an  offtcer  of  the  courts.^ 
When  the  local  administration  grew  more  important,  it  was 
confided  not  to  him,  but  to  justices  of  the  peace,  who,  though 
nominally  selected  by  the  king,  were  never  strictly  under 
his  orders,  and  in  time  became  almost  completely  independ- 
ent, except  for  the  purely  judicial  control  exercised  by  the 
Court  of  King's  Bench. ^ 

The  Royal  Power  in  France 

In  England,  therefore,  the  royal  power  came  early  into 
contact  with  the  people  all  over  the  kingdom  by  means  of 

'  Cf.  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ch.  viii,  part  ii.  3. 
'  Stubbs,  lb.,  XV.  205. 

'  On  the  powers  of  the  sherifT,  see  Stubbs,  lb.,  xiii.  163,  xv.  204-207; 
Gneist,  lb.,  pp.  1 15-120,  297. 

*  Gneist,  lb.,  pp.  298  el  seq.,  468  el  seq. 


138     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  courts  of  law,  and  the  judicial  system  became  highly 
centralized;  while  the  local  administrative  institutions 
developed  slowly,  and  through  them  the  king's  authority 
was  Httle  felt.  In  France,  the  course  of  events  was  very 
different,  for  the  royal  power  came  into  direct  contact  with 
the  people  at  a  much  later  date,  and  therefore  in  quite 
another  form. 

The  Judicial  System  hi  France 

When  the  feudal  system  became  established,  the  great 
vassals  set  up  their  own  courts  and  succeeded  in  excluding 
the  royal  judges  from  their  fiefs,  so  that  the  direct  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  crown  became  confined  to  the  comparatively 
small  part  of  the  country  which  was  included  in  the  royal 
domain.    Gradually,  indeed,  as  the  feudal  system  began  to 
lose  its  strength,  the  king's  jurisdiction  encroached  upon 
that  of  the  vassals  —  a  process  which  was  carried  on  both  by 
insisting  on  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  royal  tribunals,  and 
by  reserving  for  the  exclusive  cognizance  of  the  king's 
courts  a  somewhat  indefinite  class  of  cases  known  by  the 
name  of  cas  royaiix}    But  this  process  aroused  serious  re- 
sistance on  the  part  of  the  territorial  lords,  and  it  was  not 
until  the  sixteenth  century  that  the  crown  judges  possessed 
the  universal  authority  they  had  obtained  in  England  more 
than  three  hundred  years  earlier.     So  strong,  in  fact,  did 
the  local  jealousy  of  the  Parliament  of  Paris  (the  king's 
high  court  of  justice)  remain,  that  after  the  great  fiefs  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  crown,  they  were  not  placed  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  that  tribunal,  but  were  given  independent 

1  Aubert,  Le  Parlement  de  Paris  de  Phillippe  le  Bel  d  Charles  VII,  ch.  i, 
sec.  i;  Hist,  du  Pari,  de  Paris,  1250-1515,  liv.  ii,  ch.  i;  Du  Bois,  Hist,  du 
Droit  Criminel  de  la  France,  part,  i,  ch.  i;  Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit  Fran^ais, 
part  i,  tit.  ii,  ch.  i;  Hist,  de  la  Proc.  Crim.,  part  i,  tit.  i,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii;  ch.  ii, 
sec.  i;  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ch.  ii,  pt.  ii.  5. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 39 

parliaments  of  their  own.'  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolu- 
tion there  were  thirteen  separate  parliaments,  so  that  every 
considerable  province  had  a  distinct  body  of  tribunals.^ 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  courts  could  not  create  a 
uniform  national  justice  Hke  the  Enghsh  common  law,  and 
although  since  the  revolution  such  a  uniform  system  has 
been  provided  by  the  Code,  this  does  not  strengthen  the 
hands  of  the  judges,  but  has  rather  the  opposite  tendency. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  their  work,  and  hence  does  not 
redound  to  their  glory;  and  secondly,  by  weakening  the 
force  of  precedent,  it  diminishes  the  importance  of  judicial 
decisions.  This  review  of  the  history  of  the  courts  of  law 
shows  clearly  why  they  have  not  attained  in  France  the 
same  power  and  authority  as  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries.' 

The  Administrative  System 

The  French  courts  of  law  were  weak  because  the  royal 
authority  did  not  come  into  direct  contact  with  the  people 
at  the  time  when  public  and  private  law  were  everywhere 
blended,  when  the  tone  of  thought  was  pecuHarly  legal,  and 
when  political  power  was  chiefly  exercised  in  a  judicial  or 
semi-judicial  form.*  It  made  itself  felt  at  a  later  date,  and 
especially  as  the  restorer  of  order  after  the  anarchy  caused 
by  the  Hundred  Years'  War.  Its  presence  brought  peace  and 
prosperity,  and  naturally  enough  the  organs  which  it  em- 
ployed acquired  a  high  degree  of  vigor.    Now,  at  this  period, 

^  Du  Bois,  pt.  i,  ch.  ii.  §  2;  Bastard  d'Estang.  Les Parlements  de  France, 
i-  36-38;  Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit  Franqais,  tit.  ii,  ch.  i,  sec.  i,  §  2,  v. 

*  For  the  dates  of  the  creation  of  the  provincial  parliaments,  which  run 
from  1444  to  1775,  see  Bastard  d'Estang,  i.  189,  note,  and  Esmein,  ubi  supra. 

'  Since  the  Revolution,  the  courts  have,  of  course,  been  reorganized  on  a 
centralized  basis. 

*  On  the  relative  importance  attributed  to  law  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
in  later  times,  see  Stubbs'  chapters  on  the  Characteristic  Differences  between 
Mediaeval  and  Modern  History,  in  his  Lectures  on  Med.  and  Mod.  Hist. 


140     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

administration,  in  the  modern  sense,  was  becoming  impor- 
tant, and  as  the  royal  authority  came  to  be  exercised  by  com- 
missioners or  intendants,  who  had,  indeed,  certain  judicial 
powers,  but  whose  functions  were  chiefly  administrative,^ 
the  administration  developed  an  influence  and  a  strength 
which  the  courts  had  never  attained.  The  administrative 
system  became  centralized,  and  grew  to  be  the  most  im- 
portant factor  in  the  government.^  All  classes  of  the  people 
looked  to  it  for  protection;^  in  fact,  it  took,  to  a  great 
extent,  the  place  which  the  judiciar>'  filled  in  England  and 
in  those  countries  which  had  inherited  the  English  principles. 

Doctrine  oj  the  Separation  of  Powers 

This  difference  in  the  relative  authority  of  the  courts  and 
the  administration  was  intensified  —  so  far  as  the  United 
States  and  France  were  concerned — by  the  political  philoso- 
phy of  the  last  century.  Montesquieu,  in  his  "  Spirit  of  the 
Laws,"  proclaimed  the  importance  of  separating  the  execu- 
tive, legislative,  and  judicial  powers,  and  the  maxim  was 
eagerly  accepted  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  though  in 
very  different  senses.  Our  ancestors,  anxious  to  maintain 
the  independence  of  the  courts  and  the  sacredness  of  private 
rights,  took  the  principle  to  signify  the  necessity  of  so  pro- 
tecting the  courts  from  the  control  or  influence  of  the  other 
branches  of  the  government  that  they  might  be  free  to  ad- 
minister justice  without  regard  to  the  official  position  of  the 
Htigants  or  the  nature  of  the  questions  involved.  They 
meant  to  preserve  the  English  tradition  that  there  is  only 
one  law  of  the  land  to  which  every  one  is  subject,  from  the 

1  Cheruel,  Die.  des  Inst,  de  la  France,  "  Intendants  des  Provinces  "; 
Esmein,  Hist,  du  Droit  Fran^ais  tit.  ii,  ch.  v,  §  2. 

*  Cf.  De  Tocqueville,  An.  Reg.  et  la  Rev.,  liv.  ii,  chs.  ii,  iii. 

3  De  Tocqueville  speaks  of  all  classes  as  looking  on  the  government  as 
a  special  providence.    Id.,  ch.  vi  (7th  ed.  pp.  100-103), 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  I4I 

humblest  citizen  to  the  highest  officer.  The  French,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  acquired  no  great  passion  for  law,  or  for 
the  rights  of  the  individual,  and  did  not  admit  a  claim  on 
the  part  of  any  one  to  delay  or  overturn  the  pubHc  interests 
in  order  to  get  his  own  grievances  redressed.  Moreover, 
they  had  seen  the  Parliament  of  Paris  interfere  with  the 
government  by  refusing  to  register  the  edicts  of  the  king; 
for  although  this  tribunal  had  failed  to  acquire  judicial 
supremacy,  it  had  retained  a  good  deal  of  political  power, 
which  it  used  during  the  years  preceding  the  Revolution  to 
resist  innovations.^  Such  a  power  might  not  be  disliked  as 
a  means  of  opposing  an  unpopular  court  party,  but  it  could 
not  be  tolerated  for  a  moment  when  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment were  seized  by  men  who  beheved  themselves  com- 
missioned to  reform  the  world.  The  French  statesmen, 
therefore,  took  Montesquieu's  doctrine  in  the  sense  that  the 
administration  ought  to  be  free  to  act  for  the  pubHc  weal 
without  let  or  hindrance  from  the  courts  of  law.  The  Dec- 
laration of  the  Rights  of  Man  proclaimed  in  1789  that  a 
community  in  which  the  separation  of  powers  was  not  estab- 
lished had  no  constitution;  and  a  statute  of  the  next  year, 
on  the  organization  of  the  tribunals,  gave  effect  to  the  maxim 
as  it  was  understood  in  France  by  providing  that  the  judges 
should  not  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  work  of  adminis- 
trative authorities,  or  proceed  against  the  officers  of  the 
government  on  account  of  their  official  acts.^  The  American 
and  French  applications  of  the  doctrine  of  the  separation  of 
powers  are  both  perfectly  logical,  but  are  based  on  different 
conceptions  of  the  nature  of  law.  The  Anglo-Saxon  draws 
no  distinction  between  public  and  private  law.  To  him  all 
legal  rights  and  duties  of  every  kind  form  part  of  one  uni- 

*  Cf.  Edward  J.  Lowell,  The  Eve  of  the  French  Revolution,  p.  105. 

*  Aucoc,  Conferences,  part  i,  liv.  i,  ch.  i ;  Boeuf,  Risume,  part  iv,  sec.  ii. 


142     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

versal  system  of  positive  law,  and  so  far  as  the  functions 
of  public  ofiScials  are  not  regulated  by  that  law,  they  are 
purely  matters  of  discretion.  It  follows  that  every  legal 
question,  whether  it  involves  the  power  of  a  pubHc  officer 
or  the  construction  of  a  private  contract,  comes  before  the 
ordinary  courts.^  In  France,  and  in  the  other  states  of 
continental  Europe,  private  law,  or  the  regulation  of  the 
rights  and  duties  of  individuals  among  themselves,  is  treated 
as  only  one  branch  of  jurisprudence;  while  public  law,  which 
deals  with  the  principles  of  government  and  the  relations  of 
individuals  to  the  state,  is  regarded  as  something  of  an 
entirely  different  kind.  Of  course  every  civilized  govern- 
ment must  strive  to  treat  all  its  subjects  fairly,  and  hence, 
in  the  course  of  administration,  questions  of  justice  must 
arise;  but  as  these  do  not  concern  the  rights  of  a  man  against 
his  neighbor  they  are  not  classed  in  France  with  private 
law.  It  is  felt  that,  unhke  questions  of  private  law,  they 
ought  not  to  be  decided  solely  by  the  appHcation  of  ab- 
stract principles  of  justice  between  man  and  man,  but  must 
be  considered  from  the  broad  standpoint  of  public  poHcy. 
Now  the  domain  of  the  ordinary  French  courts  is  private 
law  alone,  and  it  is  quite  logical  to  regard  any  attempt  on 
their  part  to  judge  administrative  acts  and  thus  pass  on 
questions  of  public  policy,  as  an  attempt  to  go  beyond  their 
proper  sphere  of  action  and  invade  the  province  of  the 
executive.^ 

The  principle  of  withdrawing  questions  of  public  law 
from  the  ordinary  courts  was  not  new.    It  existed  in  prac- 

1  This  principle,  like  all  others  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  is  not  carried 
out  with  absolute  consistency.  Thus  the  various  commissions  in  America 
on  railroads,  interstate  commerce,  etc.,  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  French 
administrative  tribunals. 

2  The  French,  like  the  Americans,  have  not  applied  their  principles  quite 
strictly,  for  Criminal  Law  ought  to  be  a  branch  of  Public  Law  (Aucoc, 
Introd.,  §  i),  but  it  has  been  put  into  the  charge  of  the  ordinary  courts. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 43 

tice  under  the  old  regime,^  but  was  extended  and  syste- 
matized after  the  Revolution.  The  protection  of  officials 
from  suit  or  prosecution  was  formally  incorporated  into  the 
Constitution  of  the  year  VIII  (1799),  and  remained  in  force 
until  after  the  fall  of  Napoleon  III,  when  it  was  repealed 
by  a  decree  of  the  Government  of  the  National  Defense.^ 
This  decree  was  intended  to  remove  all  hindrances  in  the 
way  of  bringing  government  officials  before  the  ordinary 
courts,  but  it  had  very  little  effect,  because  the  Tribunal 
of  Conflicts  held  that  it  applied  only  to  the  personal  pro- 
tection of  officials,  and  did  not  affect  the  principle  of  the 
separation  of  powers,  which,  as  understood  in  France,  for- 
bids the  ordinary  judges  to  pass  upon  the  legality  of  ofl&cial 
acts.' 

The  Administrative  Courts 

Questions  of  this  kind,  therefore,  are  still  reserved  ex- 
clusively for  the  administrative  courts  —  tribunals  created 
especially  for  this  purpose,  and  composed  of  ofiicials  in  the 
service  of  the  government.  Criminal  cases  are,  indeed,  an 
exception  to  the  rule,*  but  this  is  of  no  great  practical  im- 
portance, because  as  force  is  very  sure  to  be  on  the  side 
of  the  pohce,  it  is  no  real  protection  to  the  individual  to 
know  that  he  cannot  be  condemned  for  resistance;  and  on 
the  other  hand  the  officials  concerned  run  no  risk  of  punish- 
ment for  illegal  acts  committed  in  obedience  to  orders,  be- 

1  See  Laferriere,  TraiU,  liv.  i;  De  Tocquevillc,  An.  Reg.  et  la  Rev.,  book  ii, 
ch.  iv;  Varagnac,  "  Le  Conseil  d'Etat,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Aug.  15, 
1892. 

2  Decree  of  Sept.  19,  1870. 

»  Arret,  30  Juillet,  1873,  "  Affaire  P616tier,"  Dalloz,  Jur.  Gen.,  1874, 
part  iii,  p.  5;  Laferriere,  Traill,  liv.  iii,  ch.  vii;  Aucoc,  Conf.,  liv.  v,  ch.  ii; 
Goodnow,  Comp.  Adm.  Law,  ii.  172-176. 

*  Laferriere,  Traill,  liv.  iii,  ch.  vi.  But  even  this  e.xception  is  not  abso- 
lute.   See,  also,  a  discussion  of  the  subject  in  Dalloz,  1881,  part  iii,  p.  1 7,  note. 


144     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

cause  the  government  can  easily  manage  to  prevent  their 
being  brought  to  trial,  and  can  pardon  them  if  convicted. 
In  France,  therefore,  there  is  one  law  for  the  citizen  and 
another  for  the  public  official,  and  thus  the  executive  is 
really  independent  of  the  judiciary.  Nor  is  the  danger  of 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  administrative  tribunals  as 
great  as  it  would  be  in  the  case  of  the  ordinary  judges,  be- 
cause the  former  can  be  controlled  absolutely  in  case  of 
necessity;  and,  in  fact,  they  are  so  much  a  part  of  the  ad- 
ministration itself  that  they  fall  into  the  province  of  the 
Interior  and  not  that  of  Justice.^  The  independence  of  the 
ordinary  judges  is  secured  by  a  provision  which  prevents 
their  removal  or  transfer  to  another  court,  without  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Court  of  Cassation,  the  final  court  of  error. 
But  the  judges  of  the  administrative  courts  enjoy  no  such 
protection,  and  can  be  removed  by  the  President  at  any 
time.2  The  result  is  that,  although  a  great  mass  of  adminis- 
trative law  has  slowly  grown  up  from  the  decisions  of  these 
courts,^  and  personal  Hberty  is  much  more  respected  than 

1  It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  government  always  extorts  a 
favorable  judgment.  This  was  clearly  shown  in  1895,  in  a  once  famous 
case,  which  illustrates  at  the  same  time  the  degree  of  respect  entertained 
for  the  decisions  of  the  administrative  courts.  The  Minister  of  the  Interior 
and  the  railroads  disagreed  about  the  interpretation  of  a  statute  relating 
to  the  state  guarantee  of  interest  on  the  securities  of  the  roads.  The  matter 
was  brought  before  the  Council  of  State,  which  decided  in  favor  of  the  rail- 
road. Thereupon  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  resigned,  but  the  rest  of  the 
cabinet  felt  bound  to  abide  by  the  decision.  A  discussion  was,  however, 
raised  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  in  effect  censured  the  ministers 
for  submitting  the  matter  to  the  Council  of  State,  and  thereby  caused  the 
cabinet  to  resign. 

*  Aucoc,  Conf.,  i.  156-157;  Boeuf,  Resume,  pp.  39-40.  The  members  of  the 
Council  of  State  who  are  qualified  to  sit  as  administrative  judges  are  said  to 
be  always  selected  from  the  pohtical  friends  of  the  government  (Dupriez, 
Les  Minisires,  ii.  482-483). 

*  Unlike  the  civil  law,  the  administrative  law  has  never  been  codified, 
and  indeed  it  could  not  be  without  destroying  the  element  of  discretion 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 45 

under  the  Empire,  yet  the  courts  themselves  cannot  be 
considered  entirely  judicial  bodies,  and  are  far  from  pro- 
viding the  rights  of  the  citizen  with  a  complete  guarantee, 
at  least  where  political  questions  are  involved.' 

which  is  the  reason  for  its  existence.  So  far  as  it  is  not  contained  in  statutes 
and  ordinances,  it  has  developed,  like  the  English  Common  Law,  by  de- 
cision and  precedent,  and  hence  the  sources  for  studying  it  are  the  reported 
cases  and  the  writings  of  jurists  such  as  those  heretofore  cited. 

1  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  pp.  101-102;  Goodnow  {Comp.  Administra- 
tive Law,  ii.  220-221,  231)  remarks  that  the  administrative  courts  have 
shown  themselves  more  favorable  to  private  rights  than  the  ordinary  courts, 
and  in  some  ways  that  is  certainly  true.  In  English-speaking  countries  a 
public  oflicial  can  be  prosecuted  criminally  or  sued  for  damages  in  the  ordi- 
nary courts  for  any  acts  done  without  legal  authority,  whether  his  action 
was  in  the  public  interest  or  not.  But  he  is  not,  as  a  rule,  liable  for  acts 
authorized  by  law  although  his  actual  motives  were  bad  or  his  discretionary 
powers  misused.  Nor  is  he  usually  liable  for  negligence  in  the  performance 
of  his  duties.  The  state,  on  the  other  hand,  cannot  in  theory  be  sued  at  all. 
In  practice  some  means  of  maintaining  claims  against  the  state  is  almost 
always  provided;  but  only  for  breaches  of  contract  or  to  recover  property, 
not  for  torts  committed  by  officials. 

In  France  acts  of  officials  are  classified  in  quite  another  way  with  very 
different  results.  First,  there  are  personal  acts,  which  involve  grave  per- 
sonal misconduct  or  gross  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  official,  whether 
beyond  or  within  his  legal  authority.  For  these,  and  these  alone,  he  is  liable 
in  damages  in  the  ordinary  courts.  Whatever  he  does  in  good  faith  for  the 
public  interest,  whether  within  or  beyond  his  legal  authority,  is  an  act  of 
administration  for  which  a  remedy,  if  any,  can  be  sought  only  against  the 
state,  and  as  a  rule  only  in  the  administrative  courts.  Acts  of  this  kind  fall 
into  three  classes,  called  actes  de  gestion,  actes  d'aulhorite  and  actes  de  gouverne- 
tnent.  Broadly  speaking,  actes  de  gestion  are  acts  done  in  the  course  of  the 
regular  administration  of  the  public  services,  and  the  administrative  courts 
tend  to  award  compensation  against  the  state  for  acts  of  this  nature,  not 
only  when  done  wholly  without  legal  authority,  but  also  when  there  has  been 
an  abuse  of  that  authority  for  improper  purposes,  or  even  negligence,  as,  for 
example,  where  a  merchantman  has  been  damaged  by  collision  with  a  war- 
ship. (See  a  discussion  of  this  whole  subject  in  Hauriou,  La  Gestion  Adminis- 
trative.) Actes  d'authorite  are  done  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  the  state 
to  issue  commands  to  its  citizens;  and  if  such  commands,  orders  or  regula- 
tions are  issued  without  legal  authority,  or  involve  an  abuse  of  power,  they 
can  be  annulled  by  a  special  procedure  in  the  Council  of  State,  which  may 


146     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

It  is  not  quite  accurate  to  say  that  the  ordinary  courts 
can  consider  the  validity  of  no  official  act;  and,  indeed,  the 
line  between  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ordinary  and  the  ad- 
ministrative courts  does  not  follow  any  strictly  logical 
principle.^  Questions  of  indirect  taxes,  for  example,  and 
those  relating  to  the  lesser  highways  {petite  voirie),  come  be- 
fore the  ordinary  courts,  while  those  arising  under  the  direct 
taxes,  or  relating  to  the  greater  highways  (grande  voirie), 
come  before  the  administrative  tribunals.  The  competence 
of  the  various  administrative  courts  is  no  less  complicated. 
The  prefect  and  the  mayor  have  each  a  very  limited  juris- 
diction. That  of  the  prefectorial  councils,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  very  considerable,  although  as  a  matter  of  fact 
these  councils  are  occupied  almost  altogether  with  ques- 
tions of  taxes,  and  in  these,  as  a  rule,  they  follow  the  advice 

incidentally  award  compensation.  Finally  ades  de  goiivernement,  that  is 
acts  done  for  reasons  of  state  with  a  view  to  the  public  safety,  whether 
\vithin  the  legal  power  of  the  government  or  not,  lie  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
both  of  the  ordinary  and  the  administrative  courts;  but  there  is  a  distinct 
tendency  to  restrict  this  principle  to  an  ever  narrowing  field. 

It  is  obvious  that  while  the  French  system  does  not  hold  the  official  to 
a  rigid  conformity  with  law,  it  often  gives  compensation  from  the  public 
treasury  for  tortious  acts  of  officials  when  in  England  or  America  there 
would  be  no  redress,  or  only  an  action  against  an  official  who  might  be  un- 
able to  pay  the  damages. 

It  is  somewhat  curious  in  this  connection  to  observe  that  French  writers 
often  assert  the  inability  of  an  ordinary  court  to  protect  the  public  against 
illegal  ordinances,  because  it  can  only  decide  the  case  at  bar,  whereas  an 
administrative  court  has  power  to  annul  the  ordinance  altogether;  a  re- 
mark which  shows  an  entire  failure  to  comprehend  the  force  of  precedent  in 
the  Anglo-Saxon  judicial  system.  (See,  for  example,  Varagnac,  "  Le  Conseil 
d'Etat,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Sept.  15,  1892,  pp.  290-291.) 

A  systematic  comparison  of  the  English  and  French  systems  may  be 
found  in  Professor  Dicey's  Law  of  the  Constitution,  and  especially  in  chapter 
xii. 

1  On  this  subject,  see  Laferriere's  great  work,  Traite  de  la  Jurisdiction 
Administrative. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 47 

of  the  assessors.^  But  by  far  the  most  important  adminis- 
trative court  is  the  Council  of  State,  which  has  a  special 
section  or  committee  to  attend  to  the  contentieux,  as  this 
class  of  litigation  is  called.  The  Council  not  only  hears 
appeals  from  the  lower  administrative  tribunals,  but  has 
also  original  jurisdiction  in  many  important  cases;  and,  in 
fact,  recent  practice  is  tending  to  establish  the  principle 
that  the  Council  of  State  is  the  judge  of  all  administrative 
matters  in  the  absence  of  special  provisions  of  law.  The 
number  of  cases  brought  before  it  is  very  large,  and  has  in- 
creased so  rapidly  that  the  section  for  the  conteniieux  is 
badly  in  arrears,  and  it  has  been  proposed  to  create  a  sec- 
ond section  to  relieve  the  pressure.^ 

The  Court  of  Conflicts 

It  is  evident  that  with  two  sets  of  courts,  neither  of  which 
is  superior  to  the  other,  disputes  about  jurisdiction  must 
constantly  arise.  Such  is  in  fact  the  case,  and  a  special 
tribunal  has  been  appointed  to  determine  these  disputes, 
or  conflicts  as  they  are  called.^  It  is  composed  of  the  Min- 
ister of  Justice,  of  three  members  of  the  highest  court  of 
law,  the  Court  of  Cassation,  of  three  members  of  the  high- 
est administrative  court,  the  Council  of  State  (each  of  these 
sets  being  selected  by  their  own  court),  and  of  two  other 
persons  elected  by  the  foregoing  seven.  All  the  members 
are  chosen  for  three  years,  except  the  Minister  of  Justice. 
This  officer  has  the  right  to  preside,  and  thus  his  presence 
gives  to  the  administration  a  majority  in  the  tribunal.  A 
striking  example  of  the  working  of  the  system  was  presented 

1  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  R6forme  Administrative  —  La  Justice,"  Revue 
des  Deux  Mondes,  June  i,  1889,  p.  596. 

^  For  the  number  of  cases  decided  by  the  administrative  courts,  see  the 
tables  (through  1886)  in  Laferri^re,  liv.  i,  ch.  v. 

'  Aucoc,  Conf.,  vol.  i,  §  406;  Bceuf,  Risumi,  isth  ed.,  pp.  542-543. 


148     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

in  1880,  when  the  government  issued  decrees  for  the  sup- 
pression of  all  monastic  orders  not  authorized  by  law. 
There  seems  to  have  been  grave  doubt  about  the  legality  of 
the  decrees,  and  the  victims  brought  suits  in  the  ordinary 
courts  in  several  parts  of  France.  Most  of  these  courts  held 
that  they  were  authorized  to  entertain  the  suits,  and  in 
some  cases  they  went  so  far  as  to  order  the  persons  who  had 
been  expelled  from  their  estabhshments  to  be  restored  to 
possession  pending  the  trial;  ^  but  the  government  raised 
the  question  of  jurisdiction,  and  the  Tribunal  of  Conflicts 
decided  that  the  ordinary  courts  were  not  competent  to 
deal  with  the  matter.^  It  is  a  significant  fact,  which  seems 
to  show  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  impartiality  of  the  ad- 
ministrative courts,  that  the  persons  injured  did  not  bring 
the  question  of  the  legaHty  of  the  decrees  before  the  Council 
of  State. ^ 

When  an  ordinary  court  has  assumed  jurisdiction  of  a 
case,  the  question  of  competence  can  be  raised  only  by  the 
prefect,  and  not  by  a  party,  for  the  principle  that  the  ordi- 
nary courts  cannot  determine  the  legality  of  official  acts  is 
intended  solely  as  a  protection  to  the  administration."* 

The  State  of  Siege 

Such  is  the  legal  position  of  the  administration  in  ordinary 
times,  but  in  case  of  war  or  insurrection  it  can  be  given  far 

^  Some  of  the  decisions  to  this  effect  may  be  found  in  Dalloz,  Jurispru- 
dence Generate,  1880,  part  iii,  pp.  57-62,  and  80.  In  the  note  to  page  57  there 
is  a  list  of  some  of  the  other  similar  decisions  and  a  discussion  of  the  law. 

^  Arrets  de  Nov.  4,  5,  13,  17,  and  20;  Dalloz,  1880,  part  iii,  pp.  121-132. 
These  cases  are  reported  with  unusual  fullness. 

'  At  least  I  can  find  no  decision  on  the  subject  by  the  Council  of  State 
reported  in  Dalloz.  For  criticisms  on  the  conduct  of  the  government,  see 
Jules  Simon,  Dieu,  Partie,  Liberie,  ch.  vi;  and  Channes,  Nos  Fatites,  letters 
of  July  12  and  Oct.  27,  1880. 

*  Aucoc,  Conf.,  vol.  i,  §  404;  Boeuf,  Resume,  15th  ed.,  p.  547. 


FRANCE:  INSTITUTIONS  1 49 

greater  powers,  by  a  proclamation  of  the  state  of  siege. 
This  can  be  made  by  statute,  or  if  Parliament  is  not  in 
session  it  can  be  made  by  the  President;  but  in  that  case 
in  order  to  meet  the  danger  of  a  coup  d'eiai,  which  is  ever 
present  to  the  eyes  of  Frenchmen,  it  is  provided  that  the 
chambers  shall  meet  as  of  right  in  two  days.^  Within  the 
district  covered  by  the  state  of  siege,  the  military  courts 
can  be  given  criminal  jurisdiction,  and  can  punish  any 
offenses  against  the  safety  of  the  Republic  or  the  general 
peace.  They  can  search  houses  by  day  or  night,  expel  from 
the  district  any  non-residents,  seize  all  arms,  and  forbid 
any  pubhcations  or  meetings  which  are  Hable  to  disturb 
the  public  order.^ 

Effect  on  the  Executive 

I  have  dwelt  at  some  length  on  what,  from  an  Anglo- 
Saxon  point  of  view,  may  well  be  called  the  legislative  and 
judicial  powers  of  the  executive  in  France,  because  these 
things  are  entirely  foreign  to  our  own  poHtical  ideas  and 
experience,  and  because  they  exist  in  some  form  in  almost 
every  country  on  the  continent  of  Europe. 

When  we  consider  the  paternal  character  of  the  govern- 
ment, the  centraUzation  of  the  state,  and  the  large  share 
of  authority  vested  in  the  executive  department,  we  can- 
not fail  to  see  that  the  ministers  in  whose  hands  this  vast 
power  is  lodged  must  be  either  very  strong  or  very  weak. 
If  they  are  able  to  wield  it  as  they  please,  and  are  really 
free  to  carry  out  their  own  policy,  they  must  be  far  stronger 
than  any  officer  or  body  in  Great  Britain,  and  immeasurably 
stronger  than  any  in  our  federal  repubhc.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  very  immensity  and  pervasiveness  of  their  power, 
the  fact  that  it  touches  closely  every  interest  in  the  country, 

1  Law  of  April  3,  1878,  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  79. 
"  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  76,  gives  the  text  of  the  law. 


I50     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

renders  them  liable  to  pressure  from  all  sides.  It  becomes 
important  for  every  one  to  influence  their  action,  provided 
he  can  get  a  standpoint  from  which  to  bring  a  pressure  to 
bear.  This  standpoint  is  furnished  by  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  for  the  existence  of  the  ministry  depends  on  the 
votes  of  that  body.  The  greater,  therefore,  the  power  of 
the  minister,  and  the  more  numerous  the  favors  he  is  able 
to  bestow,  the  fiercer  will  be  the  struggle  for  them,  and  the 
less  will  he  be  free  to  pursue  his  own  poHcy,  untrammeled 
by  deputies,  whose  votes  he  must  win  if  he  would  remain 
in  office.  A  Frenchman,  who  is  eminent  as  a  student  of 
political  philosophy,  and  has  at  the  same  time  great  practi- 
cal experience  in  poHtics,  once  remarked  to  the  author, 
"  We  have  the  organization  of  an  empire  with  the  forms  of 
a  repubhc."  ^  The  French  administrative  system  is,  in- 
deed, designed  for  an  empire,  but  when  arbitrary  power 
falls  under  the  control  of  popular  leaders,  it  is  hable  to  be 
used  for  personal  and  party  ends;  for,  as  a  keen  observer 
has  truly  said,  the  defect  of  democracy  Hes  in  the  fact  that 
it  is  nobody's  business  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the 
public. 

1  Gneist  expresses  the  same  idea:  "  Es  entsleht  der  unvermittelte  Gegensatz 
einer  repuUikanisch  gedachten  Verfassung  mil  einer  absolutistisch  organisirten 
Verwaltung."     (Die  Preussiche   Kreisordnung,  p.  7.) 


CHAPTER  VII 


FRANCE:  PARTIES 


Parlies  in  Popular  Governmenl 

For  more  than  a  hundred  years  it  has  been  the  habit  to  talk 
of  government  by  the  people,  and  the  expression  is,  perhaps, 
more  freely  used  to-day  than  ever  before,  yet  a  superficial 
glance  at  the  history  of  democracy  ought  to  be  enough  to 
convince  us  that  in  a  great  nation  the  people  as  a  whole  do 
not  and  cannot  really  govern.  The  fact  is  that  we  are 
ruled  by  parties,  whose  action  is  more  or  less  modified,  but 
never  completely  directed,  by  public  opinion.  Rousseau, 
indeed,  shadowed  forth  a  great  truth,  when  he  declared  that 
no  community  could  be  capable  of  a  general  will  —  or,  as  we 
should  express  it,  of  a  true  public  opinion  —  where  parties  or 
sects  prevailed ; '  and  our  own  experience  of  popular  govern- 
ment will  quite  justify  us  in  saying  that  public  opinion  is 
always  more  or  less  warped  by  the  existence  of  party  ties. 
A  study  of  the  nature  and  development  of  parties  is,  there- 
fore, one  of  the  most  important  that  can  occupy  the  student 
of  political  philosophy  to-day.  Among  Anglo-Saxon  peoples, 
who  have  had  a  far  longer  experience  in  self-government 
than  most  other  races,  there  are  usually  two  great  parties 
which  dispute  for  mastery  in  the  state.  But  in  the  countries 
on  the  continent  of  Europe  this  is  not  usually  true.  We 
there  find  a  number  of  parties  or  groups  which  are  independ- 
ent of  each  other  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  and  form  coali- 
tions, sometimes  of  a  most  unnatural  kind,  to  support  or 
oppose  the  government  of  the  hour.  Now  the  existence  of 
^  Contrat  Social,  liv.  ii,  ch.  iii. 


152     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

several  distinct  political  groups  has  a  decisive  influence  on 
the  working  of  the  parliamentary  system.  Let  us  consider 
this  question  a  moment. 

The  Parliamentary  System  and  Parties 

In  describing  the  EngHsh  government  the  relation  of 
political  parties  to  the  parhamentary  system  was  discussed, 
but  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  recall  what  was  there 
pointed  out. 

When  a  country  with  a  parliamentary  form  of  govern- 
ment is  divided  into  two  hostile  parties,  the  ministers  who 
lead  the  majority  of  the  popular  chamber  must  of  course 
belong  all  to  one  of  those  parties,  or  all  to  the  other,  and 
even  when  party  strife  is  less  bitter,  and  parties  have  begun 
to  break  up,  experience  has  proved  that  the  best  policy  for 
the  ministers  is  to  support  each  other  and  stand  or  fall  to- 
gether. Lord  Melbourne  is  reported  to  have  exclaimed  at  a 
cabinet  meeting,  after  a  discussion  on  the  question  of  chang- 
ing the  duty  on  corn,  "  Now  is  it  to  lower  the  price  of  corn, 
or  is  n't  it  ?  It  is  not  much  matter  which  we  say,  but  mind, 
we  must  all  say  the  same."  ^  The  statesmanship  impHed  by 
this  remark  may  not  have  been  of  the  highest  kind,  but  the 
politics  were  sound,  and  showed  a  knowledge  of  the  great 
secret  of  success.  It  is,  indeed,  an  axiom  in  poHtics  that, 
except  under  very  pecuhar  circumstances,^  coalition  min- 
istries are  short-lived  compared  with  homogeneous  ones, 
whose  members  are  in  cordial  sympathy  with  each  other. 
Now  so  long  as  the  ministers  cling  together,  every  member 
of  the  House  must  consider  the  cabinet  and  its  policy  as  a 
whole,  and  make  up  his  mind  whether  he  will  support  it,  or 
help  to  turn  it  out  and  put  in  an  entirely  different  set  of 

1  Bagehot,  English  Constitution,  p.  i6,  note. 
^  Like  those  brought  about  by  this  war. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  153 

ministers  with  another  policy.  He  cannot  support  the 
cabinet  on  certain  questions  and  oppose  it  on  others.  He 
must  sacrifice  details  to  the  general  question.  The  result  is 
that  the  members  either  group  themselves  about  the  minis- 
ters, and  vote  with  them  through  thick  and  thin,  or  else  they 
attach  themselves  to  an  opposition  party,  whose  object  is  to 
turn  out  the  cabinet,  and  then  take  office  itself  and  carry  on 
a  different  policy.  The  normal  condition  of  the  parhamen- 
tary  system,  therefore,  among  a  people  sufficiently  free  from 
prejudices  to  group  themselves  naturally,  and  possessing 
enough  experience  to  know  that  the  practical  and  attain- 
able, and  not  the  ideal,  is  the  true  aim  in  politics,  is  a  divi- 
sion into  two  parties,  each  of  which  is  ready  to  take  office 
whenever  the  other  loses  its  majority.  This  has  been  true  in 
England  in  ordinary  times,  and  although  of  late  years  it  has 
been  frequently  asserted  that  the  two  great  parties  in  the 
House  of  Commons  are  destined  to  come  to  an  end,  and  be 
replaced  by  a  number  of  independent  groups,  the  prophecy 
does  not  accord  with  experience.  It  is  based  on  mistaking 
a  temporary  political  condition  for  a  permanent  one.  The 
sudden  interjection  of  the  question  of  Home  Rule  into  Eng- 
Hsh  politics  caused  a  new  party  division  on  fresh  Hnes,  which 
necessarily  broke  up  the  traditional  associations  of  pubHc 
life,  and  threw  both  parties  into  a  state  of  confusion  for 
a  great  many  years.  On  one  side,  the  opponents  of  the 
measure  were  composed  of  men  whose  habits  of  thought 
had  been  most  diverse;  while  the  followers  of  Mr.  Gladstone, 
on  the  other  side,  included  many  Liberals  who  were  forced, 
against  their  will,  to  subordinate  to  Home  Rule  other  mat- 
ters which  they  deemed  more  important.  In  short,  the 
introduction  of  a  new  issue  shattered  the  old  basis  of  cleav- 
age, and  it  is  not  surprising  that  new,  solidified  parties  were 
not  formed  in  an  instant.    Moreover  it  may  be  noticed  that 


154     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

although  the  Liberal  groups  in  the  House  of  Commons  have 
often  talked  freely  of  their  dissensions,  they  have  acted  as  a 
single  party,  and  have  supported  the  cabinet  by  their  votes, 
with  astonishing  fidelity. 

A  division  into  two  parties  is  not  only  the  normal  result 
of  the  parHamentary  system,  but  also  an  essential  condition 
of  its  success.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  a  third  party,  like 
that  of  the  Irish  Home  Rulers  under  Parnell,  is  formed,  and 
places  some  one  specific  issue  above  all  others,  with  the 
determination  of  voting  against  any  cabinet  which  does  not 
yield  to  its  demands  on  that  point;  and  suppose  this  body 
becomes  large  enough  to  hold  the  balance  of  power.  If,  in 
such  a  case,  the  two  old  parties  do  not  make  a  coalition,  or 
one  of  them  does  not  absorb  the  new  group  by  making  con- 
cessions, no  ministry  will  be  able  to  secure  a  majority.  Every 
cabinet  will  be  overthrown  as  soon  as  it  is  formed,  and  parHa- 
mentary government  will  be  an  impossibiHty.  Now  suppose 
that  the  third  party,  instead  of  being  implacably  hostile  to 
both  the  others,  is  willing  for  a  time  to  tolerate  a  cabinet 
from  one  of  them  —  is  willing,  in  short,  to  allow  the  minis- 
ters to  retain  office  provided  they  give  no  offense.  Under 
these  circumstances  parHamentary  government  is  not  im- 
possible, but  it  is  extremely  difficult.  The  ministers  are 
compelled  to  ride  two  horses  at  once.  They  must  try  to  con- 
ciHate  two  inharmonious  bodies  of  men,  on  pain  of  defeat  if 
either  of  them  becomes  hostile;  and  hence  their  tenure  is 
unstable  and  their  course  necessarily  timid.  Now  the  larger 
the  number  of  discordant  groups  that  form  the  majority,  the 
harder  the  task  of  pleasing  them  all,  and  the  more  feeble  and 
unstable  the  position  of  the  cabinet.  Nor  is  the  difficulty 
removed  by  giving  portfoHos  to  the  members  of  the  several 
groups;  for  even  if  this  reduces  the  labor  of  satisfying  the 
parties,  it  adds  that  of  maintaining  an  accord  among  the 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 55 

ministers  themselves,  and  entails  the  proverbial  weakness  of 
coahtion  governments.  A  cabinet  which  depends  for  its 
existence  on  the  votes  of  the  Chamber  can  pursue  a  con- 
sistent policy  with  firmness  and  effect  only  when  it  can  rely 
for  support  on  a  compact  and  faithful  majority;  and  there- 
fore the  parliamentary  system  will  give  the  country  a  strong 
and  efficient  government  only  in  case  the  majority  consists 
of  a  single  party.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  opposition  must 
also  be  united.  So  long  as  the  ministry  stands,  the  composi- 
tion of  the  minority  is,  indeed,  of  little  consequence;  but 
when  that  minority  becomes  a  majority,  it  must  in  turn  be  a 
single  party,  or  the  weakness  of  a  coalition  ministry  cannot 
be  avoided.  It  follows  that  a  division  of  the  Chamber  into 
two  parties,  and  two  parties  only,  is  necessary  in  order  that 
the  parliamentary  form  of  government  should  permanently 
produce  good  results. 

Many  Groups  in  France 

In  France  the  parliamentary  system  has  not  worked 
smoothly,  because  this  condition  has  not  been  fulfilled.^  The 
various  groups  of  Monarchists  and  Bonapartists  formed  in 
the  traditional  party  of  the  Reactionaries,  or  as  it  was  more 
commonly  called,  the  Right. ^    The  rest  of  the  members  have 

'  This  is  recognized  by  many  French  writers,  e.g.,  Lamy,  La  Ripubliqiie 
en  iSSj;  Paul  Laffitte,  Le  Suffrage  Universel  ei  la  Regime  Parlementaire,  pt.  i, 
ch.  iii;  Saleilles,  in  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  Science, 
July,  1895,  pp.  57,  64,  65.  But  the  reason  for  the  existence  of  a  number  of 
groups  in  France  seems  to  be  only  partially  understood.  The  most  clear- 
sighted writer  on  this  subject  is  Dupriez.  (See  Les  Minislres,  ii.  363-365, 
370-371,  and  386-395.) 

^  For  readers  unfamiliar  with  European  politics  it  may  perhaps  be  neces- 
sary to  e.x'plain  the  meaning  of  the  terms  Right  and  Left,  as  they  are  used 
all  over  the  Continent.  In  England  a  broad  aisle  runs  from  the  Speaker's 
desk  through  the  middle  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  the  main  entrance 
opposite,  and  the  benches  of  the  members  are  arranged  parallel  to  this  aisle 
and  facing  it.    The  Ministry  sit  on  the  front  bench  at  the  right  of  the  Speaker 


156     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

been  supporters  of  the  Republic,  and  have  formed  nominally 
a  single  party,  but  they  have  really  been  held  together  only 
by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  existing  form  of  government,  and 
have  seldom  acted  in  concert  except  when  they  thought  that 
threatened.  They  have  always  comprised  men  of  every 
shade  of  opinion,  from  conservatives  to  radicals  and  even 
sociaUsts,  and  would  speedily  have  broken  up  into  com- 
pletely hostile  parties,  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  fear  of  the 
Reactionaries.  Even  under  the  pressure  of  this  fear  their 
cohesion  has  been  very  slight,  for  they  have  been  divided 
into  a  number  of  groups  with  organizations  which,  though 
never  either  complete  or  durable,  have  been  quite  separate; 
and  again,  these  groups  have  often  been  subdivided  into  still 
smaller  groups,  whose  members  were  loosely  held  together 
by  similarity  of  opinions  or  desire  for  advancement,  usually 
under  the  standard  of  some  chief,  who  held,  or  hoped  to  win, 
a  place  in  the  cabinet.  In  fact,  the  parties  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  have  presented  such  a  series  of  dissolving  views 
that  it  is  very  difficult  to  draw  an  intelligible  picture  of 
them.^ 

(the  so-called  Treasury  Bench),  their  supporters  taking  seats  behind  and 
alongside  of  them,  while  the  Opposition  sit  on  the  left  side  of  the  House.  The 
Liberals  and  Conservatives,  therefore,  are  each  to  be  found  sometimes  on 
one  side  of  the  House  and  sometimes  on  the  other,  according  as  their  party 
is  in  power  or  not.  But  on  the  Continent  the  seats  are  arranged,  as  a  rule, 
like  those  of  a  theatre,  as  in  our  legisaltive  bodies,  the  ministers  usually 
sitting  immediately  in  front  of  the  Speaker  or  President,  on  a  bench  which 
sometimes  faces  him  and  sometimes  looks  the  other  way,  while  the  conserva- 
tive members  sit  on  the  President's  right,  the  more  liberal  next  to  these,  and 
the  radical  on  his  left.  As  this  arrangement  is  permanent,  the  words  Right 
and  Left  have  come  to  be  generally  used  for  Conservative  and  Liberal;  and 
the  different  groups  are  often  designated  by  their  position  in  the  Chamber, 
as  the  Right,  the  Centre,  and  the  Left  Centre,  the  Left,  or  the  Extreme  Left. 
^  The  line  of  cleavage  between  the  monarchists  and  republicans  has  now 
ceased  to  be  of  much  importance.  All  the  larger  factions  now  profess  to 
be  republican.  These  factions  are  constantly  gaining  or  losing  members  so 
that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  state  their  exact  numerical  strength  at  any 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  I  57 

During  the  struggle  with  MacMahon,  the  Republicans 
had  been  soHdly  united,  but  the  danger  had  not  passed  very 
long  before  the  Radicals  began  to  show  themselves  independ- 
ent. They  soon  became  quite  ready  to  upset  any  ministry 
that  offended  them,  and  in  fact  cabinet  after  cabinet  was 
overthrown  by  the  votes  of  the  Right  and  the  Extreme  Left. 
Even  Gambetta,  who  had  striven  to  keep  the  Republicans 
together,  did  not  escape  this  fate,  in  spite  of  his  immense 
popularity  both  in  the  country  and  in  the  Parliament.  He 
did  not  consent  to  form  a  ministry  until  November,  1881; 
and  after  holding  office  only  two  months  and  a  half,  he  was 
forced  to  resign  by  the  refusal  of  the  Chamber  to  introduce 
the  scrutin  de  lisle  for  the  election  of  deputies.  He  lived  only 
till  the  end  of  the  year,  and  his  death  deprived  France  of  a 
great  popular  leader.  After  his  fall,  politics  followed  the  old 
course,  and  there  passed  across  the  stage  a  series  of  short- 
lived ministries. 

During  the  last  few  years  there  has  indeed  been  a  nearer 
approach  to  a  division  of  the  deputies  into  two  great  parties 
—  one  Conservative  and  the  other  Radical  —  than  at  any 
other  time  since  the  birth  of  the  Republic ;  and  yet  the  his- 
tory of  the  successive  ministries  during  the  hfe  of  the  later 
chambers  makes  it  clear  with  how  little  sharpness  the  Hnes 
are  drawn,  and  how  little  the  members  of  the  various  groups 

one  time.  Sometimes  it  happens,  indeed,  that  a  member  of  the  Chamber 
may  profess  to  belong  to  two  political  groups  at  the  same  time.  No  single 
faction  ever  forms  a  majority  of  the  Chamber  so  that  a  coalition  is  always 
necessary.  The  following  groups  at  present  make  up  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties but  their  names  afTord,  for  the  most  part,  no  indication  of  the  principles 
to  which  they  give  allegiance:  Conservatives  (or  members  of  the  extreme 
Right);  Nationalists  (members  of  the  Action  Liberale  populaire);  Pro- 
gressives; Republicans  (or  Moderates);  Radicals;  Radical-Socialists;  In- 
dependent SociaHsts;  and  Independents.  The  first  three  groups  make  up 
the  Right;  the  last  five  usually  make  up  the  Left;  but  some  of  the  smaller 
groups  keep  shifting  from  side  to  side. 


158     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

that  compose  the  majority  can  be  reUed  upon  to  be  faithful 
to  the  cabinet.  In  short,  there  has  been  an  approach  to  the 
system  of  two  parties,  but  as  yet  not  a  very  near  approach, 
and  the  numerous  detached  groups  still  remain  the  basis  of 
parKamentary  life. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  reasons  for  the  subdivisions  of  the 
Chamber  into  a  number  of  groups.  And  first  we  must  look 
at  a  source  of  political  dissensions  with  which  we  are  not 
familiar  at  home,  but  which  is  to  be  found  in  almost  every 
nation  in  Europe. 

The  Lack  of  Political  Consensus 

Few  persons  ever  ask  themselves  why  the  bodies  of  men 
who  assemble  every  year  at  the  State  House  or  the  Capitol 
have  power  to  make  laws.  It  is  not  because  they  have  more 
personal  force  or  wisdom  or  ^•irtue  than  any  one  else.  A 
congress  of  scientific  men  may  contain  all  these  quahties  in 
greater  abundance,  but  it  cannot  change  a  single  line  in  the 
statute-book.  Is  it  because  they  represent  the  people  ? 
But  we  all  know  that  they  occasionally  pass  laws  which  the 
people  do  not  want,  and  yet  we  obey  those  laws  without 
hesitation.  Moreover,  this  answer  only  pushes  the  question 
one  step  further  back,  for  why  should  we  obey  the  people  ? 
A  few  centuries  ago  nobody  recognized  an}-  right  on  the  part 
of  the  people  to  govern  or  misgovern  themselves  as  they 
chose,  or  rather  on  the  part  of  the  majority  to  impose  their 
will  on  the  minority;  and  in  many  countries  of  the  world  no 
such  right  is  recognized  to-day.  How  does  it  happen  that 
there  is  not  a  class  of  men  among  us  who  think  that  the  legis- 
lature does  not  fairly  represent  the  people,  or  who  think 
that  the  right  to  vote  ought  to  be  limited  by  a  certain  edu- 
cational or  property  qualification,  or  by  the  profession  of  a 
certain  creed;  and  why  does  not  some  such  class  of  men  get 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 59 

up  a  rival  legislature  ?    The  fact  is  that,  while  we  may  differ 
in  regard  to  the  ideal  form  of  government,  we  are  all  of  one 
mind  on  the  question  of  what  government  is  entitled  to  our 
actual  allegiance,  and  we  are  all  determined  to  yield  to  that 
government  our  obedience  and  support.    In  short,  a  common 
understanding  or  consensus  in  regard  to  the  basis  and  form 
of  the  government  is  so  universal  here  that  we  feel  as  if  it 
were  natural  and  inevitable;  but  in  all  countries  this  is  not 
so.    Such  a  consensus  is  the  foundation  of  all  pohtical  au- 
thority, of  all  law  and  order;  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  if  it 
were  seriously  questioned,  the  position  of  the  government 
would  be  shaken,  that  if  it  were  destroyed,  the  country 
would  be  plunged  into  a  state  of  anarchy.'    Now  persons  who 
do  not  accept  the  consensus  on  which  the  pohtical  authority 
of  the  day  is  based  are  termed  in  France  Irreconcilables. 
Men  of  this  sort  do  not  admit  the  rightfulness  of  the  existing 
government;  and,  although  they  may  submit  to  it  for  the 
moment,  their  object  is  to  effect  a  revolution  by  peaceful  if 
not  by  violent  means.    Hence  their  position  is  essentially 
different  from  that  of  all  other  parties,  for  these  aim  only  at 
directing  the  pohcy  of  the  government  within  constitutional 
limits,  and  can  be  entrusted  with  power  without  danger  to 
the  fundamental  institutions  of  the  nation,  while  the  Irrec- 
oncilables, on  the  contrary,  would  use  their  power  to  upset 
those  institutions,  and  therefore  cannot  be  suffered  to  get 
control  of  the  state.    They  form  an  opposition  that  is  incap- 
able of  taking  office,  and  so  present  a  disturbing  element, 
which  in  a  parhamentary  form  of  government  throws  the 
whole  system  out  of  gear.^ 

*  The  revolution  in  Russia  and  its  sequal  is  a  forcible  illustration  of  this 
truth. 

*  It  is  impossible  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between  what  is  revolutionary  and 
what  is  not;  or  to  define  e.xactly  an  Irreconcilable.  The  matter  depends  in 
fact  upon  the  opinion  of  the  community.    Thus,  before  1886,  Home  Rule 


l6o     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Another  thing  to  be  noticed  about  a  consensus  is  that  it 
cannot  be  created  artificially,  but  must  be  the  result  of  a 
slow  growth  and  long  traditions.  Its  essence  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  unconscious.  The  people  of  the  United  States,  for 
example,  could  not,  by  agreement,  give  to  a  dictator  the 
power  of  the  Czar  of  Russia,  for  except  in  the  presence  of 
imminent  danger  he  would  have  no  authority  unless  the 
people  beheved  in  his  inherent  right  to  rule,  and  the  people 
cannot  make  themselves  believe  in  any  such  right  simply  by 
agreeing  to  do  so.  The  foundation  of  goverrmient  is  faith, 
not  reason,  and  the  faith  of  a  people  is  not  vital  unless  they 
have  been  born  with  it.^  Now,  in  France,  the  Revolution  of 
1789  destroyed  all  faith  in  the  poKtical  institutions  of  the 
past,  and  was  unable  to  substitute  anything  else.  It  did, 
indeed,  give  birth  to  a  code  of  law,  and  to  an  administrative 
system,  both  of  which  have  taken  a  strong  hold  on  the  na- 
tion, and  have  survived  every  change  in  the  government. 
These  have  been  the  permanent  elements  in  France,  and  the 
only  ones  that  acquired  the  bhnd  force  of  tradition.  They 
have  supphed  a  machinery  unshaken  by  political  upheavals, 
and  it  is  this  that  has  made  it  possible  for  the  country  to 
pass  through  so  many  revolutions  without  falling  into  a  state 
of  anarchy.2    But  in  regard  to  institutions  of  a  purely  poHti- 

might  fairly  be  said  to  have  been  revolutionary,  and  the  Irish  Home  Rulers 
to  have  been  Irreconcilables;  but  after  Mr.  Gladstone  made  Home  Rule  a 
practical  question  in  English  politics,  it  would  have  been  absurd  to  call 
Parnell's  followers  Irreconcilables. 

1  Curiously  enough  an  exception  to  this  principle,  and  almost  a  solitary 
one,  is  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  United  States.  The  generation  that 
framed  the  Constitution  looked  upon  that  document  as  very  imperfect,  but 
they  clung  to  it  tenaciously  as  the  only  defense  against  national  dismember- 
ment, and  in  order  to  make  it  popular,  they  praised  it  beyond  their  own 
belief  in  its  merits.  This  effort  to  force  themselves  to  admire  the  Constitu- 
tion was  marvelously  successful,  and  resulted,  in  the  next  generation,  in  a 
worship  of  the  Constitution,  of  which  its  framers  never  dreamed. 

*  Cf.  Lafl&tte,  pp.  208,  209. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  l6l 

cal  character,  the  nation  has  not  been  so  fortunate,  for  the 
governments  that  followed  the  Revolution  were  not  suffi- 
ciently durable  to  lay  even  a  foundation  for  a  general  con- 
sensus, and  the  lack  of  continuity  so  thoroughly  prevented 
the  steady  growth  of  opinion  that  only  of  late  years  have  the 
people  as  a  whole  succeeded  in  acquiring  a  political  creed. 
The  result  is  that  every  form  of  government  that  has  existed 
in  France  has  had  its  partisans,  who  were  irreconcilable 
under  every  other;  while  the  great  mass  of  the  middle  classes 
and  the  peasants  had  no  strong  poHtical  convictions,  and 
were  ready  to  support  any  government  that  maintained 
order.  Thus  the  two  Empires  bequeathed  to  the  RepubHc 
the  group  of  Bonapartists,  whereas  the  Monarchists  were  a 
legacy  from  the  old  regime  and  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe. 
At  present,  the  Right  having  accepted  the  Republic,  and  the 
irreconcilable  elements  disappearing  or  becoming  insig- 
nificant, one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  the  formation  of  two 
great  parties,  one  Conservative  and  the  other  Radical,  has 
been  removed.^ 

But  this  is  only  one  of  several  obstacles,  and  the  others  are 
so  great  that  it  will  probably  be  a  long  time  before  the  sys- 
tem of  groups  breaks  down  in  France,  or  is  replaced  by  that 
of  two  political  parties. 

French  Political  Opinions  Theoretical 

In  the  first  place,  the  Frenchman  has  been  theoretical 
rather  than  practical  in  pohtics.  He  has  tended  to  pursue  an 
ideal,  striving  to  reahze  his  conception  of  a  perfect  form  of 
society,  and  is  reluctant  to  give  up  any  part  of  it  for  the  sake 
of  attaining  so  much  as  lies  within  his  reach.  Such  a  tend- 
ency naturally  gives  rise  to  a  number  of  groups,  each  with  a 

1  During  the  present  war,  there  has  certainly  been  no  strong  recrudescence 
of  irreconcilable  opinion. 


1 62     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

separate  ideal,  and  each  unwilling  to  make  the  sacrifice  that 
is  necessary  for  a  fusion  into  a  great  party.    In  short,  the 
intensity  of  political  sentiment  tends  to  prevent  the  develop- 
ment of  real  political  issues.     To  many  Frenchmen,  public 
questions  have  an  absolute  rather  than  a  relative  or  practical 
bearing,  and  therefore  they  care  more  for  principles    and 
opinions  than  for  facts.    This  tendency  is  shown  in  the  pro- 
grammes of  the  candidates,  which  are  apt  to  be  philosophic 
documents  instead  of  statements  of  concrete  policy,  and, 
although  published  at  great  length,  often  give  a  compara- 
tively small  idea  of  the  position  of  the  author  on  the  im- 
mediate questions  of  the  day.^     It  is  shown  also  in  the 
newspapers,  and  the  use  that  is  made  of  them.    An  Anglo- 
Saxon  reads  the  newspapers  chiefly  for  information  about 
current  events,  and  as  all  the  papers  contain  very  much  the 
same  news,  he  habitually  reads  only  one.    But  the  French 
papers  contain  far  less  news,  and  as  the  Frenchman  reads 
them  largely  for  the  sake  of  the  editorials,  he  commonly 
reads  several  in  order  to  compare  the  opinions  they  express. 
It  is  partly  on  account  of  this  mental  attitude,  and  partly 
owing  to  the  absence  of  the  habit  of  self-government,  and  the 
lack  of  sympathy  between  different  parts  of  the  country, 

1  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  85. 

Abstracts  of  all  the  electoral  programmes  issued  by  the  successful  candi- 
dates for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  at  the  elections  of  1889  and  1893,  together 
with  the  results  of  the  ballots,  have  been  published  by  Duguet,  under  the 
titles  Les  Deputes  et  les  Cahiers  Electoraux.  These  volumes  are  very  instruc- 
tive; and  a  perusal  of  them  shows  that  the  programmes  of  the  Radicals  are 
much  longer  and  less  vague  than  the  others,  but  often  demand  measures 
which  lie  out  of  the  domain  of  practical  politics,  such  as  revision  of  the  Con- 
stitution, abolition  of  the  Senate,  elective  judiciary,  etc.  The  programmes 
gave  a  very  good  idea  of  the  candidate's  general  turn  of  mind;  and  those  of 
the  Radicals  may  be  said  to  contain  their  conception  of  the  ideal  state  of 
politics  or  of  society.  The  Radicals  are,  indeed,  the  only  group  among  the 
Republicans  that  can  be  said  to  have  anything  like  a  positive  programme, 
and  this  is  the  source  both  of  their  strength  and  their  weakness. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 63 

that  the  French  have  not  organized  readily  in  politics.  This 
is  the  more  curious  because  in  military  matters  they  organize 
more  easily  than  any  other  people  in  the  world ;  and  it  is  no 
doubt  the  military  instinct,  as  well  as  the  want  of  confidence 
in  their  own  power  of  political  organization,  that  disposes 
them  to  seek  a  leader  and  follow  him  blindly  after  he  has 
won  their  confidence.^  The  inability  to  organize  readily  in 
politics  has  this  striking  result,  that  vehement  as  some  of  the 
groups  are,  and  passionate  as  is  their  attachment  to  their 
creeds,  they  have  made  little  eflfort  to  realize  their  aims  by 
associating  together  their  supporters  in  all  parts  of  the  coun- 
try for  concerted  action.  In  fact,  there  may  be  said  to  be  no 
national  party  organizations  in  France.^  The  various  groups 
into  which  the  deputies  are  divided  have,  as  a  rule,  no  exist- 
ence whatever  outside  of  Parliament,  the  candidates  for 
seats  merely  calling  themselves,  in  general  terms,  Moder- 
ates, Radicals,  Socialists  or  simply  Republicans  without 
further  qualification,  and  attaching  themselves  to  a  particu- 
lar group  after  the  Chamber  has  met.  Moreover,  the  pro- 
grammes, which  are  drawn  up  by  each  candidate  for  himself, 
are  only  individual  confessions  of  faith,  and  are  all  difi^erent, 
so  that  there  is  no  poHcy  which  any  party  as  a  whole  is 
pledged  to  support.  Before  the  opening  of  the  campaign, 
indeed,  party  gatherings  or  banquets  take  place,  and 
speeches  are  made,  but  until  recent  elections,  no  common 
platform  of  principles  has  been  issued  except  by  the  Social- 
ists.' It  is  after  the  campaign  has  begun,  however,  that  the 
absence  of  party  organization  is  most  clearly  seen.    Then  the 

1  Cf.  Channes,  Letter  of  Aug.  22,  1885. 

2  Cf.  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  75;  Theodore  Stanton  in  the  North 
American  Rev.,  civ.  471.  This  contrasts  strangely  with  the  United  States, 
where  the  machinery  of  a  party  has  sometimes  shown  more  vitality  than  its 
principles. 

'  Daniel,  U Annie  Politique,  1893,  pp.  254-280, 


164     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

struggle  is  conducted  in  each  electoral  district  with  very 
little  regard  to  the  rest  of  the  country,  and  in  fact  each  dis- 
trict appears  like  a  separate  nation  engaged  in  a  distinct 
contest  of  its  own.^  Political  effort  becomes  locaHzed,  and 
except  for  the  candidates  themselves,  who  confine  their 
labors  to  their  constituencies,  it  has  often  happened  that 
scarcely  a  man  of  prominence  opened  his  mouth. 

Effects  of  French  Political  Mechanism 

One  might  suppose  that  under  a  parHamentary  form  of 
government  party  organization  would  hardly  be  required, 
and  that,  as  in  England,  the  need  of  pohtical  cohesion  would 
be  to  a  great  extent  supplied  by  a  strong  ministry  that  really 
led  Parliament  and  the  nation.  But  here  we  meet  with  some 
of  the  other  causes  that  tend  to  produce  a  multiplicity  of 
groups  —  causes  that  spring  from  certain  of  the  minor 
French  institutions  which  were  referred  to  in  the  beginning 
of  the  first  chapter  as  inconsistent  with  the  parHamentary 
system.  Three  of  these  are  especially  important  —  the 
method  of  electing  deputies,  the  system  of  committees  in  the 
chambers,  and  the  practice  of  interpellations. 

The  Method  of  Electing  Deputies 

In  France  the  scrutin  de  liste,  or  the  election  of  all  the 
deputies  from  a  department  on  one  ticket,  and  the  scrutin 
d^ arrondissement,  or  the  use  of  single  electoral  districts,  have 
prevailed  alternately,  the  latter  being  in  force  at  the  present 
day.2  But  under  both  systems  an  absolute  majority  of  all 
the  votes  cast  is  required  for  election.  If  there  are  more  than 
two  candidates  in  the  field,  and  no  one  of  them  gets  such  a 
majority,  a  second  vote,  called  the  ballotage,  is  taken  two 

1  Comte  de  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  1889,  p.  89. 
*  See,  however,  note  on  p.  17,  ante. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 65 

weeks  later,  and  at  this  a  plurality  is  enough  to  elect. ^  Now 
it  is  clear  that  such  a  procedure  encourages  each  political 
group  to  nominate  a  separate  candidate  for  the  first  ballot. 
Suppose,  for  example,  that  there  are  Reactionary  and 
Moderate  Republican  candidates  in  the  field,  and  that  the 
Radicals  prefer  the  Republican  to  the  Reactionary,  still  they 
have  nothing  to  lose  by  running  a  candidate  of  their  own  on 
the  first  ballot,  for  if  the  Reactionary  can  poll  more  votes 
than  both  his  rivals  combined,  he  will  be  elected  in  any 
event;  if  he  cannot,  he  will  not  be  elected  whether  the  Rad- 
icals put  up  a  candidate  of  their  own  or  not.  In  this  last 
case,  the  first  ballot  will  have  counted  for  nothing,  and  the 
Radicals  will  be  able  to  vote  for  the  Moderate  Repubhcan 
at  the  ballotage,  and  elect  him  then.  They  are  likely,  indeed, 
to  gain  a  positive  advantage  by  nominating  a  separate  can- 
didate, for  if  they  succeed  in  polling  a  large  vote  on  the  first 
ballot,  they  are  in  an  excellent  position  to  wring  concessions 
from  the  Moderates  as  a  price  of  their  support. 

Cumbrous  as  it  is,  this  system  of  voting  dates  back  to  the 
election  of  the  States  General  in  1789,  and,  with  a  couple  of 
short  breaks,  has  been  maintained  in  France  ever  since.^ 
The  idea  that  a  representative  ought  to  be  the  choice  of  a 

'  Law  of  June  16,  1885,  Art  5.  (This  article  was  not  repealed  by  the  Law 
of  Feb.  13,  1889.)  By  the  same  article  a  quarter  as  many  votes  as  there 
are  voters  registered  is  required  for  election  on  the  first  ballot. 

According  to  strict  parliamentary  usage,  the  term  ballotage  is  applied 
only  to  cases  where,  at  the  final  trial,  the  voting  is  confined  by  law  to  the 
two  names  highest  on  the  poll  at  the  preceding  ballot,  but  the  word  is  popu- 
larly used  for  any  final  ballot  where  a  plurality  is  decisive. 

For  the  choice  of  a  senator  by  the  electoral  college  of  a  department,  the 
votes  of  a  quarter  of  the  college,  and  a  majority  of  all  the  votes  actually 
cast,  are  required  on  the  first  two  ballots,  while  on  the  third  a  plurality  is 
enough.  Law  of  August  2,  1875,  Art.  15.  The  election  of  delegates  to  the 
college  by  the  municipal  councils  is  conducted  in  the  same  manner.  Law 
of  Dec.  9,  1884,  Art.  8. 

*  Poudra  et  Pierre,  liv.  ii,  ch.  vii. 


1 66     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

majority  of  the  people  seems,  indeed,  to  be  natural  in  democ- 
racies, for  we  find  it  put  in  practice  elsewhere.  Thus,  in  the 
United  States,  a  majority  vote  was  formerly  very  commonly 
required  for  election,  but  it  is  instructive  to  notice  that  it  was 
found  to  hinder  the  smooth  working  of  two  poHtical  parties, 
and  has  been  generally  though  not  quite  universally  aban- 
doned.^ The  fact  that  election  by  majority  did  not  give  rise 
to  a  multiplicity  of  parties  in  America  shows  that  by  itself 
it  does  not  produce  that  result,  where  the  other  influences 
favor  the  development  of  two  parties;  but  it  is  nevertheless 
clear  that  where  a  number  of  groups  exist,  it  tends  to  foster 
them,  and  prevent  their  fusing  into  larger  bodies.^  The 
French  system  has  been  praised  on  the  ground  that  it  saves 
the  people  from  the  yoke  of  huge  party  machines,  and  en- 
ables them  to  select  their  candidates  more  freely.^  This  is 
true,  and  it  is  a  great  advantage.  But  the  converse  is  also 
true;  the  system  tends  to  prevent  the  formation  of  great 
consolidated  parties,  and  that  is  the  evil  from  which  parlia- 
mentary government  suffers  in  France  to-day.* 

1  Stimson,  Am.  Statute  Law,  §  232.  In  Massachusetts,  election  by  plu- 
rality was  introduced  in  1855.  Const,  of  Mass.,  Amendments,  Art.  xiv. 
For  the  previous  law,  see  Const.,  pt.  ii,  ch.  i,  sec.  ii,  Art.  iv;  ch.  ii,  sec.  xiii, 
Art.  iii;  sec.  ii,  Art.  i;  Rev.  Stats.,  ch.  iv,  sec.  xiii. 

2  At  the  elections  of  1885,  which  were  held  under  the  system  of  scrutin 
de  lisle,  there  were  two  Republican  lists  of  candidates  in  almost  all  the 
departments.  G.  Channes,  Letter  of  Oct.  30,  1885.  At  the  elections  of 
1889  and  1893,  held  under  the  scrutin  d'arrojidissement,  there  were  two  Re- 
publican candidates  in  a  large  proportion  of  the  districts,  the  total  number 
of  candidates  for  a  single  seat  running  as  high  as  ten.  Duguet,  Les  DepnUs 
et  les  Cahiers  Electoraux  en  i88g;  Id.,  1893.  And  see  Tableau  des  Elections 
a,  la  Chambre  des  Deputes,  dresse  aux  Archives  de  la  Chamhre. 

«  Alfred  Naquet,  "  The  French  Electoral  System,"  in  the  North  Am. 
Rev.,  civ.  467-468. 

*  It  is  not  a  little  curious  that  just  at  the  time,  when  the  EngHsh  system 
of  two  parties  was  thought  by  many  people  to  be  in  danger  of  breaking  up, 
a  motion  should  be  made  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  introduce  election 
by  majority  vote  and  second  ballot.  Such  a  motion  was  made  by  Mr. 
Daziel  on  April  5,  1895. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  I 6/ 

The  Committees  in  the  Chambers 

The  system  of  committees  in  the  chambers  is  a  still  more 
important  matter.  Each  of  the  French  chambers  is  divided 
into  sections  called  bureaux,  of  which  there  are  nine  in  the 
Senate  and  eleven  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.^  The  bu- 
reaux are  of  equal  size,  and  every  member  of  the  Chamber 
belongs  to  one  and  only  one  of  them,  the  division  being  made 
afresh  every  month  by  lot.  This  is  a  very  old  institution  in 
France,  a  relic  of  a  time  before  parliamentary  government 
had  been  thought  of;  for  not  only  do  we  find  it  in  the  As- 
sembly of  Notables  and  the  States  General  that  met  on  the 
eve  of  the  Revolution,^  but  it  existed  in  the  ecclesiastical 
assembhes,  and  to  some  extent  in  the  States  General,  at  a 
much  earlier  date.^  The  use  of  the  lot  is,  indeed,  a  survival 
from  the  Middle  Ages,  when  it  was  a  common  method  of 
selecting  officials.*  The  bureaux  meet  separately  and  have 
three  functions.    The  first  is  that  of  making  a  preliminary 

1  For  the  constitution  of  the  bureaux  and  the  election  of  the  committees, 
see  Poudra  et  Pierre,  liv.  v,  chs.  ii  and  iii;  Pierre,  TraiU  de  Droit  Politique, 
Electoral  et  Parliamentaire,  4th  ed.  with  supp.,  book  vi,  §  2.  Reginald  Dick- 
inson, Summary  of  the  Constitution  and  Procedure  of  Foreign  Parliaments, 
2d  ed.,  pp.  393-366. 

These  bureau.x  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  Bureau  of  the  Cham- 
ber, which  consists  of  the  President,  the  Vice-Presidents,  and  the  Secre- 
taries. The  habit  in  France  of  using  the  same  word  with  different  meanings 
is  liable  to  be  the  source  of  no  little  confusion  to  the  students  of  her  insti- 
tutions. 

^  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §  976. 

'  Sciout,  Histoire  de  la  Constitution  Civile  du  Clerge,  p.  36.  Judge  Francis 
C.  Lowell  pointed  out  to  me  that  the  States  General  which  met  at  Tours 
in  1484  was  divided  into  sLx  sections  by  provinces.  See  a  journal  of  this  body 
by  Jchan  Masselin,  in  the  Collection  de  Documents  inedits  sur  I'Histoire  de 
France  puhlies  par  ordre  du  Roi,  Paris,  1835,  pp.  66-73. 

*  The  chief  relic  of  the  lot  left  in  Anglo-Saxon  institutions  is,  of  course, 
its  use  in  the  selection  of  the  jury  —  a  survival  which  is  due  to  the  fact 
already  pointed  out,  that  the  English  royal  justice  developed  at  an  early 
period. 


1 68     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

examination  of  the  credentials  of  members  of  the  Chamber, 
which  are  divdded  among  them  for  the  purpose.  The  second 
is  that  of  holding  a  preliminary  discussion  on  bills  brought 
into  the  Chamber,  before  they  are  referred  to  a  committee; 
but  as  a  matter  of  fact  this  discussion  is  perfunctory,  and  is 
Hmited  to  finding  out  in  a  general  way  what  members  of  the 
bureau  favor  or  oppose  the  bill.^  The  third  and  most  im- 
portant function  of  the  bureaux  is  the  election  of  committees, 
for  with  some  exceptions  all  the  committees  of  both  cham- 
bers are  selected  in  the  same  way.  Each  of  the  bureaux 
chooses  one  of  its  own  members,  and  the  persons  so  elected 
together  constitute  the  committee.  In  the  case  of  the  more 
important  committees  it  is  sometimes  desirable  to  have  a 
larger  number  of  members,  and  if  so  the  bureaux  choose  in 
like  manner  two  or  even  three  members  apiece  —  the  cham- 
ber in  each  case  directing,  by  its  rules  or  by  special  vote, 
the  number  of  members  to  be  elected.  Thus  the  com- 
mittee on  the  budget,  which  is  the  most  important  one  of 
the  year,  consists  of  three  members  chosen  by  each  of  the 
bureaux  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  contains,  there- 
fore, thirt}'- three  members;  while  the  corresponding  com- 
mittee in  the  Senate  contains  eighteen  members,  or  two 
from  each  bureau. 

The  committee  on  the  budget  and  the  one  appointed  to 
audit  the  accounts  of  the  government  have  long  been  per- 
manent, remaining  unchanged  for  a  year.  With  these  ex- 
ceptions every  measure  is  in  theory  referred  to  a  special 
committee  elected  by  the  bureaux  for  the  purpose;  but  as 
there  are  certain  to  be  in  every  session  a  number  of  bills  that 
cover  very  much  the  same  ground,  a  rigid  application  of  this 
principle  would  result  in  inconsistent  reports  on  the  same 
matter  by  different  committees,  and  would  throw  the  work 

^  Dupriez,  ii.  404. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  I 69 

of  the  Chamber  into  utter  confusion.  There  have,  there- 
fore been  a  number  of  committees  that  are  treated  in  the 
Chamber  as  virtually  permanent,  and  of  late  years  these 
have  tended  to  increase  until  there  are  a  dozen  and  a  half  of 
them.  There  has  also  been  a  tendency  for  the  Chamber 
itself  to  elect  committees  by  scrutin  de  lisle  instead  of  by  the 
bureaux. 

Now  the  bureaux,  being  created  anew  every  month,  ac- 
quire no  corporate  feeUng,  and  hence  have  no  real  leaders. 
Owing  partly  to  this  fact  they  do  not  choose  freely,  and  the 
chief  of  the  parliamentary  groups  meet  and  barter  away  the 
places  on  the  important  committees,  which  are  thus  cut  and 
dried  beforehand.^  But  whether  the  choice  of  committee- 
men is  really  made  by  the  bureaux  or  dictated  by  the  chiefs 
of  the  groups,  the  main  point  to  notice  is  that  the  system  is 
inconsistent  with  the  parliamentary  form  of  government. 
The  cabinet  cannot  exert  the  same  influence  over  an  election 
conducted  in  this  way  that  it  could  over  one  made  by  the 
Chamber  in  open  session.  In  the  latter  case  it  might  insist 
on  the  choice  of  a  majority  of  the  committee  from  among  its 
own  friends,  and  make  of  the  matter  a  cabinet  question; 
but  it  cannot  treat  the  failure  of  several  irresponsible  sec- 
tions of  the  Chamber  to  act  in  accordance  with  its  wishes  as 
an  expression  of  want  of  confidence  by  the  Chamber  as  a 
whole.  The  result  is  that  the  committees  are  not  ordinarily 
nominated  by  the  cabinet,  or  necessarily  in  sjTnpathy  with 
it;  and  yet  all  measures,  including  those  proposed  by  the 
government,  are  referred  to  them  to  revise  as  they  think 
best.  But  if  the  ministers  are  to  be  responsible  for  directing 
the  work  of  the  Chamber,  they  ought  to  have  a  policy  of 
their  own  and  stand  or  fall  on  that.  They  ought  to  be  at 
liberty  to  determine  their  own  course  of  action,  and  to  pre- 
^  Cf.  Simon,  Nos  Uommes  d'Etat,  pp.  41,  241. 


1 70  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\*ERXSIEXTS 

sent  their  measures  to  Parliament  in  a  form  Lhat  they 
entirely  approve. 

If  a  committee  has  power  to  amend  government  bills,  the 
ministers  must  either  assume  the  burden  of  tiying  to  per- 
suade the  Chamber  to  reverse  the  amendments,  with  all  the 
influence  of  the  committee  against  them;  or  they  must  take 
the  risk  of  opposing  the  bill  as  reported,  although  they  still 
approve  of  many  of  its  features;  or  finally  they  must  accept 
the  biU  as  it  stands,  and  become  responsible  for  a  measure 
with  which  they  are  not  themselves  fully  satisfied.  The 
committees  in  fact  use  their  power  without  shrinking,  and 
the  annual  budget,  for  example,  has  been  compared  to  a 
tennis-baU  sent  backward  and  forward  between  the  minister 
and  the  committee  xmtn  a  compromise  can  be  reached.^ 

M.  Dupriez.  in  his  excellent  work  on  the  ministers  in  the 
principal  countries  of  Europe  and  America,  paints  in  very 
strong  colors  the  evik  of  the  French  committee  s^.'stCTQ.  He 
points  out  how  little  influence  the  ministers  have  with  the 
committees,  who  often  regard  them  almost  as  the  represen- 
tatives of  a  hostile  power  in  the  state.-  He  shows  that  while 
the  ministers  have  no  right  to  be  present  at  committee  meet- 
ings, and  are  invited  to  attend  only  when  they  wish  to  ex- 
press thdr  \-iews,  the  committees  claim  a  right  to  examine 
the  administrative  offices,  insist  on  seeing  books  and  papers, 
and  volimteer  ad\ice.^  So  little  respect,  indeed,  do  the 
committees  pay  to  the  opinions  of  the  cabinet,  and  so  freely 
do  they  amend  its  biUs,  that,  as  M.  Dupriez  sarcastically 
remarks,  the  government  and  the  committee  are  never  in 
perfect  accord  except  when  the  former  submits  to  the  latter.* 
He  says,  moreover,  that  when  a  bill  comes  up  for  debate  the 

1  Simon,  Sowaiens  toi  du  Deux  Dicem^tn,  p.  314. 

*  VoL  iL  406-4.07. 

'  Id.,  pp.  595,  405f  423--!---!-  -i.38^39- 

«  /«?.,  pp.  405-406,  41  c 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  I7I 

reporter  of  the  committee  is  a  rival  who  has  great  influence 
with  the  Chamber,  while  the  deputies  are  inclined  to  regard 
the  ministers  with  jealousy  and  defiance.^  Nor  do  the  woes 
of  the  cabinet  end  here,  for  its  bills  are  quite  freely  amended 
during  the  debate  on  the  motion  of  individual  deputies.^ 

Of  all  the  committees,  the  most  domineering  and  vex- 
atious is  that  on  the  budget.  This  committee  seems  to  take 
pride  in  criticizing  the  estimates  and  making  them  over, 
both  as  regards  income  and  expenditures,  while  each  mem- 
ber exerts  himself  to  add  appropriations  for  the  benefit  of 
his  own  constituents,  so  that  when  the  report  is  finally  made 
the  government  cannot  always  recognize  its  own  work.^  In 
strong  contrast  with  all  this  is  Dupriez's  description  of  the 
procedure  on  the  budget  in  England.*  There  the  authority 
of  the  ministers  is  expressly  protected  by  the  standing  order 
of  the  House  of  Commons  to  the  effect  that  no  petition  or 
motion  for  the  expenditure  of  the  pubhc  revenue  shall  be 
entertained  except  on  the  recommendation  of  the  crown; 
and  in  accordance  with  a  firmly  established  practice  pro- 
posals for  national  taxes  originate  only  with  the  govern- 
ment. The  comparison  of  the  Enghsh  and  French  methods 
of  dealing  with  the  budget  goes  far  to  explain  the  difference 
in  the  position  of  the  two  cabinets.  Such  a  state  of  things  as 
exists  in  France  cannot  fail  to  lessen  the  authority  and  dig- 
nity of  the  ministers,  and  place  them  at  the  mercy  of  the 
committees.  It  prevents  them  from  framing  their  own  pro- 
gramme, and  insistmg  that  the  deputies  shall  accept  or 
reject  it  as  it  stands;  and  thus,  instead  of  compelling  the 
majority  to  act  solidly  together  under  the  leadership  of  the 
cabinet,  it  allows  any  deputy  to  use  his  place  on  a  committee 
as  a  means  of  urging  his  own  personal  views.    Hence  it  tends 

1  Dupriez,  ii.  411.  ^  Id.,  pp.  425-426. 

2  Id.,  p.  412.  *  Id.,  i.  110-112. 


172     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

to  dislocate  the  majority  and  break  it  into  sections,  with 
policies  more  or  less  out  of  harmony  with  each  other.  While, 
therefore,  the  French  scheme  of  committees  has  good  points, 
and  some  features  that  might  be  very  valuable  under  an- 
other form  of  government,  it  is  clearly  incompatible  with  the 
parliamentary  system.^ 

Interpellations 

The  habit  of  addressing  interpellations  to  the  ministers 
has  also  a  bearing  on  the  stability  of  the  cabinet  and  the 
subdivision  of  parties;  for  it  cannot  be  repeated  too  often 
that  these  things  are  inseparable.  The  existence  of  the  min- 
istry depends  on  the  support  of  the  majority,  and  if  that  is 
compact  and  harmonious,  the  ministry  will  be  strong  and 
durable;  if  not,  it  will  be  feeble  and  short-lived.  The 
converse  is  also  true.  The  cohesive  force  that  unites  the 
majority  is  loyalty  to  the  cabinet  and  submission  to  its 
guidance;  but  if  the  cabinets  are  weak,  or  are  constantly 
overthrown  at  short  intervals,  they  cannot  acquire  the  au- 
thority that  is  necessary  to  lead  the  majority  and  weld  it 
into  a  single  party.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  the 
crises  occur  over  matters  which  are  not  of  vital  consequence 
to  the  bulk  of  the  followers  of  the  government,  and  yet  that 
is  precisely  the  state  of  things  that  interpellations  tend  to 
create. 

It  is  of  the  essence  of  parliamentary  government  that  the 
majority  should  support  the  ministers  so  long,  and  only  so 
long,  as  it  approves  of  their  course,  and  this  means  their 
course  as  a  whole,  in  administration  as  well  as  in  legislation; 
for  the  parliament,  having  the  fate  of  ministers  in  its  hands, 

1  Lebon,  L'Allemagne,  p.  88,  remarks  that  the  bureaux  in  the  French 
Chamber  were  intended  to  subdivide  the  factions,  and  accomplish  this  only 
too  well. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 73 

holds  them  responsible  for  all  their  acts,  and  has  gradually 
extended  its  supervision  over  the  whole  field  of  government. 
Now  a  parliament  can  judge  of  the  legislative  policy  of  the 
cabinet  by  the  bills  it  introduces,  but  it  is  not  so  easy  to  get 
the  information  necessary  for  a  sound  opinion  on  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  administration.  It  is  largely  to  satisfy  this 
need  that  a  practice  has  grown  up  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons of  asking  the  ministers  questions,  which  may  relate  to 
any  conceivable  subject,  and  afford  a  means  of  putting  the 
cabinet  through  a  very  searching  examination.  Of  course 
the  privilege  is  freely  used  to  harass  the  government,  but  the 
answer  is  not  followed  by  a  general  debate,  or  by  a  vote,  ex- 
cept in  the  unusual  case  where  a  motion  to  adjourn  is  made 
for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  matter  under  discussion.' 

A  similar  practice  has  been  adopted  in  France,  and  ques- 
tions are  addressed  to  the  ministers  by  members  who  really 
want  information.  But  another  kind  of  question  has  also 
developed,  which  is  used  not  to  get  information,  but  to  call 
the  cabinet  to  account,  and  force  the  Chamber  to  pass  judg- 
ment upon  its  conduct.    This  is  the  interpellation.^    In  form 

'  The  motion  to  adjourn  is  the  only  one  that  is  in  order,  and  since  1882 
its  use  has  been  carefully  limited.  May,  Pari.  Practice,  loth  ed.,  p.  240  el  seq. 
In  this  form  or  some  other  a  vote  is  occasionally  taken  on  a  single  detail  of 
administration.  The  most  famous  instances  of  late  years  have  been  the 
affair  of  Miss  Cass  in  1887,  where  the  House  of  Commons  expressed  its 
disapproval  of  the  government's  refusal  to  make  an  inquiry  by  voting  to 
adjourn,  but  where  no  member  of  the  cabinet  felt  obliged  to  resign;  and 
the  defeat  of  Lord  Rosebery's  ministry  in  1895.  In  the  last  case  a  motion 
was  made  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  in  order 
to  draw  attention  to  the  lack  of  a  sufBcient  supply  of  ammunition,  and  the 
motion  was  carried;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  cabinet  would  not 
have  resigned  if  its  position  had  not  already  been  hopeless. 

In  the  House  of  Lords  questions  can  always  be  debated.    May,  p.  206. 

"^  For  the  rules  and  practice  in  the  case  of  questions,  see  Poudra  et  Pierre, 
liv.  vii.,  ch.  iii.,  and  Supp.  1879-80,  §  1539.  In  the  case  of  interpellations, 
id.f  liv.  vii.,  ch.  iv. 


174     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

it  is  similar  to  the  question,  but  the  procedure  in  the  two 
cases  is  quite  different.    A  question  can  be  addressed  to  a 
minister  only  with  his  consent,  whereas  the  interpellation  is  a 
matter  of  right,  which  any  deputy  may  exercise,  without 
regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  cabinet.    The  time,  moreover, 
when  it  shall  be  made  is  fixed  by  the  Chamber  itself,  and 
except  in  matters  relating  to  foreign  affairs,  the  date  cannot 
be  set  more  than  a  month  ahead.    But  by  far  the  most  im- 
portant difference  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  author  of  the 
question  can  alone  reply  to  the  minister,  no  further  discus- 
sion being  permitted,  and  no  motion  being  in  order;   while 
the  interpellation  is  followed  both  by  a  general  debate  and 
by  motions.    These  are  in  the  form  of  motions  to  pass  to  the 
order  of  the  day,  and  may  be  orders  of  the  day  pure  and 
simple,  as  they  are  called,  which  contain  no  expression  of 
opinion,  or  they  may  be  what  are  termed  orders  of  the  day 
with  a  motive,  such  as  "  the  Chamber,  approving  the  dec- 
larations of  the  Government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 
Several  orders  of  this  kind  are  often  moved,  and  they  are  put 
to  vote  in  succession.    The  ministers  select  one  of  them 
(usually  one  proposed  by  their  friends  for  the  purpose),  and 
declare  that  they  will  accept  that.    If  it  is  rejected  by  the 
Chamber,  or  if  a  hostile  order  of  the  day  is  adopted,  and  the 
matter  is  thought  to  be  of  sufficient  importance,  the  cabinet 
resigns.    This  is  a  very  common  way  of  upsetting  a  ministry, 
but  it  is  one  which  puts  the  cabinet  in  a  position  of  great  dis- 
advantage, for  a  government  would  be  superhuman  that 
never  made  mistakes,  and  yet  here  is  a  method  by  which  any 
of  its  acts  can  be  brought  before  the  Chamber,  and  a  vote 
forced  on  the  question  whether  it  made  a  mistake  or  not. 
Moreover,  members  of  the  Opposition  are  given  a  chance  to 
employ  their  ingenuity  in  framing  orders  of  the  day  so  as  to 
catch^the  votes  of  those  deputies  who  are  in  sympathy  with 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  175 

the  cabinet,  but  cannot  approve  of  the  act  in  question.^ 
Now  if  adverse  votes  in  the  Chamber  are  to  be  followed  by 
the  resignation  of  the  cabinet  and  the  formation  of  a  new 
one,  it  is  evident  that  to  secure  the  proper  stabiUty  and  per- 
manence in  the  ministry,  such  votes  ought  to  be  taken  only 
on  measures  of  really  great  importance,  or  on  questions  that 
involve  the  whole  policy  and  conduct  of  the  administration. 
It  is  evident  also  that  they  ought  not  to  be  taken  hastily,  or 
under  excitement,  but  only  after  the  Chamber  has  deliber- 
ately made  up  its  mind  that  it  disapproves  of  the  cabinet 
and  that  the  country  would  on  the  whole  be  benefited  by  a 
change  of  ministers.  The  reverse  of  all  this  is  true  of  the 
French  system  of  interpellations,  and  a  cabinet  which  in  the 
morning  sees  no  danger  ahead,  and  enjoys  the  confidence  of 

1  A  very  good  example  of  the  various  shades  of  praise  or  blame  that  may 
be  expressed  by  orders  of  the  day  can  be  found  in  the  Journal  Officiel  for 
July  9,  1893.  There  had  been  a  riot  in  Paris,  which  had  not  been  suppressed 
without  violence  and  even  bloodshed.  The  police  were  accused  of  wanton 
brutality,  and  an  interpellation  on  the  subject  was  debated  in  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  on  July  8.  The  order  of  the  day  quoted  in  the  text,  "  The 
Chamber,  approving  the  declarations  of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order 
of  the  day,"  was  adopted,  but  the  following  were  also  moved: 

"  The  Chamber,  disapproving  the  acts  of  brutality  of  which  the  police 
have  been  guilty,  requests  the  government  to  give  to  the  police  instructions 
and  orders  more  conformable  to  the  laws  of  justice  and  humanity,  and  passes 
to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  disapproving  the  proceedings  of  the  police,  passes  to 
the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  approving  the  declarations  of  the  government,  and  per- 
suaded that  it  will  take  measures  to  prevent  the  \aolence  of  the  police  of- 
ficials, passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  censuring  the  policy  of  provocation  and  reaction  on  the 
part  of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  hoping  that  the  government  will  give  a  prompt  and 
legitimate  satisfaction  to  public  opinion,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  Considering  that  the  government  has  acknowledged  from  the  tribune 
that  its  policy  has  caused  in  Paris  '  sad  occurrences,'  '  deeds  that  must 
certainly  be  regretted,'  and  '  some  acts  of  brutality,'  the  Chamber  takes 
notice  of  the  admission  of  the  President  of  the  Council,  demands  that  the 


176     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  Chamber  and  the  nation,  may  be  upset  before  nightfall 
by  a  vote  provoked  in  a  moment  of  excitement  on  a  matter 
of  secondary  importance. 

The  frequency  with  which  interpellations  are  used  to  up- 
set the  cabinet  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  out  of  the 
twenty-one  ministries  that  resigned  in  consequence  of  a  vote 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  during  the  years  1879-1896,  ten 
went  to  pieces  on  account  of  orders  of  the  day  moved  after 
an  interpellation,  or  in  the  course  of  debate,^  and  since  1896 
the  proportion  has  remained  substantially  the  same.  Sev- 
eral of  these  orders  covered  indeed,  the  general  pohcy  of  the 
cabinet,  but  others  —  like  the  one  relating  to  the  attend- 
ance of  the  employees  of  the  state  railroads  at  a  congress 
of  labor  unions,  which  occasioned  the  resignation  of  Casimir- 

exercise  of  power  shall  be  inspired  by  the  indefeasible  sentiments  of  justice, 
of  foresight,  and  of  humanity,  and  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  convinced  that  the  government  of  the  Republic  ought 
to  make  the  law  respected  and  maintain  order,  approving  the  declarations 
of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  regretting  the  acts  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the  police, 
and  taking  notice  of  the  declarations  of  the  government,  passes  to  the  order 
of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  approving  the  declaration  whereby  the  government  has 
announced  its  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  practices  and  habits  of  the  police 
which  have  been  pointed  out,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

"  The  Chamber,  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  causing  the  laws  to  be 
respected  by  all  citizens,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 

In  this  case,  by  voting  priority  for  the  first  of  these  motions  and  adopt- 
ing it,  the  Chamber  avoided  the  snares  prepared  for  it  by  the  ingenious 
wording  of  the  others. 

1  Cf.  Haucour,  Goiivernemenls  et  ministeres  de  la  iii'  ripublique  franqaise 
(iS^o-iSgj);  Muel,  Gouvernements,  ministeres  et  conslitiitions  de  la  France 
depuis  cent  ans. 

Among  the  resignations  brought  about  in  this  way,  I  have  counted  that 
of  Rouvier's  cabinet  in  1887,  although  this  was  caused  not  by  the  vote  of 
an  order  of  the  day,  but  by  the  refusal  of  the  Chamber  to  postpone  the  de- 
bate on  an  interpellation,  and  although  the  cabinet  continued  to  hold  oflQce 
for  a  few  days  pending  the  resignation  of  President  Gr6vy. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 77 

Perier's  ministry  in  May,  1894  —  had  no  such  broad  signifi- 
cance. Moreover,  the  production  of  actual  cabinet  crises  is 
by  no  means  the  whole  evil  caused  by  interpellations.  The 
enfeebling  of  the  authority  of  the  ministers  by  hostile  votes 
about  affairs  on  wliich  they  do  not  feel  bound  to  stake  their 
office  is,  perhaps,  an  even  more  serious  matter,  for  no  cabinet 
can  retain  the  prestige  that  is  necessary  to  lead  the  cham- 
bers in  a  parliamentary  government,  if  it  is  to  be  constantly 
censured  and  put  in  a  minority  even  in  questions  of  detail. 
The  ministers  are  not  obliged,  it  is  true,  to  answer  interpel- 
lations,^ but  unless  some  reason  of  state  can  be  given  for 
refusing,  such  as  that  an  answer  would  prejudice  diplomatic 
negotiations,  a  refusal  w'ould  amount  to  a  confession  of 
error,  or  would  indicate  a  desire  to  conceal  the  fact,  and 
would  weaken  very  much  the  position  of  the  cabinet. 

The  large  part  that  interpellations  play  in  French  politics 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  they  arouse  more  popular  interest 
than  the  speeches  on  great  measures;  ^  and,  indeed,  the 
most  valuable  quality  for  a  minister  to  possess  is  a  ready 
tact  and  quick  wit  in  answering  them.^ 

The  first  two  institutions  referred  to  as  not  in  harmony 
with  parliamentary  government  —  that  is,  the  method  of 
electing  deputies  and  the  sys*  n  of  committees  in  the  cham- 
bers —  have  real  merit.  Both  tend  to  check  the  tyranny  of 
party,  and  under  a  form  of  government  where  the  existence 
of  two  great  parties  was  not  essential,  they  might  be  very 
valuable.  But,  except  in  a  despotism,  the  interpellation  fol- 
lowed by  a  motion  expressing  the  judgment  of  the  Chamber 
is  a  purely  vicious  institution.  It  furnishes  the  politicians 
with  an  admirable  opportunity  for  a  display  of  parHamen- 

'  Poudra  ct  Pierre,  §  1555. 

*  Simon,  Xos  Honimcs  d'Elat,  p.  27. 

*  Simon,  Dia4,  Patrie,  Liberti,  p.  379. 


178     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

tary  fireworks;  but  it  is  hard  to  see  how,  under  any  form  of 
popular  government,  it  could  fail  to  be  mischievous,  or 
serve  any  useful  purpose  that  would  not  be  much  better 
accomplished  by  a  question  followed  by  no  motion  and  no 
vote.  The  plausible  suggestion  has  been  made  that  the  ad- 
ministration, being  free  from  supervision  by  the  courts  of 
law,  can  be  brought  to  account  for  its  acts  only  in  this  way;  ^ 
but  surely  the  same  result  could  be  as  well  accompUshed  by 
the  simpler  process  of  the  question,  and  it  is  hard  to  see  any 
reason  for  imperiling  the  existence  or  the  prestige  of  the 
cabinet  to  rectify  some  matter  of  trifling  consequence. 

Jealousy  and  Distrust  of  the  Ministers 

The  practice  arose  from  the  fact  that,  owing  to  the  im- 
mense power  of  the  executive  in  France,  and  the  frequency 
with  which  that  power  has  been  used  despotically,  the  legis- 
lature has  acquired  the  habit  of  looking  on  the  cabinet 
officers  as  natural  enemies,  to  be  attacked  and  harassed  as 
much  as  possible.-  But  such  a  view,  which  is  defensible 
enough  when  the  ministers  are  independent  of  the  parlia- 

^  See  Vicomte  d'Avenel,  "  La  Reforme  Administrative  —  La  Justice," 
Revue  des  Deux  Motules,  June  i,  1889,  pp.  595-596- 

2  M.  Dupriez,  in  the  work  already  cited  (ii.  253  el  seq.),  has  explained  the 
strength  of  this  feeling  by  a  most  valuable  study  of  the  history  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  ministers  and  the  legislature  in  France.  He  points  out 
that  it  existed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution,  for  the  cahiers  or  state- 
ments of  grievances  prepared  by  the  meetings  of  electors  held  to  choose 
members  of  the  States  General  in  1789  express  a  widespread  dislike  and 
distrust  of  all  ministers  as  such.  He  then  shows  how  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly tried  to  curtail  the  power  of  the  ministers,  and  reduce  their  func- 
tions to  a  simple  execution  of  its  own  orders.  It  is  unnecessary  here  to  follow 
the  subject  in  detail.  It  is  enough  to  remark  that  a  large  part  of  the  political 
history  of  France  since  the  Revolution  is  filled  with  struggles  for  power 
between  the  executive  and  the  legislature,  in  which  the  former  has  twice 
won  a  complete  victory,  and  deprived  the  representatives  of  the  people  of 
all  influence  in  the  state.  Under  these  circumstances  the  suspicion  and 
jealousy  of  the  cabinet  shown  by  Liberal  statesmen  is  not  surprising. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  179 

ment,  becomes  irrational  when  they  are  responsible  to  it, 
and  bound  to  resign  on  an  adverse  vote. 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  the  development  of  interpella- 
tions has  coincided  very  closely  with  that  of  parliamentary 
government;  ^  and,  in  fact,  the  French  regard  the  privilege 
as  one  of  the  main  bulwarks  of  political  liberty.  It  is  this 
same  feeUng  of  antagonism  to  the  government  that  has 
given  rise  to  the  overweening  power  of  the  committees  in 
the  Chamber,  and  their  desire  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the 
ministers.  The  extent  to  which  this  feehng  is  carried  by  the 
Radicals  is  shown  by  the  proposal  made  some  years  ago  tc 
divide  the  whole  Chamber  into  a  small  number  of  per- 
manent grand  committees,  such  as  existed  in  1848,  in  order 
to  bring  the  ministers  even  more  completely  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  deputies;  the  ideal  of  the  Extreme  Radicals  being 
the  revolutionary  convention,  which  drew  all  the  powers  of 
the  state  as  directly  and  absolutely  as  possible  into  its  own 
hands.2  The  less  violent  Republicans  are,  no  doubt,  very 
far  from  accepting  any  such  ideal,  but  still  they  cannot  shake 
out  of  their  minds  the  spirit  of  hostility  to  the  administra- 
tion which  has  been  nurtured  by  long  periods  of  absolute  rule. 
They  fail  to  realize  that  when  the  ministry  becomes  respon- 
sible to  the  deputies,  the  relations  between  the  executive  and 
the  legislature  are  radically  changed.  The  parUamentary 
system  requires  an  entire  harmony,  a  cordial  s>Tnpathy,  and 

'  The  practice  was  first  regularly  established  at  the  accession  of  Louis 
Philippe,  the  period  when  cabinets  became  thoroughly  responsible  to  the 
Chamber;  and  it  was  freely  used  during  the  Republic  of  1848.  After  the 
Coup  d'Elat  it  was,  of  course,  abolished;  but  toward  the  end  of  his  reign 
Napoleon  III,  as  a  part  of  his  concessions  to  the  demand  for  parliamentary 
institutions,  gradually  restored  the  right  of  interpellation.  Finally,  under 
the  present  Republic  the  right  has  been  used  more  frequently  than  ever 
before.    See  Poudra  et  Pierre,  §§  1544-1549;   Dupriez,  ii.  305,  317-318. 

*  Cf.  De  la  Berge,  "  Les  Grands  Comit6s  Parlementaires,"  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  Dec.  i,  1889. 


l8o     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

a  close  cooperation  between  the  ministers  and  the  Chamber; 
and  to  the  obHgation  on  the  part  of  the  cabinet  to  resign 
when  the  majority  withdraws  its  approval,  there  corre- 
sponds a  duty  on  the  part  of  the  majority  to  support  the 
ministers  heartily  so  long  as  they  are  retained  in  office.  Par- 
Hamentary  government,  therefore,  cannot  be  really  success- 
ful in  France  until  a  spirit  of  mutual  confidence  between  the 
cabinet  and  the  Chamber  replaces  the  jealousy  and  distrust 
that  now  prevail. 

A  comparison  of  the  poHtical  history  of  France  and  Eng- 
land during  corresponding  years  shows  to  what  extent  the 
French  procedure  has  interfered  with  discipline  and  disinte- 
grated the  parties.  In  England  the  Liberals  came  into  power 
after  the  elections  of  1892  with  a  small  majority  in  the  House 
of  Commons;  and,  although  the  supporters  of  the  govern- 
ment were  far  from  harmonious,  were,  in  fact,  jealous  of  each 
other  and  interested  in  quite  different  measures,  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  parliamentary  machinery  enabled  the  ministers 
to  keep  their  followers  together  and  maintain  themselves  in 
office  for  three  years.  In  France,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
elections  of  1893  produced  a  majority  which,  if  even  smaller, 
was  far  more  homogeneous;  and  indeed,  if  we  compare  the 
position  of  some  of  the  outlying  groups  with  that  of  certain 
sections  of  the  English  Liberal  party,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the 
majority  in  France  was  both  larger  and  more  homogeneous. 
Yet  within  two  years  this  majority  suffered  three  cabinets 
which  represented  it  to  be  overthrown  on  interpellations 
about  matters  of  secondary  importance,  and  finally  be- 
came so  thoroughly  disorganized  that  it  lost  control  of  the 
situation  altogether. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  l8l 

Results  of  the  Condition  of  Parties 

We  have  surveyed  some  of  the  causes  of  the  condition  of 
political  parties  in  France.  Let  us  now  trace  a  few  of  its 
results.  In  the  earlier  years,  the  presence  of  the  Reaction- 
aries deprived  cabinet  crises  of  the  significance  they  might 
otherwise  possess.  The  defeat  of  the  ministers  did  not  mean 
the  advent  to  power  of  a  different  party,  because  there  was 
no  other  party  capable  of  forming  a  cabinet  —  not  the  Re- 
actionaries, for  they  were  irreconcilable  and  hostile  to  the 
Republic,  and  of  late  years  have  been  far  too  few  in  num- 
bers; nor  those  Republicans  who  helped  the  Right  to  turn 
out  the  ministers,  because  by  themselves  they  did  not  con- 
stitute a  majority  of  the  Chamber.  Although  the  Reaction- 
aries have  now  practically  disappeared  the  condition  of  the 
groups  is  still  such  that  a  new  cabinet  is  obliged  to  seek  its 
support  mainly  in  the  ranks  of  the  defeated  minority,  and 
hence  is  usually  formed  from  very  much  the  same  material 
as  its  predecessor.  In  fact,  a  number  of  the  old  ministers 
have  generally  kept  their  places,  at  most  an  attempt  being 
made  to  gain  a  httle  more  support  from  the  Right  or  Left  by 
giving  one  or  two  additional  portfolios  to  the  Moderates, 
Radicals,  or  Socialists.^ 

When  a  ministry  falls,  the  parHamentary  cards  are 
shuffled,  a  few  that  have  become  too  unpopular  or  too 
prominent  are  removed,  and  a  new  deal  takes  place.  So 
true  is  this,  that  out  of  the  twenty-four  ministries  that  suc- 
ceeded each  other  from  the  time  President  MacMahon 
appointed  a  Republican  cabinet  in  1877  until  1897,  only 
three  contained  none  of  the  retiring  ministers,  the  aver- 

'  Lebon,  France  as  It  Is,  p.  94. 


1 82     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

age  proportion   of  members   retained    being   about   two- 
fifths.i 

Now,  the  fact  that  the  fall  of  the  cabinet  does  not  involve 
a  change  of  party  has  two  important  effects:  by  removing 
the  fear  that  a  hostile  opposition  will  come  to  power,  it  de- 
stroys the  chief  motive  for  discipline  among  the  majority;  ^ 
and  by  making  the  Chamber  feel  that  a  change  of  ministers 
is  not  a  matter  of  vital  consequence,  it  encourages  that  body 
to  turn  them  out  with  rash  indifference.  The  result  is  that 
the  cabinets  are  extremely  short-Hved;  during  the  forty 
years  between  1875  and  1914  there  were  fifty  of  them,  so 
that  the  average  duration  of  a  French  cabinet  has  been  a 
httle  less  than  ten  months.^  The  same  fact  explains,  more- 
over, the  persistence  of  the  system  of  interpellations,  for  if  a 
change  of  ministry  does  not  imply  a  different  programme, 
there  is  no  self-evident  impropriety  in  overthrowing  a  cabi- 
net on  a  question  that  does  not  involve  a  radical  condem- 
nation of  its  pohcy. 

The  Cabinet  a  Coalition  and  therefore  Weak 

The  subdivision  of  the  Republican  party  into  separate 
groups  has  also  an  important  bearing  on  the  character  of  the 
ministry.  Instead  of  representing  a  united  party,  the  cabi- 
net must  usually  rely  for  support  on  a  number  of  these 
groups,  and  the  portfolios  must  be  so  distributed  as  to  con- 
ciliate enough  of  them  to  form  a  majority  of  the  Chamber.* 

^  Cf.  Haucour,  Gouv.  et  Min.;  Muel,  Gotiv.,  Min.  ei  Const.;  Dupriez, 
ii-  338,  343-  The  three  exceptions  were  the  cabinets  of  Brisson  in  1885, 
Bourgeois  in  1895,  and  Meline  in  1896. 

^  This  is  very  clearly  pointed  out  by  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  ii.  390.- 

'  I  have  not  counted  the  reappointment  of  the  Dupuy  ministry  on  the 
election  of  Casimir-Perier  to  the  presidency  as  the  formation  of  a  new  cabinet. 

*  Only  on  two  or  three  occasions  has  the  cabinet  been  supported  by  a 
group  which  has  contained  by  itself  anything  like  a  majority  of  the  deputies. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 83 

As  a  rule,  therefore,  the  cabinet  is  in  reality  the  result  of  a 
coalition,  and  suffers  from  the  evils  to  which  bodies  of  that 
kind  are  subject.  The  members  tend  to  become  rivals 
rather  than  comrades,  and  each  of  them  is  a  little  inclined  to 
think  less  of  the  common  interests  of  the  cabinet  than  of  his 
own  future  prospects  when  the  combination  breaks  up.^ 
Such  a  government,  moreover,  is  essentially  weak,  for  it  can- 
not afford  to  refuse  the  demands  of  any  group  whose  defec- 
tion may  be  fatal  to  its  existence.^  The  ministers  are  not  at 
the  head  of  a  great  party  that  is  bound  to  follow  their  lead, 
and  yet  they  must  secure  the  votes  of  the  Chamber  or  they 
cannot  remain  in  office.  Hence  they  must  seek  support  as 
best  they  may,  and  as  they  cannot  rule  the  majority,  they 
are  constrained  to  follow  it;  ^  or  rather  they  are  forced  to 
conciliate  the  various  groups,  and,  as  the  members  of  the 
groups  themselves  are  loosely  held  together,  they  must  grant 
favors  to  the  individual  deputies  in  order  to  secure  their 
votes.  This  is  not  a  new  feature  in  French  politics.  It  is 
said  that  during  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe,  the  government 
kept  a  regular  account  with  each  deputy,  showing  his  votes 
in  the  Chamber  on  one  side,  and  the  favors  he  had  been 
granted  on  the  other,  so  that  he  could  expect  no  indulgence 
if  the  balance  were  against  him."*  Nor  has  the  cause  of  the 
evil  changed.  It  is  the  same  under  the  Third  Repubhc  that 
it  was  under  the  Monarchy  of  July,  for  in  both  cases  the  lack 
of  great  national  parties  with  definite  programmes  has  made 
the  satisfaction  of  local  and  personal  interests  a  necessity. 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  ii.  348-349.  Lebon,  France  as  II  Is,  p.  85,  speaks  of  the 
never-ending  struggles  for  mastery  within  the  cabinet. 

»  Cf.  Dupriez,  ii.  347-348,  434-435- 

'  Cf.  Simon,  Nos  Ilommes  d'Etat,  ch.  vii,  p.  iii. 

*  Hello,  Dii  Regime  Co)istUiUionnel,  quoted  by  Minghetti,  /  Parliti 
Polilici,  p.  loi;  and  see  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  Revolution  and  Reaction  in 
Modern  France,  pp.  11 8-1 20. 


184  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Political  Use  of  Offices 

We  are,  unfortunately,  only  too  familiar  in  this  country 
with  the  doctrine  that  to  the  victors  belong  the  spoils.  In 
France  we  find  the  same  thing,  although  it  has  not  been 
acknowledged  so  openly,  and  has  been  disguised  under  the 
name  of  epuration,  or  the  purification  of  the  administration 
from  the  enemies  of  the  RepubHc.  The  practice  of  turning 
pohtical  foes  out  of  office  and  substituting  one's  friends 
seems  to  have  begun  during  President  MacMahon's  contest 
with  the  Chamber,  when  the  Reactionary  party  dismissed  a 
large  number  of  officials  who  had  served  under  former  cabi- 
nets.^ After  the  Right  had  been  overthrown  in  1877,  there 
arose  a  cry  that  the  RepubUc  ought  not  to  be  administered 
by  men  who  did  not  s}Tnpathize  with  it,  and  would  naturally 
throw  their  influence  against  it;  but  although  the  fear  of 
danger  to  the  form  of  government  was  no  doubt  genuine  at 
first,  the  cry  became  before  long  an  excuse  for  a  hunt  after 
office.2  In  speaking  of  this  subject,  however,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  France  is  not  divided  into  two  great  parties 
which  succeed  each  other  in  power,  and  hence  a  wholesale 
change  of  public  servants,  such  as  has  often  taken  place  after 
a  presidential  election  in  the  United  States,  does  not  occur. 
The  process  is  continuous,  but  slower  and  less  thorough. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  evil  in  France  is  by  no  means  limited 
to  office-seeking,  for  owing  to  the  immense  power  vested  in 
the  government,  the  favors  which  the  deputies  demand  and 
exact  as  the  price  of  their  votes  extend  over  a  vast  field.  Nor 
do  they  show  any  false  modesty  about  making  their  desires 

^  See  Channes,  pp.  18-19,  231-232. 

2  See  the  remarkable  little  book  by  Edmond  Scherer,  La  Democralie  el 
la  France;  Channes,  Nos  Faules  (passim);  Simon,  Nos  Hommes  d'Etal, 
pp.  114-115,  and  ch.  vi,  p.  ii;  Dupriez,  ii.  502-509;  Lamy,  La  Repiihlique 
en  1 88 J,  pp.  6-8,  22;  and  see  a  highly  colored  account  by  Hurlbert,  "  The 
Outlook  in  France,"  Fortnightly  Review,  Iv.  347. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 85 

known.  They  do  not  hesitate  to  invade  the  executive  of- 
fices, and  meddle  directly  in  the  conduct  of  affairs.'  Even 
the  prefect,  who  has  the  principal  charge  of  local  administra- 
tion, is  not  free  from  their  interference.  He  is  liable  to  lose 
his  place  if  he  offends  the  Republican  deputies  from  his 
department,  and  is  therefore  obliged  to  pay  court  to  them 
and  follow  their  lead.  In  short,  the  prefect  has  become,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  tool  of  the  deputies;  and  his  dependence  is 
increased  by  the  fact  that  nowadays  he  does  not  usually  re- 
main in  office  long  enough  to  acquire  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  the  local  wants,  or  to  exercise  a  strong  personal  influence. 
I  do  not  mean  that  he  has  become  corrupt;  far  from  it.  The 
level  of  integrity  among  French  officials  appears  to  be  ex- 
tremely high,  and  though  wedded  to  routine,  their  efficiency 
is  great;  ^  but  the  discretion  in  their  hands  is  enormous,  and 
in  using  it  they  must  take  care  not  to  displease  his  Majesty 
the  Deputy.^ 

Deputies  and  their  Committees 

Of  course  the  deputies  do  not  wield  this  immense  in- 
fluence to  forward  their  own  private  ends  alone.  They  are 
representatives,  and  must  use  their  position  for  the  benefit 
of  the  persons  they  represent.  But  whom  do  they  repre- 
sent ?  The  people  at  large  ?  No  representative  ever  really 
does  that.  So  far  as  he  is  actuated  by  purely  conscientious 
motives  he  represents  his  own  ideas  of  right,  and  for  the  rest 
he  represents  primarily  the  men  who  have  elected  him,  and 
to  whom  he  must  look  for  help  and  votes  in  the  next  cam- 
paign.   In  some  countries  this  means  the  party,  and  those 

1  Dupriez,  ii.  435,  507-508;  Channes,  pp.  253-256;  Lamy,  pp.  21-26; 
LaflBtte,  Le  Siifrage  Universe!,  pp.  54-59. 

2  Simon,  "  Stability  of  the  French  Republic,"  The  Forum,  x.  383. 

«  Cf.  Channes,  Letter  of  Oct.  i,  1884;  Laffitte,  pp.  56-58;  Dupriez,  ii. 
471-472,  506-509. 


1 86     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

classes  that  hang  on  the  skirts  of  the  party  and  may  be  pre- 
vailed upon  to  fall  into  line.  But  in  France  there  are  no 
great  organized  parties,  and  hence  we  must  consider  how 
candidates  are  nominated  there.  The  government,  at  the 
present  day,  does  not  put  forward  official  candidates  of  its 
own,  as  was  commonly  done  during  the  Second  Empire;  ^ 
and,  indeed,  it  is  not  supposed  to  take  an  active  part  in  elec- 
tions. This  last  principle  is  not  strictly  observed,  for  the 
administrative  officials  at  times  exert  no  Httle  influence  in 
important  campaigns,  and  the  government  is  said  to  have 
spent  a  good  deal  of  money  to  defeat  Boulanger  in  1889. 
Still  there  is  nothing  resembling  the  control  of  elections 
under  Napoleon  III,  and  especially  there  is  no  interference 
with  the  selection  of  candidates,  this  matter  being  left  to  the 
spontaneous  movement  of  the  voters  themselves.  The  usual 
method  of  proceeding  is  as  follows:  a  number  of  men  in 
active  politics  in  a  commune,  or  what  we  should  call  the 
wire-pullers,  form  themselves  into  a  self-elected  committee, 
the  members  usually  belonging  to  liberal  or  semi-liberal 
professions,  and  very  commonly  holding  advanced  views 
which  are  apt  to  go  with  political  activity  in  France.  The 
committees  or  their  representatives  meet  together  to  form 
an  assembly,  which  prepares  the  programme,  nominates  the 
candidate,  and  proclaims  him  as  the  candidate  of  the  party .'^ 
These  self-constituted  committees,  therefore,  have  the 
nomination  entirely  in  their  own  hands;  ^  and,  except  in  the 

^  Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  372. 

*  Simon,  Nos  Honwies  d'Etal,  pp.  17-25;  Scherer,  La  Democratie  el  la 
France,  pp.  22-24;  ^eina.ch, La  Polilique  Opporlumsle,pp  .186-188;  LafEtte, 
op.  cil.,  pp.  64-69. 

'  Since  the  system  of  scrittin  de  lisle  has  been  given  up  and  the  single 
electoral  districts  have  been  reestablished,  the  matter  is  said  to  have  be- 
come somewhat  more  simplified.  It  is  stated  that  the  nominating  commit- 
tees are  now  formed,  at  least  in  many  cases,  without  any  meeting  of  dele- 
gates from  the  communes;  and  that  their  function  lies  not  in  the  selection 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 87 

larger  cities,  a  candidate  owes  his  position  largely  to  local 
influence  and  personal  interests.^  Sometimes  he  has  won 
prominence  by  a  clever  speech  at  a  local  meeting.  Some- 
times he  has  earned  gratitude  by  services  rendered  in  his 
profession,  or  otherwise.^ 

After  the  candidate  is  nominated,  his  first  care  is  to  issue 
his  programme,  and  under  the  system  of  single  electoral  dis- 
tricts, each  candidate,  as  has  already  been  observed,  has  a 
separate  programme,  which  expresses  only  his  particular 
views.  The  active  campaign  is  carried  on  by  means  of  plac- 
ards posted  on  walls  and  fences,  which  make  a  great  show, 
but  win  few  votes;  and  what  is  far  more  effective,  by  means 
of  newspapers  and  the  stump.^  The  stump,  curiously 
enough,  is  used  very  Httle  except  by  the  candidates  them- 
selves," who  constantly  speak  at  political  rallies,  of  late 
years  frequently  holding  joint  debates.* 

It  is  a  common  saying  that  if  the  committees  want  any- 
thing they  exert  a  pressure  on  the  deputy,  who  in  his  turn 

of  a  candidate,  but  rather  in  helping  the  candidate  in  whose  behalf  they 
have  been  organized,  and  acting  as  his  sponsors.  (See  Alfred  Naquet, 
"  The  French  Electoral  System,"  North  Ajnerican  Review,  civ.  466.  But 
see  Charles  Benoist,  "  De  I'Organization  du  Suffrage  Universel,"  Reme  des 
Deux  Mondes,  July  i,  1895,  pp.  15-20.)  However  this  may  be,  the  close 
relations  between  the  deputy  and  a  small  self-constituted  clique  of  local 
politicians,  which  is  the  essential  point  in  the  French  electoral  system, 
remains  very  much  the  same. 

1  Simon,  Nos  Homvies  d'Etat,  pp.  24-25. 

^  Chaudordy,  La  France  en  i88g,  p.  96. 

3  Alfred  Naquet,  "  The  French  Electoral  System,"  North  American 
Review,  civ.  468-470. 

*  Theodore  Stanton,  supplement  to  the  article  of  Alfred  Naquet,  p.  473. 

^  Alfred  Naquet,  lb.  The  newspapers  at  election  time  are  full  of  ac- 
counts of  these  meetings  for  joint  debate,  called  Reunions  puhliques  con- 
tradictoires.  Direct  bribery  of  voters,  though  not  unknown,  seems  to  be 
rare,  but  the  complaint  that  elections  have  been  getting  a  good  deal  more 
expensive  of  late  years  is  general.  Naquet,  lb.;  Reinach,  pp.  189-190; 
Simon,  Dieu,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  373;  Souviens  toi  du  Deux  Dicembre,  p.  91. 


1 88     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

brings  a  pressure  to  bear  on  the  ministers;  and  hence  it 
has  been  a  common  saying  that  the  electoral  committees 
rule  the  deputies,  and  the  deputies  rule  the  government.^ 

The  Deputies  and  their  Constituents 

It  is  asserted  that,  since  the  reintroduction  of  single  elec- 
toral districts,  the  power  of  the  committees  has  sensibly 
diminished,^  and,  whether  this  be  true  or  not,  it  is  certainly 
easy  to  exaggerate  their  influence,  for  the  deputy  must 
always  consider  other  people  besides  the  wire-pullers.  He 
must  try  to  strengthen  his  general  popularity  throughout 
his  district.  He  is,  indeed,  expected  to  look  after  the  politi- 
cal business  of  his  constituents,  and  is  a  regular  channel  for 
the  presentation  of  grievances  and  the  distribution  of  favors; 
one  of  the  complaints  most  commonly  heard  in  France  being 
that  the  deputies  represent  local  and  personal  interests 
rather  than  national  ones.  But  even  this  does  not  end  his 
responsibihties.  The  traditions  of  centralization  which 
make  all  France  look  to  Paris  for  guidance,  and  the  habit  of 
paternal  government  that  makes  men  turn  to  the  state  for 
aid,  have  caused  many  people  to  regard  the  deputy  as  a  kind 
of  universal  business  agent  for  his  district  at  the  capital,  and 
burden  him  with  all  sorts  of  private  matters  in  addition  to 
his  heavy  pubHc  duties.  Sometimes  this  is  carried  to  an 
extent  that  is  positively  ludicrous.  Some  years  ago  a 
couple  of  deputies  gave  an  account  at  a  public  dinner  of  the 

1  Channes,  Nos  F antes,  pp.  238-239;  and  see  Scherer,  La  Democralie  et 
la  France,  p.  27;  Simon,  Dieii,  Patrie,  Liberie,  p.  378. 

For  this  reason  one  frequently  hears  it  said  that  the  deputies  do  not  see 
the  real  people,  but  only  their  own  political  dependents.  Channes,  p.  38; 
Simon,  Souviens  lot  dit  Deux  Decembre,  pp.  165-166. 

2  Naquet,  "  The  French  Electoral  System,"  Norlh  American  Review,  civ. 
466.  But  see  on  the  other  side  the  article  of  Benoist  in  the  Remte  des  Deux 
Mondes,  July  i,  1895,  pp.  17-19. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 89 

letters  they  had  received  from  their  districts.  Some  con- 
stituents wanted  their  representative  to  go  shopping  for 
them ;  others  asked  him  to  consult  a  physician  in  their  be- 
half; and  more  than  one  begged  him  to  procure  a  wet  nurse, 
hearing  that  this  could  be  done  better  in  Paris  than  in  the 
provinces.^  Is  it  to  be  wondered  that  the  French  deputy 
should  bend  under  the  weight  of  his  responsibiUties  ? 

If  I  seem  to  have  drawn  a  somewhat  dark  picture  of  the 
position  of  the  deputy,  I  do  not  want  to  be  understood  as 
implying  that  all  deputies  are  alike;  that  many  of  them  are 
not  men  of  high  character,  who  will  not  yield  to  the  tempta- 
tion and  pressure  with  which  they  are  surrounded.  My 
object  is  simply  to  describe  a  tendency;  to  point  out  a 
defect  in  the  French  political  system,  and  to  show  clearly 
the  characteristic  evils  which  that  defect  cannot  fail  to  de- 
velop. The  famous  scandals  about  the  bribery  of  deputies 
in  connection  with  the  Panama  Canal,  with  which  the  news- 
papers were  filled  for  three  months,  cast  a  dismal  light  over 
public  life  in  France,  and  although  at  first  the  credulous  no 
doubt  exaggerated  the  extent  of  the  corruption,  still  there 
was  fire  enough  under  the  smoke  to  show  what  baleful 
influences  haunt  the  corridors  of  the  Palais  Bourbon. 

Prospects  of  the  Republic 

Before  closing,  let  us  consider  for  a  moment  the  political 
prospects  of  the  country.  The  generous  enthusiasm  that 
greeted  the  Republic  at  the  outset  has  faded  away,  and  even 
its  most  ardent  advocates  have  found  to  their  sorrow  that  it 
has  not  brought  the  promised  millennium.  Such  a  feehng  of 
disappointment  is  not  surprising.  On  the  contrary,  it  might 
have  been  surely  predicted,  for  in  every  form  of  government 
that  has  existed  in  France  since  the  Revolution  the  period 

'  This  is  quoted  by  Scherer  in  La  Dimocratie  et  la  France,  pp.  34-35- 


190     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  enthusiasm  has  been  followed  by  one  of  disenchantment, 
and  to  this  latter  stage  the  Republic  has  come  in  the  natural 
course  of  events.  Now  this  period  may  well  be  looked  upon 
as  crucial,  because  as  yet  no  form  of  government  in  France 
has  been  able  to  Kve  through  it.  After  a  political  system  has 
lasted  about  half  a  generation,  the  country  has  always  be- 
come disgusted  with  it,  torn  it  down,  and  set  up  another  —  a 
course  that  has  made  any  steady  progress  in  pubHc  life  im- 
possible. The  effect  has,  in  fact,  been  very  much  Hke  that 
which  would  be  produced  by  a  man  who  should  constantly 
root  out  his  crops  before  they  came  to  maturity,  and  sow  his 
field  with  new  and  different  seed. 

The  reason  for  such  a  state  of  things  is  not  hard  to  find. 
Since  the  Revolution  every  form  of  government  in  France 
has  been  the  expression  or  outward  sign  of  a  definite  set  of 
political  opinions.  So  close,  indeed,  has  the  connection  been 
between  the  two,  that  it  has  been  impossible  for  men  to  con- 
ceive of  one  without  the  other,  and  therefore  a  fundamental 
change  of  opinion  has  always  involved  a  change  in  the  form 
of  government.  Any  one  who  studies  the  history  of  the 
nation  will  see  that  there  has  never  been  a  change  of  party 
without  a  revolution.  There  has  often  been  a  shifting  of 
control  from  one  group  to  another  of  a  sUghtly  different 
coloring,  but  the  real  party  in  opposition  has  never  come  to 
power  without  an  overturn  of  the  whole  poHtical  system. 
Under  the  Restoration,  for  example,  the  ministers  were 
sometimes  Moderate  and  sometimes  extremely  Reactionary, 
but  were  never  taken  from  the  ranks  of  the  Hberal  opposi- 
tion. Again,  during  the  Monarchy  of  July  the  different 
groups  of  Liberals  disputed  fiercely  for  the  mastery,  but 
neither  the  Radicals  nor  the  Reactionaries  had  the  slightest 
chance  of  coming  to  power.  If  space  permitted,  this  truth 
might  be  illustrated  by  taking  up  in  succession  each  of  the 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  I9I 

governments  that  have  flourished  since  the  Revolution,  but 
perhaps  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  the  only  apparent  exception 
that  has  occurred.    While  General  MacMahon  was  Presi- 
dent of  the  Third  Republic,  power  was  certainly  transferred 
from  the  Reactionaries  to  the  Republicans,  but  the  circum- 
stances of  this  case  were  very  peculiar.    The  Republic  had 
hardly  got  into  working  order,  and  the  struggle  of  the  Re- 
actionaries may  be  looked  upon  as  a  final  effort  to  prevent  it 
from  becoming  firmly  estabhshed.    The  French  themselves 
have  always  considered  the  occurrence,  not  as  a  normal 
change  of  party,  but  as  the  frustration  of  an  attempt  at  a 
coup  d'etat  or  counter-revolution.    This  case,  therefore,  from 
the  fact  that  it  has  been  generally  regarded  as  exceptional, 
may  fairly  be  treated  as  the  kind  of  exception  that  tends  to 
prove  the  rule.    A  revolution  in  France  has  corresponded  in 
many  ways  to  a  change  of  party  in  other  countries,  but  with 
this  grave  disadvantage,  that  the  new  administration,  in- 
stead of  reforming  the  political  institutions,  destroyed  them 
altogether.    Of  course  such  a  method  put  gradual  improve- 
ment out  of  the  question,  and  before  the  nation  could  perfect 
her  government  she  had  to  learn  that  the  remedy  for  defects 
is  to  be  sought  through  the  reform,  not  the  overthrow,  of  the 
existing  system. 

One  would  suppose  that  under  the  RepubHc  no  such  diffi- 
culty could  arise,  because  a  repubhc  means  the  rule  of  the 
majority,  and  the  majority  is  sure  to  be  sometimes  on  one 
side  and  sometimes  on  the  other.  But  this  is  not  the  view  of 
most  French  Republicans,  and  especially  of  the  Radicals. 
These  men,  recognizing  that,  on  account  of  a  want  of  train- 
ing in  self-government,  the  people  can  be  cajoled,  or  fright- 
ened, or  charmed,  or  tricked  into  the  expression  of  the  most 
contradictory  opinions,  refuse  to  admit  that  any  vote  not  in 
harmony  with  their  own  ideas  can  be  a  fair  test  of  the  popu- 


192     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

lar  will,  and  assume  for  themselves  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
declaring  what  the  people  really  want.  As  M.  Edmond 
Scherer  has  cleveriy  said:  "  Let  us  add  that  the  God  (uni- 
versal suffrage)  has  his  priests,  whose  authority  has  never 
been  quite  clear,  but  who  know  his  wishes,  speak  in  his 
name,  and,  if  resistance  occurs,  confound  it  by  an  appeal  to 
the  oracle  whose  secrets  are  confided  to  them  alone."  ^  The 
Radicals,  therefore,  cannot  admit  a  possibility  that  the  true 
majority  can  be  against  them,  and  nothing  irritates  them  so 
much  as  to  hear  the  other  parties  claim  that  the  people  are 
on  their  own  side.  It  has  been  said  that  the  Republic  will 
not  be  safe  until  it  has  been  governed  by  the  Conservatives,^ 
and  the  remark  has  a  special  significance  in  this  connection. 
It  meant  that,  until  the  Conservative  elements  come  to 
power,  it  would  not  be  clear  whether  the  RepubKc  has 
enough  strength  and  elasticity  to  stand  a  change  of  party 
without  breaking  down.  It  meant  also  that  the  right  of  the 
majority  to  rule,  which  is  the  ultimate  basis  of  the  consensus 
on  which  the  RepubKc  must  rest,  would  not  be  surely  estab- 
hshed  until  each  party  has  submitted  peaceably  to  a  popular 
verdict  in  favor  of  another. 

As  the  Republic  grows  older,  the  form  of  its  institutions 
will  no  doubt  be  gradually  modified,  but,  whatever  changes 
take  place,  one  thing  is  clear :  the  responsibility  of  the  minis- 
ters to  parliament  must  be  retained.  In  a  country  like  the 
United  States,  where  power  is  spHt  up  by  the  federal  system, 
where  the  authority  in  the  hands  of  the  executive  is  com- 
paratively small,  and,  above  all,  where  the  belief  in  popular 
goverrmient  and  the  attachment  to  individual  liberty  and 
the  principles  of  the  common  law  are  ingrained  in  the  race, 

^  La  Dimocralie  el  la  France,  p.  i8. 

^  "  La  Republique  et  les  Conservateurs,"  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  March 
I,  1890,  pp.  1 20-1 21.  This  means,  of  course,  the  conservative  element 
among  the  people,  and  not  merely  the  conservative  Republicans. 


FRANCE:  PARTIES  1 93 

there  is  no  danger  in  entrusting  the  administration  to  a  presi- 
dent who  is  independent  of  the  legislature.  But  this  would 
not  be  safe  in  France,  because,  owing  to  the  centralization  of 
the  government  and  the  immense  power  vested  in  the  execu- 
tive, such  a  president  would  be  almost  a  dictator  during  his 
term  of  office;  and  the  temptation  to  prolong  his  authority, 
from  public  no  less  than  from  selfish  motives,  would  be  tre- 
mendous. And,  in  view  of  the  tendency  of  the  mercantile 
classes,  and  even  of  the  peasants,  to  crave  a  strong  ruler,  it 
might  not  be  difficult  for  him  to  do  so,  as  Louis  Napoleon 
proved  long  ago.  He  was  able  to  overthrow  a  popular  as- 
sembly because  the  French  had  long  been  accustomed  to 
personal  government,  and  because  an  assembly  was  incap- 
able of  maintaining  a  stable  majority;  because,  in  short,  the 
French  knew  how  to  work  personal  but  not  representative 
government :  and  the  danger  will  continue  until  parliamen- 
tary institutions  are  perfected,  and  their  traditions  by  long 
habit  have  become  firmly  rooted.  The  French  president 
cannot,  therefore,  be  independent,  and  the  only  feasible 
alternative  is  to  surround  him  with  ministers  who  are  respon- 
sible to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  But  if  the  parhamentary 
system  must  be  retained,  it  is  important  to  remove  the  de- 
fects that  it  shows  to-day,  and  especially  is  it  necessary,  on 
the  one  hand,  to  diminish  the  autocratic  power  of  the  ad- 
ministration, which  offers  a  well-nigh  irresistible  temptation 
to  both  minister  and  deputy;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
give  the  cabinet  more  stabihty,  more  dignity,  and  more 
authority;  to  free  it  from  the  yoke  of  the  groups  in  the 
Chamber;  to  refieve  it  from  the  domination  of  irresponsible 
committees,  and  from  the  danger  of  defeat  by  haphazard 
majorities;  to  enable  it  to  exert  over  its  followers  the  disci- 
pline that  is  required  for  the  formation  of  great,  compact 
parties;  to  make  it,  in  short,  the  real  head  of  a  majority  in 
parhament  and  in  the  nation. 


194     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

That  the  Republic  will  endure  no  one  will  now  doubt. 
The  conduct  of  the  nation  during  its  heroic  struggle  in  this 
war  seems  to  prove  it  beyond  all  question.  But  that  the 
methods  of  operating  the  repubhcan  government  are  defec- 
tive no  one  is  more  keenly  aware  than  the  French  them- 
selves. Their  criticism  of  the  evils  of  politics  have  been 
incisive;  and  in  fact  the  very  disenchantment  which  the 
Republic  has  brought,  the  loss  of  faith  in  regeneration  by 
any  form  of  government,  has  not  been  without  its  value.  If 
political  idealism  has  faded  into  the  light  of  common  day 
this  has  had  a  bracing  effect  upon  the  national  character, 
a  sobering,  invigorating  influence  which  could  be  perceived 
even  before  this  war  revealed  it  to  the  world.  The  French 
people  are  more  serious,  more  earnest,  of  a  finer  and  deeper 
nature  than  their  parliamentary  life  suggests.  The  imper- 
fections in  the  government  have  been  largely  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  Republic  was  at  the  outset  an  experiment,  sur- 
rounded, as  they  believed,  by  uncertainty  and  perils  which 
with  growing  stability  have  vanished  into  the  past.  When 
peace  returns  such  genius  can  hardly  fail  to  remove  them, 
relying  upon  the  confidence  the  people  have  acquired  in  their 
own  national  force,  in  one  another,  and  in  the  capacity  for 
common  action  which  their  achievements  in  this  war  have 
made  clear. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ITALY 

The  perfection  of  its  organization  and  the  excellence  of  its 
laws  preserved  the  life  of  Rome  long  after  its  vital  force  had 
become  exhausted;  and  when  the  Teutonic  tribes  had  once 
broken  through  the  shell  of  the  western  empire,  they  over- 
ran it  ahnost  without  resistance.  Europe  sank  into  a  state 
of  barbarism,  from  which  she  recovered  to  find  her  political 
condition  completely  changed.  Slowly,  during  the  Middle 
Ages,  the  nations  were  forming,  until  at  last  Europe  became 
divided  into  separate  and  permanent  states,  each  with  an 
independent  government  of  its  own.  In  two  countries, 
however  —  Italy  and  Germany  —  this  process  of  develop- 
ment was  delayed  by  the  existence  of  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
pire, which  claimed  an  authority  far  greater  than  it  was 
able  to  wield,  and,  while  too  weak  to  consolidate  its  vast 
dominions  into  a  single  state,  was  strong  enough  to  hinder 
them  from  acquiring  distinct  and  national  governments. 
The  condition  of  Italy  was  further  compHcated  by  the 
presence  of  the  Pope;  for  although  the  papacy  was  an 
immense  civihzing  force  in  mediaeval  Europe,  yet  the  con- 
stant quarrels  of  the  Pope  and  the  Emperor,  and  the  exist- 
ence of  the  States  of  the  Church,  tended  greatly  to  prevent 
the  development  of  Italy  as  a  nation.  The  country  was 
broken  into  a  multitude  of  jarring  elements,  and  even 
Dante  saw  no  hope  of  union  and  order  save  under  the  sway 
of  a  German  emperor.  The  north  of  Italy  was  full  of 
flourishing  cities  enriched  by  commerce  and  manufactures 
and  resplendent  with  art,  but  constantly  fighting  with  each 

I9S 


196     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

other,  and,  except  in  the  case  of  Venice,  a  prey  to  internal 
feuds  that  brought  them  at  last  under  the  control  of  auto- 
cratic rulers.'  The  south,  on  the  other  hand,  fell  under  the 
dominion  of  a  series  of  foreign  monarchs,  who  were  often 
despotic,  and,  by  making  the  government  seem  an  enemy 
of  the  governed,  destroyed  in  great  measure  the  legal  and 
social  organization  of  the  people.  For  thirteen  centuries  — 
from  the  reign  of  Theodoric  the  Ostrogoth  to  the  time  of 
Napoleon  —  the  greater  part  of  Italy  was  never  united 
under  a  single  head;  and  in  both  of  these  cases  the  country 
was  ruled  by  foreigners.  Yet,  short-Uved  and  unnatural  as 
the  Napoleonic  kingdom  of  Italy  was,  it  had  no  small 
effect  in  IdndHng  that  longing  for  freedom  and  union  which 
was  destined  to  be  fulfilled  after  many  disappointments. 

By  the  treaty  of  Vienna,  in  181 5,  Italy  was  again  carved 
into  a  number  of  principalities,  most  of  them  under  the 
direct  influence  of  Austria.  Most  of  them,  but  not  all,  for 
in  the  northwestern  corner  of  the  peninsula,  between  the 
mountains  and  the  sea,  lay  Piedmont,  ruled  by  a  prince  of 
the  house  of  Savoy,  with  the  title  of  King  of  Sardinia.  Dur- 
ing the  great  popular  upheaval  of  1848,  Charles  Albert,  a 
king  of  this  line,  granted  to  his  people  a  charter  called  the 
Statuto,  and  in  that  year  and  the  following  he  waged  war 
with  Austria  for  the  liberation  of  Italy.  He  was  badly 
beaten,  but  succeeded  in  attracting  the  attention  of  all 
Italians,  who  now  began  to  look  on  the  King  of  Sardinia  as 
the  possible  savior  of  the  country.  After  his  second  defeat, 
at  Novara,  on  March  23,  1849,  Charles  Albert  abdicated 
in  favor  of  his  son,  Victor  Emmanuel,  who  refused  to  repeal 
the  Statuto  in  spite  of  the  offers  and  the  threats  of  Austria 
—  an  act  that  won  for  him  the  confidence  of  Italy  and  the 

'  Genoa  was  torn  with  factions,  and  was  at  times,  though  not  perma- 
nently, subject  to  Milan  or  to  France. 


ITALY  197 

title  "  II  Re  Galantuomo,"  the  King  Honest  Man.  The 
reliance,  indeed,  which  Victor  Emmanuel  inspired  was  a 
great  factor  in  the  making  of  Italy;  and  to  this  is  due  in 
large  part  the  readiness  with  which  the  Italian  revolution- 
ists accepted  the  monarchy,  although  contrary  to  their  re- 
publican sentiments.  In  fact,  the  chivalrous  nature  of  the 
principal  actors  makes  the  struggle  for  Italian  unity  more 
dramatic  than  any  other  event  in  modern  times. ^  The  chief 
characters  are  heroic,  and  stand  out  with  a  vividness  that 
impresses  the  imagination,  and  gives  to  the  whole  history 
the  charm  of  a  romance.  Victor  Emmanuel  is  the  model 
constitutional  king;  Cavour,  the  ideal  of  a  cool,  far-sighted 
statesman;  Garibaldi,  the  perfect  chieftain  in  irregular 
war,  dashing,  but  rash  and  hot-headed;  Mazzini,  the  typical 
conspirator,  ardent  and  fanatical;  —  all  of  them  full  of 
ardor  and  devotion.  The  enthusiasm  which  they  inspired 
went  far  to  soften  the  difficulties  in  their  path,  and  to  help 
the  people  to  bear  the  sacrifices  entailed  by  the  national 
regeneration.  Over  against  these  men  stands  Pius  IX,  who 
began  his  career  as  a  reformer,  but,  terrified  by  the  march 
of  the  revolution,  became  at  last  the  bigoted  champion  of 
reaction.  The  purity  of  his  character  and  the  subtle  charm 
of  his  manner  fitted  him  to  play  the  part  of  the  innocent 
victim  in  the  great  drama. 

The  Union  of  Italy 

When  Cavour  first  became  prime  minister  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  in  1852,  his  plan  was  a  confederation  of  the 
Italian  States  under  the  Pope  as  nominal  head,  but  practi- 
cally under  the  lead  of  the  King  of  Sardinia.  Now,  in  order 
to  make  this  plan  a  success,  it  was  necessary  to  exclude  the 

'  Professor  Dicey  speaks  of  this,  and  draws  a  comparison  between  Italian 
and  Swiss  politics,  in  a  letter  to  The  Nation,  of  Nov.  18,  1886. 


198  GREATER  EUROPEAN  G0\T:RNMENTS 

powerful  and  reactionary  House  of  Hapsburg  from  all 
influence  in  the  peninsula,  and  with  this  object  he  induced 
Napoleon  III  to  declare  war  against  Austria  in  1859;  but 
when  the  Emperor  brought  the  war  to  a  sudden  end  by  a 
peace  that  required  the  cession  of  Lombardy  alone,  and  left 
Venice  still  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  Cavour  saw  that  so 
long  as  Austria  retained  a  foothold  in  Italy,  many  of  the 
principalities  would  remain  subject  to  her  control.  He 
therefore  changed  his  plan,  and  aimed  at  a  complete 
union  of  Italy  under  the  House  of  Savoy. ^  The  whole 
country  was  ready  to  follow  the  lead  of  Victor  Emmanuel, 
and,  except  for  Venice  and  Rome,  which  were  guarded  by 
foreign  troops,  the  march  of  events  was  rapid.  The  people 
of  the  northern  states  had  already  risen  and  expelled  their 
rulers,  and  early  in  i860  they  declared  for  a  union  with 
Sardinia.  Later  in  the  same  year  Garibaldi  landed  at 
Marsala  with  a  thousand  men,  roused  the  country,  and 
quickly  overran  Sicily  and  Naples,  which  decided  by  popu- 
lar vote  to  join  the  new  kingdom  —  a  step  that  was  soon 
followed  by  Umbria  and  the  marches.  The  rest  of  Italy 
was  won  more  slowly.  Venice  was  annexed  in  1866,  as  a 
result  of  the  war  fought  against  Austria  by  Prussia  and 
Italy;  and  Rome  was  not  added  until  1870,  after  the  with- 
drawal of  the  French  garrison  and  the  fall  of  Napoleon  III, 
who  had  sent  it  there  to  protect  the  Pope. 

The  Statuto 

It  is  curious  that  Sardinia  expanded  into  the  kingdom 
of  Italy  without  any  alteration  of  its  fundamental  laws,  for 
the  Statuto,  originally  granted  by  Charles  Albert  in  1848, 
remains  the  constitution  of  the  nation  to-day.    It  has  never 

^  Jacini,  I  Conservatori  e  V  Evoluzione  dei  Parliti  PolUici  in  Italia,  p.  55 
et  seq. 


ITALY  199 

been  formally  amended,  and  contains,  indeed,  no  provision 
for  amendment.  At  first  it  was  thought  that  any  changes 
ought  to  be  made  by  a  constituent  assembly,  and  in  1848 
a  law  was  passed  to  call  one,  although  on  account  of  the 
disastrous  Tesults  of!  the  war  it  never  met.  By  degrees, 
however,  an  opinion  gained  ground  that  the  political  institu- 
tions of  Italy,  hke  those  of  England,  could  be  modified  by 
the  ordinary  process  of  legislation.  This  has  actually  been 
done,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  on  several  occasions;  and 
now  both  jurists  and  statesmen  are  agreed  that  unlimited 
sovereign  power  resides  in  the  king  and  Parliament.^  The 
Statu  to  contains  a  bill  of  rights;  but,  except  for  the  pro- 
vision forbidding  censorship  of  the  press,  and  perhaps  that 
protecting  the  right  of  holding  meetings,^  it  was  not  de- 
signed to  guard  against  oppression  by  the  legislature,  but 
only  by  the  executive.  The  Statuto  is,  in  fact,  mainly  oc- 
cupied with  the  organization  of  the  powers  of  state,  and  has 
gradually  become  overlaid  with  customs,  which  are  now  so 
strong  that  many  ItaUan  jurists  consider  custom  itself  a 
source  of  public  law.  They  claim,  for  example,  that  the 
habit  of  selecting  ministers  who  can  command  a  majority 
in  ParUament  has  become  binding  as  part  of  the  law  of  the 
land.' 

'  Brusa,  Italien,  in  Marquardsen's  Handbuch,  pp.  12-16,  181-182;  Ruiz, 
"  The  Amendments  to  the  Italian  Constitution,"  Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol. 
Set.,  Sept.,  1895.  It  may  be  noted  that  the  v^arious  contributions  to  Mar- 
quardsen's series  are  of  very  different  value,  and  that  Brusa's  is  one  of  the 
best.  He  remarks  (p.  15)  that,  before  changing  any  constitutional  provi- 
sion, it  has  been  customary  to  consult  the  people  by  means  of  a  general 
election,  and  that  it  is  the  universal  opinion  that  Parliament  has  not  power 
to  undo  the  work  of  the  popular  votes  by  which  the  various  provinces  were 
annexed;  in  other  words,  that  Parliament  cannot  break  up  the  kingdom. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  courts  can  consider  the  constitutionality  of  a 
law  which  involves  a  forced  construction  of  the  Statuto,  but  this  view  has 
not  prevailed.    (Brusa,  pp.  182,  note  3,  229-230.) 

*  Arts.  28,  32.  »  See  Brusa,  p.  19. 


200     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Let  us  consider  the  powers  of  state  in  turn,  beginning 
with  the  king  and  his  ministers,  then  passing  to  the  ParUa- 
ment,  then  to  the  local  government  and  the  judicial  system, 
and  finally  to  the  position  of  the  Catholic  Church. 

The  King 

At  the  head  of  the  nation  is  the  king,  whose  crown  is 
declared  hereditary,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Salic 
law;  that  is,  it  can  be  inherited  only  by  and  through  males. ^ 
It  sounds  hke  a  paradox  to  say  that  the  king  is  a  constitu- 
tional sovereign,  but  that  the  constitution  does  not  give  a 
correct  idea  of  his  real  functions,  and  yet  this  is  true.  By 
the  Statuto,  for  example,  his  sanction  is  necessary  to  the 
vaHdity  of  laws  passed  by  the  Parliament,^  but  in  point  of 
fact  he  never  refuses  it.^  Again,  the  constitution  provides 
that  treaties  which  impose  a  burden  on  the  finances  or 
change  the  territory  shall  require  the  assent  of  the  cham- 
bers,^ leaving  the  crown  free  to  conclude  others  as  it  thinks 
best;  but  in  practice  all  treaties,  except  mihtary  conven- 
tions and  alHances,  are  submitted  to  Parliament  for  ap- 
proval.^ The  king  is  further  given  power  to  declare  war,  to 
appoint  all  officers,  to  make  decrees  and  ordinances,  to 
create  senators,  to  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and 
so  forth;  ^  but  the  Statuto  also  provides  that  no  act  of  the 
government  shall  be  valid  unless  countersigned  by  a  min- 
ister; and  in  fact  all  the  powers  of  the  king  are  exercised 
in  his  name  by  the  ministers,  who  are  responsible  to  the 
popular  chamber.^    He  is,  indeed,  seldom  present  at  cabinet 

1  Statuto,  Art.  2.  ^  statute,  Art.  7. 

'  Brusa,  pp.  105,  153;  cf.  Dupriez,  i.  281,  292-297. 

*  Statuto,  Art.  5. 

^  Brusa,  p.  106. 

'  Statuto,  Arts.  5-9. 

'  Statuto,  Art.  67;  and  see  Brusa,  p.  105. 


ITALY  20 I 

meetings,  and  has  little  or  no  direct  influence  over  current 
domestic  politics/  although  it  is  said  that  his  personal 
opinion  has  a  good  deal  of  weight  on  the  relations  with 
foreign  states. ^  When,  however,  a  cabinet  crisis  occurs 
and  the  ministry  resigns,  the  king  has  a  great  deal  of  lati- 
tude in  the  appointment  of  its  successor;  for  the  Chamber 
is  not  divided  into  two  parties,  one  of  which  naturally  comes 
into  power  when  the  other  goes  out,  but,  as  in  France,  it  is 
split  up  into  a  number  of  small  groups,  so  that  every  min- 
istry is  based  upon  a  coalition.  The  king  can,  therefore, 
send  for  almost  any  one  he  pleases  and  allow  him  to  attempt 
to  form  a  cabinet.  It  often  happens,  moreover,  that  the 
man  selected  feels  that  he  cannot  get  the  support  of  a  ma- 
jority in  the  existing  Chamber,  but,  hoping  for  a  favorable 
result  from  a  new  election,  is  willing  to  undertake  to  form  a 
cabinet  if  allowed  to  dissolve  Parliament.  In  such  cases  the 
king  exercises  his  own  discretion,  and  grants  permission  or 
not  as  he  thinks  best;  for,  contrary  to  the  habit  in  France, 
dissolutions  in  Italy  are  by  no  means  rare.  Thus  the  Italian 
king,  although  strictly  a  constitutional  monarch  tied  up  in 
a  parliamentary  system,  is  not  quite  so  powerless  as  the 
French  president  or  the  English  king. 

The  Ministers 

In  the  selection  of  his  ministers  the  king  is  not  limited 
by  law  to  members  of  Parliament,  but,  if  a  man  is  appointed 
who  is  not  a  member  of  either  house,  he  is  obliged  by  cus- 
tom to  become  a  candidate  for  the  next  vacant  seat  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  unless  he  is  created  a  senator.^    As 

1  Brusa,  p.  108.  Dupriez,  i.  289,  says  that  he  presides  only  when  pecul- 
iarly important  matters  are  under  discussion. 

'  Dupriez,  i.  296.     This  is  a  common  opinion. 

'  Brusa,  p.  108;  and  the  same  thing  is  true  of  the  parliamentary'  under- 
secretaries.    Id.,  p.  196. 


202     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

in  other  parliamentary  governments  on  the  Continent, 
however,  the  ministers  and  their  undersecretaries  have  a 
right  to  be  present  and  speak  in  either  Chamber,  although 
they  can  vote  only  in  the  one  of  which  they  happen  to  be 
members.^  The  work  of  the  Parliament  is,  indeed,  chiefly 
directed  by  them;  for,  while  individual  members  have  a 
right  to  introduce  bills,  the  power  is  used  only  for  matters 
of  small  importance.^  As  a  rule,  each  minister  has  charge 
of  a  department  of  the  administration;  but  it  is  allowable, 
and  was  at  one  time  not  uncommon,  to  appoint  additional 
ministers  without  portfolios,  whose  duties  consisted  solely 
in  helping  to  shape  the  policy  of  the  government,  and 
defending  it  in  the  chambers.^ 

The  Senate 

The  Italian  Parliament  has  two  branches  —  the  Senate 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  Senate  is  composed 
of  the  princes  of  the  royal  family,^  and  of  members  ap- 
pointed by  the  king  for  life  from  certain  categories  of  per- 
sons defined  by  the  Statuto.^    These  are:  bishops;^  sundry 

^  Statute,  Art.  66;  Law  of  Feb.  12,  1888,  i\ri.  2. 

^  Brusa,  p.  172.  Dupriez  (i.  308)  says  that  the  ministers  in  Italy  have 
not  so  complete  a  monopol)'  of  initiative  as  in  other  countries,  and  that  pri- 
vate members  often  propose  measures  with  success.  But  in  saying  this  he 
must  not  be  understood  to  deny  that  the  laws  enacted  as  a  result  of  private 
initiative  are  unimportant  compared  with  the  government  measures,  both 
as  regards  number  and  character. 

'  Brusa,  p.  197.  See,  also,  the  lists  of  the  different  ministries  published 
in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies.  This  manual,  by  the  way,  is  a  most  valua- 
ble production,  for  it  contains  the  text  of  many  important  laws  and  a  large 
amount  of  interesting  information.  For  the  organization  and  functions  of 
the  various  departments,  see  Brusa,  p.  200  d  seq. 

*  Statute,  Art.  34. 

'  Statute,  Art.  33.    All  the  appointed  members  must  be  forty  years  old. 

*  Since  the  quarrel  with  the  Pope  in  1870  this  class  has  not  been  avail- 
able.    Brusa,  p.  119. 


ITALY  203 

high  officials,  civil,  military,  and  judicial;  *  deputies  who 
have  served  three  terms,  or  six  years;  ^  men  who  have  been 
for  seven  years  members  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Science; 
men  who  pay  over  three  thousand  Ure  (about  six  hundred 
dollars)  in  taxes;'  and  men  deserving  exceptional  honor 
for  service  to  the  state.  Owing  to  the  extreme  severity  of 
the  Senate  in  recognizing  such  desert,  there  are  at  present 
only  two  members  from  this  last  class;  for  the  Senate  itself 
has  the  strange  privilege  of  deciding  whether  a  person 
selected  by  the  king  belongs  properly  to  one  of  these  classes, 
and  is  quaHfied  to  be  a  senator.^  Except  for  money  bills, 
which  must  be  presented  first  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
the  legislative  powers  of  the  two  houses  are  the  same,  but 
the  Senate  has  also  judicial  functions.  It  can  sit  as  a  court 
to  try  ministers  impeached  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies; 
to  try  cases  of  high  treason  and  attempts  on  the  safety  of 
the  state;  ^  and  to  try  its  own  members  —  the  Italians, 
curiously  enough,  having  copied  in  their  Senate  the  anti- 
quated privilege  which  entitles  the  English  peers  to  be 
tried  for  crime  only  by  members  of  their  own  body.*  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Senate  has  very  Httle  real  power,  and 
is  obhged  to  yield  to  the  will  of  the  lower  house.'  In 
1878-1880  it  did,  indeed,  refuse  to  abohsh  the  unpopular 
grist-tax  for  more  than  a  year,  but  gave  way  before  a  newly 

1  Except  in  the  case  of  the  highest  ofBcials,  persons  of  this  class  can  be 
appointed  only  after  a  period  of  service  which  varies  from  three  to  seven 
years,  according  to  the  office  they  hold.  In  1910  there  were  ninety-nine 
senators  from  this  class. 

*  Out  of  a  total  of  about  three  hundred  and  eighty-three,  there  were  in 
igio  about  one  hundred  and  forty-seven  senators  from  this  class. 

'  There  were  seventy-one  senators  from  this  class. 

*  Brusa,  p.  119;  and  see  the  Statuto,  Art.  60. 

*  Statuto,  Art.  36.  »  Statuto,  Art.  37. 

^  The  changes  made  by  the  Senate  in  bills  have  usually  a  legal  rather 
than  a  political  importance.     Dupriez,  p.  313. 


204     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

elected  Chamber  of  Deputies.^  It  would  probably  not 
venture  even  so  far  to-day,  for  the  number  of  senators  is 
unlimited,  and  on  several  occasions  a  large  batch  of  mem- 
bers has  been  created  in  order  to  change  the  party  coloring 
of  the  body  —  in  1890  as  many  as  seventy-five  having  been 
appointed  for  this  purpose  at  one  time.^  As  in  other  coun- 
tries where  the  parliamentary  system  exists,  the  cabinet  is 
not  responsible  to  the  upper  house ;  and  it  is  only  occasion- 
ally, and  as  it  were  by  accident,  that  a  minister  has  resigned 
on  account  of  an  adverse  vote  in  the  Senate.^ 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  consists  of  five  hundred  and 
eight  members,  elected  until  191 2  on  a  limited  franchise. 
By  the  earlier  law,  the  suffrage  was  so  restricted  that  less 
than  two  and  a  half  per  cent  of  the  population  were  entitled 
to  vote;  but  this  was  felt  to  be  too  small  a  proportion,  and 
in  1882  it  was  increased  by  an  act  whose  provisions  were 
in  force  for  thirty  years.*  By  this  statute  a  voter  must  be 
able  to  read  and  write,  and  must  have  passed  an  examina- 
tion on  the  subjects  comprised  in  the  course  of  compulsory 
education,^  except  that  the  examination  was  not  required 
in  the  case  of  officials,  professional  men,  graduates  of  col- 
leges, and  others  who  could,  of  course,  pass  it;  nor  in  the 
case  of  men  who  had  received  a  medal  for  military  or  civil 

1  Brusa,  pp.  155-156.  See  Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  Storia  d'  Italia, 
1860-1880,  pp.  420-421,  558-559- 

*  In  1886  forty-one  were  appointed  together,  and  in  1892  forty-two.  See 
the  list  of  senators  with  their  dates,  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for  1892, 
p.  806  et  seq.,  and  p.  876. 

'  Brusa,  p.  158,  note  3. 

*■  Brusa,  pp.  122-127.  This  law,  with  its  amendments,  recodified  in  1895, 
may  be  found  in  full  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for  that  year. 

'  Education  was  compulsory  in  Italy  only  between  the  ages  of  six  and 
nine.     Act  of  July  15,  1877,  Art.  2. 


ITALY  205 

service,  or  who  paid  a  direct  tax  of  nineteen  and  four- 
fifths  lire  (about  four  dollars),  or  who  paid  rents  of  certain 
amounts.  The  change  more  than  tripled  the  number  of 
voters  at  once; '  and,  although  these  still  included  only  a 
small  part  of  the  citizens,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  with 
the  spread  of  elementary  education  their  number  was  ex- 
pected to  increase  until  the  suffrage  became  substantially 
universal.^ 

At  first  the  members  were  chosen  each  in  a  separate  dis- 
trict, but  after  the  times  of  enthusiasm  for  Italian  unity  were 
over,  and  the  generous  impulse  that  had  stirred  the  country 
began  to  give  way  before  the  selfish  motives  of  everyday 
life,  it  was  found  that  the  deputies  failed  to  take  broad 
views  of  national  questions,  and  were  largely  absorbed  by 
personal  and  local  interests.  It  was  found,  in  short,  that 
they  represented  the  nation  too  little  and  their  particular 
districts  too  much;  ^  and  it  was  hoped  that  by  increasing 
the  size  of  the  districts  they  would  be  freed  from  the  tyranny 
of  local  influence,  and  enabled  to  form  compact  parties  on 
national  issues."*  With  this  object  the  Act  of  1882  dis- 
tributed the  five  hundred  and  eight  seats  among  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-five  districts,  which  elected  from  two  to  five 

1  It  raised  the  number  from  627,838  to  2,049,461.  Brusa,  p.  127.  When 
the  law  went  into  effect,  the  v^oters  were  not  very  unequally  divided  into 
those  who  passed  the  examination,  those  who  paid  the  taxes,  and  the  other 
excepted  classes.    Id.,  p.  126,  notes  1-2. 

*  In  order  to  restrict  the  arbitrary  influence  of  the  government  over 
elections,  and  to  prevent  the  abuses  which  had  been  common  before,  a  pro- 
cedure for  preparing  the  lists  of  voters  and  insuring  the  secrecy  of  the  ballot 
was  established  by  the  same  law  (see  Brusa,  pp.  127-128,  130-132);  and  in 
this  connection  it  may  be  noticed  that  soldiers  and  sailors  in  active  ser\'ice 
(including  subalterns  and  police  officials)  are  not  allowed  to  vote.  Law  of 
March  28,  1895,  Art.  14. 

*  Brusa,  p.  16. 

*  Minghetti,  /  Parliti  Politici,  p.  18;   Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  p.  504. 


2o6     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

deputies  apiece;  ^  and,  in  order  to  give  some  representation 
to  minorities,  it  was  provided  that  in  those  districts  which 
elected  five  deputies  no  one  should  vote  for  more  than  four 
candidates.^  The  new  system,  called  the  scrutinio  di  lista, 
did  not  produce  the  results  that  were  expected  from  it.  On 
the  contrary,  in  Italy  as  in  France,  where  the  same  remedy 
was  applied  to  the  same  evil,  the  organization  and  power  of 
the  local  wirepullers  grew  with  the  increase  in  the  num- 
ber of  deputies  elected  in  a  district,  while  the  influence  of 
the  latter  over  the  ministers  and  the  provincial  officers  was 
greater  than  ever  before.^  An  Act  of  May  5,  1891,  aboHshed, 
therefore,  the  scrutinio  di  lista  and  reestablished  single 
electoral  districts. 

Finally,  in  spite  of  the  large  number  of  illiterates,  an  act 
was  passed  on  June  30,  191 2,  which  established  very  nearly 
universal  manhood  suffrage.  It  extended  the  right  to  vote 
to  all  men  who  can  read  and  write,  and  to  those  who  cannot 
but  who  have  reached  the  age  of  thirty  years  and  have 
performed  their  military  service.  The  system  of  single 
electoral  districts  was  retained.  The  act  increased  the  elec- 
torate from  three  millions  to  about  eight  millions;  and  the 
first  elections  held  under  it  in  the  course  of  the  following 
year  showed  a  distinct  tendency  toward  the  more  radical 
groups. 

In  accordance  with  the  general  practice  in  Europe,  the 
deputies  are  not  required  to  be  residents  of  their  districts, 
the  only  important  limitations  on  the  choice  of  candidates 
being  the  requirement  of  the  age  of  thirty  years,  and  the 

^  Three  districts  elected  two  deputies,  sixty-one  elected  three,  thirty-six 
elected  four,  and  thirty-five  elected  five.  Brusa,  p.  129.  See  Arts.  44  and 
45  of  the  Act  of  1882,  and  the  table  of  districts  annexed  thereto. 

2  Act  of  1882,  Art.  65. 

^  Brusa,  lb.;,  and  see  Turiello,  Governo  e  Governali  in  Italia,  2d  ed.; 
Fatli,  p.  326;  Proposle,  p.  171. 


ITALY  207 

provision  excluding  priests  who  have  active  duties,  mayors 
and  provincial  counsellors  in  their  own  districts,  and  all 
officials  paid  from  the  treasury  of  the  state  with  the  excep- 
tion of  ministers,  undersecretaries,  and  a  few  others.^  Under 
the  earlier  laws  the  deputies  received  no  pay  for  attendance, 
but  were  given  free  passes  over  the  railroads,^  and  it  was 
no  doubt  partly  for  this  reason  that  the  small  attendance  in 
the  Chamber  was  long  a  crying  evil.  To  remedy  this  the 
Act  of  1 91 2  provided  for  the  payment  of  the  members. 

The  Chamber  is  elected  for  five  years,  but  so  far  its  life 
has  always  been  cut  short  by  a  dissolution,  and  in  fact  the 
average  length  of  term  has  been  less  than  three  years.^  The 
budget  and  the  contingent  of  recruits  are  adjusted  by  annual 
laws,  and  there  would  naturally  be  a  new  session  every 
year;  but  in  order  not  to  interrupt  the  work  of  Parliament, 
and  especially  the  consideration  of  the  budget,  which  is 
apt  to  be  behindhand,  a  curious  habit  grew  up  of  prolonging 
the  sessions,  so  that  three  parliaments  have  had  only  a 
single  session  apiece,  one  lasting  two  and  a  half  and  another 
three  and  a  half  years,  all  of  them  unbroken  save  by 
occasional  recesses.* 

The  Chamber  of  Deputies  elects  its  own  President  and 
other  officers,  and  the  vote  for  President  used  to  be  an 

1  Brusa,  pp.  132-134;  and  see  Acts  of  Dec,  i860  (Arts.  97,  98),  July  3, 
1875,  May  13,  1877,  July  5,  1882,  March  28,  1895  (Arts.  81-89).  There  is 
a  curious  provision  that  only  forty  oflBcials  of  all  kinds  (except  ministers 
and  undersecretaries),  and  among  them  not  more  than  ten  judges  and  ten 
professors,  can  be  deputies  at  the  same  time,  and  if  more  are  elected  they 
are  reduced  to  that  number  by  lot.  Law  of  March  28,  1895,  Art.  88.  On 
account  of  some  scandals  that  occurred  at  one  time  it  is  further  provided 
that  no  officers  of  companies  subventioned  by  the  state,  and  no  government 
contractors,  can  sit  in  the  Chamber.  Brusa,  p.  134;  law  of  March  28, 
1895,  Arts.  84-85. 

'  Bnisa,  pp.  159-160.  '  Id.,  p.  139. 

*  Brusa,  p.  139;  and  see  the  list  of  the  sessions  of  the  varfous  Parliaments 
in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies. 


208     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

occasion  for  a  trial  of  party  strength,  as  in  most  other  legis- 
lative bodies.  Of  late  years,  however,  the  English  habit 
has  prevailed  of  reelecting  the  same  man  without  regard  to 
party  affiliations;  ^  and  this  is  the  more  striking  because  the 
President  appoints  the  committees  on  rules  and  contested 
elections  ^  which  have,  of  course,  no  little  importance.  The 
idea  that  the  presiding  officer  ought  to  be  strictly  impartial 
is  not  the  only  valuable  suggestion  the  Itahans  have  derived 
from  England,  for  they  have  inherited  Cavour's  admiration 
for  British  parliamentary  procedure,  and  in  general  they 
attempt  to  follow  it.  Unfortunately  they  have  not  done 
so  in  all  cases,  for  the  system  of  committees  and  of  interpel- 
lations or  questions  has  been  copied  mainly  from  the  French 
and  not  the  English  practice. 

The  Administrative  System 

Such,  briefly  stated,  are  the  position  of  the  king  and  the 
composition  of  the  Parliament;  but  although  the  king  and 
his  ministers  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Parliament  on  the 
other,  are  the  great  political  forces  whose  interaction  de- 
termines the  character  of  the  government,  still  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  appreciate  the  relations  between  the  two  without 
some  knowledge  of  the  method  of  administration,  the  prin- 
ciples of  local  government,  and  the  control  exercised  by  the 
courts  of  law,  because  these  matters  have  a  direct  bearing 
on  the  functions  of  the  cabinet  and  hence  on  the  nature  of 
the  influence  exerted  upon  it  by  the  Parliament. 

The  administration  both  of  national  and  local  affairs, 
and  to  some  extent  the  judicial  system  of  Italy,  are  modeled 

*  Brusa,  pp.  140  and  156,  note  2.  Biancheri  was  President  of  the  Chamber 
continuously  from  1884  to  1892.  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for  1892  (pp.  800- 
802).  In  that  year  he  was  dropped  for  party  reasons,  and  in  fact  the  practice 
of  looking  on  the  President  as  the  representative  of  a  party  has  unfortunately 
revived. 

*  Rules  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  Art.  12. 


ITALY  209 

on  those  of  France,  and  they  present  the  defects  without 
all  the  advantages  of  the  original.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  the  administrative  system,  where  Italy  has  copied  the 
centralization,  but  has  been  unable  to  acquire  the  tradi- 
tions which  give  real  solidity  to  the  body  of  officials.  At 
first  sight  it  seems  strange  that  Cavour  and  his  successors, 
with  their  admiration  for  English  institutions,  should  have 
turned  to  the  French  bureaucracy  as  a  pattern;  but  there 
were  several  reasons  for  their  course.  In  the  first  place  the 
Napoleonic  rule  had  already  made  the  Italians  famihar 
with  the  French  form  of  administration.  A  far  stronger 
motive  came  from  the  fact  that  after  Cavour  gave  up  the 
idea  of  a  confederation,  and  strove  to  create  a  united  king- 
dom of  Italy,  it  became  important,  in  view  of  the  possible 
interference  of  foreign  powers,  to  consolidate  the  different 
provinces  as  completely  and  rapidly  as  possible.  The 
Italian  statesmen  tried,  therefore,  to  make  the  people 
homogeneous;  to  remove  as  far  as  possible  all  local  differ- 
ences; and  to  destroy  all  possibiUty  of  local  opposition.' 
The  country,  moreover,  was  very  backward,  and  a  great 
work  of  regeneration  had  to  be  undertaken,  especially  in 
the  south,  where  society  was  badly  disintegrated  and  brig- 
andage was  rife.  To  accomplish  this  a  highly  centralized 
and  autocratic  system,  in  which  the  government  could  make 
itself  quickly  and  decisively  felt,  was  thought  essential;  ^ 
and  it  was  beheved,  not  without  reason,  that  until  the  union 
was  accomplished,  and  order  had  been  estabhshed  in  Naples 
and  Sicily,  it  was  impossible  to  introduce  general  local  self- 
government  or  universal  liberty.  The  old  territorial  divi- 
sions were  therefore  swept  away,  and  replaced  by  artificial 
districts  devoid,  of  course,  of  real  local  hfe.    A  centralized 

1  See  Brusa,  pp.  23,  337;   Jacini,  /  Conservalori,  p.  55  et  seq.,  Due  Anni 
di  Polilica  Ilaliana,  pp.  93-94. 
*  See  Brusa,  pp.  253-254. 


2IO     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

form  of  administration  was  set  up,  and  the  government  was 
given  a  highly  arbitrary  power  to  interfere  with  the  free- 
dom of  the  individual.  Such  a  system  might  have  worked 
very  well  in  the  hands  of  a  wise  dictator,  but,  as  some  of 
the  Itahan  writers  have  themselves  remarked,  it  was  so 
entirely  inconsistent  with  the  parliamentary  form  of  govern- 
ment that  one  of  them  was  sure  to  spoil  the  other,  and  ex- 
perience has  shown  that  both  of  them  have  suffered  from 
the  combination.^ 

Contrast  between  Theory  and  Practice 

There  is  a  marked  contradiction  in  Italy  between  the 
theory  and  practice  of  government;  for  there  is  a  strong 
ambition  to  be  abreast  of  the  times  and  a  general  behef  in 
the  principle  of  personal  liberty;  but  the  actual  condition 
of  the  nation  has  made  it  impossible  to  Hve  up  to  these 
standards.  A  striking  example  of  the  contrast  between 
aspirations  and  results  is  furnished  by  the  state  of  the 
criminal  law,  for  capital  punishment  has  been  aboHshed, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  homicide  is  more  common  than  in 
any  other  civilized  country  in  Europe,^  and  yet  criminal 
procedure  is  in  such  a  condition  that  thousands  of  people 
have  been  arrested  on  suspicion,  kept  in  prison  sometimes 
for  years,  and  finally  released  because  there  was  not  suffi- 
cient ground  for  trial.^    Thus  by  her  code  Italy  appears  to  be 

'  Cf.  Jacini,  /  Conservatori,  pp.  67-68;  Minghetti,  /  Parii  Politki,  p.  100; 
Pareto,  "  L'ltalie  Economique,"  Revue  des  Deux  Moudes,  Oct.  15,  1891; 
and  see  Bertolini,  "  I  Pieni  Poteri  per  le  Riforme  Organiche,"  Nuova  Anto- 
logia,  June  i,  1894.  ^  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  330-332. 

'  See  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  i.  576.  Petruccelli  della  Gattina  says 
(Storia  d'llalia,  p.  258)  that  in  1876,  93,444  persons  were  arrested  on  sus- 
picion and  let  off  because  there  was  no  ground  for  trial.  This,  it  is  true, 
was  eleven  years  before  the  code  was  finally  enacted;  nevertheless  it  illus- 
trates the  contrast  between  ideals  and  practice  in  criminal  matters,  and  in 
fact  in  that  very  year  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  was  voted  by  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  but  rejected  by  the  Senate. 


ITALY  211 

in  advance  of  most  other  nations,  but  in  her  criminal  prac- 
tice she  is  really  far  behind  them.  The  truth  is  that  the 
successive  governments,  in  view  of  the  unsettled  state  of 
the  country,  have  been  afraid  to  place  restraints  on  their 
own  power,  and  weaken  an  authority  thought  necessary  for 
the  preservation  of  order.  Of  course  the  result  has  been  a 
good  deal  of  arbitrary  officialism  and  disregard  of  the  rights 
of  the  citizen/  but  while  this  is  a  misfortune  for  the  north 
of  Italy,  extraordinary  and  autocratic  power  has  at  times 
been  indispensable  in  Sicily  and  the  south.^  The  impossi- 
bility, indeed,  of  giving  effect  to  the  theories  of  liberty  that 
are  constantly  proclaimed  from  every  quarter  was  forcibly 
illustrated  by  the  only  serious  attempt  that  has  been  made 
to  do  so.  When  Cairoli  and  Zanardelh  became  ministers 
in  1878  they  tried  to  carry  out  their  principles  thoroughly. 
They  permitted  the  constitutional  right  of  public  meeting 
to  be  freely  exercised,  and  gave  up  the  despotic  practice  of 
preventive  arrest,  trusting  to  the  courts  to  punish  offenders 
against  the  law;  but  brigandage  increased  so  fast,  and  other 
disturbances  became  so  alarming,  that  the  cabinet  was 
driven  from  office,  and  its  policy  was  abandoned.  In  later 
years  Zanardelh  has  again  held  office,  and  succeeded  in  im- 
proving the  administrative  and  judicial  system  to  some  ex- 
tent, but  the  progress  of  the  reform  has  been  extremely 
slow,  and  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  government,  although 
reduced,  still  conforms  even  in  quiet  times  far  more  nearly 
to  French  than  to  Anglo-Saxon  notions. 

The  Ordinance  Power 

There  are  two  matters  in  connection  with  the  adminis- 
tration that  require  special  notice.  One  of  them  is  the  power 
of  the  executive  officials  to  make  ordinances.    This  is  even 

*  Cf.  Brusa,  p.  183.  ^  Cf.  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  i.  581. 


212     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

more  extensively  used  than  in  France,  and  there  are  com- 
plaints  that  it  is  sometimes  carried  so  far  as  to  render  the 
provisions  of  a  statute  nugatory/  although  the  constitu- 
tion expressly  declares  that  "  the  king  makes  the  decrees 
and  regulations  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the  laws, 
without  suspending  their  observance  or  dispensing  with 
them."  2  The  interpretation  put  upon  this  provision  is  in 
fact  so  broad  that  the  government  is  practically  allowed  to 
suspend  the  law  subject  to  responsibiHty  to  Parliament,  and 
even  to  make  temporary  laws  which  are  to  be  submitted  to 
ParUament  later  —  a  power  that  is  used  when  a  tariff  bill 
is  introduced,  to  prevent  large  importations  before  the  tariff 
goes  into  effect.^  The  Parliament  has,  moreover,  a  habit 
of  delegating  legislative  power  to  the  ministers  in  the  most 
astonishing  way.  In  the  case  of  the  ItaUan  criminal  code, 
for  example,  the  final  text  was  never  submitted  to  the  cham- 
bers at  all,  but  after  the  subject  had  been  sufficiently  de- 
bated, the  government  was  authorized  to  make  a  complete 
draft  of  the  code,  and  then  to  enact  it  by  royal  decree,  har- 
monizing it  with  itself  and  with  other  statutes,  and  taking 
into  account  the  views  expressed  by  the  chambers.  The 
same  was  true  of  the  electoral  law  of  1882,  of  the  general 
laws  on  local  government  and  on  the  Council  of  State,  and 
of  many  other  enactments.'*    It  may  be  added  that  although 

1  Brusa,  pp.  170-172. 

"  Statute,  Art.  6.  The  courts  have  power  to  refuse  to  apply  an  ordinance 
which  exceeds  the  authority  of  the  government,  but,  in  practice,  this  is  not 
an  effective  restraint.    Brusa,  pp.  171-172,  175,  187. 

^  Brusa,  pp.  186-187.  In  1891  the  customs  duties  on  several  articles 
were  increased  by  royal  decree,  which  was  subsequently  ratified  by  Parlia- 
ment. 

*  Brusa,  pp.  175-176;  Bertolini,  "I  Pieni  Poteri,"  Nuova  Antologia, 
June  I,  1894.  Several  laws  of  this  kind  may  be  found  in  the  Manuals  of 
the  Deputies.  They  are  issued  in  the  form  not  of  statutes,  but  of  ordinances, 
and  begin  by  reciting  the  legislative  authority  under  which  they  are  made. 


ITALY  213 

the  Statute  does  not  expressly  provide  for  it,  the  ministers, 
prefects,  syndics,  and  other  officials  are  in  the  habit  of  mak- 
ing decrees  on  subjects  of  minor  importance.'  The  prefer- 
ence indeed  for  administrative  regulations,  which  the 
government  can  change  at  any  time,  over  rigid  statutes  is 
deeply  implanted  in  the  Latin  races,  and  seems  to  be 
especially  marked  in  Italy.^ 

The  Civil  Service 

The  other  matter  referred  to  as  requiring  special  notice 
is  the  civil  service.  The  host  of  officials,  who  are,  unfortu- 
nately, too  numerous  and  too  poorly  paid,^  can  be  appointed 
or  dismissed  very  much  at  the  pleasure  of  the  government, 
for  although  there  are  royal  decrees  regulating  appoint- 
ments and  removals  in  many  cases,  they  do  not  appear  to 
furnish  a  satisfactory  guarantee.'*  Here,  then,  is  a  great 
mass  of  spoils,  in  the  distribution  of  which  the  poHticians 
take  an  active  part.^  Decrees,  providing  for  competitive 
examinations  for  admission  to  the  service,  are  indeed  com- 
mon; and  in  1890  a  statute,^  affecting  the  officers  in  the 
department  of  public  safety,  was  passed  with  provisions  for 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that  Italian  statutes  vary  a  great  deal,  sometimes  con- 
taining only  general  principles,  and  leaving  to  the  government  the  task 
of  completing  them  by  supplementary  regulations,  and  sometimes  going  into 
minute  details  (Brusa,  p.  171).  Dupriez,  who  looks  at  the  matter  from  a 
French  standpoint,  says  (i.  336)  that  in  the  struggle  between  the  government 
and  the  Parliament  over  the  limits  of  the  ordinance  power,  the  government 
has  tried  to  extend  its  authority  beyond  measure,  and  the  Parliament  to 
dispute  it  even  in  the  matter  of  organizing  the  administrative  service. 

1  Brusa,  pp.  188-190. 

»  Minghetti,  pp.  293-294. 

'  Brusa,  p.  260. 

*  Dupriez,  i.  337-340;  Brusa,  pp.  252-255.  For  the  scope  of  these  de- 
crees, see  p.  261  et  seq. 

*  Brusa,  pp.  152-153;  and  see  Dupriez,  i.  340-342. 
'  Law  of  Dec.  21,  1890. 


214     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

such  examinations,  and  for  preventing  removal  ^vithout  the 
consent  of  a  standing  commission.  But  civil  sendee  laws, 
like  all  others,  depend  for  much  of  their  effectiveness  on 
the  persons  who  execute  them.^ 

Local  Government 

Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  local  goverimient.  The 
Itahan  statesmen  had  at  first  a  general  beUef  in  decentrali- 
zation,^  but  the  force  of  circumstances  and  a  repugnance  to 
the  idea  of  federation  were  so  strong  that  the  old  territorial 
divisions,  which  could  alone  have  furnished  a  solid  basis  for 
a  decentralized  system,  were  abandoned,  and  the  whole 
country  was  cut  up  into  a  series  of  brand-new  districts. 
These  are  the  provinces,  the  circondari,  the  mandamenti, 
and  the  communes,^  of  which  the  first  and  the  last  are  the 

1  There  are  two  bodies  that  exercise  a  considerable  control  over  the  gov- 
ernment. One  of  these  is  the  Council  of  State,  which  has,  however,  only 
an  advisory  power,  except  in  matters  of  administrative  justice,  and  in  the 
case  of  provincial  and  communal  oflacials  whom  it  protects  from  arbitrary 
removal.  On  this  subject  see  Brusa,  p.  212  et  seq.  The  laws  of  June  2,  1889, 
which  regulate  this  body,  may  be  found  in  the  Manual  of  the  Deputies  for 
1892,  p.  357.  The  other  is  the  Courts  of  Accounts  {Corte  dei  Conti),  whose 
members  can  be  removed  only  with  the  consent  of  a  commission  composed 
of  the  Presidents  and  Vice-Presidents  of  both,  Chambers.  It  has  a  limited 
supervision  over  the  collection  of  the  revenue,  and  passes  finally  on  pensions 
and  on  the  accounts  of  officials,  provinces,  and  communes.  It  also  makes  a 
yearly  report  to  Parliament  on  the  accounts  of  each  ministry;  but  its  most 
extraordinary  function  consists  in  the  fact  that  all  decrees  and  orders  which 
involve  the  payment  of  more  than  2,000  lire  must  be  submitted  to  it  for 
registration,  and  if  it  thinks  them  contrary  to  the  laws  or  regulations  it  can 
refuse  to  register  them.  It  is,  indeed,  obliged  to  register  them  if  the  Council 
of  Ministers  insists  upon  it,  but  in  that  case  they  must  be  transmitted  to  the 
President  of  the  Chambers  together  with  the  opinion  of  the  Corte  dei  Conti. 
Law  of  Aug.  14,  1862,  Arts.  14,  18,  19;  and  see  Brusa,  pp.  219-224. 

'  In  1868,  the  Chamber  actually  voted  an  order  of  the  day  in  favor  of 
decentralization.    Petruccelli  della  Gattina,  pp.  192-195. 

*  In  the  provinces  of  Mantua  and  Venice  the  division  is  somewhat  dif- 
ferent, but  is  being  brought  into  accord  with  the  general  plan.    Brusa,  p,  339. 


ITALY  215 

only  ones  of  great  importance.  Until  the  Act  of  1888,  the 
powers  conferred  on  the  local  bodies  were  extremely  small, 
and  even  now  they  are  far  from  extensive,  for  the  whole 
system  is  copied  from  that  of  France,  and,  with  some  varia- 
tions in  detail,  the  organization  and  powers  of  the  French 
local  officers  and  councils  have  been  followed  very  closely.^ 
A  general  description  of  the  local  government  would  there- 
fore consist  very  largely  in  a  repetition  of  what  has  been 
already  said  in  the  first  chapter  on  France;  and  hence  it  is 
only  necessary  to  touch  on  a  few  salient  points,  begging  the 
reader  to  remember  how  great  a  power  and  how  large  a 
share  of  pohtical  patronage  this  system  places  in  the  hands 
of  the  central  authorities.^  At  the  head  of  each  province, 
which  corresponds  to  the  French  department,  is  a  prefect 
appointed  by  the  king,  and  directly  subject  to  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior.  Like  his  French  prototype,  he  is  regarded 
as  a  political  officer,  and  uses  his  influence  more  or  less 
openly  at  elections.^  The  chief  executive  magistrate  of  the 
commune  is  the  syndic;  who  is  chosen,  like  the  mayor  in 
France,  by  the  communal  council  from  its  own  members. 
In  the  smaller  communes,  he  was,  until  1896,  selected  by 
the  king  from  among  the  members  of  the  council.  As  in 
France,   both   the  provinces  and   the  communes  possess 

^  For  a  description  of  the  local  government,  see  Brusa,  p.  337  et  seq. 
The  full  text  of  the  law  on  the  subject  was  fixed  by  royal  ordinance  on 
Feb.  10,  1889,  in  accordance  with  the  Act  of  Dec.  30,  i888.  It  was  followed 
by  an  elaborate  ordinance  regulating  its  execution,  and  on  July  7,  1889, 
and  July  11,  1894,  by  acts  amending  the  law.  Manual  of  Deps.,  1895, 
pp.  301-394. 

*  In  practice  the  administration  appears  to  be,  if  anything,  even  more 
centralized  than  in  France,  owing  to  the  habit  on  the  part  of  the  officials  of 
referring  everything  to  the  central  government.  Jacini,  /  Conservatori, 
p.  130;  Minghetti,  /  Partiti  Politici,  pp.  240-241. 

'  Brusa,  pp.  225,  277.  On  the  eve  of  the  elections  in  1892,  forty-six  out 
of  the  sLxty-nine  prefects  were  dismissed  or  transferred  to  other  provinces, 
in  order  to  help  the  government  to  carry  the  country. 


21 6     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

elected  councils.  In  Italy  they  are  chosen  for  six  years, 
one  half  being  renewed  every  three  years;  but  the  suffrage 
for  these  bodies  was  exceedingly  restricted,  until  by  the 
Act  of  1888  it  was  extended  so  as  to  be  somewhat  wider, 
especially  as  apphed  to  the  peasants,  than  the  suffrage  for 
the  election  of  deputies.^  The  resources  of  the  local  bodies 
are  not  adequate  for  the  fulfillment  of  their  duties,  and  this, 
combined  with  a  love  of  municipal  display,  has  been  the 
cause  of  heavy  debts,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  larger 
cities,  many  of  which  have  long  been  on  the  verge  of 
bankruptcy.^ 

The  Judicial  System 

There  is  one  branch  of  the  Italian  government  which  has 
not  been  centrahzed,  and  that  is  the  judicial  system.  The 
lower  courts  are,  indeed,  new  creations,  organized  on  a 
symmetrical  plan  very  much  resembling  the  French;  but, 
in  order  apparently  not  to  offend  the  bench  and  bar  of  the 
old  principaHties,  the  highest  courts  have  been  suffered  to 
remain  in  the  more  important  capitals,  so  that  there  are 
now  five  independent  Courts  of  Cassation,  those  of  Turin, 
Florence,  Naples,  Palermo,  and  Rome,  each  of  which  has 
final  and  supreme  authority,  within  its  own  district,  on  all 
questions  of  ordinary  civil  law.^    The  Court  of  Cassation  at 

1  The  other  communal  and  provincial  bodies  are  the  municipal  giunta, 
which  is  elected  by  the  communal  council,  and  has  executive  powers;  the 
provincial  deputation,  which  occupies  a  similar  position  in  the  province, 
and  is  elected  by  the  provincial  council;  the  prefectorial  council,  appointed 
by  the  central  government  to  assist  the  prefect;  and  the  provincial  adminis- 
trative giunta,  partly  appointed  and  partly  elected,  which  has  a  certain 
share  in  administrative  justice,  and  whose  approval  is  necessary  for  the 
validity  of  some  of  the  most  important  acts  of  the  local  councils.  For  a  list 
of  these  acts  see  the  Local  Government  Law  of  Feb.  10,  1889,  Arts.  142, 
166-171,  173,  and  223. 

2  See  Brusa,  pp.  365-367;  Turiello,  Proposie,  pp.  56,  63-65. 

'  A  Court  of  Cassation  is  a  court  of  last  resort,  which  considers  only 
errors  in  law  in  the  decisions  of  inferior  tribunals. 


ITALY  217 

Rome  has,  it  is  true,  been  given  little  by  little  exclusive 
jurisdiction  over  certain  special  matters;  ^  but  the  ordinary 
civil  jurisdiction  is  still  divided  among  the  five  Courts  of 
Cassation,  which  bear  the  same  relation  to  each  other  as 
the  highest  state  courts  in  America. ^  There  is  no  appeal 
from  one  to  another,  and  no  one  of  them  feels  bound  to  ac- 
cept the  decisions  of  the  others,  or  to  follow  them  as  prece- 
dents. One  cannot  help  thinking  that  this  is  an  unfortu- 
nate condition,  because  there  is  nothing  that  tends  more 
completely  to  consolidate  a  people,  without  crushing  out 
local  life,  than  a  uniform  administration  of  justice.  Italy 
has,  indeed,  a  series  of  codes  enacted  at  various  times  from 
1865  to  1889,  s-iid  covering  civil  law,  civil  procedure,  com- 
mercial law,  criminal  law,  and  criminal  procedure;  but  a 
code  alone  will  not  produce  uniformity,  because  there  is  still 
room  for  differences  of  interpretation,  and  in  fact  the  Italian 
Courts  of  Cassation  often  disagree,  and  there  is  no  tribunal 
empowered  to  harmonize  their  decisions.' 

The  Courts  and  the  Officials 

As  we  have  already  seen  in  the  case  of  France,  the  decision 
of  civil  and  criminal  questions  forms  only  a  part  of  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice  in  continental  Europe,  on  account 
of  the  distinction  drawn  between  public  and  private  law.* 

1  These  are,  conflicts  of  competence  between  different  courts,  or  between 
the  courts  and  the  administration;  the  transfer  of  suits  from  one  court  to 
another;  disciplinary  matters;  and  writs  of  error  in  criminal  cases,  in 
complaints  for  violation  of  election  laws,  in  civil  suits  against  judges,  and 
in  questions  of  taxes  and  of  church  property. 

^  For  the  organization  and  jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  see  Brusa,  pp.  231- 

238- 

'  Cf.  Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1879,  i.  576. 

*  Belgium  presents  an  exception,  for  there  the  officials  can  be  sued,  and 
the  acts  of  the  government  can  be  reviewed  by  the  ordinary  courts,  as  in  an 
Anglo-Saxon  country.  Cf.  Kerchove  de  Denterghem,  De  la  Responsahilit6 
des  Minislres  dans  le  Droit  Public  Beige. 


21 8     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

In  order,  therefore,  to  form  a  correct  estimate  of  the  position 
of  the  courts,  we  must  consider  their  relation  to  the  govern- 
ment, and  their  power  to  determine  the  legahty  of  the  acts 
of  public  ofl&cers.  In  Italy  the  prefects,  subprefects,  syndics, 
and  their  subordinates  still  enjoy  the  so-called  administra- 
tive protection,  that  is,  they  cannot  be  sued  or  prosecuted 
for  their  official  conduct  without  the  royal  consent.^  This 
privilege  is  generally  unpopular,  and  will  no  doubt  be 
abolished  when  the  proposed  bill  on  the  tenure  of  office  is 
passed.  Meanwhile  the  benefit  of  it  is  claimed  more  and 
more  frequently,  although  the  permission  to  proceed  ap- 
pears to  be  usually  granted.^  But  even  when  this  protection 
has  been  taken  away,  the  courts  will  not  have  as  much 
authority  as  in  England  or  America.  The  reader  will  re- 
member that  the  officers  of  the  French  government  formerly 
possessed  a  similar  pri\ilege,  and  were  deprived  of  it  after 
the  fall  of  the  Second  Empire.  He  will  remember  also  that 
the  change  made  very  httle  practical  difference,  because  it 
was  held  that  the  ordinary  courts  had  no  power  to  pass  on 
the  legality  of  official  acts,  such  questions  being  reserved 
exclusively  for  the  administrative  courts.  The  result  of 
abolishing  the  privilege  will  not  be  precisely  the  same  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Alps,  because  the  problem  has  been  worked 
out  on  somewhat  different  Hues,  a  curious  attempt  having 
been  made  to  establish  a  compromise  between  the  English 
and  the  French  systems. 

Administrative  Law 

The  subject  of  administrative  law  is,  indeed,  very  con- 
fused in  Italy,  and  some  years  ago  it  was  in  a  thoroughly 

^  Law  of  Feb.  lo,  1889,  Arts.  8,  139. 

*  Brusa,  p.  282;  Turiello,  Fatti,  pp.  210-211.  The  permission  to  prose- 
cute is  not  necessary  in  the  case  of  offenses  against  the  election  laws.  Law 
of  Feb.  10,  1889,  Art.  100  et  seq.;  Brusa,  pp.  73,  130,  note  i, 


ITALY  219 

unsatisfactory  condition.  When  the  union  was  formed, 
several  of  the  component  states  possessed  administrative 
courts  of  their  own;  but  in  order  to  produce  uniformity, 
and  also  with  a  view  of  furnishing  the  rights  of  the  citizen 
with  a  better  guarantee,  an  act  of  March  20,  1865,  abolished 
all  these  tribunals,  and  provided  that  the  ordinary  courts 
should  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  all  criminal  prose- 
cutions and  of  all  civil  cases  in  which  a  civil  or  political 
right  was  involved,  the  Council  of  State  being  empowered 
to  decide  whether  such  a  right  was  involved  or  not.^  It  was 
not  clearly  foreseen  that  this  last  provision  would  place  in 
the  hands  of  the  government  an  arbitrary  power;  ^  but  such 
proved  to  be  the  case,  for  the  Council  of  State,  composed 
as  it  was  at  that  time  of  members  who  could  be  removed 
at  pleasure,^  showed  little  inclination  in  disputed  cases  to 
recognize  that  any  private  rights  were  involved ;  and,  there 
being  no  administrative  courts  at  all,  the  government  had 
an  absolutely  free  hand  as  soon  as  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ordinary  courts  was  ousted.^  The  attempt  to  place  the 
rights  of  the  citizen  more  fully  under  the  protection  of 
the  ordinary  courts  than  in  France  had  resulted  in  freeing 
the  officials  more  completely  from  all  control;  for,  except 
when  strong  poHtical  motives  come  into  play,  arbitrary  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  the  French  officials  is  restrained  by  the 
administrative  courts.  This  state  of  the  law  in  Italy  gave 
rise  to  bitter  complaints,  but  it  lasted  until  1877,  when  the 
decision  of  conflicts,  as  they  are  called,  or  disputes  about 

^  Legge  sul  Contenzioso  Administrativo  (March  20,  1865).  See,  especially, 
Arts.  I,  2,  3,  13. 

*  Perhaps  it  would  be  more  correct  to  say  that  it  was  not  foreseen  how 
this  power  would  be  used  for  party  purposes.  Minghetti,  /  Partili  Poliiici, 
p.  270  et  seq. 

'  See  Legge  sul  Consiglio  di  Stato  of  March  20,  1865,  Art.  4. 

■•    See  Brusa,  pp.  212-213,  ^47'  Minghetti,  /  Partili  Poliiici,  p.  147  et  seq. 


220     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

jurisdiction  between  the  administration  and  the  courts,  was 
transferred  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  at  Rome.^  Still  there 
was  no  system  of  administrative  justice;  and  hence,  how- 
ever illegal,  and  however  much  in  excess  of  the  authority  of 
the  official  who  made  it,  a  decree,  ordinance,  or  other  act 
might  be,  no  redress  could  be  obtained  from  any  tribunal 
unless  it  could  be  shown  that  an  actual  legal  right  was 
\dolated.2 

Administrative  Courts 

This  omission  in  the  judicial  system  was  finally  supplied 
by  the  statutes  of  1889  and  i8po,  which  reorganized  the 
Council  of  State,  created  a  special  section  of  it  to  act  as  an 
administrative  court,  and  conferred  an  inferior  administra- 
tive jurisdiction  on  the  provincial  giunta.^  In  order  to  give 
the  council  a  considerable  degree  of  independence,  it  was 
provided  at  the  same  time  that  the  members,  whose  num- 
ber is  limited,  should  be  retired  only  on  account  of  sickness 
and  removed  only  for  breach  of  duty,  and  in  each  case  only 
after  hearing  the  opinion  of  the  Council  of  State  itself.* 
The  section  which  acts  as  an  administrative  court  enjoys  a 
still  greater  degree  of  protection;  for  it  is  composed  of  a 
president  and  eight  other  members  selected  from  among  the 
councillors  of  state  by  the  king,  and  of  these  eight  not  less 
than  two  nor  more  than  four  can  be  changed  in  any  one 
year,^  so  that,  although  the  body  has  not  the  permanence  of 
a  court  of  law,  it  is  by  no  means  a  tool  of  the  government. 
Except  in  purely  political  matters,  and  in  certain  questions 
relating  to  customs  duties  and  conscription,  it  has  power  to 

^  Law  of  March  31,  1877  (Manual  of  Deps.  1892,  p.  374). 

2  Cf.  Brusa,  pp.  247-250. 

3  These  acts,  June  2,  1889,  and  May  i,  1890,  are  printed  in  the  Manual 
for  1892,  at  pp.  357  and  377. 

*  Act  of  June  2,  1889,  Art.  4. 
'  Act  of  June  2,  1889,  Art.  8. 


ITALY  221 

decide  whether  the  acts  of  the  central  or  local  officers  are 
authorized  by  law,  unless  some  special  tribunal  or  the  ordi- 
nary courts  have  jurisdiction.^  In  brief,  therefore,  the 
legality  of  official  acts  is  determined  in  civil  cases  by  the 
ordinary  courts  when  a  question  of  private  right,  and  by 
the  administrative  courts  when  a  question  only  of  interest, 
is  involved.  The  function  of  the  ordinary  courts  in  these 
cases  is,  however,  strictly  limited  to  the  protection  of  the 
individual,  and  does  not  involve  an  authoritative  declara- 
tion of  the  law,  for  it  is  expressly  provided  that  the  judg- 
ment must  be  confined  to  the  case  at  bar,  and  in  that  alone 
is  the  administration  bound  by  the  decision. ^  This  principle 
is  deeply  rooted  in  the  jurisprudence  of  the  nation,  for  the 
Statuto  itself  declares  that  the  interpretation  of  the  law  in 
such  a  way  as  to  be  universally  binding  belongs  exclusively 
to  the  legislative  power."*  The  ItaUan,  indeed,  has  a  dread 
of  that  wholesome  form  of  legislation,  judge-made  law  — 
a  prejudice  which  certainly  seems  very  strange  when  we 
consider  what  a  large  part  of  the  law  of  the  civilized  world, 
and  especially  of  the  law  of  the  Latin  races,  was  developed 
by  means  of  the  edicts  of  the  Roman  praetors. 

It  wiU  be  observed  that  the  ItaHan  system  of  adminis- 
trative law  differs  from  that  of  every  other  nation.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Enghsh  principle,  the  ordinary  courts  have 
jurisdiction  in  all  cases,  and  the  idea  of  administrative  law 
as  an  independent  branch  of  jurisprudence  is  little  known. 
In  most  of  the  continental  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  all 
matters  involving  the  legality  of  official  acts  are  reserved 
for  a  special  class  of  courts,  which  have  exclusive  cogni- 
zance of  those  questions  which  constitute  the  domain  of 
administrative  law;  but  in  Italy  both  classes  of  tribunals 
are  called  upon  to  decide  the  same  questions,  the  ordinary 
courts  being  specially  empowered  to  protect  legal  rights. 

'  Id.,  Art.  24.        *  Act  of  March  20,  1865,  Art.  4.       '  Statuto,  Art.  73. 


222     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Weakness  of  the  Judicial  System 

As  seen  on  the  statute  book,  the  Italian  judicial  system 
appears  to  be  very  good.    It  seems  to  provide  the  individual 
with  more  ample  remedies,  and  a  better  guarantee  against 
arbitrary  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  officials,  than  can  be 
found  in  most  of  the  countries  of  continental  Europe.   But  in 
fact  the  judiciary  is  not  strong  enough  to  protect  the  citizen 
effectually.    This  is  chiefly  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  absence 
of  those  deep-seated  traditions  that  are  necessary  to  give 
the  magistrates  a  controlling  authority  over  public  opinion. 
It  is  due  also  to  the  existence  of  the  five  independent  Courts 
of  Cassation,  which  prevents  any  one  court  from  having 
the  power  that  might  be  acquired  by  a  supreme  national 
tribunal;  and  indeed  it  is  self-evident  that  a  decentralized 
judiciary  can  hardly  be  expected  to  restrain  a  centraHzed 
administration.    Nor  is  the  protection  afforded  to  the  bench 
satisfactory.    The  constitution  provides  that  judges,  except 
in  the  lowest  courts,  shall  be  irremovable  after  three  years 
of  service,^  and  by  statute  they  can  be  retired  only  on  ac- 
count of  illness,  and  removed  only  for  crime  or  neglect  of 
duty,  and  in  these  cases  only  with  the  approval  of  the  Court 
of  Cassation  at  Rome.    But  a  judge  is  not  protected  against 
a  transfer  from  one  judicial  post  to  another  of  the  same  rank, 
and  although  by  royal  decree  a  commission  annually  ap- 
pointed by  the  court  at  Rome  must  be  consulted  before 
such  a  transfer  can  be  made,  its  advice  is  not  binding  on 
the  government.2    The  judges  are,  therefore,  by  no  means 
entirely  independent  of  the  executive,  and  complaints  are 
often  made  that  they  are  altogether  too  much  under  its 

1  Statute,  Art.  69. 

2  Brusa,  pp.  277-278.  In  1878  this  decree  was  repealed  for  a  time,  and 
one  hundred  and  twenty-two  transfers  were  made  in  six  months.  Minghetti, 
pp.  134-135. 


ITALY  223 

control.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how  far  these  complaints 
are  justified/  but  it  is  certain  that  the  judiciary  either  has 
not  enough  power,  or  does  not  feel  sufficiently  free,  to  pro- 
tect individuals  against  an  oppressive  abuse  of  pohtical 
power,  especially  in  local  matters.  This  is  true  even  in 
tranquil  times,  while  the  wholesale  resort  to  martial  law 
by  the  proclamation  of  the  state  of  siege  during  the  troubles 
in  Sicily  and  at  Carrara  some  years  ago  shows  that  the 
courts  find  it  hard  to  cope  with  disorder  on  any  large 
scale.2 

The  judicial  system  has  been  dwelt  upon  here  at  what  may 
seem  an  inordinate  length  because  its  condition  is  one  of 
the  most  important  factors  in  the  present  political  condi- 
tion of  the  kingdom. 

The  Church 

There  is  one  institution  in  Italy  which  is  not  strictly  a 
part  of  the  goverrmient,  but  is  so  closely  connected  with  it, 
and  has  so  direct  an  influence  on  politics,  that  it  cannot  be 
passed  over.  This  is  the  Cathohc  Church.  Within  the  last 
quarter  of  a  century  every  country  in  central  Europe  has 
found  itself  confronted  with  the  Catholic  question,  and 
has  been  obliged  to  grapple  with  it;   but  the  matter  has  a 

^  Writing  in  1878,  Jacini  (/  Cofiservatori,  p.  29)  said  that,  so  far,  the  ju- 
diciary had  resisted  all  party  pressure,  but  since  that  time  this  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  true.  See  Minghetti,  ubi  supra;  Turiello,  Fatli,  p.  316;  Pro- 
poste,  pp.  234-235;  De  Viti  di  Marco,  "The  Political  Situation  in  Italy," 
Nineteenth  Cent.,  Oct.,  1895;  Pareto,  "  L'ltalie  Economique,"  Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  Oct.  15,  1891,  Giornale  del  Economisti,  March,  1895,  p.  353; 
Ruiz,  Ann.  Amer.  Acad,  of  Pol.  Sci.,  Sept.,  1895,  p.  54;  Wolflfson,  "  Italian 
Secret  Societies,"  Conlemp.  Rev.,  May,  1891;  Lord,  "Italia  non  Fara  da 
Se,"  Nineteenth  Cent.,  March,  1892.  The  charge  that  the  courts  were  sub- 
ject to  political  influence  was  made  by  the  Parliamentary  committee  on  the 
bank  scandals  in  December,  1894. 

*  Contrast  \vith  these  events  the  Chicago  riots  of  1894,  where  not  only 
the  military  authorities  never  superseded  the  judicial,  but  where  the  national 
troops  were  called  into  action  solely  by  means  of  the  United  States  courts. 


224     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

peculiar  importance  in  Italy.  Not  because  the  Italian  is 
fanatical.  On  the  contrary,  his  intense  religious  fervor 
seems  to  have  burned  itself  out  during  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  has  left  him  comparatively  indifferent;  yet  he  clings 
to  the  church  with  a  tenacity  that  is  out  of  proportion  to 
his  zeal.^  This  is  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  he  knows  no 
other  creed,  partly  to  his  conservative  nature,  and  partly, 
perhaps,  to  the  fact  that  the  ceremonies  and  rites  of  the 
Catholic  faith,  having  been  moulded  for  the  most  part  by 
his  own  race,  are  closely  fitted  to  his  temperament,  and 
therefore  continue  to  attract  him  strongly,  especially  on 
the  aesthetic  side.  The  nation  is  almost  whoUy  CathoHc; 
and  to-day,  as  in  the  past,  the  church  in  Italy  is  assailed, 
not  by  heretics,  but  by  her  own  children. 

Church  and  State 

Cavour  proclaimed  the  doctrine  of  a  free  church  in  a  free 
state;  but  although  the  church  is  more  independent  of  the 
government  than  might  have  been  expected,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  carry  the  principle  out  fully  in  a  country  where 
there  is  only  one  religious  body,  and  where  that  body  has 
always  been  intimately  connected  with  pubHc  Hfe.  The 
church  is  not  independent  of  the  state  in  Italy  in  the  same 
sense  that  it  is  in  America ;  and  this  fact  has  led  some  of  the 
Italian  advocates  of  the  doctrine  to  give  it  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent meaning  from  that  which  it  has  here.  They  complain, 
for  example,  that  the  actual  relation  between  church  and 
state  is  based  on  the  idea  that  the  church  is  a  private  asso- 
ciation instead  of  a  public  institution,  and  lament  that  the 
state  has  surrendered  too  much  its  control  over  the  educa- 

'  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  in  his  Present  Position  of  European  Politics  (pp.  261- 
262),  quotes  the  saying  that  the  Italians  would  be  a  nation  of  freethinkers 
if  they  had  ever  been  known  to  think,  and  remarks  that  although  the  epi- 
gram is  unfair,  there  is  a  certain  measure  of  truth  underlying  it. 


ITALY  225 

tion  of  priests  *  —  expressions  which  amount  to  a  complaint 
that  the  church  is  too  free.  But,  although  the  principle  is 
not  applied  rigorously  in  Italy,  it  has  been  carried  out  to  a 
considerable  extent.  The  state  has  abandoned  the  right  of 
nomination  to  ecclesiastical  offices,  which  had  existed  in 
some  of  the  former  Italian  principalities;  and  the  bishops 
are  no  longer  required  to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
king.2  Moreover,  the  so-called  exequatur  and  placet,  that 
is,  the  requirement  of  permits  from  the  government  for  the 
pubHcation  and  execution  of  the  acts  of  ecclesiastical  au- 
thorities, have  been  given  up.^  The  state  has  also  renounced 
all  control  over  the  seminaries  for  priests  in  Rome,*  and 
rarely  interferes  with  those  elsewhere;^  and  finally  the 
church  has  been  granted  freedom  of  meeting,  of  publica- 
tion, and  of  jurisdiction  in  spiritual  matters.^  Conversely, 
the  acts  of  the  ecclesiastical  authorities  have  ceased  to  be 
privileged.  They  have  no  legal  force  if  they  are  contrary 
to  law  or  violate  private  rights,  and  they  are  not  exempt 
from  the  provisions  of  the  criminal  code.'' 

*  See,  for  example,  Brusa,  pp.  426-427,  429. 

"^  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii,  Art.  15.  It  has  been  decided  that  in  the 
case  of  the  lower  clergy  the  oath  was  not  dispensed  with  wherever  it  had 
been  required  by  earlier  laws  (Brusa,  p.  428);  and  even  the  bishops  are  not 
entirely  independent  of  the  state,  for  the  royal  exequatur  is  still  required  for 
the  enjoyment  of  their  revenues  {Id.,  p.  437).  At  times  these  have  actually 
been  withheld,  notably  in  1877.    Speyer,  in  Unsere  Zeit,  1878,  ii.  604. 

'  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii.  Art.  16. 

*  Id.,  Tit.  i.  Art.  13. 

*  Brusa,  p.  438. 

*  Id.,  Tit.  ii.  Arts.  14,16,17.  Religious  processions  outside  the  churches 
may  be  forbidden  by  the  local  authorities,  if  they  are  liable  to  interfere  with 
public  order  or  public  health.    Law  of  June  30,  1889,  Art.  8. 

^  Act  of  May  13,  1871,  Tit.  ii.  Art.  17.  The  Penal  Code  of  1888  specially 
punishes  abuse  of  language  by  the  clergy.    Brusa,  p.  61. 


226     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Monastic  Orders 

A  thorny  question  for  the  new  kingdom  was  involved  in 
the  position  of  the  monastic  orders,  many  of  which  still 
held  great  tracts  of  land,  but  had  long  outlived  their  use- 
fulness and  were  felt  to  be  an  anachronism.  The  solution 
adopted,  though  almost  a  necessity,  was  drastic,  and  illus- 
trates how  far  the  theory  of  a  free  church  in  a  free  state 
was  at  this  time  from  being  a  reality.  The  order  of  Jesuits 
was  absolutely  excluded  from  the  kingdom;  ^  and  even  in 
the  case  of  the  other  bodies,  which  had  not  aroused  such 
violent  antipathy,  the  government  determined,  while  spar- 
ing the  existing  members,  to  forbid  the  enrollment  of  new 
recruits.  By  the  statutes  of  1866  and  1867,  therefore,  all 
these  monastic  institutions  and  most  of  the  benefices  without 
a  cure  of  souls  were  suppressed,  and  their  property  trans- 
ferred to  the  state  to  be  employed  for  the  support  of  religion ; 
but  a  pension  for  hfe  was  reserved  to  the  present  possessors, 
who  were  also  allowed  to  remain  in  their  estabHshments.^ 
Every  traveler  will  remember  the  aged  monks  in  white 
habits  who  might  be  seen  wandering  among  the  cloisters  of 
the  Val  d'  Ema,  near  Florence.  These  are  the  last  represent- 
atives of  a  mighty  order  that  once  overspread  Christen- 
dom; and  with  the  spirit  of  romance  which  Italy  cannot 
shake  off  even  if  she  would,  they  have  been  allowed  to  drop 
away  one  by  one  until  the  monastery  becomes  silent  for- 
ever. 

The  convents  were  not  the  only  great  landowners  in  the 
church.  Many  of  the  higher  secular  clergy  were  also  richly 
endowed.    But  there  was  a  strong  feeling  that  the  soil  of  the 

*  Brusa,  p.  56,  note  4. 

*  Acts  of  July  7,  1866,  and  Aug.  15,  1867.  See,  also,  Brusa,  pp.  431-433. 
By  an  Act  of  1873  these  provisions  were  applied  to  Rome,  but  in  a  modified 
form.     Brusa,  lb. 


ITALY  227 

country  ought  to  be  controlled  by  laymen,  and  that  the 
larger  ecclesiastical  incomes  ought  to  be  reduced.  This 
feeling  found  its  expression  in  the  same  statutes  of  1866  and 
1867,  by  which  all  church  lands,  except  those  belonging  to 
parishes,  those  used  by  bishops  and  other  dignitaries,  and 
buildings  actually  devoted  to  worship,  were  taken  by  the 
state  and  converted  into  perpetual  five  per  cent  annuities;  ^ 
while  all  ecclesiastical  revenues,  not  of  a  parochial  nature, 
were  taxed  thirty  per  cent,  or  in  other  words  partially 
confiscated.^ 

The  Pope 

By  far  the  most  difficult  question  was  presented  by  the 
papacy.  The  Holy  See  had  ruled  over  a  territory  of  con- 
siderable size  extending  across  the  peninsula  from  the  Medi- 
terranean to  the  Adriatic.  It  claimed  to  trace  its  rights 
from  a  grant  made  in  the  fourth  century  by  the  Emperor 
Constantine  the  Great  to  Pope  Sylvester,  and  in  fact  its 
dominion  was  as  old  and  well  founded  as  that  of  any 
monarch  in  Europe.  It  felt  that  the  sovereignty  over  its 
own  states  —  the  so-called  temporal  power  —  was  neces- 
sary for  its  independence,  and  that  if  the  Pope  lived  in  a 
city  subject  to  another  ruler  he  could  not  remain  entirely 
free  in  spiritual  matters.  But  the  Italians  felt  no  less 
strongly  that  their  country  would  never  be  a  complete 
nation  until  it  included  everything  between  the  Alps  and 

1  Act  of  July  7,  1866,  Arts.  ir-i8. 

2  Act  of  Aug.  15,  1867,  Art.  18.  By  the  Act  of  July  7,  1866,  Art.  31,  the 
revenues  of  bishops  exceeding  10,000  lire  are  taxed  progressively  for  the 
benefit  of  the  general  fund  for  religion,  the  whole  excess  above  60,000  lire 
being  so  taken.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  income  of  a  bishop  falls  be- 
low 6,000  lire,  it  is  made  up  to  that  sum  out  of  the  general  fund  (Art.  19). 
Similar  ta.xes  for  the  benefit  of  the  fund  are  imposed  on  other  ecclesiastical 
revenues.  In  the  Act  of  1873,  Rome  was  more  gently  treated.  Brusa, 
pp. 432-433- 


228     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  sea,  with  Rome  as  its  capital,  and  this  feeling  was  fully 
shared  by  the  Romans  themselves. 

The  northern  and  eastern  part  of  the  Papal  States  was 
annexed  to  the  new  kingdom  of  Italy  at  the  same  time  as 
Naples  and  Sicily,  that  is  in  i860;  but  Rome  and  the  coun- 
try about  it  was  protected  by  Napoleon  III,  whose  power 
depended  so  much  on  the  support  of  his  ultramontane  sub- 
jects that  he  could  not  safely  desert  the  cause  of  the  Pope. 
Italy  chafed  under  his  interference,  and  waited  uneasily 
until  the  war  with  Prussia  forced  him  to  recall  his  troops. 
Then  came  the  revolution  that  overturned  his  throne.  An 
Italian  army  at  once  crossed  the  frontier  of  the  Papal 
States,  and  entered  Rome  on  September  20,  1870. 

The  Law  of  the  Papal  Guarantees 

The  problem  before  the  government  was  a  delicate  one, 
because  any  appearance  of  an  intention  to  treat  the  Pope 
as  an  Italian  subject  would  have  excited  the  indignation  of 
the  whole  Catholic  world,  and  might  have  led  to  foreign 
complications,  or  even  to  an  armed  intervention  in  favor 
of  the  temporal  power.  The  cabinet  determined,  there- 
fore, that  a  law  fixing  definitely  the  position  and  privileges 
of  the  Holy  See  should  be  passed  before  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment was  moved  to  Rome.  Recognizing  the  peculiar  rela- 
tions of  the  Pope  to  other  states,  the  ministers  proposed  to 
make  this  law  one  of  international  bearing,  so  that  it  would 
have  an  effect  analogous  to  that  of  a  treaty,  but  they 
yielded  to  the  firm  opposition  of  the  Left  in  the  Chamber, 
and  the  act  was  finally  passed  as  a  piece  of  domestic  legis- 
lation.^  This  is  the  celebrated  Law  of  the  Papal  Guar- 
antees, which  was  enacted  in  May,  187 1,  and  remains 
unchanged  at  the  present  day.  Its  object  is  to  insure  the  free- 

*  Petriccelli  della  Gattina,  Sloria  d'  Italia,  pp.  93-94. 


ITALY  229 

dom  of  the  Pope  in  the  exercise  of  all  his  spiritual  functions, 
and  for  that  purpose  it  surrounds  him  with  most  of  the 
privileges  of  sovereignty.  His  person  is  declared  sacred  and 
inviolable;  assaults  or  public  slander  directed  against  him 
being  punishable  hke  similar  offenses  against  the  king. 
Pubhc  officials  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties  are  forbidden 
to  enter  his  palace  or  its  grounds;  and  the  same  exemption 
applies  to  the  place  of  meeting  of  a  Conclave  or  (Ecumenic 
Council.  Searching  any  papal  offices  that  have  solely 
spiritual  functions,  or  confiscating  papers  therefrom,  is 
prohibited,  and  it  is  provided  that  priests  shall  not  be 
punished  or  questioned  for  publishing,  in  the  course  of  their 
duties,  the  acts  of  the  spiritual  authority  of  the  Holy  See. 
The  Pope  is  accorded  the  honors  of  a  sovereign  prince,  and 
persons  accredited  to  him  enjoy  all  the  immunities  of  diplo- 
matic agents.  He  is  guaranteed  free  intercourse  with  the 
bishops,  and  indeed  with  the  whole  Catholic  world,  mes- 
sages sent  in  his  name  being  placed  on  the  same  footing  as 
those  of  foreign  goveniments.  Moreover  he  is  granted  a 
perpetual  annuity  of  over  six  hundred  thousand  dollars, 
which  is  entered  in  the  great  book  of  state  debts,  and  is 
free  from  all  tax.  This  grant  he  has  always  refused  to 
accept,  and  every  year  it  is  returned  to  the  treasury. 
Finally  he  is  left  in  absolute  possession  of  the  palaces  of  the 
Vatican,  the  Lateran,  and  Castel  Gandolfo,  with  all  their 
buildings,  gardens,  and  lands,  free  of  taxes.  ^ 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  law — which  is  alleged,  by  the 
way,to  have  been  faithfully  carried  out  by  the  Italian  govern- 
ment— assures  to  the  Pope  absolute  freedom  in  the  exercise 

'  This  is  the  law  of  May  13,  1871,  several  sections  of  which  have  already 
been  cited.  There  is  a  criticism  of  the  legal  situation  of  the  Holy  See  from 
a  papal  standpoint  by  Comte  Rostworowski,  entitled  "  La  Situation  Inter- 
nationale du  Saint-Siege,"  in  the  Ann.  de  I'Ecole  Libre  des  Sciences  Folitiques, 
1892,  p.  102. 


230     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  his  functions  as  head  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  guards 
him  against  all  personal  disrespect.  Nevertheless,  neither 
Pius  IX  nor  his  successors  have  accepted  it;  and  indeed 
they  could  not  have  done  so  without  acknowledging  the  au- 
thority of  the  government  by  which  it  was  enacted,  and 
this  they  have  never  been  willing  to  do.  They  have  not 
ceased  for  a  moment  to  protest  against  the  destruction  of 
the  temporal  power;  in  fact,  they  have  avoided  everything 
that  could  possibly  be  construed  as  a  recognition  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Italy.  The  Pope  has  affected  to  consider  him- 
self a  prisoner,  and  never  since  the  royal  cannon  opened  a 
breach  in  the  Roman  walls  at  the  Porta  Pia  has  he  placed 
his  foot  outside  the  grounds  of  the  Vatican.^  He  even  re- 
fused to  allow  the  clerical  party  to  vote  for  deputies  to 
Parliament,  on  the  ground  that  this  would  involve  a  tacit 
acknowledgment  of  the  legality  of  the  existing  goverrunent; 
and  thus  a  large  portion  of  the  Italian  people  took  no  part 
in  national  poHtics,  although  the  same  men  voted  freely 
and  sometimes  won  victories  at  municipal  elections.^  Such 
a  condition  of  things  was  very  unfortunate,  for  it  tended  to 
create  a  hostility  between  religion  and  patriotism,  and  made 
it  very  hard  for  a  man  to  be  faithful  both  to  his  church  and 
his  country.  If  the  Italians  had  any  liking  for  other  sects, 
these  would  no  doubt  increase  rapidly;  but  as  religion  and 
Cathohcism  are  synonymous  terms  in  Italy,  the  antagonism 
between  church  and  state  merely  stimulates  skepticism  and 
indifference. 

Difficulty  of  the  Question 

It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  papal  question  will  finally 
be  solved.  Pope  Leo  XIII  was  a  man  of  great  tact,  and 
with  marvelous  dexterity  he  changed  the  policy  of  the 

1  Until  1888  he  did  not  even  appear  in  St.  Peter's. 

*  In  1905  an  encyclical  of  Pius  X  somewhat  relaxed  the  prohibition. 


ITALY  231 

Vatican  so  as  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  nineteenth 
century.  He  made  a  peace  with  Bismarck  by  which  the 
Iron  Chancellor  virtually  acknowledged  defeat;  and  by  his 
conciliatory  tone  towards  the  French  Repubhc  he  made 
fair  headway  in  checking  the  Radicals  in  France  with  their 
hatred  of  the  church.  Yet  even  Leo  XIII  was  unable  to 
come  to  terms  with  Italy.  One  thing  is  clear.  Italy  will 
never  give  up  Rome,  nor  is  there  the  shghtest  probabUHty 
that  any  foreign  country  will  try  to  force  her  to  do  so;  and, 
indeed,  it  is  said  that  even  in  the  Vatican  the  restoration 
of  the  temporal  power  is  considered  hopeless.^  To  the 
outside  observer  it  hardly  appears  desirable  in  the  interest 
of  the  papacy  itself,  because  with  the  loss  of  its  secular 
functions,  the  Holy  See  has  gained  enormously  in  ecclesiasti- 
cal authority.  This  is  not  an  accident,  for  the  destruction 
of  the  temporal  power  is  one  step  in  the  long  movement  for 
the  separation  of  church  and  state,  which  during  the  last 
hundred  years  has  been  breaking  the  local  and  national  ties 
of  the  clergy  in  the  dififerent  countries,  and  has  thus  made 
the  Catholic  Church  more  cosmopoHtan,  more  centralized, 
and  more  dependent  on  its  spiritual  head.  Such,  however, 
is  not  the  view  of  many  ardent  Catholics,  who  are  so  dis- 
satisfied with  the  present  situation  that  a  departure  of  the 
Pope  from  Rome  has  often  been  suggested;   but  although 

*  In  an  answer  ("  Italy,  France,  and  the  Papacy,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  Aug., 
1891)  to  an  article  entitled  "The  Savoy  Dynasty,  the  Pope,  and  the  Re- 
public," by  an  anonymous  writer  (Contemp.  Rev.,  Apr.,  1891),  Crispi  spoke 
of  the  possibility  of  a  French  intervention  in  favor  of  the  temporal  power 
as  a  real  danger.  One  cannot  help  feeling  that  this  must  have  been  said 
rather  for  its  effect  than  from  conviction.  In  a  previous  answer  to  the  same 
article  ("  Italy  and  France,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  June,  1891),  Crispi  made  the 
interesting  statement  that  even  in  Rome  only  the  highest  church  dignitaries 
want  the  temporal  power,  while  over  the  rest  of  Italy  the  clergy  never  were 
papal,  and  are  not  so  now.  In  a  later  number  of  the  same  Review  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  the  papal  question  are  further  discussed  by  Emile  de  Laveleye 
("  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Italy,"  Contemp.  Rev.,  Feb.,  1892.) 


232  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

on  more  than  one  occasion  a  removal  has  been  said  to  be 
imminent,  it  has  always  been  in  the  highest  degree  unlikely, 
for  the  Holy  See  could  not  get  from  any  other  state  in  whose 
territory  it  might  settle  terms  more  favorable  than  those 
accorded  by  the  Law  of  the  Papal  Guarantees;  and  even  if 
it  should  accept  a  grant  of  complete  sovereignty  over  some 
island  or  small  tract  of  land,  the  loss  in  prestige  from  the 
change  of  residence  would  be  incalculable.  The  veneration 
of  the  past  still  clings  to  Rome,  and  although  the  civic 
splendor  of  the  Vatican  is  gone,  the  Pope  bereft  of  his 
temporal  power  wields  a  greater  spiritual  influence  than  he 
has  had  for  centuries. 


CHAPTER  IX 

GERMANY:  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE 

Former  Subdivision  of  Germany 

Cherbuliez  has  remarked  that  most  countries  which  have 
grown  in  size  have  started  with  a  compact  territory  and 
increased  it  by  absorbing  the  adjacent  lands,  but  that  Prus- 
sia began  with  her  frontiers  and  afterwards  filled  in  between 
them.  The  statement  is  almost  Hterally  true,  for  early  in  the 
seventeenth  century  the  electors  of  Brandenburg,  who  were 
the  ancestors  of  the  kings  of  Prussia,  acquired  the  large 
Duchy  of  Prussia  on  the  Baltic  and  the  Duchy  of  Cleves  on 
the  Rhine,  possessions  which  form  to-day  very  nearly  the 
extreme  limits  of  the  Prussian  monarchy  on  the  east  and 
west.  At  that  time  these  duchies  did  not  touch  the  electors' 
other  territories,  and  in  fact  until  half  a  century  ago  several 
states  were  so  wedged  in  among  the  Prussian  dominions  as 
to  cut  the  kingdom  quite  in  two.  Nor  was  this  the  case  with 
Prussia  alone.  The  whole  map  of  Germany  as  it  stood  in  the 
last  century  was  a  mass  of  patches  of  different  color  mingled 
together  in  bewildering  confusion.  Not  only  were  some  of 
the  principalities  inconceivably  small,  but  they  often  con- 
sisted in  part  of  outlying  districts  at  a  distance  from  one 
another,  and  entirely  surrounded  by  the  estates  of  some 
other  potentate.  The  cause  of  such  a  state  of  things  is  to  be 
found  in  the  excessive  development  of  the  feudal  system, 
which  treated  sovereignty  as  a  private  right  of  the  ruler,  so 
that  princes  dealt  with  their  fiefs  very  much  as  men  do  with 
their  lands  to-day.    They  acquired  them  freely  in  all  direc- 

S33 


234     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

tions  by  inheritance,  by  marriage,  and  even  by  purchase, 
and,  what  was  worse,  at  their  death  they  divided  them  as 
they  pleased  among  their  sons.  Still  another  source  of  con- 
fusion was  presented  by  the  bishops  and  other  high  church 
dignitaries,  who  held  large  estates  which  they  ruled  as  tem- 
poral sovereigns.  The  result  was  that  Germany  was  divided 
in  a  most  fantastic  way  among  several  hundred  princes,  who 
owed,  it  is  true,  a  shadowy  allegiance  to  the  Emperor  as 
head  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  but  for  all  practical 
purposes  were  virtually  independent. 

The  Growth  of  Prussia 

Aknost  alone  among  the  German  states  Prussia  was 
steadily  gaining  in  size  and  power.  Her  growth  may  be 
traced  primarily  to  the  Constitutio  Achillea  of  1473,  which 
forbade  the  splitting  up  of  the  monarchy  among  the  sons  of 
the  electors,  and  thus  kept  all  their  dominions  together; 
but  it  was  due  chiefly  to  the  thrift,  the  energy,  and  the  sagac- 
ity of  the  rulers  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollem.  At  the  close 
of  the  thirty  years'  war,  in  1648,  the  Great  Elector  obtained 
possessions  which  made  his  domains  larger  than  those  of  any 
other  German  state  except  Austria,  and  in  the  next  cen- 
tury the  annexations  of  Frederic  the  Great  more  than 
doubled  the  population  of  his  kingdom.  The  growth  of 
Prussia  was  suddenly  checked  by  an  event  that  tended  ulti- 
mately to  hasten  its  development.  This  was  the  outbreak 
of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  career  of  Bonaparte. 
When  a  series  of  victories  had  laid  Germany  at  his  feet. 
Napoleon  suppressed  a  large  number  of  petty  principaHties, 
including  all  the  ecclesiastical  ones,  and  combined  the 
smaller  states  that  remained  into  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine.  He  also  deprived  Prussia  of  half  her  territory,  think- 
ing by  these  means  to  reduce  her  to  impotence,  and  create 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  235 

in  the  heart  of  Germany  a  body  that  would  always  be  de- 
voted to  the  cause  of  France.  But  in  fact  the  petty  prin- 
cipalities had  been  too  small  to  act  separately  or  to  combine 
effectively,  and  too  independent  to  be  made  serviceable  by 
any  sovereign;  and  by  suppressing  them  Napoleon  had 
given  the  Germans  a  capacity  for  organization  which  was 
used  against  him  as  soon  as  the  tide  turned.^ 

The  Germanic  Confederation 

After  his  overthrow  Germany  was  reorganized  by  the 
treaty  of  Vienna,  and  the  states,  which  now  numbered  only 
thirty-nine,  were  formed  into  a  loose  confederation.  This 
was  not  properly  a  federal  union,  but  rather  a  perpetual  in- 
ternational alliance,  the  states  remaining  separate  and 
independent,  except  for  matters  affecting  the  external  and 
internal  safety  of  Germany.  The  only  organ  of  the  Con- 
federation was  a  diet  composed  of  the  diplomatic  agents  of 
the  different  states,  who  acted  like  ambassadors,  and  voted 
in  accordance  with  the  instructions  they  received  from  their 
respective  governments.  It  had  power  to  declare  war  and 
make  peace,  to  organize  the  federal  army,  to  enact  laws  for 
the  purpose  of  applying  the  constitution,  and  to  decide  dis- 
putes between  the  states;  but  it  had  no  administrative 
officers  under  its  command,  the  federal  laws  being  executed 
entirely  by  the  officials  of  the  states.  Hence  the  only  means 
of  getting  its  orders  carried  out  in  case  a  state  refused  to 
obey  them  was  by  the  process  known  as  federal  execution, 
which  meant  that  the  diet  called  on  one  or  more  members 

^  This  is  very  well  stated  by  Colonel  Malleson  in  his  Refoimding  of  the 
German  Empire,  pp.  4-6.  Napoleon  prophesied  that  within  fifty  years  all 
Europe  would  be  either  Republican  or  Cossack.  One  of  the  chief  causes  of 
the  failure  of  this  prediction  has  been  the  creation  of  a  united  Germany, 
which  Napoleon  himself  unwittingly  helped  to  bring  about. 


236     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  the  Confederation  to  attack  the  recalcitrant  state,  and 
by  invading  its  territories  to  compel  submission. 

The  procedure  in  the  diet  was  complicated.  For  ordinary 
matters  it  acted  by  sections  called  curice,  when  the  eleven 
largest  states  had  one  vote  apiece,  the  other  twenty-eight 
being  combined  into  six  groups  each  of  which  had  a  single 
vote.  For  constitutional  questions,  on  the  other  hand,  and 
those  relating  to  peace  and  war,  the  diet  proceeded  in 
plenum,  and  in  that  case  each  of  the  smaller  states  had  one 
vote,  while  the  fourteen  largest  had  two,  three,  or  four  votes 
apiece.^  This  distribution  of  votes  was  by  no  means  in  pro- 
portion to  population,  for  the  largest  states  were  much 
more  than  four  times  as  large  as  the  smallest,  but  it  was  a 
distinct  recognition  of  an  inequality  of  rights  on  the  part  of 
the  states,  and  as  such  it  still  retains  an  especial  importance 
because  the  arrangement  of  the  votes  in  the  plenum  has 
continued  almost  unchanged  in  one  of  the  chief  organs  of  the 
Empire  to-day.  It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  the 
influence  of  the  states  in  the  diet  was  determined  by  the 
number  of  their  votes,  for  Austria,  which  had  a  permanent 
right  to  the  presidency  of  the  assembly,  and  Prussia,  which 
had  a  permanent  right  to  the  vice-presidency,  exercised  in 
fact  a  controlKng  authority.  When  these  two  great  powers 
agreed  that  they  had  their  own  way;  when  they  disagreed, 
which  often  happened,  the  opinion  of  Austria  usually 
prevailed. 

The  Attempt  at  Union  in  i848-4g 

The  wars  of  Napoleon  did  a  great  deal  more  for  Germany 
than  to  suppress  petty  principalities  and  give  rise  to  a 
clumsy  confederation.  They  awakened  a  sentiment  of  Ger- 
man nationality.    At  first  this  was  only  a  sentiment,  and  for 

'  Six  of  the  states  had  four  votes,  five  had  three,  three  had  two,  and 
twenty-five  had  one. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  237 

a  long  period  it  had  no  practical  results.  It  was  especially 
strong  among  the  Liberals,  and  grew  stronger  as  time  went 
on;  but  during  the  reaction  that  followed  the  overthrow  of 
Napoleon,  the  Liberals  had  little  influence,  until  the  con- 
vulsions of  1848  and  1849  brought  them  to  the  front.  At 
this  time  they  tried  hard  to  bring  about  a  national  union  of 
Germany,  but  they  were  sadly  hampered  by  their  theoretical 
views  and  their  want  of  poHtical  experience.  Their  aim  was 
a  German  state  constructed  on  an  ideal  model,  and  they 
lacked  the  quality  which  is  essential  to  real  statesmanship  — 
the  power  to  distinguish  the  elements  in  the  existing  order  of 
things  which  have  a  solid  basis,  to  seize  upon  these,  and 
adapt  them  to  the  end  in  view.  Hence  their  efforts  ex- 
pended themselves  in  declamation  and  academic  discussion, 
and  came  to  nothing.  In  May,  1848,  they  succeeded  in 
bringing  together  at  Frankfort  a  National  German  Parlia- 
ment elected  by  universal  suffrage,  and  if  this  body  had 
proposed  quickly  any  rational  plan  for  a  union  of  Germany, 
the  chances  of  its  adoption  would  have  been  very  good ;  for 
every  government  in  the  country  had  been  forced  to  give 
way  before  the  fierce  onslaught  of  the  Liberal  movement. 
But  unfortunately  more  than  four  months  of  precious  time 
were  consumed  in  debating  the  primary  rights  of  the  citizen, 
and  when  these  were  finally  disposed  of  the  tide  was  begin- 
ning to  ebb.  At  last,  in  March,  1849,  ^  constitution  was 
agreed  upon,  and  the  imperial  crown  was  tendered  to  the 
King  of  Prussia;  but  the  offer  came  too  late.  Had  it  been 
made  in  the  preceding  summer  it  might  have  been  accepted, 
but  now  the  revolution  had  spent  its  force.  Austria,  at  first 
paralyzed  by  insurrection,  had  now  recovered  from  the 
shock,  was  rapidly  putting  down  her  rebellious  subjects,  and 
under  the  able  leadership  of  Prince  Schwartzenberg  was 
determined  to  prevent  any  reorganization  of  Germany  that 


238     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

would  diminish  her  influence.  After  a  feeble  struggle 
Prussia  yielded  to  her  more  determined  rival,  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  came  to  an  end,  and  the  old  Confeder- 
ation was  restored. 

Bis7narck 

Again  a  period  of  reaction  set  in,  which  lasted  about  ten 
years,  when  Gemany  was  thrilled  by  the  events  in  Italy, 
and  the  Liberals  again  became  powerful.  Whether  they 
would  have  avoided  their  former  mistakes  and  succeeded 
better  it  is  impossible  to  say,  for  just  at  this  time  there  ap- 
peared upon  the  scene  a  man  who  was  destined  to  stamp  his 
will  on  Germany,  and  change  the  whole  face  of  European 
pohtics.  That  man  was  von  Bismarck.  He  belonged  to  the 
lesser  Prussian  nobility,  which  is  the  most  conservative  class 
in  the  race;  but  he  was  of  far  too  large  a  calibre  to  be  bound 
down  by  traditional  prejudices;  and  indeed  he  had  already 
formed  very  decided  opinions  of  his  own  on  the  subject  of 
German  unity.  He  had  served  as  a  representative  of  Prussia 
at  the  diet,  and  had  learned  that  a  German  nation  was  im- 
possible so  long  as  the  two  great  powers  —  Austria  and 
Prussia  —  were  contending  for  a  mastery.  He  saw  that  the 
first  step  must  be  the  forcible  expulsion  of  Austria  from  all 
share  in  German  politics;  and  he  beheved  that  union  could 
never  be  brought  about  by  argument,  that  the  Germans 
could  not  be  persuaded,  but  must  be  compelled  to  unite, 
that  the  work  must  be  done,  as  he  expressed  it,  by  blood 
and  iron. 

The  Constitutional  Conflict 

An  important  advance  towards  closer  relations  between 
the  States  had,  indeed,  been  made  long  ago  by  the  creation 
of  the  Zollverein  or  customs  union.  This  had  been  founded 
by  Prussia  in  the  early  part  of  the  century,  and  had  grad- 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  239 

ually  been  extended  until  it  included  almost  all  the  German 
states  except  Austria,  which  had  been  jealously  excluded 
by  the  Prussian  statesmen;  but  valuable  as  the  Zollverein 
was  in  teaching  the  people  their  common  interests,  Bismarck 
was  convinced  that  no  further  progress  could  be  expected 
without  the  use  of  force.  Now  it  was  precisely  on  this  point 
that  his  methods  differed  from  those  of  the  Liberals,  because 
war  formed  no  part  of  their  programme,  and  for  that  reason 
they  were  unable  to  understand  his  policy.  In  1859  they 
had  obtained  a  majority  in  the  lower  house  of  the  Prussian 
Parliament,  and  had  very  soon  become  involved  in  a  quarrel 
with  King  William  over  the  reorganization  of  the  army  on 
which  he  had  set  his  heart. ^  In  1862  the  King  turned  to 
Bismarck  and  made  him  the  President  of  the  Council.  Bis- 
marck submitted  to  the  chamber  a  budget  containing  the 
appropriations  for  the  military  changes,  and  when  the  cham- 
ber refused  to  pass  it  he  withdrew  it,  and  governed  without 
any  budget  at  all.  This  he  was  enabled  to  do,  because  the 
taxes  were  collected  under  standing  laws  which  required  no 
reenactment,  and  in  fact  could  not  be  changed  without  the 
consent  of  the  crown;  and  because  a  doctrine  was  developed 
that  in  case  the  king  and  the  two  houses  were  unable  to 
agree  upon  appropriations,  the  king  was  entitled  to  make 
all  those  expenditures  which  were  necessary  in  order  to  carry 
on  the  government  in  accordance  with  the  laws  regulating 
the  various  branches  of  the  administration.  The  Liberals 
were  furious  at  this  budgetless  rule,  but  Bismarck  proceeded 
in  spite  of  them.  He  persuaded  Austria  to  join  Prussia  in 
wresting  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  from  Den- 
mark in  1864,  and  then  contrived  to  quarrel  with  her  about 
the  disposition  to  be  made  of  them.    The  majority  in  the 

^  William  became  Regent  on  Oct.  7,  1858,  and  on  the  death  of  his  brother 
Frederick  William  IV,  on  January  2,  1 861,  he  became  King. 


240     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

German  diet  sided  with  Austria,  and  ordered  the  troops  of 
the  Confederation  mobiHzed  against  Prussia.  Then  fol- 
lowed the  war  of  1866,  and  the  crushing  defeat  of  Austria 
and  the  smaller  German  states  that  took  her  part. 

The  North  German  Confederation 

Bismarck  had  originally  intended  to  compel  all  the  states 
except  Austria  to  form  a  federal  union,  but  the  intervention 
of  Napoleon  III  forced  him  to  abandon  the  plan  and  limit 
the  Confederation  to  the  country  north  of  the  river  Main.^ 
He  therefore  determined  as  a  compensation  to  increase  the 
direct  strength  of  Prussia  by  annexing  the  states  that  had 
fought  against  her.^  Hanover,  Electoral  Hesse-Nassau,' 
and  Frankfort,  besides  Schleswig-Holstein,  were  accordingly 
incorporated  in  Prussia,  while  with  the  other  states  north 
of  the  Main  a  new  federal  union  was  formed  under  the  name 
of  the  North  German  Confederation.'*  This  had  for  its  presi- 
dent the  Prussian  king;  and  for  its  legislature  two  cham- 
bers —  one  the  Reichstag,  a  popular  assembly  elected  by 
universal  suffrage,  and  the  other  the  Bundesrath,  or  federal 
council,  which  was  copied  from  the  old  diet,  and  composed 
in  the  same  way  of  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  different 
states,  but  was  endowed  with  pecuHar  and  extensive  powers. 
Austria  was  excluded  from  all  participation  in  German 

1  Luxemburg  and  Limburg,  which  belonged  to  Holland,  had  been  a  part 
of  the  old  Confederation,  but  were  allowed  to  drop  out  at  this  time,  and  were 
not  included  in  the  reorganization  of  Germany.  This  was  true  also  of  the 
tiny  principality  of  Lichtenstein  in  the  south. 

*  Von  Sybel,  Begriindung  des  Deutschen  Reiches,  book  xix,  ch.  ii. 

'  Also  called  Hesse-Cassel  to  distinguish  it  from  Hesse-Darmstadt  or 
grand-ducal  Hesse,  which,  being  the  only  Hesse  remaining  in  existence  as  a 
separate  state,  is  hereinafter  called  simply  Hesse. 

*  The  constitution  of  the  Confederation  was  first  agreed  upon  by  the 
governments  of  the  several  states,  then  accepted  with  slight  modifications 
by  a  National  Assembly  elected  by  universal  suffrage  for  the  purpose,  and 
finally  ratified  by  the  legislatures  of  the  states. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  241 

politics;  while  the  four  States  south  of  the  Main  —  Bavaria, 
Wurtemberg,  Baden,  and  Hesse  '  —  became  independent, 
and  were  expressly  left  at  liberty  to  form  a  separate  union 
among  themselves.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  made  offensive 
and  defensive  alliances  with  the  Confederation,  and  formed 
with  it  a  Zollverein  or  customs  union,  whose  organs  were 
the  two  chambers  of  the  Confederation  reinforced  by  repre- 
sentatives from  the  southern  states.  Every  one  felt  that  the 
union  of  Germany  was  incomplete  so  long  as  these  states 
were  not  a  part  of  it;  but  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg  were 
reluctant  to  surrender  their  independence;  and  the  enthu- 
siasm aroused  by  the  war  with  France  in  1870  was  required 
to  raise  the  sentiment  for  German  nationality  to  such  a  pitch 
as  to  sweep  them  into  line.  Even  then  they  demanded  and 
obtained  special  privileges  as  the  price  of  their  adhesion;  but 
at  last  all  the  difficulties  were  arranged,  and  in  the  autumn 
of  1870  treaties  were  made  with  the  four  southern  states 
whereby  they  joined  the  union.  The  name  of  the  Confedera- 
tion was  changed  at  the  same  time  to  that  of  "  German 
Empire,"  the  president  being  given  the  title  of  Kaiser;  and 
in  the  course  of  the  following  winter  the  changes  and  addi- 
tions entailed  by  these  treaties  were  embodied  in  a  new  draft 
of  the  constitution.^ 

•  This  is  Hesse-Darmstadt.  It  lay  on  both  sides  of  the  Main,  but  the 
part  on  the  north  of  that  river  was  already  included  in  the  North  German 
Confederation. 

^  Cf.  Laband,  Deutsches  Staatsrecht,  2d  ed.,  ch.  i.  In  1873  three  amend- 
ments were  made  in  this  instrument.  The  first  (that  of  Feb.  25)  abolished 
the  provision  limiting  the  right  to  vote  in  the  Reichstag,  on  those  matters 
which  by  the  constitution  are  not  common  to  the  whole  Empire,  to  the 
representatives  of  the  states  affected.  The  second  (that  of  March  3)  put 
the  lighthouses,  buoys,  etc.,  along  the  coast  under  the  control  of  the  federal 
government;  and  the  third  (that  of  Dec.  20)  extended  the  legislative  power 
of  the  P^mpire  over  the  whole  field  of  civil  and  criminal  law.  It  had  previously 
covered  contracts,  commercial  law,  and  criminal  law.  In  1888  (Art.  24), 
an  amendment  was  adopted  changing  the  term  of  the  Reichstag  from  three 


242     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Constitution  of  the  Empire 

This  instrument  has  nothing  about  it  that  is  abstract  or 
ideal.  It  was  drawn  up  by  a  man  of  affairs  who  knew  pre- 
cisely what  he  wanted,  and  understood  very  well  the  limita- 
tions imposed  upon  him,  and  the  concessions  he  was  obliged 
to  make  to  the  existing  order  of  things.  His  prime  object 
was  to  create  a  powerful  miUtary  state;  and  hence,  as  has 
been  pointed  out,  the  articles  on  most  subjects  are  compara- 
tively meagre,  but  those  on  the  army,  the  navy,  and  the 
revenue  are  drawn  up  with  a  minuteness  befitting  the 
by-laws  of  a  commercial  company.^ 

to  five  years.  In  1893  (Art.  53,  §  s),  an  amendment  was  adopted  about 
the  method  of  conscription  for  the  navy.  In  1904  (Art.  70),  the  article  on 
the  finances  was  amended  to  authorize  levying  contributions  on  the  states, 
in  addition  to  federal  taxes.  In  1905  (Art.  59,  §  i),  the  article  on  com- 
pulsory miUtary  service  was  changed,  chiefly  to  substitute  two  for  three 
years  of  active  service.  In  May,  1906  (Art.  32),  an  amendment  was  made 
permitting  the  payment  of  members  of  the  Reichstag;  and  in  June  of 
the  same  year  (Art.  38,  §  2),  an  amendment  was  made  about  the  allow- 
ance to  the  states  for  the  cost  of  collecting  the  excise  on  beer.  In  May, 
191 1  (Art.  6a),  an  article  was  added  virtually  making  Alsace-Lorraine  a 
member  of  the  Confederation;  and  in  December,  191 1  (Art.  54),  a  change 
was  made  about  the  tolls  chargeable  for  improvements  in  navigation.  As 
this  goes  to  print,  an  amendment  is  proposed  that  a  declaration  of  war  shall 
require  the  consent  of  the  Reichstag. 

Substantial  changes  in  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Empire  have  been 
made  without  a  formal  modification  of  the  text.  (See  Laband,  i.  48-49,  51.) 
Some  of  the  German  jurists  maintain  that  such  a  practice  is  wrong  (von 
Ronne,  Slaatsrecht  des  Deulschen  Retches,  2d  ed.,  pp.  31-34;  Meyer,  Lehrbuch 
des  Deulschen  Slaatsrechts,  p.  416);  others  that  it  is  quite  proper,  provided 
the  majority  required  in  the  Bundesrath  for  a  formal  amendment  of  the 
constitution  is  in  fact  obtained.  (Laband,  i.  545-549)  Arndt,  Verfassung 
des  Deulschen  Reiches,  pp.  290-291.) 

1  Lebon,  Eludes  sur  VAllemagne  Folilique,  Introd.,  p.  iii. 

Amendments  to  the  constitution  can  be  made  by  a  majority  vote  in  the 
Reichstag,  but  are  vetoed  by  fourteen  adverse  votes  in  the  Bundesrath. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  243 

Nature  of  the  Confederation 

Before  proceeding  to  a  description  of  the  organs  of  the 
state,  it  will  be  worth  while  to  examine  the  nature  of  the 
Confederation.  We  are  in  the  habit  of  speaking  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  as  a  federal  government,  and  rightly;  but  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  it  departs  essentially  from  the  type 
which  we  commonly  associate  with  that  term,  and  which  is 
embodied  in  our  own  constitution.  We  conceive  of  a  federal 
system  as  one  in  which  there  is  a  division  of  powers  between 
the  central  government  and  the  states  according  to  sub- 
jects, so  that  in  those  matters  which  fall  within  the  sphere  of 
federal  control  the  central  government  not  only  makes  the 
laws,  but  executes  them  by  means  of  its  own  officials.  Thus 
Congress  enacts  a  tariff;  the  United  States  custom  house 
collects  the  duties;  and  the  federal  courts  decide  the  ques- 
tions that  arise  under  the  law.  But  all  this  is  very  different 
in  Germany.  There  the  legislative  power  of  the  central 
government  is  far  more  extensive  than  in  this  country,  for  it 
includes  almost  everything  that  is  placed  under  the  control 
of  Congress  and  many  other  matters  besides.  In  addition  to 
such  subjects  as  customs  duties  and  taxes,  the  army  and 
navy,  the  consular  service,  and  the  protection  of  foreign 
commerce,  which  are  obviously  essential,  the  list  comprises 
many  matters  of  domestic  legislation.  It  covers  not  only  the 
posts  and  telegraphs,^  transportation  on  streams  running 
through  more  than  one  state,  and  extraditions  between  the 
states,  but  also  in  general  terms  railroads,^  roads  and  canals, 
citizenship,  travel,  change  of  residence,  the  carrying  on 
of  trades,  also  the  regulation  of  weights  and  measures, 
of  coinage  and  paper  money,  of  banking,  patents,  copy- 
rights, and  of  medical  and  veterinary  police.    Moreover,  it 

*  Except  in  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg.  *  Except  in  Bavaria. 


244  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

includes  the  regulation  of  the  press  and  associations,  and 
finally  the  whole  domain  of  ordinary  civil  and  criminal  law 
and  of  judicial  proceedings.  All  these  things  are  declared 
subject  to  imperial  legislation  and  supervision.^ 

The  administrative  power  of  the  Empire,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  very  small,  the  federal  laws  being  carried  out  in  the 
main  by  the  officers  of  the  states  as  under  the  Confederation 
of  1815.  Except,  indeed,  for  foreign  affairs,  the  navy,  and 
to  some  extent  the  army,  and  the  postal  and  telegraphic 
service,  the  executive  functions  of  the  Empire  are  limited  for 
the  most  part  to  the  laying  down  of  general  regulations,  and 
a  supervision  of  their  execution  by  the  several  states.^  Thus 
the  federal  government  can  enact  a  tariff,  make  regulations 
which  shall  govern  the  customhouse  officers,  and  appoint 
inspectors  to  see  that  they  are  carried  out;  but  the  duties 
are  actually  collected  by  state  officials.^  One  naturally  asks 
what  happens  if  a  state  refuses  or  fails  to  carry  out  a  federal 
law.  The  matter  is  reported  to  the  Bundesrath,  which 
decides  any  controversy  about  the  interpretation  of  the 
law.*  But  suppose  the  state  persists  in  its  refusal  to  ad- 
minister the  law,  what  can  the  federal  government  do  ?  It 
cannot  give  effect  to  the  law  itself,  nor  has  it  any  officials  for 

1  Art.  4  of  the  constitution  and  the  amendment  of  Dec.  20,  1873. 

*  See  Laband,  §  66.  In  the  case  of  the  army  (Const.  Arts.  63-66)  and 
the  posts  and  telegraphs  (Art.  50),  the  highest  officers  are  appointed  by  the 
Kaiser,  who  gives  them  their  orders,  while  the  subordinates  are  appointed 
by  the  states. 

'  As  a  rule  the  whole  net  revenue  flows  into  the  imperial  treasury.  In 
case  the  receipts  of  the  Empire  are  not  equal  to  its  expenses,  the  deficiency 
is  covered  by  means  of  contributions  called  Malricularbeitrdge  assessed  on 
the  different  states  in  proportion  to  their  population.  (Const.  Art.  70,  and 
see  Laband,  6th  ed.,  §  45.)  This  was  originally  intended  to  be  a  subsidiary 
and  exceptional  source  of  revenue,  but  owing  to  the  quarrel  between  Bis- 
marck and  the  Reichstag  on  the  subject  of  federal  taxation,  the  Matricular- 
beitrage  became  large  for  many  years.    (Cf.  Lebon,  AUemagne,  p.  106  el  seq.) 

♦  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE        245 

the  purpose.  Its  only  resource  is  federal  execution  —  that 
is,  an  armed  attack  on  the  delinquent  state  —  which  can  be 
ordered  by  the  Bundesrath,  and  carried  out  by  the  Kaiser.* 
This  last  resort  has  never  been  used,  nor  is  it  likely  to  be, 
because  the  Kaiser  is  also  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  Prussia 
alone  is  not  only  larger  than  any  other  state,  but  larger  than 
all  the  rest  put  together.  Execution  against  Prussia  is  there- 
fore doubly  out  of  the  question;  and  any  other  state  would 
be  so  easily  overpowered  that  it  is  certain  to  submit,  rather 
than  provoke  an  appeal  to  force. 

The  Privileges  of  Prussia 

Another  conception  that  we  associate  with  federal  govern- 
ment is  an  equahty  of  rights  among  the  members.  But  in 
the  German  Empire  all  is  inequality.  It  would,  indeed,  have 
been  impossible  to  make  a  federation  on  really  equal  terms 
between  a  number  of  states,  one  of  which  contained  three 
fifths  of  the  total  population,  while  the  other  twenty-four 
contained  altogether  only  two  fifths.  The  compact  could 
not  fail  to  resemble  that  between  the  lion  and  the  fox,  or 
rather  a  compact  between  a  lion,  half  a  dozen  foxes,  and  a 
score  of  mice.  The  larger  states  are  accorded  all  sorts  of 
privileges,  and  so  much  of  the  lion's  share  of  these  falls  to 
Prussia  that  it  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that  she  rules  Ger- 
many with  the  advice  and  assistance  of  the  other  states.  In 
the  first  place  she  has  a  perpetual  right  to  have  her  king  the 
Kaiser.2  Secondly,  amendments  to  the  constitution  —  al- 
though requiring  only  an  ordinary  majority  vote  in  the 
Reichstag  —  are  defeated  in  the  Bundesrath  if  fourteen 
negative  votes  are  thrown  against  them,  and  as  Prussia  has 
seventeen  votes  in  that  body,  she  has  an  absolute  veto  on  all 

'  Const.  Art.  19,  and  see  Laband,  i.  105-106. 
*  Const.  Art.  11. 


246     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

changes  of  the  constitution.^  Besides  this,  it  is  expressly 
provided  that  in  the  case  of  all  bills  relating  to  the  army,  the 
navy,  the  customs  duties,  or  the  excises,  and  in  the  case  of 
all  proposals  to  revise  the  administrative  regulations  for 
collecting  the  revenue,  the  vote  of  Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath 
is  decisive  if  cast  in  favor  of  maintaining  the  existing 
institutions. 2  In  other  words,  Prussia  has  a  veto  on  all 
measures  for  making  changes  in  the  army,  the  navy,  or  the 
taxes.  She  has  also  the  casting  vote  in  case  of  a  tie  in  the 
Bundesrath,'  and  the  chairmanship  of  all  the  standing 
committees  of  that  body.^ 

These  are  Prussia's  constitutional  pri\dleges;  but  she  has 
others  obtained  by  private  agreement  with  her  smaller 
partners;  for  the  several  states  are  at  liberty  to  make  con- 
ventions or  treaties  with  each  other  in  regard  to  the  affairs 
that  remain  subject  to  their  control.^  When  the  North  Ger- 
man Confederation  was  formed,  universal  military  service 
and  a  uniform  organization  like  that  of  Prussia  were  intro- 
duced into  all  the  states,  but  the  army  was  not  made  exclu- 
sively a  national  nor  left  entirely  a  state  institution.^     The 

1  Const.  Art.  78.  In  the  North  German  Confederation  a  two  thirds  vote 
in  the  Bundesrath  was  necessary  for  a  change  in  the  constitution,  but  when 
the  South  German  states  were  admitted,  Prussia  had  no  longer  a  third  of 
the  delegates,  and  in  order  to  preserve  her  veto  the  proportion  required  was 
increased  to  three  quarters.  Finally  at  the  instance  of  Bavaria,  which 
wanted  to  enlarge  the  power  of  the  states  of  the  second  size,  it  was  agreed 
that  fourteen  negative  votes  should  be  enough  to  defeat  an  amendment  to 
the  constitution.    Arndt,  p.  290;   Robinson,  The  German  Bundesrath,  p.  40. 

2  Const.  Arts.  5,  35,  and  37. 
^  Const.  Art.  7. 

*  Const.  Art.  8;  Laband,  i.  264.  E.xcept  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs, 
where,  as  will  be  explained  hereafter,  it  would  be  of  no  use  to  her. 

*  Laband,  §  63.  To  some  extent  the  states  are  at  liberty  to  make  separate 
conventions  with  foreign  powers,  and  they  have  a  right  to  send  their  own 
representatives  to  foreign  courts.    Laband,  §  71. 

*  Const,  .^rts.  57-68.  The  last  eight  of  these  articles  do  not  apply  to 
Bavaria,  and  only  partially  to  Wurtemberg.    The  expense  of  maintaining 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  247 

constitution  provides  that  the  military  laws  shall  be  made 
by  the  Empire/  and  declares  that  the  forces  of  the  country 
shall  be  a  single  army  under  the  command  of  the  Kaiser, 
whose  orders  they  are  bound  to  obey.  It  gives  him  a  right  to 
inspect  and  dispose  of  the  troops,  and  to  appoint  all  officers 
whose  command  includes  the  entire  contingent  of  a  state. 
It  provides  also  that  the  selection  of  the  generals  shall  be 
subject  to  his  approval,  but  it  leaves  to  the  states  the  ap- 
pointment of  all  inferior  officers,  and  the  management  of 
their  troops  in  other  respects.  Now  these  reserved  rights 
were  of  Httle  value,  and  all  but  three  of  the  states  transferred 
them  to  Prussia,  chiefly  in  consideration  of  an  agreement  on 
the  part  of  the  Kaiser  not  to  remove  the  troops  from  their 
own  territory  except  in  case  of  actual  necessity.  Thus  the 
contingents  of  these  states  are  recruited,  drilled,  and  com- 
manded by  Prussia,  and  form,  in  short,  an  integral  part  of 
her  army.2 

A  number  of  conventions  of  a  similar  character  affecting 
other  public  matters,  such  as  the  postal  service  and  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts,  have  been  concluded  between  the 

the  army  is  borne  by  the  Empire.  Unlike  the  army,  the  navy  is  a  purely 
national  institution.    Art.  53. 

'  The  double  position  of  the  Prussian  monarch  comes  out  curiously  here, 
for  the  constitution  provides:  first,  that  the  military  laws  and  regulations 
of  Prussia  shall  be  in  force  throughout  the  Empire,  until  a  comprehensive 
imperial  military  law  shall  be  enacted;  and  second  that  any  future  general 
orders  of  the  Prussian  army  shall  be  communicated  by  the  military  commit- 
tee of  the  Bundesrath  to  the  commanders  of  the  other  contingents  for  ap- 
propriate imitation. 

*  Some  of  the  states  transferred  all  their  rights  (Baden  with  a  provision 
that  her  troops  should  form  a  separate  coqis);  others  retained  certain  rights, 
mainly  of  an  honorary  nature,  but  agreed  that  their  troops  should  be  united 
with  the  Prussian  army,  and  that  Prussia  should  appoint  the  officers.  Only 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wurtemberg  still  exercise  the  military  functions  re- 
served to  them  by  the  constitution.  Cf.  Laband,  §  94,  iii;  Schulze,  Lehrbuch 
des  Deulschen  Slaalsrechts,  §  335;  Meyer,  Lehrbuch,  §  197. 


248     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

states;  but  the  most  comprehensive  compact  of  all  was 
made  by  Waldeck.  The  ruler  of  this  httle  principahty  was 
crippled  with  debts,  and  unable  to  raise  the  money  required 
for  the  reorganization  of  his  army.  So  he  sold  his  govern- 
mental rights  as  a  whole  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  retired  from 
business, and  went  to  Italy  to  live  upon  his  income;  while  the 
Prussian  goverrmient,  having  bought  the  goodwill  of  his 
trade,  proceeded  to  carry  it  on  as  his  successor.  There  is 
something  decidedly  comical  in  treating  the  right  to  govern 
a  community  as  a  marketable  commodity,  to  be  bought  and 
sold  for  cash;  but  to  Bismarck  the  matter  presented  itself  as 
a  perfectly  natural  business  transaction,  and  in  fact  the  con- 
tract bears  a  strong  resemblance  to  the  lease  of  a  small 
American  railroad  to  a  larger  one. 

Privilege  of  Other  States 

Such  are  the  special  privileges  of  Prussia.  Those  reserved 
to  the  other  states  are  far  less  extensive.  By  the  constitu- 
tion Hamburg  and  Bremen  had  a  right  to  remain  free  ports, 
outside  of  the  operation  of  the  tariff  laws;  ^  but  both  of  them 
have  now  surrendered  this  privilege.^  The  other  special 
rights  are  mostly  enjoyed  by  the  southern  states,  and  were 
given  to  them  as  an  inducement  to  join  the  Confederation. 
Thus  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and  Baden  were  exempted  from 
imperial  excises  on  brandy  and  beer,  and  given  a  right  to 
lay  excises  of  their  own  on  these  articles.*  Bavaria  and 
Wurtemberg  have  their  own  postal  and  telegraph  services, 

'  Const.  Art.  34. 

*  The  treaty  for  this  purpose  was  made  with  Hamburg  in  1881,  and  went 
into  effect  Oct.  i,  1888.  That  with  Bremen  was  made  in  1885.  For  an  ac- 
count of  these  treaties  and  the  way  they  were  brought  about,  see  Blum,  Das 
Deutsche  Reich  zur  Zeit  Bismarck's,  p.  360  el  seq.;  Leband,  ii.  901-904. 

'  Const.  Art.  35.  But  in  1887  they  gave  up  their  privileges  in  regard  to 
brandy.     See  Blum,  p.  532;  Leband,  ii.  920,  923-924. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  249 

which  are  subject  only  to  general  imperial  laws.^  Except 
for  the  principle  of  universal  military  service,  and  the  agree- 
ment to  conform  to  the  general  organization  of  the  imperial 
army,  Bavaria  has  in  time  of  peace  the  entire  charge  of  her 
own  troops,  the  Kaiser  having  only  a  right  to  inspect  them; 
while  Wurtemberg,  although  not  so  much  favored  as  this, 
has  greater  military  privileges  than  the  remaining  states.^ 
Bavaria  is  further  exempt  from  imperial  legislation  in  regard 
to  railroads,^  and  to  residence  and  settlement;  *  and  finally, 
by  the  constitution  or  by  military  convention,  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  and  Wurtemberg  have  a  right  to  seats  on  the  com- 
mittees of  the  Bundesrath  on  foreign  affairs  and  on  the  army 
and  fortresses.^  In  order  to  guarantee  more  effectually  these 
privileges,  it  is  provided  that  they  shall  not  be  changed 
without  the  consent  of  the  state  entitled  to  them.^ 

The  Empire  and  the  Old  Confederation 

From  this  description  of  the  privileges  of  the  different 
states  it  is  evident  that  the  German  Empire  is  very  far  from 
being  a  federal  union  of  the  kind  with  which  we  are  familiar. 

'  Const.  Art.  52. 

*  Treaties  of  Nov.  23,  1870,  with  Bavaria;  and  Nov.  25,  1870,  with 
Wurtemberg;  incorporated  in  the  constitution  by  a  reference  in  the  Appen- 
dix to  Part  XI. 

'  Except  in  the  case  of  lines  that  have  a  strategic  importance.  Const. 
Art.  46. 

*  Const.  Art.  4,  §  i. 

^  Const.  Art.  8;  Laband,  i.  113.  By  the  treaty  of  Nov.  23,  1870  (Schluss- 
protokoll,  Art.  ix),  Bavaria  has  a  right  to  preside  over  the  Bundesrath  in 
the  absence  of  Prussia,  but  as  this  never  happens,  the  privilege  is  merely 
honorary. 

«  Const.  Art.  78.  Meyer  (Lehrbuch,  p.  421)  and  Zorn  {Staatsrecht  des 
Deutscken  Retches,  pp.  88-93)  think  this  provision  applies  only  to  the  limita- 
tions on  the  competence  of  the  Empire,  and  not  to  the  privileges  given  to  the 
several  states  in  the  organization  of  the  government,  such  as  the  presidential 
rights  of  Prussia,  the  allotment  of  the  votes  in  the  Bundesrath,  the  seats  on 


250  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

It  is  rather  a  continuation  of  the  old  Germanic  Confedera- 
tion, with  the  centre  of  gravity  shifted  from  the  states  to  the 
central  government,  and  the  preponderating  power  placed 
in  the  hands  of  Prussia  —  the  other  large  states  retaining 
privileges  roughly  in  proportion  to  their  size.^ 

Its  chief  organ  of  government  is  still  the  old  diet,  re- 
named the  Bundesrath  or  Federal  Council,  to  which  have 
been  added  on  one  side  a  Kaiser,  who  is  commander-in-chief 
of  the  forces,  and  represents  the  Empire  in  its  relation  with 
foreign  powers;  and,  on  the  other,  an  elected  chamber, 
called  the  Reichstag,  created  for  the  sake  of  stimulating 
national  sentiment  and  enlisting  popular  support  as  against 
the  local  and  dynastic  influences  which  have  free  play  in  the 
Bundesrath.    Let  us  consider  each  of  these  organs  in  detail. 

committees,  etc.  Their  opinion,  however,  is  not  generally  accepted.  La- 
band,  i.  110-114;  Schulze,  §  249;  v.  Ronne,  ii.  43-48.  It  is  universally 
agreed  that  an  affirmative  vote  in  the  Bundesrath  by  the  delegate  of  the 
state  is  a  sufficient  consent  by  that  state  to  a  law  affecting  its  privileges  so 
far  as  the  Empire  is  concerned;  but  there  js  a  difference  of  opinion  on  the 
question  how  far  the  ruler  of  the  state  is  bound,  or  can  be  bound,  by  state 
law  to  consult  his  parliament.  Laband,  i.  114-117;  Schulze,  book  ii.  p.  19; 
V.  Ronne,  ii.  36-43;   Meyer,  p.  422;  Zom,  pp.  94-98. 

1  In  saying  this  I  am  speaking  only  of  the  political  structure  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  do  not  mean  to  touch  the  philosophical  question  whether  the 
sovereignty  has  or  has  not  been  transferred  from  the  states  to  the  Empire. 
This  point  has  been  the  subject  of  elaborate  argument,  and  in  fact  the  same 
juristic  questions  about  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  federal  government  have 
been  discussed  in  Germany  as  in  the  United  States.  (For  a  reference  to  these 
discussions,  see  Laband,  i.  30-33,  52  et  seq.,  and  see  especially  Jellinek,  Die 
Lehre  von  den  Staatenverbindungen.)  Some  of  the  German  publicists  main- 
tain that  the  sovereignty  resides  in  the  Bundesrath,  a  view  which,  as  Burgess 
points  out  in  his  Political  Science  (ii.  90-93)  is  somewhat  artificial.  For  those 
who  think  as  I  do,  that  sovereignty  is  not  in  its  nature  indivisible,  the  ques- 
tion loses  much  of  its  importance.  (Cf.  Essays  on  Government,  chapter  on  the 
Limits  of  Sovereignty.) 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  25 1 

The  Reichstag 

The  Reichstag  is  elected  for  five  years  by  direct  universal 
suffrage  and  secret  ballot.^  The  voters  must  be  twenty-five 
years  old,  and  not  in  active  military  service,  paupers,  or 
otherwise  disqualified.^  The  members  are  chosen  in  single 
electoral  districts  fixed  by  imperial  law.^  These  had  origi- 
nally a  hundred  thousand  inhabitants  apiece,^  but  they  have 
not  been  revised  for  more  than  a  score  of  years,  and  with 
the  growth  of  the  large  cities  have  gradually  become  very 
unequal.  In  the  case  of  Berlin  the  disproportion  is  enormous, 
for  the  city  has  now  over  two  million  inhabitants,  but  is  still 
represented  by  only  six  members.  The  government,  how- 
ever, is  not  anxious  for  a  redistribution  of  seats,  because 
Berhn  elects  Radicals  and  Socialists,  who  form  a  trouble- 
some exposition  —  a  tendency  which  is  also  true  of  other 
large  centres.  As  in  the  United  States,  no  district  can  be 
composed  of  parts  of  different  states,  so  that  every  state, 
however  small,  elects  at  least  one  representative.  The  three 
hundred  and  ninety-seven  seats  are  in  fact  distributed  as 
follows:  Prussia  has  two  hundred  and  thirty-five,  or  about 
three-fifths  of  the  whole  number,  Bavaria  forty-eight.  Sax- 
ony twenty-three,  Wurtemberg  seventeen,  Alsace-Lorraine 
fifteen,  Baden  fourteen,  Hesse  nine,  Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
six,  Saxe-Weimar  three,  Oldenburg  three,  Brunswick  three, 
Hamburg  three,  Saxe-Meiningen  two,  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 
two,  Anhalt  two,  and  all  the  rest  one  each.^    As  regards  the 

*  Cf.  Laband,  §  34;  Const.  Arts.  20,  24.  Until  1888  the  period  was  three 
years. 

*  Wahlgesetz,  May  31,  1869,  §§  1-3.  Every  voter  who  has  been  a  citizen 
of  any  state  for  a  year  is  eligible  in  any  district  in  the  Empire  without  regard 
to  residence.  Soldiers  in  active  service,  though  not  allowed  to  vote,  are 
eligible,     (/i.,  §4.) 

'  Id.,  §  6.  <  Except  in  the  smallest  states. 

'  Wahlgesetz,  §5;  Const.  Art.  20;  Actof  June  25, 1873  (Alsace-Lorraine), 
§3- 


252  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\^ERNMENTS 

method  of  election  the  system  of  ballotage  prevails;  that  is, 
an  absolute  majority  is  required  for  election  on  the  first 
ballot,  and  if  no  one  obtains  this,  a  second  ballot  takes  place 
which  is  confined  to  the  two  candidates  who  have  received 
the  largest  number  of  votes. ^ 

Universal  suffrage  was  looked  upon  as  an  experiment  of  a 
somewhat  hazardous  character,  and  Bismarck  insisted  on 
the  non-payment  of  the  members  of  the  Reichstag  as  a  safe- 
guard.2  This  was  a  bone  of  contention  with  the  Liberals  for 
many  years  —  the  Reichstag  having  repeatedly  passed  bills 
for  the  payment  of  members,  which  the  Bundesrath  until 
1906  rejected.^  The  absence  of  remuneration  was  not  with- 
out effect,  for  it  deterred  university  professors  and  other 
men  of  small  means,  usually  of  Hberal  views,  from  accepting 
an  office  which  entails  the  expense  of  a  long  residence  in  Ber- 
lin; but  it  did  not  fulfill  the  predictions  that  were  made 
either  by  its  foes  or  its  friends,  for  it  did  not  cause  a  dearth 
of  candidates,  or  discourage  the  presence  of  men  who  made 
politics  their  occupation.'*  The  provision  had,  however,  a 
meaning  one  would  hardly  suspect.  In  1885,  when  the 
Socialist  representatives  were  paid  a  salary  by  their  own 
party,  Bismarck,  claiming  that  such  a  proceeding  was  illegal, 
caused  the  treasury  to  sue  them  for  the  sums  of  money  they 
had  received  in  this  way,  and,  strange  to  say,  the  Imperial 
Court  of  Appeal  sustained  the  suits.  ^    The  object  of  with- 

^  Wahlgesetz,  §  12.  Lebon  (p.  82)  thinks  this  last  provision,  by  cutting 
out  all  the  candidates  but  the  two  highest  on  the  list,  favors  the  government 
and  hampers  the  free  expression  of  opinion. 

2  Const.  Art.  32. 

'  In  1906  a  measure  providing  for  the  payment  of  members  was  enacted. 
Since  that  date  an  annual  allowance  of  3000  marks  (about  $750)  per  year 
has  been  paid,  with  a  reduction  of  25  marks  for  each  day's  absence.  The 
annual  allowance  is  hardly  large  enough  to  be  termed  a  salary. 

«  Blum,  pp.  36-37. 

'  J^aband,  §  38;  Lebon,  p.  78.    The  members  cannot  be  arrested  during 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  253 

holding  pay  from  the  members  was,  of  course,  to  prevent  the 
power  of  the  poorer  classes  from  becoming  too  great;  but  a 
much  more  effectual  means  to  the  same  end  is  the  habit  of 
holding  elections  on  working  days,  instead  of  holding  them 
on  Sundays,  as  is  done  in  France  and  most  of  the  other 
Catholic  countries. 

The  Committee  System 

The  Reichstag  has  the  ordinary  privileges  of  a  legislative 
assembly,  electing  its  own  president,  making  its  own  rules, 
and  deciding  upon  the  validity  of  elections.^  Its  internal 
organization  conforms  to  the  pattern  generally  followed  in 
continental  chambers.  At  the  beginning  of  each  session  the 
members  are  divided  by  lot  into  seven  Ahtheilungen  or  sec- 
tions, which  correspond  to  the  bureaux  of  the  French  cham- 
bers, but  differ  from  these  in  the  important  respect  that  they 
last  during  the  whole  session,  instead  of  being  renewed  at 
short  intervals.  The  duties  of  the  sections  consist  in  making 
a  preliminary  examination  of  the  validity  of  elections  to  the 
Reichstag,  and  in  the  choice  of  committees,  each  section 
electing  one  or  more  committeemen,  according  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  committee.2  As  in  France  and  Italy,  however, 
the  choice  by  the  sections  is  really  cut  and  dried  before- 
hand. It  is  in  fact  controlled  by  the  Senioren-Convent,  a 
body  composed  of  the  leaders  of  the  different  parties,  who 
determine  in  advance  the  number  of  seats  on  the  committee 
to  which  each  party  shall  be  entitled.^    Bills  are  not  always 

the  session  except  for  certain  flagrant  offenses,  and  if  a  criminal  prosecution 
is  pending  against  one  of  them  the  Reichstag  can  order  him  to  be  set  at 
Uberty  (Const.  Art.  31);  but  in  fact  it  has  not  always  been  easy  to  make 
this  last  right  effective;  Lebon,  pp.  34-85. 

*  Const.  Art.  27. 

*  Laband,  ii.  327-329.  Unlike  the  French  bureaux,  their  choice  is  not 
confined  to  members  of  their  own  section.    Lebon,  p.  88. 

*  Lebon,  lb.;  Dupriez,  i.  526;  Leband,  i.  328. 


2^4    GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

referred  to  a  committee;  but  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  more 
advanced  Liberals  have  constantly  urged  such  a  reference  in 
the  case  of  government  bills,  because  the  authoritative  in- 
fluence of  the  ministers  is  thereby  diminished,  and  greater 
opportunity  is  given  for  criticism  and  amendment;  while  the 
more  moderate  parties,  following  the  lead  of  the  govern- 
ment, have  often  preferred  an  immediate  discussion  of  im- 
portant measures  by  the  full  house,  without  the  intervention 
of  any  committee  at  all. 

The  Powers  of  the  Reichstag 

The  powers  of  the  Reichstag  appear  very  great  on  paper. 
All  laws  require  its  consent,  and  so  do  the  budget,  all  loans, 
and  all  treaties  which  involve  matters  falling  within  the 
domain  of  legislation.  It  has  a  right  to  initiate  legislation, 
to  ask  the  government  for  reports,  and  to  express  its  opinion 
on  the  management  of  affairs.^  In  reality,  however,  its 
powers  are  not  so  great  as  they  seem.  The  constitution  pro- 
vides, for  example,  that  the  budget  shall  be  annual,^  but  the 
principal  revenue  laws  are  permanent,  and  cannot  be 
changed  without  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath,^  while  the 
most  important  appropriation,  that  for  the  army,  is  virtually 
determined  by  the  law  fixing  the  number  of  the  troops,  and 
this  has  hitherto  been  voted  for  a  number  of  years  at  a  time.'* 
The  chief  function  of  the  Reichstag  is,  in  fact,  the  considera- 

1  Const.  Arts,  s,  ii,  23,  69,  73;  Laband,  §  2,2,. 

2  In  1867  Bismarck  wanted  triennial  sessions,  and  in  1888,  when  the 
term  of  the  Reichstag  was  changed  to  five  years,  he  wanted  the  sessions  held 
only  every  other  year. 

'  It  is  to  be  remembered,  moreover,  that  the  bulk  of  the  civil  adminis- 
tration is  in  the  hands  of  the  states,  which  provide  the  means  of  carrying 
it  on. 

*  In  1871,  for  three  years;  in  1874,  1880,  and  1887  for  seven  years;  and 
since  1893  for  five  years,  until  in  1905  for  an  indefinite  period;  and  then 
again  in  191 1  for  five  years. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  255 

tion  of  bills  prepared  by  the  Chancellor  and  the  Bundesrath. 
These  it  criticizes  and  amends  very  freely;  but  its  activity 
is  rather  negative  than  positive,  and  although  important 
measures  have  occasionally  been  passed  at  its  instigation/ 
it  cannot  be  said  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  state  either  in 
legislation  or  administration.^ 

The  Right  of  Dissolution 

The  influence  of  the  Reichstag  is  also  diminished  by  the 
fact  that  it  can  be  dissolved  at  any  time  by  the  Bundesrath 
with  the  consent  of  the  Kaiser.^  In  most  constitutional  gov- 
ernments at  the  present  day  the  power  of  dissolution  is  the 
complement  of  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers,  and  is 
used,  at  least  in  theory,  to  ascertain  whether  the  cabinet  pos- 
sesses the  confidence  of  the  nation.  But  in  Germany  it  exists 
without  any  such  responsibiHty,  and  hence  is  simply  a  means 
of  breaking  down  resistance  in  the  Reichstag.  It  has,  in- 
deed, been  used  for  this  purpose  on  a  number  of  occasions: 
first,  in  1878,  when  the  Reichstag  refused  to  pass  a  bill  for 
the  repression  of  agitation  by  the  Socialists;  afterwards  in 
1887,  when  it  refused  to  pass  the  bill  fixing  the  size  of  the 
army  for  seven  years;  and  again  in  1893,  when  it  refused  to 
sanction  changes  proposed  in  the  military  system.  In  each 
case  the  new  Reichstag  supported  the  plans  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  thus  a  serious  conflict  with  the  Chancellor  was 
avoided,  and  the  question  of  the  ultimate  authority  of  the 

1  A  striking  example  of  this  was  the  amendment  to  Art.  4  of  the  con- 
stitution extending  the  legislation  of  the  Empire  to  cover  ordinary  civil  and 
criminal  law. 

*  Cf.  Lebon,  pp.  113-116.  The  debate  on  the  budget  is  used  as  an  occasion 
for  criticism  of  the  government,  and  for  the  expression  of  opinion,  but  in  the 
budget  itself  few  changes  are  made.  The  reductions  have  little  importance, 
while  the  rejection  of  an  appropriation  asked  for  is  extremely  rare,  and  an 
increase  is  almost  unknown.    Dupriez,  i.  543-544. 

^  Const.  Art.  24. 


256  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOV'ERNMENTS 

different  organs  of  the  state  was  postponed.  The  last  dis- 
solution took  place  in  1906  because  the  Reichstag  refused  to 
vote  the  government's  colonial  estimates. 

Interpellations 

The  rules  of  the  Reichstag  provide  for  interpellations,  but 
the  question  to  whom  these  shall  be  addressed  involves  one 
of  the  paradoxes,  or  contradictions  between  theory  and  prac- 
tice, which  are  common  in  the  government  of  the  Empire. 
There  is  no  imperial  cabinet,  and  the  Chancellor,  who  is  the 
only  minister,  has  no  right,  as  such,  to  sit  in  the  Reichstag. 
In  theory  he  comes  there  only  as  one  of  the  delegates  to  the 
Bundesrath  —  all  whose  members  have  the  privilege  of 
being  present  in  the  Reichstag,  where  a  special  bench  is  re- 
served for  them.  They  appear  as  the  representatives  of  the 
united  governments  of  Germany,  and  are  entitled  to  speak 
whenever  they  choose;  for  the  Bundesrath  is  not  only  a  col- 
lection of  delegates  from  the  governments  of  the  different 
states,  but  has  also  some  of  the  attributes  of  an  imperial 
cabinet.  In  form,  therefore,  interpellations  are  addressed 
to  the  Bundesrath,  but  in  fact  they  are  communicated  to  the 
Chancellor,  who  usually  answers  them  himself,  or  allows  one 
of  his  subordinates  to  do  so.  A  debate  may  ensue  if  de- 
manded by  fifty  members,  but  it  is  not  followed  by  an  order 
of  the  day  expressing  the  opinion  of  the  House, ^  and,  in- 
deed, interpellations  have  no  such  importance  as  in  France 
and  Italy,  because  the  parliamentary  system  does  not  exist; 
that  is,  the  Chancellor  does  not  resign  on  an  adverse  vote  of 
the  Reichstag,  nor  does  he  feel  obliged  to  conform  to  its 
wishes. 

1  Lebon,  p.  105;  v.  Ronne,  p.  268.  A  resolution  can,  of  course,  be  moved 
in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  rules  of  procedure,  and  this  was  done  on 
the  occasion  of  the  expulsion  of  the  Poles  in  Jan.  1886.  Blum,  pp.  498-501. 
Dupriez  (i.  545)  comments  on  the  Polish  incident, 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  257 

The  Bundesrath 

Let  us  now  examine  more  closely  the  Bundesrath  —  that 
extraordinary  mixture  of  legislative  chamber,  executive 
council,  court  of  appeal,  and  permanent  assembly  of  diplo- 
mats. It  is  the  most  thoroughly  native  feature  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  and  has,  therefore,  a  peculiar  vitality.  The 
Bundesrath  is  composed  of  delegates  appointed  by  the 
princes  of  the  states  and  the  senates  of  the  free  cities ;  ^ 
and  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  was 
taken  from  France  in  1871,  was  not  strictly  a  member  of  the 
union,  but  only  Reichsland  or  imperial  territory,  and  hence 
had  no  right  to  a  representative  in  the  Bundesrath,  al- 
though as  a  part  of  the  Empire  it  elected  members  of  the 
Reichstag.  Its  position  was  in  some  ways  analogous  to  that 
of  one  of  our  Territories,  while  the  other  parts  of  the  Empire 
correspond  to  our  states.  Curiously  enough,  Alsace-Lor- 
raine was  allowed  in  1879  to  send  to  the  Bundesrath  dele- 
gates who,  like  the  representatives  of  the  Territories  in 
Congress,  could  debate,  but  could  not  vote;  ^  and  finally  in 
191 1,  it  was  allotted  three  regular  delegates  in  that  body, 
but  as  they  are  appointed  by  the  statthalter  who  is  entirely 
under  the  control  of  the  Kaiser  —  that  is  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia —  it  was  provided  that  their  votes  should  not  be  counted 
when  the  votes  of  Prussia  would  not  prevail  without  them.' 

The  seats  in  the  Bundesrath  are  distributed  among  the 
states  and  cities  in  such  a  way  that  each  of  them  is  en- 
titled to  the  same  number  of  votes  as  in  the  diet  of  the  old 

1  Const.  Arts.  6-10. 

^  Laband,  i.  219-220.  In  the  law  of  1879,  as  originally  drawn  up  by  Bis- 
marck, Alsace-Lorraine  was  entitled  to  ordinary  delegates  to  the  Bundes- 
rath; but  that  body,  in  order  not  to  increase  the  seats  virtually  controlled 
by  the  King  of  Prussia,  insisted  that  they  should  have  no  vote.  Blum, 
pp.  635-636.    The  number  of  these  delegates  was  four. 

'  Const.  Art.  6a. 


25 8     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Germanic   Confederation   when   that   body   proceeded   in 
plenum,  except  that  Bavaria,  as  part  of  the  inducement  to 
join  the  Empire,  was  given  six  delegates  instead  of  four,^ 
and  Prussia  obtained  those  of  the  states  she  absorbed  in 
1866.2    There  are  in  all  fifty-eight  members,  Prussia  having 
seventeen,  Bavaria  six,  Saxony  and  Wurtemberg  four  each, 
Baden  and  Hesse  three  each,  Brunswick  and  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  two  each,  and  the  remaining  fourteen  states  and 
three  free  cities  one  each.     But  Prussia  has  really  three 
votes  more,  because  the  contract  for  the  government  of 
Waldeck  already  mentioned  gave  her  the  vote  of  that  state, 
and  in  1884-85  she  caused  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  to  be 
excluded  from  the  succession  in  Brunswick,  got  a  Prussian 
prince  appointed  perpetual  regent,  and  thus  obtained  the 
virtual  control  of  these  two  votes  also;  ^  so  that  she  has  in 
reality  twenty  votes  out  of  the  fifty-eight.    This,  of  course, 
is  much  less  than  her  proportion  of  the  population;^   but 
twenty  votes  in  the  same  hand  count  far  more  than  the  same 
number  held  by  different  states,  and  she  has  only  to  win  ten 
additional  votes  —  those  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg,  for 
example,  or  those  of  some  of  the  smaller  states  —  in  order  to 
have  an  absolute  majority.    In  fact,  she  has  usually  had  her 

1  She  had  six  votes  in  the  Bundesrath  of  the  Zollverein  from  1866  to  1871. 

^  Laband,  i.  220.  The  votes  acquired  by  Prussia  in  this  way  were  those 
of  Hanover,  4;  Hesse  Cassel,  3;  Holstein-Lauenburg,  3;  Nassau,  2;  and 
Frankfort,  i. 

*  The  Duke  was  excluded  because  as  son  and  heir  of  the  late  King  of 
Hanover  he  insisted  on  his  right  to  that  kingdom,  and  refused  to  acknow- 
ledge its  incorporation  in  Prussia.  His  son,  who  married  the  Kaiser's 
daughter,  has  recently  been  restored  to  the  dukedom. 

*  The  population  of  Germany  on  Dec.  i,  19 10,  was  about  sixty-five  mil- 
lions, of  which  Prussia  had  forty  millions,  Bavaria  nearly  seven  millions, 
Saxony  nearly  five  millions,  Wurtemberg  two  millions  and  a  half,  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  Baden  a  couple  of  millions  apiece,  Hesse  and  Hamburg  each 
one  million,  and  the  other  eighteen  states  together  not  much  more  than  four 
millions. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  259 

way,  although  on  several  notable  occasions  the  other  states 
have  combined  and  defeated  her.  This  happened  in  1877, 
when  the  seat  of  the  Imperial  Court  of  Appeal  was  fixed  at 
Leipsic  instead  of  Berlin  as  she  desired;  '  and  in  1876  on  the 
more  miportant  question  of  the  imperial  railroad  law.  At 
that  time  Bismarck  refrained  altogether  from  introducing 
into  the  Bundesrath  a  bill  for  the  purchase  of  railroads  by 
the  Empire,  knowing  that  it  would  be  defeated  by  the  op- 
position of  the  middle-sized  states,  although  the  project  was 
one  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart.^  Again,  in  1879,  another 
railroad  bill  was  killed  in  the  Bundesrath  by  the  opposition 
of  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wurtemberg,^  and  in  the  same  year 
a  conference  of  the  finance  ministers  of  the  states  refused  to 
consent  to  the  tobacco  monopoly.* 

Character  of  the  Bundesrath 

The  members  of  the  Bundesrath  are  diplomats  rather 
than  senators.^  They  enjoy  at  Berlin  the  privileges  of 
foreign  ambassadors,  and  are  appointed  and  removed  at 
will  by  the  states  they  represent  —  which  also  pay  them  or 
not  as  they  please.  The  votes  they  cast  are  the  votes  of  the 
states,  not  those  of  its  representatives,  and  it  is  therefore 
provided  that  all  the  delegates  of  a  state  must  vote  alike. 
In  fact,  all  the  votes  belonging  to  a  state  are  counted  with- 
out reference  to  the  number  of  delegates  actually  voting; « 

1  Cf.  Blum,  pp.  146-147.  The  vote  in  favor  of  Leipsic  was  thirty  to 
twenty-eight;  and  it  is  noteworthy  that  if  Trussia  had  then  controUed  the 
votes  of  Brunswick  the  majority  would  have  been  the  other  way. 

*  Cf.  Blum,  pp.  165-168. 
3  Blum,  p.  345. 

*  Blum,  p.  312.     On  this  point,  however,  "they  yielded  some  years  later. 
"  The  constitution  (Art.   10)  provides  that  the  Kaiser  shall  vouchsafe 

to  them  the  protection  accorded  to  ambassadors,  while  the  members  of  the 
Reichstag  have  the  ordinary  privileges  of  members  of  a  parliament. 
'  Laband,  i.  223. 


26o     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

and  thus  the  seventeen  votes  of  Prussia,  for  example,  can  be 
cast  in  her  name  by  a  single  representative,  just  as  at  the 
meeting  of  a  private  corporation  a  properly  authorized 
agent  can  vote  on  all  the  shares  of  stock  belonging  to  his 
principal.  The  delegates,  moreover,  vote  according  to  the 
instructions  of  their  home  government,  and  the  constitution 
expressly  declares  that  votes  not  instructed  shall  not  be 
counted.'  Tliis  last  provision  has  given  rise  to  some  com- 
ment. It  does  not  mean  that  a  delegate  must  produce  his 
instructions  before  he  is  allowed  to  vote.  On  the  contrary, 
the  Bundesrath  appears  to  take  no  cognizance  of  instruc- 
tions, which  may,  indeed,  be  of  any  kind,  including  an  au- 
thority to  vote  as  the  delegate  thinks  best;  and  it  is  even 
asserted  that  a  vote  is  valid  whether  it  is  in  accord  with  the 
instructions  or  not.^  The  provision  in  the  constitution  is 
probably  a  mere  survival ;  but  it  has  been  suggested  that  its 
object  is,  on  the  one  hand,  to  allow  a  delegate  to  excuse  him- 
self from  voting  on  the  plea  that  he  has  not  been  instructed, 
and  on  the  other  to  make  it  clear  that  a  vote  can  be  taken, 
although  the  delegates  have  not  all  received  instructions, 
thus  taking  away  an  excuse  for  delay  that  might  other- 
wise be  urged. ^ 

A  delegate  is  usually  an  officer  of  the  state  he  represents, 
often  one  of  its  ministers,  or  even  the  head  of  its  cabinet, 
and  in  any  case  the  ministers  of  a  state  are  responsible  ac- 
cording to  its  own  laws  for  their  instructions  to  the  dele- 
gates.^ In  fact,  the  ministers  are  frequently  questioned  in 
the  local  Landtag  or  legislature,  about  the  instructions  they 
have  given,  or  propose  to  give;   and  resolutions  are  some- 

*  Const.  Art.  7. 

^  Laband,  i.  229. 

'  Cf.  Robinson,  "  The  German  Bundesrath,"  Pub.  Univ.,  Pa.  Pub.  Law 
Series,  iii.  no.  i,  34-35. 

*  Laband,  i.  225-227. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  261 

times  passed  in  regard  to  them.^  If,  indeed,  the  strict  parlia- 
mentary system  existed  in  any  of  the  German  states,  the 
cabinet  would  no  doubt  be  held  responsible  to  the  Land- 
tag for  these  instructions  as  for  every  other  act  of  the 
government. 

Although  the  delegates  are  frequently  officers  of  the  state 
they  represent,  they  are  not  necessarily  even  its  citizens 
and  it  is  not  uncommon  for  several  of  the  smaller  states, 
from  motives  of  economy,  to  empower  the  same  man  to  act 
as  delegate  for  them  all  jointly.  This  habit  grew  to  such  an 
extent  that  in  April,  1880,  when  a  stamp  act  proposed  by  the 
Chancellor  was  seriously  amended  by  a  vote  of  thirty  to 
twenty-eight,  thirteen  of  the  smaller  states  were  not  repre- 
sented by  any  delegates  of  their  own,  their  votes  being  cast 
by  two  delegates  from  other  states.  Bismarck  tendered  his 
resignation  in  disgust,  and  this  caused  the  Bundesrath  to  re- 
consider its  action  and  vote  the  tax.  But  the  Chancellor 
was  not  satisfied.  He  complained  that  the  practice  of  sub- 
stitution deprived  the  Bundesrath  of  the  presence  of  mem- 
bers who  were  open  to  argument,  and  he  insisted  on  the 
adoption  of  a  rule  dividing  the  session  into  two  periods,  in 
one  of  which  the  important  matters  should  be  considered, 
and  delegates  from  all  the  states  should  be  present,  while 
the  other  should  be  devoted  to  current  affairs,  when  the 
states  might  appoint  substitutes  if  they  pleased.  This  rule 
was  adopted,  and  for  the  convenience  of  the  delegates  the 
former  period  is  made  as  short  as  possible. ^ 

The  Bundesrath  is  in  its  nature  unhke  any  other  body  in 
the  world,  and  its  peculiarities  can  be  explained  only  by  a 
reference  to  the  diet  of  the  old  Germanic  Confederation,    It 

'  Interpellations,  for  example,  were  presented  and  answered  in  several 
states  in  regard  to  the  proposal  for  the  purchase  of  railroads  by  the  Empire, 
to  which  allusion  has  already  been  made  (Blum,  p.  167). 

*  Blum,  pp.  348-349;  Laband,  i.  256-257. 


262     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

is  not  an  international  conference,  because  it  is  part  of  a 
constitutional  system,  and  has  power  to  enact  laws.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  a  deliberative  assembly,  because  the 
delegates  vote  according  to  instructions  from  home.  It  is 
unlike  any  other  legislative  chamber,  inasmuch  as  the  mem- 
bers do  not  enjoy  a  fixed  tenure  of  office,  and  are  not  free  to 
vote  according  to  their  personal  convictions.  Its  essential 
characteristics  are  that  it  represents  the  governments  of  the 
states,  not  their  people,  and  that  each  state  is  entitled  to 
a  certain  number  of  votes  which  it  may  authorize  one  or 
more  persons  to  cast  in  its  name,  these  persons  being  its 
agents,  whom  it  may  appoint,  recall,  or  instruct  at  any  time. 
The  true  conception  of  the  Bundesrath,  therefore,  is  that  of 
an  assembly  of  the  sovereigns  of  the  states,  who  are  not, 
indeed,  actually  present,  but  appear  in  the  persons  of  their 
representatives. 

lis  Internal  Organization 

The  internal  organization  of  the  Bundesrath  is  in  accord 
with  its  federal  character  and  the  privileged  position  of  the 
larger  states.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  seventeen 
votes  of  Prussia  are  more  than  enough  to  defeat  any  con- 
stitutional amendment,  and  that  she  is  expressly  given  a 
veto  on  all  proposals  to  change  the  laws  relating  to  the 
army  or  the  taxes.  Besides  this,  the  constitution  declares 
that  the  Kaiser,  that  is,  the  King  of  Prussia,  shall  appoint 
the  Chancellor,  who  presides  over  the  body  and  arranges  its 
business,  through  whose  hands  all  communications  from 
the  Reichstag  and  all  motions  and  petitions  must  pass,^ 
and  who  is  in  fact  always  one  of  the  Prussian  delegates.^ 

^  Const.  Art.  15.     Cf.  Robinson,  p.  37. 

^  Most  of  the  German  jurists  argue  tliat  the  Chancellor  must  always  be 
a  Prussian  delegate,  because  Art.  15  of  the  constitution  implies  that  he  must 
be  a  member  of  the  Bundesrath,  and  the  Kaiser  has  power  to  create  such 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  263 

But  the  constitution  goes  into  much  smaller  details  in  regu- 
lating privileges  of  the  states,  and  prescribes  even  the  com- 
position of  the  committees;  for  the  Germans  have  shown  a 
remarkable  astuteness  in  this  matter,  and  nowhere  else  in 
the  world  can  we  find  the  important  influence  of  committees 
in  a  legislative  body  so  thoroughly  recognized.  There  are 
eight  standing  committees  of  the  Bundesrath  estabUshed  by 
the  constitution.^  The  members  of  one  of  these  —  that  on 
the  army  and  fortresses  —  are  appointed  by  the  Kaiser;  but 
it  is  provided  by  the  constitution  that  Bavaria,  and  by  mili- 
tary convention  that  Saxony  and  Wurtemberg,  shall  have 
places  upon  it.  The  members  of  the  committee  on  maritime 
affairs  are  also  appointed  by  the  Kaiser;  while  the  commit- 
tees on  taxes  and  customs,  on  trade,  on  railroads,  posts  and 
telegraphs,  on  justice,  and  on  accounts,  are  elected  every 
year  by  the  Bundesrath  itself.  On  each  of  the  last  seven 
committees,  five  states  at  least  must  be  represented,  of 
which  one  must  always  be  Prussia,  whose  member  is  always 
the  chairman.  But  here  again  we  have  an  illustration  of  the 
fact  that  the  Bundesrath  is  an  assembly  of  diplomats  and  not 
of  senators,  for  the  practice  followed  by  the  Kaiser  or  the 
Bundesrath  —  whichever  has  the  power  of  appointment  — ■ 
is  to  designate  the  states  to  be  represented,  and  the  delega- 
tion from  each  of  those  states  chooses  one  of  its  own  mem- 
bers to  sit  on  the  committee.  The  seat  on  a  committee 
belongs,  therefore,  not  to  the  representative  selected,  but 
to  the  state  which  he  represents.  There  is  one  other  corn- 
members  only  in  his  capacity  as  King  of  Prussia.  Laband,  i.  253-254; 
Meyer,  Lehrbiich,  §  124;  Schulze,  ii.  91.  Hensel  {Die  Stelliing  des  Reichs- 
kanzlers,  pp.  10-12)  denies  this  and  quotes  Bismarck  in  his  favor.  The 
Chancellor  is  authorized  to  commit  the  duty  of  acting  as  chairman  to  a  sub- 
stitute, and  in  fact  he  rarely  presides  in  person.  See  Dupriez,  i.  522,  and 
Blum,  p.  143. 
»  Const.  Art.  8. 


264     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

mittee  provided  for  by  the  constitution  —  that  on  foreign 
affairs.  Its  functions  are  peculiar ;  for  it  does  not  report  like 
the  other  committees,  but  its  members  listen  to  the  com- 
munications made  to  them  by  the  Chancellor,  and  express 
the  views  of  their  respective  governments  thereon.  It  is  thus 
in  reality  a  means  by  which  the  ministers  of  the  larger  states 
may  be  consulted  upon  foreign  affairs;  and  it  consists  of 
representatives  of  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Wurtemberg,  and  two 
other  states  designated  every  year  by  the  Bundesrath.  As 
its  only  function  is  to  consult  with  the  Chancellor,  who  is 
virtually  the  Prussian  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  Prussia 
has  no  seat  upon  it,  and  in  her  absence  Bavaria  presides.^ 

Another  illustration  of  the  federal  character  of  the  Bun- 
desrath is  to  be  found  in  the  provision  that  on  matters  not 
common  to  the  whole  Empire  —  such,  for  example,  as  the 
excise  on  beer,  from  which  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and  Baden 
enjoy  an  exemption  —  only  those  states  which  are  inter- 
ested can  vote.2  There  was  at  first  a  similar  provision  for 
the  Reichstag,  but  it  was  felt  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
spirit  of  a  national  house  of  representatives,  and  was 
repealed.^ 

Powers  of  the  Bundesrath 

The  powers  of  the  Bundesrath  are  very  extensive,  and 
cover  nearly  the  whole  field  of  government.  It  is  a  part  of 
the  legislature,  and  every  law  requires  its  assent."   But,  more 

^  There  are  also  four  standing  committees  not  provided  for  by  the  con- 
stitution: those  on  Alsace-Lorraine,  on  the  constitution,  on  rules,  and  on 
railroad  rates.  All  the  standing  committees  may  sit  when  the  Bundesrath 
is  not  in  session.    On  the  subject  of  the  conunittees,  see  Laband,  6th  ed., 

I912,  §  II,  V. 

2  Const.  Art.  7. 

'  Amend.  Feb.  24,  1873. 

*  Including  treaties  that  fall  within  the  domain  of  legislation,  Const. 
Art.  II.  Each  state  has  the  right  of  initiative  (Art.  7),  which  is,  of  course, 
most  frequently  used  by  Prussia. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  265 

than  this,  it  has  the  first  and  last  word  on  almost  all  the 
laws,  for  the  Reichstag  has  not  succeeded  in  making  its 
right  of  initiative  in  legislation  very  effective,  and  by  far  the 
larger  part  of  the  statutes  (as  well  as  the  budget)  are  pre- 
pared and  first  discussed  by  the  Bundesrath.  They  are  then 
sent  to  the  Reichstag,  and  if  passed  by  that  body,  are  again 
submitted  to  the  Bundesrath  for  approval  before  they  are 
promulgated  by  the  Kaiser.^  The  Bundesrath  may  there- 
fore be  said  to  be  not  only  a  part  of  the  legislature,  but  the 
main  source  of  legislation. 

It  is  also  a  part  of  the  executive.  As  such,  it  has  power  to 
make  regulations  for  the  conduct  of  the  administration,  and 
to  issue  ordinances  for  the  completion  of  the  laws,  so  far  as 
this  power  has  not  been  specially  lodged  by  statute  in  other 
hands.^  In  regard  to  finance  its  authority  is  even  more  ex- 
tensive, for  it  has  been  given  many  of  the  functions  of  a 
chamber  of  accounts.^  It  enjoys  a  share  of  the  power  of  ap- 
pointment, for  it  nominates,  among  other  officials,  the  judges 
of  the  Imperial  Court,  and  elects  the  members  of  the  Court 
of  Accounts;  while  collectors  of  taxes  and  consuls  can  be 
appointed  only  with  the  approbation  of  its  committees.^ 
Under  this  head  of  executive  power  must  also  be  classed  the 
provisions  by  which  its  consent  is  required  for  a  declaration 

1  Laband,  i.  542;  Schulze,  ii.  118. 

^  Const.  Art.  7.  It  exercises  this  power  with  great  freedom.  Robinson, 
pp.  50-53.  There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  how  far  this  power  e.xtends. 
Laband,  i.  236-237;  v.  Ronne,  i.  213-215;  Arndt,  pp.  115-119.  Arndt  has 
also  published  a  treatise  on  this  subject,  Das  VcrordniingsrecfU  des  Deulschen 
Retches.  It  is  also  empowered  to  decide  upon  defects  that  appear  in  the  exe- 
cution of  the  laws.  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3.  The  meaning  of  this  clause  has  been 
much  discussed.  Laband,  i.  238-242,  246;  v.  Ronne,  i.  215-216;  Arndt, 
Verfassung  des  Deutschen  Rciches,  p.  119;   Robinson,  pp.  56-59. 

'  Laband,  i.  244-246. 

*  Laband,  i.  242-243. 


266     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  war,^  for  a  dissolution  of  the  Reichstag,^  and  for  federal 
execution  against  a  refractory  state.^  The  Bundesrath, 
moreover,  acts  in  some  ways  like  a  ministry  of  state,  for  it 
designates  one  or  more  of  its  members  to  support  in  the 
Reichstag  the  measures  it  has  approved;  and  in  fact  a  prac- 
tice has  grown  up  of  informing  the  Reichstag  during  the 
progress  of  a  debate  what  amendments  to  a  bill  the  Bundes- 
rath is  willing  to  accept.*  But  the  federal  nature  of  the 
Bundesrath  comes  into  play  again  curiously  here,  for  each 
of  the  delegates  also  represents  in  the  Reichstag  his  par- 
ticular government,  and  can  express  its  views,  although 
contrary  to  those  of  a  majority  of  the  members.^ 

The  Bundesrath  has  no  Uttle  power  of  a  judicial  or  semi- 
judicial  nature.  It  decides  disputes  between  the  imperial 
and  state  governments  about  the  interpretation  of  imperial 
statutes.^  It  is  virtually  a  court  of  appeal  in  cases  where 
there  is  a  denial  of  justice  by  a  state  court.''  It  decides  con- 
troversies between  states,  which  are  not  of  the  nature  of 
private  law,  if  appealed  to  by  one  of  the  parties;  ^  and, 
finally,  when  a  constitutional  question  arises  in  a  state 
which  has  no  tribunal  empowered  to  decide  it,  the  Bundes- 
rath must  try  to  settle  it  by  mediation  if  requested  to  do  so 
by  one  of  the  parties,  or  if  this  fails,  it  must  try  to  dispose  of 
the  matter  by  imperial  legislation.^ 

^  Except  on  the  ground  that  an  attack  has  been  made  on  the  territory 
of  the  Empire.     Const.  Art.  ii. 

2  Const.  Art.  24.  *  Laband,  i.  537,  n.  5. 

3  Const.  Art.  19.  ^  Const.  Art.  9. 
8  This  is  deduced  from  Const.  Art.  7,  §  3. 

^  Art.  77. 

»  Const.  Art.  76.  If  unfitted  to  decide  the  question,  it  can  substitute  for 
itself  some  other  body,  and  this  it  did  in  1877  in  the  case  of  the  controversy 
between  Prussia  and  Saxony  in  regard  to  the  Berlin-Dresden  railroad,  select- 
ing the  Court  of  Appeal  of  Liibeck.    Laband,  i.  249,  note  2. 

•  Const.  Art.  76,  §  2. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE        267 

Privacy  of  Meetings 

The  Bundesrath  has  not  only  far  more  extensive  powers 
than  the  Reichstag,  but  it  has  also  certain  privileges  that 
enhance  its  prestige  and  increase  its  authority.    Thus  the 
Reichstag  cannot  be  summoned  to  meet  without  the  Bundes- 
rath, whereas  the  latter  can  sit  alone  and  must  in  fact  be 
called  together  at  any  time  on  the  request  of  one  third  of  its 
members.^     Unhke  the  Reichstag,  moreover,  the  order  of 
business  in  the  Bundesrath  is  not  broken  off  by  the  ending 
of  a  session,  but  is  continuous,  so  that  matters  are  taken 
up  again  at  the  point  where  they  were  left,  and  thus  its  work 
is  made  far  more  effective.^    The  most  important  privilege  it 
enjoys,  however,  is  that  of  excluding  the  pubhc  from  its 
meetings.^    This  has  given  it  the  advantage  of  conceaUng 
to  some  extent  its  internal  differences,  and  has  enabled  it  to 
acquire  a  reputation  for  greater  unanimity,   and  conse- 
quently to  exert  more  influence  than  it  would  otherwise 
possess.    Privacy,  indeed,  would  seem  to  be  almost  as  essen- 
tial to  the  Bundesrath,  as  to  the  cabinet  in  a  parliamentary 
government,  or  to  an  Anglo-Saxon  jury.    It  is  easy  to  per- 
ceive that  the  twelve  jurors  would  seldom  agree,  if  the  public 
were  allowed  to  witness  the  mysterious  process  of  reaching  a 
verdict;  and  it  is  equally  clear  that  harmony  in  the  Bundes- 
rath would  be  very  seriously  imperiled,  if  its  galleries  were 
filled  with  spectators.    One  can  imagine  how  the  newspapers 

'  Const.  Arts.  13-14. 

2  Laband,  i.  253. 

'  The  constitution  does  not  provide  whether  the  sessions  shall  be  public 
or  not,  and  in  fact  they  have  always  been  secret  (v.  Ronne,  i.  2 10-2 11).  A 
brief  report  of  the  matters  dealt  with  and  the  conclusions  reached  is  given 
to  the  press  after  each  session,  but  the  Bundesrath  can  vote  to  withhold 
from  the  public  all  information  about  any  matter,  and  the  rules  provide 
that  the  oral  proceedings  both  in  the  Bundesrath  and  its  committees  shall 
be  kept  secret  in  all  cases.    Laband,  i.  259. 


268     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

would  gloat  over  the  last  altercation  between  the  Chancellor 
and  the  representative  of  Bavaria  or  Saxony,  and  how  hard 
it  would  be  for  the  contending  parties  to  make  the  conces- 
sions necessary  to  effect  an  agreement  after  their  differences 
had  been  discussed  in  public.  The  work  of  the  Bundesrath 
must  be  an  unending  series  of  compromises,  and  com- 
promise is  a  thing  with  which  the  world  at  large  has  little 
sympathy.  If,  therefore,  the  meetings  of  the  Bundesrath 
were  open,  it  would  be  a  hotbed  of  dissensions  between  the 
governments  of  the  different  states,  instead  of  a  bond  of 
union  and  a  means  of  mutual  understanding. 

Actual  Influence  of  the  Bundesrath 

In  regard  to  the  power  and  influence  actually  wielded  by 
the  Bundesrath,  the  most  contradictory  statements  are 
made.  It  is  said  on  the  one  hand  to  be  the  most  important 
body  in  the  Empire, ^  and  on  the  other  that  it  is  a  mere  nul- 
lity which  moves  almost  entirely  at  the  dictation  of  Prussia.^ 
Both  these  statements  are  largely  true,  for  considered  as  an 
independent  council  with  a  will  of  its  own  the  Bundesrath  is 
a  nuUity,  because  it  derives  its  impulse  exclusively  from  out- 
side forces;  but,  considered  as  an  instrument  by  means  of 
which  the  governments  of  the  larger  states,  and  especially  of 
Prussia,  rule  the  nation,  it  is  probably  the  most  important, 
although  the  least  conspicuous,  organ  in  the  Empire.  The 
extent  of  Prussia's  authority  in  the  Bundesrath  cannot  be 
accurately  determined,  owing  to  the  secrecy  of  the  proceed- 
ings. That  her  will,  or  rather  the  will  of  the  Chancellor 
acting  in  her  name,  is  the  chief  moving  and  directing  force, 
is  evident;  but  that  he  is  not  influenced  by  the  opinions  of 
the  other  states,  that  he  does  not  modify  his  plans  in  con- 

1  Robinson,  p.  43. 

«  Lebon,  pp.  145-1S1;  Dupriez,  i.  478,  517-523- 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  269 

sequence  of  their  objections,  or  make  compromises  with 
them  on  contested  points,  it  seems  hazardous  to  assert.  The 
members  are  usually  wise  enough  not  to  talk  about  their 
differences  in  public,  and  hence  these  are  only  partly  known 
to  the  world.  At  one  time  the  minister  of  Wurtemberg  com- 
plained openly  in  the  Reichstag  that  bills  were  presented  to 
the  Bundesrath  drawn  up  in  a  complete  form  by  Prussian 
officials,  and  filled  exclusively  with  a  Prussian  spirit; '  but 
we  know  that  this  has  not  always  been  the  case,  and  that 
important  measures  have  frequently  been  considered  and 
discussed  by  the  ministers  of  all  the  larger  states  before  they 
were  introduced  at  all.^  We  know  also  that  in  more  than  one 
instance  Bismarck  found  it  impossible  to  persuade  the 
Bundesrath  to  adopt  his  views,  and  that  on  one  occasion 
he  thought  a  threat  of  resignation  necessary  to  compel  sub- 
mission. In  this  case  the  threat  produced  the  desired  result, 
but  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  it  would  have  the  same 
effect  in  the  mouth  of  any  one  but  the  Iron  Chancellor, 
whose  strong  will  dominated  also  the  Reichstag  and  the 
throne.' 

The  Kaiser 

We  now  come  to  the  Kaiser.*  The  title  seems  to  imply  an 
hereditary  sovereign  of  the  Empire,  but  from  a  strictly  legal 
point  of  view  this  is  not  his  position.  He  is  simply  the  King 
of  Prussia,  and  he  enjoys  his  imperial  prerogatives  by  virtue 
of  his  royal  office.  There  is,  in  fact,  no  imperial  crown,  and 
the  right  to  have  her  king  bear  the  title,  and  exercise  the 

'  See  Blum,  p.  140. 

*  This  was  notably  true  in  the  case  of  the  Gerichtsverfassunggesetz  in  1873 
(Blum,  p.  141). 

'  Lebon  (p.  147)  thinks  that  Prussia  has  a  good  deal  of  influence  in  the 
appointment  of  delegates  by  the  other  states,  and  refers  to  the  case  where 
Bismarck  procured  the  recall  of  the  Bavarian  representative  in  1880. 

*  Cf.  Const.  Arts.  11-19. 


270     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

functions  of  Kaiser,  is  really  one  of  the  special  privileges  of 
Prussia.  The  language  of  the  constitution  is:  "  The  presi- 
dency of  the  union  belongs  to  the  king  of  Prussia,  who  bears 
the  title  of  German  Kaiser."  The  succession  is  therefore 
determined  solely  by  the  law  of  the  Prussian  Royal  House, 
and  in  case  of  incapacity  the  Regent  of  Prussia  would,  ipso 
facto,  exercise  the  functions  of  the  office.^ 

His  Powers  as  Kaiser  and  King 

It  has  been  said  that  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
and  navy  the  Kaiser  has  in  theory  the  personal  direction  of 
miUtary  matters,  but  that  in  all  others  he  acts  as  the  delegate 
of  the  confederated  governments,  under  the  direction  of  the 
Bundesrath;  ^  and  even  if  this  statement  is  not  strictly  ac- 
curate, it  gives  a  very  fair  idea  of  his  prerogatives.  He  has 
charge  of  foreign  affairs,  makes  treaties  subject  to  the  hmita- 
tions  already  mentioned,  and  represents  the  Empire  in  its 
relation  to  other  countries,  to  the  states,  or  to  individuals. 
He  declares  war  with  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath,  and 
carries  out  federal  execution  against  a  state  when  it  has  been 
ordered  by  that  body.  He  summons  and  adjourns  the  cham- 
bers, and  closes  their  sessions,  and  with  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrath  he  can  dissolve  the  Reichstag.  He  promul- 
gates the  laws,  and  executes  them  so  far  as  their  administra- 
tion is  in  the  hands  of  the  Empire,  subject,  however,  to  the 
important  qualification  that  most  of  the  administrative 
regulations  are  made  by  the  Bundesrath.  He  appoints  the 
Chancellor  and  all  other  officers,  except  in  cases  where  the 
Bundesrath  has  been  given  the  right  of  appointment  or  con- 
firmation; but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  laws  are 
mainly  administered  by  the  state  governments  under  federal 
supervision,  and  hence  there  are  comparatively  few  federal 

1  Laband,  i.  202-204.  ^  Lebon,  pp.  i54-i55- 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  27 1 

officials  to  appoint.  In  short,  the  executive  power  of  the 
central  government  is  very  limited;  and  even  that  limited 
power  is  shared  by  the  Bundesrath. 

The  Kaiser  has,  therefore,  very  little  power  as  such,  ex- 
cept in  military  and  foreign  matters.  His  authority  as 
Kaiser,  however,  is  vigorously  supplemented  by  his  func- 
tions as  King  of  Prussia.  Thus  as  Kaiser  he  has  no  initiative 
in  legislation ;  ^  and  indeed  he  is  not  represented  in  the  Reich- 
stag at  all;  for  the  Chancellor,  strictly  speaking,  appears 
there  only  as  a  member  of  the  Bundesrath.^  But  as  King  of 
Prussia  the  Kaiser  has  a  complete  initiative  by  means  of  the 
Prussian  delegates  to  the  Bundesrath  whom  he  appoints. 
As  Kaiser  he  has  no  veto,  but  as  king  he  has  a  very  exten- 
sive veto  —  for  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  negative  vote 
of  Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath  is  sufficient  to  defeat  any 
amendment  to  the  constitution,  or  any  proposal  to  change 
the  laws  relating  to  the  army,  the  navy,  or  the  taxes. 

His  functions  as  Kaiser  and  as  king  are,  indeed,  so  inter- 
woven that  it  is  very  difficult  to  distinguish  them.  As 
Kaiser  he  has  supreme  command  of  the  army  and  appoints 
the  highest  officers.  As  King  of  Prussia  he  appoints  the 
lower  officers,  and  has  the  general  management  of  the 
troops  over  most  of  Germany.  As  Kaiser  he  instructs  the 
Chancellor  to  prepare  a  bill.  As  king  he  instructs  him  to 
introduce  it  into  the  Bundesrath,  and  directs  how  one  third 
of  the  votes  of  that  body  shall  be  cast.  Then  the  bill  is  laid 
before  the  Reichstag  in  his  name  as  Kaiser,^  and  as  king  he 

1  Laband,  i.  537.  Strictly  speaking,  the  initiative  in  the  Bundesrath  be- 
longs to  the  states,  and  in  the  Reichstag  it  is  confined  to  the  members. 
Laband,  i.  534. 

2  Cf.  Lebon,  pp.  155-156;  Dupriez,  i.  534.  If,  as  the  German  jurists 
maintain,  the  Chancellor's  right  to  preside  in  the  Bundesrath  depends  on  his 
being  a  Prussian  delegate,  the  Kaiser,  as  such,  is  not  represented  in  the 
Bundesrath  at  all. 

3  Const.  Art.  16. 


2/2     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

directs  the  Chancellor  what  amendments  to  accept  on  behalf 
of  the  Bundesrath,  or  rather  in  behalf  of  the  Prussian  delega- 
tion there.  After  the  bill  has  been  passed  and  become  a  law, 
he  promulgates  it  as  Kaiser,  and  in  most  cases  administers 
it  in  Prussia  as  king;  and  finally  as  Kaiser  he  supervises  his 
own  administration  as  king.  This  state  of  things  is  by  no 
means  so  confusing  to  the  Germans  as  might  be  supposed; 
for  it  is  not  really  a  case  of  one  man  holding  two  distinct 
offices,  but  of  the  addition  of  certain  imperial  functions  to 
the  prerogatives  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  The  administration 
of  the  country  is  vested  in  the  sovereigns  of  the  states, 
among  whom  the  King  of  Prussia  is  ex  officio  president ;  and 
until  one  has  thoroughly  mastered  this  idea,  it  is  impossible 
to  understand  the  government  of  Germany.^ 

The  Chancellor 

There  is  no  imperial  cabinet,  and  the  only  federal  minister 
is  the  Chancellor,  who  has  subordinates  but  no  colleagues.^ 
The  reason  for  this  is  to  be  found  partly  in  Bismarck's  per- 
sonal peculiarities,  and  partly  in  the  nature  of  the  ties  that 
bind  Prussia  to  the  Empire.  In  the  first  place,  Bismarck  pre- 
ferred to  stand  alone,  and  did  not  want  to  be  hampered  by 
associates.  He  had  had  experience  enough  of  the  Prussian 
cabinet,  where  each  of  the  ministers  was  highly  independent 
in  the  management  of  his  own  department,  and  he  did  not 
care  to  create  for  himself  a  similar  situation  in  imperial  mat- 
ters. After  he  had  decided  on  a  course  of  action,  he  hated, 
as  he  said,  to  waste  his  time  and  strength  in  persuading  his 
colleagues,  and  all  their  friends  and  advisers,  that  his  policy 
was  a  wise  one.    Hence  he  would  not  hear  of  an  imperial 

1  Schulz  (Preussen,  in  Marquardsen,  pp.  33-34)  remarks  that  the  two 
oflBces  are  so  closely  bound  together  that  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  them 
separately. 

*  Laband,  i.  348;  and  see  §  40. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  273 

cabinet.^  In  the  second  place,  he  did  not  originally  intend 
to  have  any  federal  ministers  at  all.  According  to  his  plan 
the  general  supervision  and  control  of  the  administration 
was  to  be  exercised  by  the  Bundesrath,  while  those  matters 
—  such  as  military  and  foreign  affairs — which,  from  their 
nature  must  be  entrusted  to  a  single  man,  were  to  be  con- 
ducted by  the  King  of  Prussia  as  President  of  the  Confedera- 
tion, all  others  being  left  in  the  hands  of  the  several  states. 
The  Chancellor  was  to  be  a  purely  Prussian  officer,  who 
should  receive  his  instructions  from  the  king,  and  be  re- 
sponsible to  him  alone.2  This  plan  is  very  interesting,  be- 
cause, although  in  form  it  was  not  accepted,  in  substance  it 
presents  an  almost  exact  picture  of  the  real  political  situa- 
tion, except  that  the  power  of  the  Prussian  King  has  become 
greater  than  was  at  first  intended.^  The  Liberals  objected 
to  it,  and  under  the  lead  of  Bennigsen  the  constituent  Reich- 
stag amended  the  draft  of  the  constitution,  by  providing 
that  the  acts  of  the  president  *  should  be  countersigned  by 
the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  assumed  responsibility  for 
them  —  thus  making  the  Chancellor  a  federal  officer  respon- 
sible to  the  nation.^  The  principle  was  excellent,  but  has 
remained  unfruitful;  for  the  Chancellor  is  not  responsible 
criminally,  and  Bismarck  refused  to  hold  himself  poUtically 
responsible  to  any  one  but  the  monarch.    He  always  insisted 

'  Cherbuliez,  L'Allemagne  Politique,  2d  ed.,  pp.  228-229.  Meyer,  in  his 
Grundziige  des  N orddeutschen  Bundesrechts  (pp.  88-97),  discusses  Bismarck's 
objections  to  a  collegiate  ministry. 

^  Lebon,  p.  152. 

'  It  is  a  striking  fact  that  the  high  imperial  officials  have  usually  been 
selected  from  among  the  Prussian  functionaries.    Lebon,  p.  157. 

*  This  was  in  1867,  before  the  King  of  Prussia  was  given  the  title  of 
Kaiser. 

'  Const.  Art.  17.  Unlike  matters  of  military  administration,  the  acts 
of  the  Kaiser  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  are  not  treated  as  requir- 
ing a  countersignature.     Schulze,  Lehrbuch,  p.  93. 


274     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

that  the  motto  "  The  king  reigns  but  does  not  govern  " 
had  no  application  to  the  House  of  Hohenzollern.  In  short, 
the  parliamentary  system  does  not  exist  in  the  Empire,  and 
the  Chancellor  is  not  forced  to  resign  on  a  hostile  vote  in  the 
Reichstag.  If  that  body  will  not  pass  one  of  his  measures,  he 
gets  on  as  well  as  he  can  without  it;  or,  if  he  considers  the 
matter  of  vital  importance,  he  causes  the  Reichstag  to  be 
dissolved  and  takes  the  chance  of  a  new  election,^ 

His  Functions 

The  Chancellor  is  at  the  head  of  the  whole  body  of  federal 
ofi&cials.  Besides  he  is  the  chairman  of  the  Bundesrath,  and 
is,  in  fact,  its  leading  and  moving  spirit.  He  takes  also  an 
active  part  in  the  debates  in  the  Reichstag,  where  he  is  the 
chief  representative  of  the  policy  of  the  government.  But 
like  his  royal  master  he  has  a  double  nature,  and  his  functions 
are  partly  imperial  and  partly  Prussian.  It  is  as  Chancellor 
appointed  by  the  Kaiser  that  he  is  at  the  head  of  the  national 
administration,  and  presides  in  the  Bundesrath;  but  it  is  as 
Prussian  delegate  that  he  votes  in  that  body,  and  indeed  his 
influence  there  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  he  speaks  in  the 
name  of  Prussia,  and  casts  as  he  chooses  the  twenty  votes 
which  she  controls.  In  the  Reichstag,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
appears  nominally  as  commissioner  for  the  Bundesrath  or  as 
one  of  its  Prussian  members,  while  his  importance  is  really 
due  to  his  position  as  chief  of  the  federal  government. 

It  is  obviously  essential  to  the  Chancellor's  position  that 
he  should  be  the  leader  of  Prussia's  delegation  in  the  Bundes- 

1  I  do  not  mean  that  no  imperial  official  has  ever  been  driven  from  office 
by  the  Reichstag.  The  fall  of  a  minister  may  be  occasionally  brought  about 
by  the  opposition  of  a  popular  chamber,  although  there  is  no  general  cabinet 
responsibility.  Prince  Maximilian  of  Baden  appointed  to  negotiate  a  peace 
is  now  insisting  (Oct.,  1918)  that  he  is  in  harmony  with  the  majority  in  the 
Reichstag,  and  that  his  successors  will  always  be  so  hereafter. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  275 

rath,  and  should  be  able  to  direct  her  imperial  policy.  For 
this  reason  the  Chancellor,  except  for  short  intermissions, 
has  been  also  the  president  of  the  Prussian  cabinet;  and  in 
fact  the  policy  of  combining  the  two  offices  may  now  be 
looked  upon  as  settled. 

His  Substitutes 

The  powers  of  the  German  Chancellor  in  Bismarck's  day 
were  greater  than  those  of  any  other  man  in  the  world,  and 
his  work  and  responsibilities  were  heavier  than  even  his  iron 
frame  could  bear.  In  order,  therefore,  to  relieve  him  in  part, 
an  act  was  passed  in  1878  providing  for  the  appointment  by 
the  Kaiser  of  substitutes,  whenever  the  Chancellor  should 
declare  himself  prevented  from  doing  his  work.  These 
offices  were  expected  at  first  to  be  temporary,  especially 
that  of  Vice-Chancellor,  or  general  substitute,  who  was  in- 
tended to  act  only  during  the  illness  of  the  Chancellor ;  but 
with  the  increase  of  business  they  have  become  a  permanent 
necessity,  the  Chancellor  declaring  that  he  is  prevented 
from  doing  his  work  by  the  fact  that  he  has  too  much  of  it  to 
do.  For  many  years  there  has  been  a  Vice-Chancellor  con- 
tinuously, and  it  has  been  the  habit  to  make  as  many  of  the 
secretaries  of  state  as  possible  special  substitutes  for  their 
own  departments,^  appointing  them  at  the  same  time  Prus- 
sian delegates  to  the  Bundesrath,  in  order  that  they  may  be 
able  to  speak  both  in  that  body  and  in  the  Reichstag.^  The 
substitutes  countersign  the  acts  of  the  Kaiser  in  the  Chan- 
cellor's stead,  but  are  nevertheless  subject  to  his  orders,  and 
thus  he  still  remains  sole  head  of  the  government,  and  is 
morally  responsible  for  its  whole  policy.^ 

1  Dupriez,  i.  495-497.  The  substitution  can  be  made  only  for  those 
matters  which  the  Empire  administers  directly.  Dupriez,  lb.;  Laband, 
i.  358.  ^  Dupriez,  i.  522. 

*  Laband,  i.  359;  Dupriez,  i.  497-499.    The  federal  administration  began 


276     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  Judiciary 

The  judicial  branch  of  the  imperial  government  remains 
to  be  considered.  Justice  is  administered  in  the  first  in- 
stance by  the  state  courts;  but  curiously  enough,  the  organ- 
ization of  these  courts  is  regulated  by  imperial  statutes.^ 
Their  rules  of  practice  are  also  derived  from  the  same  source, 
for  the  federal  government  has  enacted  general  codes  of 
civil  and  criminal  procedure,  which  apply  to  the  state  tribu- 
nals.^  It  has,  moreover,  enacted  a  universal  criminal  code, 
a  commercial  code,  and  a  general  code  of  civil  law;  so  that 
there  are  in  each  state  a  similar  series  of  courts  organized  on 
an  imperial  plan  and  expounding  imperial  laws  in  accordance 
with  imperial  forms  of  procedure,  but  whose  members  are 
appointed  by  the  local  sovereign  and  render  their  decisions 
in  his  name. 

The  Reichsgericht 

Apart  from  administrative  and  consular  courts,  there  is 
only  one  federal  tribunal,  called  the  Reichsgericht,  or  Court 
of  the  Empire.  It  has  original  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  treason 
against  the  Empire,  and  appellate  jurisdiction  from  the 

in  a  very  simple  form,  for  there  was  only  one  chancery  office  {Biitideskanzle- 
ramt),  divided  into  three  sections,  the  Prussian  officials  doing  in  some  de- 
partments a  good  deal  of  federal  work.  But  as  the  number  of  affairs  to  be 
attended  to  has  grown,  the  federal  machinery  has  become  more  elaborate. 
The  general  chancery  office  has  disappeared,  and  there  are  now  many 
separate  departments,  each  with  a  secretary  of  state,  or  president  of  a  bureau 
at  its  head.  Such  are  the  Interior,  Foreign  /Vffairs,  Navy,  Post  Office,  Justice, 
Treasury,  Railroads,  Colonies,  Invalid  Funds,  Debt  Commission,  and  Im- 
perial Bank.    Laband,  6th  ed,  §  13,  iv. 

1  The  Gerichtsverfassunggesetz  of  Jan.  27,  1877.  Laband,  §  86,  and  see 
§  81.  This  is  true  only  of  the  ordinary  courts  of  law,  the  subject  of  adminis- 
trative courts  being  left  for  the  most  part  in  the  discretion  of  the  several 
States.     See  Laband,  ii.  368. 

^  The  Civilprozessordnung  of  Jan.  30,  1877.  The  Strafprozessordnung  of 
Feb.  1,  1877. 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  EMPIRE  277 

federal  consular  courts  and  from  the  state  courts  on  ques- 
tions of  imperial  law.^  It  is  to  be  observed,  therefore,  that 
with  the  completion  of  the  system  of  national  codes  the 
imperial  tribunal  has  become  a  general  court  of  error  in  all 
cases  arising  under  the  ordinary  civil  or  criminal  law.^ 

Character  of  the  Federal  System 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said,  the  German  Empire  is  a 
federal  government  of  a  peculiar  type,  in  which  legislative 
centralization  is  combined  with  administrative  decentraliza- 
tion. The  centre  of  gravity  is  to  be  found  in  the  body  repre- 
senting the  governments  of  the  several  states,  and  here 
Prussia  has  a  controlling  influence,  and  a  veto  on  the  most 
important  matters.  In  fact,  the  Confederation  is  not  a 
union  of  states  with  equal  rights,  but  rather  an  association 
of  privileged  members,  so  contrived  that  Prussia  has  the 
general  management,  subject  only  to  a  limited  restraint  by 
her  associates.  And  herein  there  is  a  marked  contrast  be- 
tween the  American  and  German  federal  systems.  That  of 
the  United  States  is  based  on  the  equality  of  the  members; 
and  a  decided  preponderance  on  the  part  of  any  one  state 
would  destroy  the  character  of  the  union.  That  of  Ger- 
many, on  the  contrary,  is  organized  on  a  plan  that  can  work 
successfully  only  in  case  one  member  is  strong  enough  to 
take  the  lead,  and  keep  the  main  guidance  in  its  own  hands.^ 
This  Prussia  does  by  its  king,  by  the  Chancellor  whom  he 
appoints  and  by  its  influence  in  the  Bundesrath. 

'  Laband,  §  84. 

'  A  state  which  has  several  courts  of  error  can  create  a  supreme  court 
of  appeal  and  confer  upon  it  the  appellate  civil  jurisdiction  of  the  Reichs- 
gericht,  but  this  has  been  done  by  Bavaria  alone,  and  only  to  a  limited  extent. 
Laband,  6th  ed.,  p.  341,  note  2. 

»  Cf.  Dupriez,  i.  475-477- 


CHAPTER  X 

GERMANY:   PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SM.\LLER  STATES 

The  interlacing  of  the  powers  of  the  Kaiser  as  such  and  as 
King  of  Prussia  has  already  been  illustrated  by  the  process 
of  enactment  and  execution  of  a  federal  statute.  Another 
striking  example  may  be  found  in  the  military  institutions  of 
Germany.  The  navy  is,  indeed,  an  imperial  force  wholly 
under  imperial  management  and  control.  One  might  sup- 
pose that  this  would  be  true  also  of  the  army  if  one  looked 
only  at  the  pro\asion  in  the  constitution  that  the  whole  land 
force  of  the  Empire  shall  form  a  single  body  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  Kaiser  in  war  and  peace;  and  yet  German 
jurists  disagree  on  the  question  whether  the  Empire  has 
legally  any  troops  at  all,  or  has  only  a  right  to  direct  the 
troops  of  the  several  states.^  Except  for  certain  privileges 
reserved  to  Bavaria,  the  Empire  in  fact  prescribes  the  obHga- 
tion  of  military  service,  the  regulations  for  the  recruiting, 
organization  and  discipHne  of  the  troops  and  the  qualifica- 
tions for  officers.  It  determines  the  number  of  men  in  time 
of  peace,  and  appropriates  the  money  for  their  maintenance ; 
while  the  Kaiser,  as  commander-in-chief,  appoints  the  high- 
est ofiicers,  approves  the  appointment  of  generals,  directs 
the  garrisoning  of  fortresses,  and  has  the  right  of  inspection. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  monarchs  of  the  several  states  have 
charge  of  their  contingents,  conducting  the  mihtary  admin- 
istration thereof,  expending  the  appropriations  voted  by  the 
Empire,  and  appointing  all  the  other  officers.  The  authority 
of  the  King  of  Prussia  is,  moreover,  distinctly  greater  than 

^  Laband,  Deutsches  Reichstaatsrecht,  6th  ed.,  §  40,  p.  356,  n.  i. 

278 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  279 

this  statement  would  lead  one  to  suppose,  so  great  as  to  give 
him  practically  the  management  of  the  troops  over  most  of 
Germany;  for,  save  where  imperial  military  regulations  are 
made,  those  of  Prussia  must  be  followed  by  the  other  states; 
and  in  fact  all  the  states,  except  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and 
Wurtemberg,  have  by  contract  transferred  their  forces 
bodily  to  Prussia.  The  administration  of  the  troops  is, 
indeed,  so  completely  in  the  hands  of  the  states  that  there  is 
no  imperial  minister  of  war.  Certainly  the  military  func- 
tions of  king  and  Kaiser  are  inextricably  combined. 

With  such  an  organization  and  distribution  of  powers,  it  is 
obviously  very  difficult  for  any  representative  assembly  to 
exert  a  substantial  control  over  the  administration  or  con- 
duct of  the  army,  the  more  so  as  the  mihtary  orders  of  the 
Kaiser,  both  as  imperial  commander-in-chief  ^  and  as  King  of 
Prussia,^  are  not  countersigned  by  any  minister,  and  are, 
therefore,  not  regarded  as  political  acts  for  which  anyone  is 
responsible  to  the  legislative  bodies.  The  only  serious  con- 
trol possessed  by  the  Reichstag  is  over  the  size  of  the  army, 
and  this  is  regulated  by  laws  covering  usually  five  years  at 
a  time. 

Prussia:  The  Constitution  and  the  King 

The  close  interlocking  of  powers  in  Germany  between  the 
central  government  and  the  states  makes  a  brief  description 
of  the  institutions  of  the  latter  necessary  for  an  understand- 
ing of  the  system.  Of  these  states  by  far  the  most  important 
is  the  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

The  present  constitution  of  Prussia  was  drawn  up  by  the 
king  in  1849,  submitted  for  revision  to  the  legislature  elected 
in  accordance  with  its  provisions,  and  promulgated  in  Jan- 

'  Laband,  id.,  p.  358,  n.  3. 

2  V.  Ronne,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  Preussischen  Monarchic,  4th  ed.,  i.  418; 
Meyer,  Lehrbuch,  p.  187. 


28o     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

uary,  1850.  It  can  be  amended  by  a  majority  vote  in  each 
of  the  two  chambers,  sanctioned  by  the  king,  but  this  has 
not  been  done  since  1888.  The  method  in  its  creation  was  in 
accord  with  its  character.  It  was  not  the  work  of  the  people 
but  of  the  crown  whose  authority,  although  limited  thereby, 
is  not  derived  from  it,  or  based  upon  it.  In  fact,  German 
jurists  constantly  assert  in  Prussia,^  and  for  that  matter  in 
other  states  of  the  Empire,  that  the  monarch  is  the  sovereign 
possessor  of  all  residual  pohtical  authority;  the  represen- 
tative bodies  having  only  the  powers  specifically  assigned 
to  them  by  the  constitution.  Except,  therefore,  for  the 
limitations  imposed  by  that  document— chiefly  in  requiring 
for  statutes  and  appropriations  the  consent  of  the  legisla- 
ture —  the  royal  authority  is  regarded  by  jurists  as  abso- 
lute. There  is,  indeed,  a  provision  that  the  acts  of  the  king 
must  be  countersigned  by  a  minister  who  becomes  thereby 
responsible  for  them;  ^  but  in  the  absence  of  any  duty  to 
resign  at  the  request  of  the  chambers  the  pohtical  respon- 
sibility is  only  to  the  king  himself.  Moreover,  his  acts  as 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Prussian  troops  and  as  head  of 
the  Evangelical  Church,  and  his  addresses  to  the  chambers, 
are  not  in  practice  countersigned  at  all. 

The  Ministers  and  the  Bureaucracy 

The  king  acts,  of  course,  through  his  ministers,  but  unlike 
the  chief  officers  of  state  in  most  countries  at  the  present 
day,  they  are  singularly  independent  of  one  another,  some- 
times differing  considerably  in  their  pubhc  poHcy.'  There  is, 
indeed,  a  minister  president,  but  he  has  no  real  control  over 
his  colleagues;   and  there  is  a  collective  ministry  of  state, 

^  E.g.,  Schulze,  Preussen  in  Marquardsen,  pp.  41,  42. 

^  Const.,  Art.  44. 

^  Cf.  Dupriez,  i.  361,  363. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  28 1 

but  it  has  little  legal  and  scarcely  more  moral  authority.' 
One  can  readily  see  that  such  a  system  of  ministers,  inde- 
pendent of  each  other  in  their  several  departments,  but 
strictly  responsible  to  the  king,  tends  to  enhance  the  per- 
sonal power  of  the  monarch  if  he  has  the  will  and  capacity  to 
exert  it.  Although  the  ministers  are  not  responsible  to  the 
legislature,  they  have  the  right,  universal  in  the  German 
constitutional  states,  of  appearing  and  speaking  in  either 
chamber,  a  privilege  which  they  use  constantly. 

Subordinate  to  the  ministers  is  the  bureaucracy,  which  is 
certainly  a  highly  efficient  body  of  officials.  The  qualifica- 
tions and  examinations  for  appointment  to  this  corps  of  civil 
servants  are  strictly  prescribed  and  observed,  and  member- 
ship is  permanent ;  while  discipline  is  maintained  by  special 
tribunals  composed  of  administrative  officials  whose  con- 
sent is  required  for  dismissal  without  a  pension.^  Under  the 
Prussian  system  of  minute  regulation  of  the  everyday  life  of 
the  citizens,  such  a  body  of  men  has  great  power;  and  owing 
to  the  habit  of  not  appointing  Social  Democrats  and  other 
opponents  of  the  government  to  public  office  that  power 
tends  strongly  to  support  monarchical,  conservative,  and 
autocratic  principles.  The  authority  wielded  by  the  bureau- 
cracy would  probably  be  regarded  as  oppressive  were  it  not 
for  three  facts;  first,  that  the  people  like  to  be  controlled  in 
their  daily  life  to  an  extent  that  would  be  resented  among  us; 
second,  that  the  officials  are  not  excessively  tied  down  by 
routine  or  minutely  directed  from  above,  but  are  allowed  a 
considerable  latitude  for  the  exercise  of  their  own  discre- 
tion ;  and  third,  that  in  their  dealings  with  the  public  they 
are  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  series  of  administrative 
courts,  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  lower  ones  being 

>  Cf.  Id.,  pp.  367-371- 

2  V.  Ronne,  §§  251,  256,  260,  264,  387. 


282     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

private  citizens  elected  by  the  local  representative  bodies, 
while  the  highest  is  composed  of  men  appointed  by  the  king 
for  life  with  the  ordinary  judicial  security  of  tenure. 

The  Landtag 

The  Landtag,  or  legislative  body  of  Prussia,  consists  of 
two  chambers,  the  Herrenhaus,  or  House  of  Lords,  and  the 
Abgeordnetenhaus,  or  House  of  Representatives.  Its  nor- 
mal life  is  five  years,  but  the  lower  chamber  may  at  any  time 
be  dissolved  by  the  king.  It  must  be  summoned  to  meet 
every  year,  and  all  statutes,  taxes,  loans  and  the  yearly 
budget  require  its  consent.  Most  of  the  Prussian  jurists, 
however,  teach  the  doctrine  that,  as  the  popular  chamber 
has  not  a  right  alone  to  repeal  the  laws,  it  cannot  produce 
the  same  result  by  refusing  the  funds  required  for  their  exe- 
cution.^ This  doctrine  was  put  into  effect  by  Bismarck  in  the 
budgetless  years  preceding  the  War  of  1866,  and  perhaps 
might  be  again.  The  Landtag  has  a  right  to  initiate  legisla- 
tion, but  in  fact  most  bills  are  introduced  by  the  govern- 
ment, so  that  its  chief  activity  consists  in  the  consideration 
and  amendment  of  measures  submitted  to  it  by  the  ministers 
of  the  crown.  We  may  add  that  the  influence  of  the  Landtag 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  public  administration  by  the  royal 
officers  is  not  large. 

The  House  of  Lords  consists  of  about  three  hundred  mem- 
bers, of  whom  more  than  one  third  are  hereditary,  landown- 
ing nobles,  and  another  third,  life  members  nominated  by 
landholders;  so  that  the  body  is  in  fact  controlled  by  the 
landed  gentry,  a  class  that  has  a  marked  character  in  Prussia. 

^  Cf.  Schulze,  pp.  102-104;  Gneist,  Die  Militdrvorlage  von  i8q2  und  der 
Preussische  Verfassungskonjlikt.  The  authorities  are  collected  and  dis- 
cussed by  Laband,  ii.  993-995,  1037  et  seq.;  v.  Ronne  (§  118)  is  of  the  con- 
trary opinion.    Compare  in  this  connection,  Const.,  Arts.  100,  109. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  283 

It  is  vigorous,  resolute,  jealous  of  its  rights,  conservative  in 
temperament,  military  in  spirit,  and  devotedly  loyal  to  the 
throne.  It  can  be  relied  upon,  therefore,  to  reject  any 
changes  proposed  by  the  other  house  which  the  king  does 
not  approve;  but  is  by  no  means  ready  to  follow  him  in  a 
liberal  policy.  The  greater  part  of  the  remaining  members 
are  appointed  by  the  king  for  Ufe;  a  few  on  the  nomination 
of  certain  bodies,  but  most  of  them  at  his  pleasure.  These 
last  are  unlimited  in  number  and  thus  the  king  can  control 
the  house  in  case  of  need.  The  point  is  important,  because  if 
the  king  should,  in  case  of  popular  upheaval,  think  the 
preservation  of  his  dynasty  depended  upon  taking  the  popu- 
lar side,  he  could  legally  overcome  any  opposition  on  the 
part  of  the  upper  chamber. 

The  House  of  Representatives  is  composed  of  four  hun- 
dred and  forty-three  members,  elected  by  a  suffrage  which, 
though  substantially  universal  for  all  men  twenty-four  years 
old,^  is  neither  equal  nor  direct.  One  cause  of  inequality  is 
that  there  has  been  little  change  in  the  electoral  districts  for 
nearly  sixty  years,  in  spite  of  the  great  growth  of  the  cities 
within  that  period.  BerUn,  for  example,  with  more  than 
one  twentieth  of  all  the  people  of  the  kingdom,  had  its  num- 
ber of  representatives  raised  in  1906  only  to  twelve,  or  to 
about  one-half  its  ratio  to  population;  the  reason  being,  of 
course,  the  radical  tendencies  of  its  citizens.  A  second  cause 
of  inequality  in  the  suffrage  is  the  three-class  system  of 
indirect  election. 

The  Three-Class  System  of  Election 

The  representatives  are  elected  in  districts  each  of  which 
is  entitled,  as  a  rule,  to  two  members,  but  often  only  to  one, 

*  The  Constitution  says  twenty-five  years  old,  but  the  Ordinance  of 
May  30,  1849,  which  regulates  the  procedure,  says  twenty-four. 


284  GREATER  EUROPEAN  GO\'ERNMENTS 

and  sometimes  to  three.  The  voters  in  the  district  do  not, 
however,  vote  directly  for  the  representatives,  but  for  elec- 
tors chosen  in  smaller  areas  into  which  the  district  is  sub- 
divided. To  these  lesser  areas,  one  elector  is  allotted  for 
every  two  hundred  and  fifty  inhabitants,  and  the  voters  are 
separated  into  classes  for  the  purpose  of  choosing  them. 
The  first  class  is  composed  of  the  largest  taxpayers  who 
together  pay  one  third  of  the  aggregate  direct  taxes;  the 
second  of  the  next  largest  taxpayers  who  pay  another  third 
of  these  taxes;  the  third  class  comprises  all  the  rest  of  the 
voters  who  pay  the  remaining  third  of  the  taxes.  Each  of 
these  classes  chooses  separately  one-third  of  the  electors  to 
which  the  subdivision  is  entitled.  All  the  electors  chosen  in 
the  subdi\isions  then  meet  together  and  elect  the  representa- 
tive, or  representatives,  of  the  district  by  absolute  majority 
vote.  It  follows  that  the  first  two  classes  can  wholly  control 
the  election. 

The  effect  of  the  system  may  be  gathered  from  the  state- 
ment that  in  more  than  two  thousand  of  the  subdivisions 
the  first  class  consists  of  only  one  man,  and  in  nearly  as  many 
more  it  contains  only  two  men.  In  1907,  it  was  estimated 
that  about  three  per  cent  of  all  the  voters  of  the  kingdom 
belonged  to  the  first  class,  about  nine  and  one-half  per  cent 
to  the  second,  and  the  remaining  eighty-seven  and  one-half 
per  cent  to  the  third ;  so  that  on  the  average,  less  than  thir- 
teen per  cent  of  the  voters,  comprising  the  richest  people,  had 
an  absolute  control  of  an  election  to  the  popular  chamber. ^ 
The  system  was  devised  in  order  to  give  ever}'one  a  share  in 
the  direction  of  public  affairs,  while  retaining  for  property 
and  the  bearing  of  the  public  burdens,  as  compared  with 
mere  numbers,  a  special  weight  in  the  apportionment  of 
power;  and  it  does  so  with  a  vengeance.    In  a  country  where 

'  Ogg,  The  Goverftmenls  of  Europe,  pp.  259-260. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  285 

the  social  and  political  cleavage  between  the  different  classes 
is  so  sharp  as  it  is  in  Prussia  the  results  are  very  striking. 
Two  recent  elections  will  illustrate  this.  In  1903,  the  Social 
Democrats  cast  almost  as  many  votes  as  the  Conservatives, 
but  they  did  not  elect  a  single  representative,  while  the  Con- 
servatives elected  one  hundred  and  forty-three.  At  the  next 
election  in  1908,  the  Social  Democrats  polled  nearly  one 
quarter  of  all  the  votes  cast  and  elected  only  seven  of  the 
four  hundred  and  forty-three  representatives.  The  effect 
of  the  three-class  system  is  increased  by  the  fact  that  the 
ballot  is  not  secret  —  a  matter  that  is  deemed  of  no  small 
importance  in  Germany  on  account  of  the  opportunity  it 
gives  to  the  government  and  to  employers  to  exert  pressure 
on  the  voters. 

There  has  long  been  a  persistent  agitation  for  a  change  of 
the  electoral  laws,  the  more  radical  elements  demanding  the 
entire  abolition  of  the  three-class  system,  together  with 
direct  elections  and  secret  ballot.  At  last  the  goverrmient 
became  convinced  of  the  need  of  some  reform,  and  in  1910 
introduced  a  bill  for  the  purpose;  but  as  it  merely  lessened 
instead  of  removing  the  objections  to  the  system,  it  did  not 
go  far  enough  to  satisfy  even  the  moderate  reformers,  and 
was  finally  lost  by  a  disagreement  between  the  houses.^  Dur- 
ing this  war,  the  government  has  again  promised  reform,  but 
has  not  as  yet  overcome  the  stout  opposition  of  the  landed 
gentry.  Their  repugnance  to  a  radical  change  is  the  more 
comprehensible  because  equal,  direct  and  secret  suffrage 
would,  in  the  present  social  conditions  in  the  country,  lead 
to  far-reaching  changes.  It  would  transfer  from  them  to 
quite  a  different  class  the  centre  of  gravity  of  political  power, 
and  would  no  doubt  be  followed  by  a  demand  that  the  minis- 
ters should  be  politically  responsible  to  the  popular  chamber, 
'  Ogg,  pp.  262-263.     In  1913,  they  elected  only  ten. 


286     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

thereby  changing  the  whole  character  of  the  monarchical 
institutions  and  of  the  system  of  administration  depending 
thereon. 

Prussian  Local  Government 

The  principle  of  placing  political  power  under  the  con- 
trol of  property,  rather  than  of  numbers,  is  applied  through- 
out the  Prussian  government,  local  as  well  as  central. 
Everywhere  there  are  elected  councils,  and  everywhere  the 
lion's  share  in  choosing  them  Hes  in  the  hands  of  the  wealth- 
ier classes.  In  the  cities  the  municipal  council  is  usually 
elected  by  the  three-class  system,  while  in  the  rural  districts 
all  elected  bodies  are,  as  a  rule,  chosen  directly  or  indirectly 
by  the  Kreistag.  This  is  the  assembly  of  a  local  area  called 
the  Kreis,  and  it  is  elected  partly  by  municipal  councils, 
partly  by  the  larger  taxpayers  and  partly  by  the  rest  of  the 
voters  on  a  complicated  plan  so  arranged  that  the  great 
majority  of  citizens  elect  only  a  minority  of  the  members. 
The  system  of  local  goverimient  is  efficient,  but  it  is  not 
democratic,  and,  in  the  cities  at  least,  tends  to  aggravate 
rather  than  reduce  social  discontent.^ 

Bavaria 

Bavaria  is  the  second  largest  state  in  the  Empire,  and  its 
pohtical  institutions,^  although  differing  much  in  detail 
from  those  of  Prussia,  and  showing  marked  traces  of  French 
influence  dating  from  the  Napoleonic  period,  illustrate  the 
pervasiveness  of  German  principles  of  government.  The 
electoral  franchise  is  far  more  popular  than  in  Prussia,  yet 
the  personal  authority  of  the  king,  and  the  relation  of  the 
legislature  to  the  ministers  and  the  administration,  are  very 

'  For  a  fuller  description  of  Prussian  local  government,  see  the  writer's 
Governments  and  Parlies  in  Conlinental  Europe,  i.  308-333. 
^  V.  Seydel,  Bayericshes  Staatsrecht,  19 13. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  287 

much  the  same.  The  Landtag  is  composed  of  two  cham- 
bers. The  first,  unchanged  since  18 18,  contains  royal 
princes,  crown  ofiicers,  high  ecclesiastics,  mediatized  nobles 
and  members  appointed  by  the  king  in  heredity  or  for  life, 
with  a  provision  that  the  life  appointments  shall  not  exceed 
one-third  of  the  body.  The  House  of  Representatives  is 
chosen  under  laws  that  have  constantly  become  more  demo- 
cratic. The  constitution  of  1818  provided  for  election  by 
several  different  classes  of  voters;  that  of  1848  substituted  a 
universal  equal  suffrage  of  all  taxpayers  twenty-five  years  of 
age,  but  the  election  was  indirect  and  the  ballot  was  not 
secret.  In  1881  the  ballot  was  made  secret;  in  1906,  the 
election  was  made  direct,  and  in  1907 -1908,  payment  of  the 
members  was  introduced.  The  districts  are  not  alike  in  size, 
but  the  suffrage  is  otherwise  now  substantially  universal, 
equal,  direct,  and  secret  so  far  as  the  central  legislature  is 
concerned.  In  the  local  government,  on  the  other  hand, 
except  in  the  cities,  the  larger  taxpayers  are  still  given  a 
special  share  of  power. 

In  spite  of  the  extended  suffrage  the  ministers  are  not 
politically  responsible  to  the  popular  chamber.  For  years 
the  majority  of  that  chamber,  which  until  1893  was  almost 
continuously  in  the  hands  of  the  clerical  party,  strove  to 
bring  about  such  a  result;  but  they  did  not  succeed,  and 
their  failure  proves  that  in  Germany  a  democratic  system  of 
election  does  not  necessarily  bring  the  government  under 
popular  control.  One  would  suppose  that  an  elected  cham- 
ber, holding  the  power  of  the  purse,  could,  if  it  chose,  compel 
an  hereditary  monarch  to  select  ministers  in  accordance 
with  its  wishes.  But  it  has  not  done  so  in  Bavaria;  nor  was 
the  failure  due  to  a  peculiarly  conservative  attitude  on  the 
part  of  the  crown;  for  during  the  period  in  question,  the 
ministers,  although  not  always  in  harmony  among  them- 


288     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

selves,  and  by  no  means  the  representatives  of  any  party, 
pursued,  in  the  main,  a  decidedly  liberal  policy.  The  result 
shows  the  persistence  of  the  monarchical  principle  in 
Germany. 

Wurtemherg,  Baden,  and  Hesse 

Like  Bavaria,  the  other  southern  states  ^  were  more  af- 
fected than  the  northern  by  the  principles  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  of  late  years  they  have  hke\^ise  made  their 
elections  more  truly  representative  of  the  whole  people.  Yet 
the  control  of  the  monarch  over  administration  and  his  lead- 
ing influence  in  legislation  are  the  same  that  prevail  uni- 
versally in  Germany.  The  composition  of  their  upper 
chambers  is  of  the  usual  type,  except  that  in  addition  to  the 
official,  hereditary  and  appointed  members,  there  are  a  few 
elected  representatives  of  trade,  industry,  and  commerce. 

Until  1906,  the  lower  house  in  the  kingdom  of  Wurt  em- 
berg  consisted  of  nine  ecclesiastics,  of  the  chancellor  of  the 
university,  of  thirteen  members  elected  by  the  landowning 
nobility,  and  of  seventy  other  members  elected  in  single 
districts  by  manhood  suffrage  and  secret  ballot.  Twenty 
years  ago,  this  body  was  in  two  respects  unique  in  Germany. 
In  no  other  Landtag  composed  of  two  chambers  did  the 
popular  branch  contain  privileged  members,  and  in  no  other 
were  members  elected  by  direct  universal  suffrage.  The 
first  of  these  peculiarities  has  now  ceased  to  be  true  of  Wur- 
temherg; the  second  has  ceased  to  be  pecuHar  and  is  true  in 
all  four  of  the  South  German  states.  By  an  act  of  1906,  the 
twenty-three  privileged  members  were  abolished  in  Wurtem- 
herg, and  all  the  members  are  now  elected  by  universal  direct 
suffrage  and  secret  ballot.    Sixty-nine  of  them  are  chosen  in 

^  Goz,  Das  Slaatsrechl  des  Konigreichs  Wurtemherg,  1908;  Walz,  Das 
Slaalsrechl  des  Grossherzogtums  Baden,  1909:  v.  Calker,  Das  Slaatsrechl  des 
Grossherzoglums  Hessen,  1913. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  289 

single  districts,  while  the  remaining  twenty-three  are  divided 
among  three  large  districts  where  they  are  elected  by  the 
free  list  system  of  proportional  representation. 

In  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden,  on  the  whole  the  most 
liberal  of  the  German  states,  the  suffrage  has  long  been  sub- 
stantially universal  and  the  ballot  secret;  but  until  fourteen 
years  ago  the  election  instead  of  being  direct  was  conducted 
by  means  of  electors,  a  method  w^hich  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Germans  themselves  does  not  give  a  free  expression  to  pop- 
ular opinion.  In  1904  this  was  changed,  and  the  election 
was  made  direct.  Curiously  enough  the  cities  have  rather 
more  than  their  proportion  of  the  members. 

The  conditions  were  much  the  same  in  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Hesse,  where  the  elections  were  also  indirect  until  191 1. 
The  members  are  now  chosen  for  six  years,  one  half  retiring 
every  three  years,  in  single  districts,  directly,  by  secret 
ballot  of  all  men  over  twenty-five  years  of  age  who  pay  any 
direct  tax;  a  slight  conservative  tendency  being  shown  in 
the  provision  that  men  over  fifty  have  two  votes. 

As  in  the  case  of  Bavaria,  a  widely  extended  suffrage  has 
not  as  yet  caused  the  ministers  in  these  three  states  to  be 
responsible  to  the  majority  of  the  elected  chamber;  al- 
though on  the  whole  their  governments  have  pursued  a 
liberal  policy.^ 

Saxony 

The  changes  in  the  composition  of  the  Saxon  represent- 
ative chamber  during  the  last  century  reflect  in  an  illu- 
minating way  the  shifting  currents  of  political  opinion  in 
Germany.-    The  mediaeval  estates  were  replaced  in  183 1  by 

1  There  are,  in  all  three  states,  provisions  whereby  divergent  action  of  the 
two  chambers  on  certain  matters,  chiefly  financial,  may  be  settled.  This 
is  done  by  a  joint  sitting,  or  by  counting  the  aggregate  votes  in  both  bodies. 

*  Mayer,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  K'dnigreichs  Sachsen,  1909. 


290     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

a  Landtag  or  legislature  of  two  chambers.  The  upper  one 
which  has  remained  substantially  unchanged,  was  made  to 
consist,  in  accordance  with  the  common  German  custom,  of 
royal  princes,  ecclesiastics,  nobles,  representatives  of  the 
landed  gentry  and  the  cities,  and  of  members  appointed  by 
the  king  for  life.  The  other  chamber  has  undergone  several 
transformations.  In  the  year  following  the  general  Europ- 
ean upheaval  of  1830,  an  act  was  passed  whereby  it  was 
composed  of  twenty  members  elected  by  the  landed  gentry, 
twenty-five  each  by  the  cities  and  the  peasants,  and  five 
(later  ten)  by  the  traders  and  manufacturers.  The  next 
great  popular  upheaval  in  1848  produced  for  the  moment  a 
revolutionary  change,  and  a  law  of  that  year  brought  direct 
election  by  manhood  suffrage.  But  the  movement  soon 
spent  its  force  and  the  law  was  repealed  in  1850.  The  war 
of  1866  and  the  creation  of  the  federal  Reichstag  on  the 
basis  of  manhood  suffrage,  caused  that  electoral  principle  to 
prevail  again  in  Saxony.  The  representatives  of  the  gentry 
were  transferred  to  the  rural  districts  and  those  of  trade  to 
the  cities,  so  that  the  chamber  consisted  of  eighty  members 
elected  practically  by  all  men  twenty-five  years  of  age, 
voting  in  single  districts  by  direct  and  secret  ballot.  Except 
for  the  fact,  usual  in  Germany,  that  the  cities  were  under- 
represented,  the  system  was  certainly  democratic.  It  lasted 
for  a  quarter  of  a  century  until  that  bugbear  of  German 
statesmen,  the  growth  of  the  Social  Democratic  party, 
brought  about  a  change.  The  elections  to  the  Reichstag  in 
1893  made  it  probable  that  under  the  existing  franchise  this 
party  would  obtain  a  majority  of  the  seats  in  the  Saxon 
chamber;  and  to  prevent  such  a  result,  an  act  was  passed  in 
1896  establishing  in  a  modified  form  the  three-class  system 
of  Prussia.  The  reason  given  for  the  change  was  the  usual 
German  argument  that  electoral  rights  ought  to  be  propor- 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  29 1 

tional  to  taxation.  But  prolonged  agitation  and  a  feeling 
that  the  restriction  had  gone  too  far  brought  in  1909  an- 
other and  more  complicated  plan  to  limit  democratic  tend- 
encies. It  was  based  upon  the  principle  of  multiple  votes. 
The  chamber  now  consists  of  ninety-one  members  elected  in 
single  districts  by  direct  and  secret  ballot.  Every  citizen 
twenty-five  years  of  age  who  pays  any  direct  taxes  has  one 
vote.  If  he  pays  taxes  upon  an  income,  ranging  from  1250 
to  1600  marks  according  to  its  source,  or  owns  two  hectares 
of  land  or  half  a  hectare  of  garden  or  vineyard,  or  has  a 
secondary  school  education,  he  has  two  votes.  If  he  pays 
taxes  upon  an  income  ranging  in  the  same  way  from  1600  to 
2200  marks,  or  owns  more  land,  he  has  three  votes;  if  the 
income  is  from  2200  to  2800  marks,  or  the  land  is  larger  still, 
he  has  four  votes.  Men  over  fifty  years  of  age  have  an  addi- 
tional vote,  on  the  theory  that  age  is  conservative;  but  no 
one  has  more  than  four  votes  in  all.  This  plan  is  more 
democratic,  and  has  proved  distinctly  less  favorable  to  the 
privileged  classes  than  that  of  Prussia,  for  at  the  election 
that  followed  its  adoption,  the  Social  Democrats  carried 
nearly  one- third  of  the  seats ;  whereas,  under  the  three-class 
system  they  had  carried  only  one. 

The  king  has  the  customary  powers  of  a  German  mon- 
arch, and  as  is  usually  the  case,  legislation  is  mainly  initiated 
by  his  ministers.  There  is,  moreover,  a  curious  provision  in 
the  constitution  that  a  measure  introduced  by  the  crown  is 
adopted  if  one  chamber  passes  it  and  the  other  rejects  it  by 
less  than  a  two-thirds  vote. 

The  Small  Monarchies 

The  example  of  Saxony  shows  either  that  the  tendency  to- 
wards popular  goverimient  is  by  no  means  so  strong  in  the 
north  of  Germany  as  in  the  south,  or  that  it  is  counterbal- 


292     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

anced  by  a  dread  of  Social  Democracy.   With  some  notable 
exceptions  this  is  true  of  the  fourteen  small  northern  consti- 
tutional principalities.    No  one  of  these  contains  more  than 
half  a  million  inhabitants,  and  some  of  them  far  less.  Yet  in 
each  of  them  the  ruler  exercises  the  usual  monarchical  pow- 
ers.   Each  has  a  Landtag  consisting  of  a  single  chamber, 
which  contains  in  most  cases,  beside  the  representatives  of 
the  people,  members  appointed  by  the  crown,  or  representa- 
tives of  prix-ileged  classes  who  might  otherwise  sit  in  a  sep- 
arate house.     On  account  of  the  minute  size  of  these  states 
and  their  correspondingly  small  influence  on  the  current  of 
German  political  life,  any  changes  in  their  organization  are 
important  only  so  far  as  they  throw  light  on  the  tendency 
of  pohtical  thought.    But  such  changes  as  have  taken  place 
of  late  years  are  hardly  general  enough  for  this  purpose.    In 
Oldenburg,^  indeed,  and  Saxe-Weimar,  the  election  of  rep- 
resentatives was  made  direct  in  1909  instead  of  through  the 
medium  of  electors,  and  at  the  same  time,  the  suffrage  in 
Oldenburg  was  extended;  while  in  Brunswick,^  on  the  other 
hand,  where  the  ducal  crown  is  practically  under  the  control 
of  the  King  of  Prussia,  a  modified  form  of  the  Prussian  three- 
class  system  of  election  for  the  popular  representatives  has 
been  introduced.    This  last  is  not,  however,  so  reactionary 
a  change  as  it  might  appear,  for  the  Landtag  had  previously 
been  elected  by  the  municipal  and  communal  councils  which 
were  chosen  under  a  form  of  local  government  resembling 
that  of  Prussia.     In  the  other  small  constitutional  mon- 
archies no  very  significant  changes  have  taken  place. 

1  Schucking,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  Grossherzoglums  Oldenburg,  191 1. 

2  Rhamm,  Das  Staatsrecht  des  Herzogtums  Brauns'^eig,  1908. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  293 

The  Two  Mecklenburgs 

In  Gcmany,  political  institutions  certainly  become  less 
democratic  as  one  travels  north;  and  on  the  shores  of  the 
Baltic  the  two  Grand  Duchies  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  and 
its  much  smaller  sister  Mecklenburg-Strelitz  have  an  or- 
ganization that  remains  truly  mediaeval.  These  two  states 
are  a  case  of  poUtical  Siamese  twins,  for  although  the  Grand 
Dukes  are  independent  sovereigns,  there  is  a  common 
Landtag.  This  body  consists  of  two  estates,  that  of  the 
owners  of  knights'  fees,  all  of  whom  (some  eight  hundred  in 
number)  have  a  right  to  sit;  and  that  of  deputies  from  the 
municipal  authorities  of  the  cities.  The  powers  and  pro- 
cedure of  the  estates  are  also  archaic.  An  example  of  this 
may  be  seen  in  the  conduct  of  debates  where  everyone 
speaks  whenever  and  as  long  as  he  pleases,  so  that  in  mo- 
ments of  excitement  no  less  than  twenty  members  have  been 
known  to  speak  at  once  —  a  habit  that  tends,  no  doubt,  to 
save  time.  The  survival  of  these  ancient  forms  of  govern- 
ment is  not  approved  even  in  Germany,  and  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  himself  has  on  several 
occasions  sought  to  create  a  modem  representative  legisla- 
ture, but  has  been  prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  refusal  of 
the  landowning  knights  to  give  up  their  privileges. 

Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Liibeck 

There  remain  the  three  hanse  cities  which  are  the  only 
members  of  the  German  Empire  repubhcan  in  form,  al- 
though that  by  no  means  implies  a  democratic  organization.^ 
The  institutions  of  these  city-states  differ  much  in  detail, 
but  the  general  plans  are  so  far  alike  that  they  can  well  be 
described  together.    Each  has  a  Senate  and  a  Biirgershaft, 

'  Bollmann,  Das  Staalsrecht  der  Freien  Hansesladte  Bremeti  und  Liibeck, 
1914. 


294     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

the  two  bodies  forming  together  the  legislature;  while  the 
Senate  is  the  principal  factor  in  the  administration,  which  it 
carries  on  largely  through  committees.  It  is,  in  fact,  treated 
in  national  affairs  as  the  sovereign  of  the  state.  The  sena- 
ators,  fourteen,  sixteen,  and  eighteen  in  number,  are  chosen 
for  Ufe  by  a  complex  procedure  in  which  both  the  Senate  and 
Biirgerschaft  take  part. 

The  Biirgerschaft  is  a  much  more  numerous  body,  one 
hundred  and  twenty  in  Liibeck,  one  hundred  and  fifty  in 
Bremen,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty  in  Hamburg.  The 
members  are  chosen  for  six  years,  one-third  or  one-half  retir- 
ing every  two  or  three  years.  In  Bremen  the  methods  of 
election  have  been  Uttle  changed  since  1854;  while  in  Ham- 
burg and  Liibeck  they  have  been  altered  several  times,  the 
last  changes  having  been  made  in  1906  and  1907.  In  all 
three  cities,  however,  care  is  taken  to  keep  the  control  in  the 
hands  of  the  more  conservative  and  wealthier  people.  Bre- 
men has  the  least  undemocratic  system.  Here  every  citizen 
may  obtain  political  rights  as  a  burger  by  paying  a  small  fee, 
but  the  representatives  are  elected  by  eight  classes  of  voters 
so  arranged  that  eighty-two  are  chosen  by  persons  possessing 
educational  or  business  qualifications,  and  sixty-eight  by  the 
rest  of  the  citizens.  In  Hamburg  and  Liibeck  the  electoral 
rights  of  a  biirger  can  be  acquired  only  by  citizens  who  have 
paid  an  income  tax  for  five  consecutive  years,  and  then  the 
voters  are  divided  into  classes  based  upon  educational, 
official,  business,  or  property  quahfications,  so  that  in  Ham- 
burg only  twenty-four,  and  in  Liibeck  only  fifteen  are 
elected  by  the  poorer  citizens.  In  the  case  of  Liibeck  the 
new  system  is  far  less  democratic  than  that  which  prevailed 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  last  century. 

The  effect  of  such  a  distribution  of  political  power  has 
been  much  the  same  as  in  the  large  Prussian  cities.    Munici- 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  295 

pal  affairs  are  efficiently  conducted,  but  the  fact  that  in  all 
three  cities  the  deputies  elected  to  the  Reichstag  by  uni- 
versal suffrage  are  Social  Democrats  —  a  clear  indication  in 
Germany  of  political  discontent  among  the  working  classes 
—  seems  to  show  that  the  system  does  not  satisfy  a  large 
section  of  the  people. 

Alsace-Lorraine 

When,  after  the  war  with  France,  the  French  provinces 
west  of  the  Rhine  were  ceded  to  Germany  in  187 1,  they  were 
in  an  anomalous  and  unfortunate  position.     The  violent 
objection  of  the  inhabitants  to  the  annexation,  and  their 
consequent  hostility  to  the  Empire,  forbade  any  idea  of 
creating  a  new  state  with  the  autocracy  and  privileges  of  the 
other  members  of  the  confederation.    On  the  other  hand,  a 
proposal  to  incorporate  the  provinces  with  any  existing  state 
would  have  aroused  jealousy;   nor  could  any  state,  except 
Prussia,  have  annexed  them  without  serious  danger  to  its 
own  internal  tranquility.    The  only  possible  course,  there- 
fore, was  to  treat  the  country  as  a  dependency  of  the  Empire, 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  imperial  authorities.    With 
this  object  the  Act  of  June  9, 187 1,  gave  the  executive  power 
to  the  Kaiser,  reserving  the  legislative  for  the  Bundesrath 
and  Reichstag.    In  response,  however,  to  a  demand  for  some 
measure  of  self-government,  an  imperial  decree  of  October, 
1874,  created  an  elected  Landesausschuss,  or  assembly,  and 
in  1877  a  statute  was  passed  providing  that  laws  for  Alsace- 
Lorraine  might  be  enacted  by  the  Kaiser  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  Reichstag,  if  the  Bundesrath  and  the  Landesaus- 
schuss agreed  to  them.   Two  years  later  another  statute  gave 
the  Landesausschuss  a  right  to  originate  legislation,  and  au- 
thorized the  appointment  of  a  statthalter  or  governor,  to 
exercise  the  powers  previously  confided  to  the  imperial 


296     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

Chancellor.  Laws  might  nevertheless  still  be  made  for  the 
province  by  the  Bundesrath  and  Reichstag,  which  were  thus 
enabled  to  disregard  local  opinion  entirely  if  they  pleased. 

The  statthalter  was,  and  still  is,  appointed  and  removed 
at  pleasure  by  the  Kaiser,  to  whom  he  is  directy  subordi- 
nate. He  is  in  fact  the  minister  for  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  as 
such  countersigns  the  acts  of  the  crown.  He  governs  by 
means  of  a  secretary  of  state  and  four  heads  of  departments; 
and  is  assisted  by  a  council  of  state  with  merely  advisory 
powers. 

In  local  matters  the  old  French  system  was  in  the  main 
preserv^ed,  all  the  executive  officials  being  appointed  by  the 
government,  and  the  local  councils  being  elected  by  uni- 
versal suffrage.  In  regard  to  the  central  officials,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  German  law  was  introduced  which  protects 
them  from  arbitrary  removal. 

The  provinces  participated  to  some  extent  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Empire  for  they  elected  fifteen  representatives 
to  the  Reichstag,  and  after  1879  the  statthalter  was  au- 
thorized to  send  to  the  Bundesrath  delegates  who  could 
speak  but  not  vote.^ 

The  motives  for  annexing  Alsace-Lorraine  were  chiefly 
military,  but  there  was  also  no  little  talk  about  restoring  the 
long-lost  brothers  to  the  German  family.  The  brothers, 
however,  although  for  the  most  part  German  by  descent  and 
language,  cried  piteously  at  being  united  to  the  Fatherland, 
and  the  government  was  obliged  to  use  its  utmost  energies 
in  trying  to  reconcile  them  to  their  lot,  to  Germanize  them 
and  to  transplant  Germans  among  them.  French  writers 
declare  that  nothing  has  been  accomphshed  in  changing  the 
sentiments  of  the  people,  while  the  Germans  insist  that  if  the 
result  has  not  been  wholly  satisfactory  the  progress  has  been 
very  considerable. 

'  Leoni,  Elsass-Lothringen,  in  Marquardsen. 


PRUSSIA  AND  THE  SMALLER  STATES  297 

The  Act  of  191 1 

The  demand  for  autonomy  in  Alsace-Lorraine  grew  more 
and  more  insistent.  Its  spokesmen  asked  that  the  internal 
legislation  of  the  province  should  be  freed  from  the  control 
of  the  Bundesrath  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  legislature  of 
its  own;  that  the  executive  authority  should  be  transferred 
to  an  independent  head  of  some  kind ;  and  that  the  province 
should  become  fully  a  state  of  the  Empire.  At  last  the  gov- 
ernment determined  to  yield  the  first  of  these  demands,  and 
to  some  extent  the  third  was  forced  upon  it  by  the  Reichstag 
during  the  discussion  of  the  bill.  The  second  has  not  been 
granted  at  all.  The  act  of  May  31,  1911,^  provides  that 
Alsace-Lorraine  shall  be  treated  as  a  state  of  the  Empire  for 
the  purpose  of  sending  delegates  to  the  Bundesrath.^  But 
as  already  pointed  out  the  votes  of  its  three  delegates  to  that 
body  are  not  to  be  counted  when  needed  to  give  Prussia  a 
majority,  or  the  minority  required  to  reject  certain  measures. 
The  act  declares  that  the  sovereignty  is  exercised  by  the 
Kaiser,  who  appoints  and  removes  for  the  purpose  a  stat- 
thalter.  He  in  turn  appoints  and  instructs  the  delegates  to 
the  Bundesrath,  countersigns  the  acts  of  the  Kaiser,  and  has 
under  him.  at  the  head  of  his  administration,  a  secretary  of 
state. 

The  legislation  for  the  province  is  entrusted  to  a  Landtag 
of  two  chambers.  The  first  contains  the  bishops  and  other 
high  church  dignitaries;  the  president  of  the  highest  court; 
representatives  elected  by  the  university,  the  chief  cities, 
chambers  of  commerce,  agriculture  and  labor;  and  members 
appointed  by  the  Kaiser  for  the  term  of  the  Landtag,  not 

•  In  his  sixth  edition  of  191 2,  §§  22,  iv.  v.  23.  Laband  discusses  this  act, 
and  prints  the  greater  part  of  it  in  an  appendix. 

*  Laband  (§  22,  v.)  notes  this  as  evidence  that  .\lsace-Lorraine  is  not 
a  full  state,  but  only  treated  as  such  for  certain  purposes. 


298     GREATER  EUROPEAN  G0\  ERNMENTS 

exceeding  in  number  the  other  members.  The  second 
chamber  is  elected  for  five  years  by  universal,  direct  and 
secret  ballot.  The  Kaiser  must  summon  the  chambers  to 
meet  every  year,  but  can  dissolve  either  of  them.  All  their 
acts  require  his  consent,  and  there  is  a  pro\ision  that  if  the 
Landtag  fails  to  vote  the  budget,  the  government  can 
make  expenditures  previously  authorized  by  law  or  needed 
to  carry  on  the  administration.  It  may  be  noted  also  that 
the  second  chamber  cannot  increase  any  appropriation  in  the 
budget  laid  before  it  without  the  consent  of  the  government, 
and  that  the  first  chamber  can  only  accept  or  reject  the 
budget  as  it  comes  from  the  second.  The  Landtag  has  full 
power  to  initiate  other  laws;  and  the  Kaiser  has  the  usual 
authority  to  issue  ordinances  with  the  force  of  law  when  the 
pubHc  safety  requires  it  and  the  Landtag  is  not  in  session. 
Except  in  the  case  of  financial  measures,  the  relations  be- 
tween the  chambers  and  the  ruler  are  in  fact  modeled  upon 
those  usual  in  German  monarchies.  For  fear,  however,  of 
French  influence  it  is  provided  that  the  German  language 
must  be  used  in  the  Landtag,  and,  save  in  exceptional  cases, 
in  the  schools  and  by  the  public  officials. 

The  new  constitution  has  not  been  in  operation  long 
enough  before  the  war  to  produce  definite  results,  but  the 
first  Landtag  elected  showed  an  independent  spirit  dis- 
concerting in  high  places  at  Berlin. 


CHAPTER  XI 

GERMANY:  COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM 

After  having  surveyed  the  political  structure  of  the  Empire 
and  the  states,  we  are  in  a  position  to  examine  the  actual 
working  of  the  federal  government.  This  may  be  said  to 
turn  upon  the  relation  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  other  organs 
of  state;  for,  like  a  central  wheel  that  is  geared  to  all  the 
others,  the  Chancellor  comes  into  direct  contact  with  each 
of  the  imperial  authorities. 

The  Position  of  the  Chancellor 

It  is  clear  that  the  Chancellor  would  occupy  an  absurd 
position  if  he  were  confined  to  the  matters  that  belong 
strictly  to  his  office,  for  he  would  be  the  chief  minister  of  one 
of  the  greatest  nations  in  the  world,  and  yet  his  powers 
would  be  insignificant.  Apart  from  foreign  affairs,  the  navy, 
and  the  selection  of  a  few  high  officers,  his  executive  duties 
would  be  ahnost  entirely  limited  to  watching  over  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  imperial  laws  by  the  several  states,  and 
seeing  that  they  complied  with  the  ordinances  and  regula- 
tions issued,  not  by  him,  but  by  the  Bundesrath.  In  regard 
to  legislation,  moreover,  his  very  lack  of  executive  powers 
would  prevent  his  exerting  an  effective  control.  Represent- 
ing strictly  in  his  capacity  of  Chancellor  neither  the  King  of 
Prussia  nor  the  confederated  sovereigns,  he  would  be  unable 
to  acquire  any  considerable  authority  in  the  Bundesrath. 
He  would,  it  is  true,  preside  over  that  body;  but  simply  as 
chairman  he  would  be  in  a  situation  not  much  better  than 
that  occupied  by  the  vice-president  in  the  Senate  of  the 


agg 


300     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

United  States.  Unless  he  could  also  speak  in  the  name  of 
Prussia,  and  cast  her  votes,  he  would  have  very  little  influ- 
ence with  the  members,  and  could  neither  guide  legislation 
nor  direct  the  policy  of  administration.  In  order,  therefore, 
that  the  Chancellor  may  be  a  real  minister  of  state,  and 
not  a  mere  inspector  and  honorary  chairman,  he  must  be  at 
the  head  of  the  Prussian  delegation  in  the  Bundesrath.  But 
the  delegation  receives  its  instructions  from  the  Prussian 
government,  and  it  would  be  irrational  for  the  Chancellor 
to  be  given  instructions  by  men  whose  policy  differed  from 
his  own.  Hence  he  must  be  in  absolute  accord  with  the 
Prussian  government,  so  far  as  these  instructions  are  con- 
cerned. Nor  is  this  all.  The  friction  between  the  Chancellor 
and  the  Prussian  cabinet  would  be  intolerable  if  the  latter 
were  to  administer  the  imperial  laws  in  a  hostile  spirit;  and 
indeed  the  relations  between  the  Empire  and  the  kingdom 
are  interwoven  in  such  a  way  that  the  machiner}-  of  state 
can  work  smoothly  only  on  condition  that,  so  far  as  they 
deal  with  the  same  matters,  both  governments  are  conducted 
in  harmony,  and  this  can  be  true  only  in  case  both  are 
directed  by  a  common  will.  Now,  in  \dew  of  the  fact  that 
the  Chancellor  is  the  sole  head  of  the  imperial  administra- 
tion, while  the  Prussian  ministers  are  seldom  completely 
united,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  they  should  be  able  as  a 
body  to  control  his  actions;  and  if  one  of  their  number 
should  acquire  a  predominant  influence  in  public  affairs,  he 
would  find  it  almost  impossible  not  to  be  the  Chancellor. 
Unless,  therefore,  the  Kaiser  has  the  desire  and  the  capacity 
to  keep  the  personal  direction  of  both  the  imperial  and  the 
royal  government  in  his  own  hands,  the  Chancellor  must  be 
also  the  leading  minister  in  Prussia. 

These  observations  about  the  position  of  the  Chancellor  in 
the  Bundesrath  apply  with  equal  force  to  his  position  in  the 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM        3OI 

Reichstag.  A  minister  of  state  has  an  influence  over  an 
elected  chamber  because  he  represents  the  government,  and 
a  Chancellor  who  can  speak  at  the  same  time  in  the  name 
of  the  federal  administration,  of  the  Prussian  state,  of  the 
confederated  sovereigns,  and  of  the  upper  house  of  the  leg- 
islature, has  enormous  authority  at  his  back.  But  if  he 
possessed  only  his  very  limited  powers  as  imperial  adminis- 
trator; if  someone  else  represented  and  cast  the  votes  of 
Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath,  so  that  he  was  powerless  there, 
he  would  be  impotent  in  the  Reichstag  also.  It  follows  that 
with  the  present  intricate  connection  between  Prussian  and 
imperial  affairs,  the  system  can  work  well  only  as  it  was 
designed  to  work,  by  placing  both  in  the  same  hands. 

Why  not  Responsible  to  the  Reichstag 

There  is  another  and  quite  different  relation  possible  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  representatives  of  the  people, 
it  is  that  of  the  parliamentary  system,  where  the  power  of 
the  minister  comes  from  his  speaking  in  the  name  not  only 
of  the  government  but  also  of  the  majority  in  the  assembly. 
In  that  case  his  authority  is  doubled.  There  are  many  rea- 
sons why  such  a  relation  has  not  grown  up  in  Germany.  One 
of  them  has  been  the  vitality  of  the  monarchical  principle 
there;  another  is  to  be  found  in  the  interlacing  of  powers 
which  makes  the  enforcing  of  responsibility  to  any  one  pop- 
ular body  extremely  difficult;  and  there  is  a  third  that 
merits  further  consideration.  A  parliament  holding  the 
strings  of  the  public  purse,  and  meeting  with  tolerable  fre- 
quency, has  in  its  hands  the  means  of  compelling  the  mon- 
arch through  his  ministers  to  govern  according  to  its  wishes, 
and  whether  it  does  so  or  not  depends  very  much  on  the 
condition  of  its  poHtical  parties.  If  the  members  are  divided 
into  two  parties  only,  so  that  one  or  other  of  them  always 


302     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

has  a  majority,  the  parliament  is  certain  in  time  to  bring  the 
cro\\'n  under  its  control;  but  if  there  are  a  number  of  small 
groups,  it  is  much  easier  for  the  government,  by  making 
from  time  to  time  special  concessions  to  one  or  more  of  them, 
to  secure  a  majority  on  all  important  occasions,  and  thus 
remain  independent.    This  is  the  case  in  the  Reichstag. 

Parties  in  Germany 

The  bitter  conflict  between  the  King  of  Prussia  and  the 
House  of  Representatives,  which  reached  its  height  shortly 
after  Bismarck  became  chief  of  the  cabinet  in  September, 
1862,  and  lasted  for  the  next  four  years,  consolidated  the 
different  poHtical  elements  in  the  Chamber  into  two  hostile 
bodies  —  the  supporters  and  the  opponents  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  former,  who  shrunk  at  times  to  a  mere  handful 
of  members,  were  called  the  Conservatives,  while  their  an- 
tagonists belonged  for  the  most  part  to  a  new  organization 
known  as  the  Fortschritt  or  party  of  progress.  The  decisive 
victory  over  the  Austrians  at  Sadowa  wrought  a  sudden 
change  in  public  opinion.  Instead  of  the  tyrannical  despiser 
of  popular  rights,  Bismarck  appeared  in  the  light  of  the 
champion  of  German  unity  and  even  of  liberty,  and  the  re- 
sult was  a  breaking  up  of  the  old  party  relations  and  a  re- 
arrangement of  the  political  groups  on  a  new  basis.'  The 
Conservatives,  who  had  supported  the  government,  ceased 
to  be  unpopular,  and  regained  the  seats  they  had  lost;  but, 
what  is  more  important,  each  of  the  great  parties  split  in  two. 
A  number  of  the  Conservatives,  who  were  more  progressive 
in  opinion  than  their  fellows,  and  more  in  favor  of  the  new 
federal  system,  left  the  party  to  organize  another  under  the 
name  of  Free  Conservatives;  ^  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a 

1  See  the  articles  on  the  parties  in  the  Reichstag  in  Unsere  Zeit,  by  Op- 
penheim  (1880,  i)  and  Johannes  Berg  (1882,  i,  ii;   1883,  ii). 
*  Called  later  the  Deutsch-Reichspartei. 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM        303 

body  of  men,  including  the  most  influential  leaders,  sep- 
arated themselves  from  the  Fortschritt,  and  formed  the 
National  Liberal  party.  These  men  were  less  dogmatic  than 
their  former  associates,  were  more  inclined  to  sacrifice  the 
ideal  for  the  practical,  and,  above  all,  had  more  confidence 
in  Bismarck. 

Thus  two  new  middle  parties  arose,  the  four  groups 
corresponding  fairly  well  to  the  four  divisions  into  which, 
according  to  the  theory  of  Rohmer,^  all  mankind  is  naturally 
divided  —  the  Reactionaries,  the  Conservatives,  the  Lib- 
erals, and  the  Radicals.  Each  of  the  four  has  continued  to 
exist  under  one  name  or  another  ever  since  the  formation  of 
the  North  German  Confederation ;  for  although  some  of  the 
members  have  often  broken  away  and  formed  new  groups, 
these  have  disappeared  after  a  short  time,  or  been  absorbed 
by  one  of  the  older  bodies.  It  is  therefore  worth  our  while  to 
consider  these  parties  a  little  more  closely.  The  two  ex- 
treme ones  —  the  Fortschritt  and  the  Conservative  —  were 
almost  exclusively  Prussian;  the  Conservatives  being  re- 
cruited chiefly  among  the  lesser  nobiHty  or  Junkers,  and  the 
Fortschritt  in  the  larger  towns  and  cities.  The  Free  Con- 
servatives also  came  mainly  from  Prussia,  the  core  of  the 
party  being  the  greater  nobiHty,  from  whom  the  ambassa- 
dors and  other  high  ofiicials  were  mostly  selected.  The 
National  Liberals,  on  the  other  hand,  extended  far  more  into 
the  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  and  included  during  their  era 
of  prosperity  almost  all  the  deputies  from  the  smaller  North 
German  states,  and  most  of  the  men  of  Uberal  views  from 
the  South.  This  has  been,  indeed,  the  only  truly  national 
party  that  the  Empire  has  ever  known,  all  the  other  groups 
being  mainly  local,  or  founded  on  questions  of  race,  of  sect, 
or  of  class,  rather  than  on  general  political  issues. 

*  Lehre  von  den  Polilischen  Parteien.  Cf.  Bluntschli,  Charakier  u.  Geisl 
der  Pol.  Parteien. 


304     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

The  various  kinds  of  particularists  so-called  are  based 
mainly  on  questions  of  race.  They  are  irreconcilables,  who 
complain  that  their  province  or  their  race  has  been  unjustly 
treated,  and  has  been  forced  into  a  union  repugnant  to  its 
feelings.  The  most  important  of  them  are  the  Poles,  the 
Hanoverian  Guelphs,  the  Danes,  and  the  Alsatians,  all  few 
in  numbers,  but  uncompromising  fighters.  On  the  question 
of  religion  is  founded  the  Catholic  party  or  Centre,  which 
arose  when  Bismarck  entered  upon  his  quarrel  with  the 
Catholic  Church;  but  which  has  continued  with  undimin- 
ished strength  ever  since,  although  the  original  cause  of  its 
formation  disappeared  long  ago.  At  the  opposite  end  of  the 
social  scale  from  that  of  the  conservative  landowners  there 
was  later  formed  among  the  workingmen  the  party  of  the 
Social  Democrats.  Recruited  primarily  from  the  discon- 
tented classes  in  the  large  cities  it  has  spread  so  widely  over 
the  country  that  it  can  claim  to  be  considered  a  national 
party. 

Parties  in  the  Landtags 

It  is  worth  while  to  observe  here  that  the  parties  in  the 
Prussian  Landtag  have  always  been  similar  to  those  in  the 
Reichstag  —  except,  of  course,  for  certain  groups  like  that  of 
the  Alsatians,  which  belong  exclusively  to  other  parts  of  the 
Empire;  and,  in  general,  it  may  be  said  that  in  each  state 
the  parties  for  national  and  local  politics  are  very  nearly  the 
same,  so  that  every  party  in  the  Reichstag  corresponds  to  a 
local  party  in  one  or  more  of  the  states,  and  every  consider- 
able local  party  appears  in  the  Reichstag  either  as  a  sep- 
arate group  by  itself,  or  as  part  of  a  larger  organization.  It 
is  not,  however,  possible  to  say  that  the  parties  are  divided 
as  in  France,  on  national  issues,  or,  as  in  Italy,  on  local  ones, 
because  neither  class  of  issues  has  a  predominant  influence; 
and,  in  fact,  owing  to  the  peculiar  apportionment  of  power 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM        305 

between  the  federal  government  and  the  states,  the  same 
question,  as  for  example  that  of  the  rights  of  the  Catholic 
Church,  is  presented  both  in  the  Reichstag  and  in  the 
Landtags. 

Class  Strife  an  Obstacle  to  Popular  Government 

The  condition  of  the  classes  has  had  a  momentous  effect 
on  political  development.  The  Prussian  nobility  have  never 
stood  like  the  English  as  defenders  of  the  lowly  against  the 
crown.  On  the  contrary,  the  crown  has  been  the  shield  of 
the  peasants  against  the  oppressions  of  the  great  landowners. 
The  nobles,  moreover,  have  belonged  wholly  to  one  poUtical 
party,  so  that  Prussia  has  never  known  that  division  of  its 
aristocracy  into  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  each  furnishing 
leaders  to  the  people,  which  has  been  of  such  inestimable 
value  in  England.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  strife  of  noble  with 
peasant,  of  city  with  country,  compelling  everyone  to  look 
to  the  king  as  an  arbiter,  that  has  given  to  the  crown,  and 
the  bureaucracy  as  its  tool,  so  great  an  influence  and  re- 
nown.^ The  same  cause  must  continue  to  produce  the  same 
effect,  and  so  long  as  the  royal  authority  endures  at  all  it  can 
hardly  fail  to  be  strong  unless  a  great  party  is  formed  which 
finds  hearty  support  in  every  rank  of  life,  and  can  speak  in 
the  name  of  the  people  without  distinction  of  class. 

The  material  is  not  well  adapted  to  the  formation  of  great 
parties,  for  the  Germans  are  so  little  homogeneous,  and  their 
traditions  of  thought  are  so  diverse  as  to  hinder  any  large 
part  of  the  people  from  working  together  for  a  common  end. 
One  is  constantly  struck  by  the  contradictions  in  the  dif- 
ferent phases  of  German  character.  Side  by  side  with  the 
dreamy,  mystical  turn  of  mind,  there  is  a  talent  for  organiza- 

'  This  was  also  true  at  one  time  of  the  monarchy  in  France,  but  hardly 
to  so  great  an  extent  as  in  Germany. 


306     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

tion  and  a  submission  to  discipline  that  have  made  them  the 
first  mihtary  people  of  the  day.  Again,  we  are  apt  to  attrib- 
ute to  German  scholarship  a  peculiarly  agnostic  tendency, 
and  yet  no  rulers  in  Christendom  have  the  name  of  God  so 
constantly  on  their  lips  as  the  German  Kaisers.  Nor  is  there 
the  least  affectation  or  cant  about  this,  for  the  Germans  are 
at  the  same  time  one  of  the  most  religious  and  one  of  the 
most  skeptical  of  races.  The  fact  is  that  the  people  are 
divided  into  strata,  social  and  intellectual,  which  are  very 
different  from  one  another  in  character  and  tone  of  thought. 
The  various  classes  are,  indeed,  separated  by  an  almost  im- 
passable gulf.^  At  one  extremity  we  find  the  noble  land- 
owners of  Prussia,  who  form  an  aristocracy  of  the  most  ex- 
clusive type.  They  are  conservative  by  temperament,  mili- 
tary by  taste  and  education,  and  the  privilege  which  the 
officers  still  retain  in  most  of  the  Prussian  regiments  of  ad- 
mitting as  comrades  only  such  men  as  they  choose  has 
enabled  this  class  to  keep  the  bulk  of  the  offices  in  the  army 
in  its  own  hands.  At  the  other  end  of  the  social  scale  are  the 
workingmen,  and  these  on  account  of  their  very  isolation  are 
pecuharly  prone  to  socialism.  Between  the  two  extremes 
stand  the  commercial  classes  and  the  Jews,  who  are  de- 
spised by  those  above  them,  and  disliked  by  those  below. 
The  geographical  differences  are  also  strongly  marked  in 
Germany.  The  south  and  west  were  far  more  thoroughly 
imbued  with  the  principles  of  the  French  Revolution,  and 
are  far  more  democratic  to-day,  than  the  older  parts  of 
Prussia.  The  Prussians  also  are  less  German,  as  we  com- 
monly understand  the  German  character,  than  the  rest  of 
the  people.  They  are  more  practical,  more  military,  and 
more  bureaucratic;  and  hence  the  sympathy  even  between 

1  See  an  interesting  article  entitled  "  Society  in  Berlin,"  by  Professor 
Geffcken,  in  the  New  Review,  August,  1892. 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM       307 

the  corresponding  classes  in  different  parts  of  the  country  is 
by  no  means  complete. 

The  Growth  of  Discontent 

Two  opposite  forces  have  been  growing  in  Germany  of  late 
years:  one  is  the  belief  in  military  monarchy,  which  has  re- 
ceived no  little  support  among  scholars;  the  other  is  a  spirit 
of  discontent,  which  has  made  great  headway  among  the 
lower  classes;  and  between  the  two  the  liberal  elements  have 
been  pushed  into  the  background.^  In  fact,  both  of  these 
opposing  forces  derive  much  of  their  strength  from  a  com- 
mon source.  The  change  from  a  theoretical  to  a  practical 
point  of  view,  that  has  lent  potency  to  the  doctrine  of  miU- 
tary  monarchy,  applies  not  only  to  politics,  but  also  to 
private  life,  and  here  it  has  replaced  the  enthusiasm  for  ideal 
and  intellectual  aims  by  a  craving  for  material  prosperity 
and  well-being.2  The  result  has  been  an  immense  increase  in 
the  power  of  the  Social  Democrats.  It  would  be  a  great 
mistake,  however,  to  suppose  that  all  the  men  who  vote  for 
the  Socialist  candidates  agree  with  their  doctrines.  Prob- 
ably a  small  part  of  them  do  so;  ^  but  the  autocratic  poHcy  of 
the  government,  the  burden  of  service  in  the  army,  and  the 
difficulty  of  earning  a  comfortable  living,  have  made  a  great 
many  people  discontented,  and  these  vote  the  Socialist 
ticket  as  the  most  effective  method  of  protest.  The  size  of 
the  Socialist  vote  is,  therefore,  a  measure  of  the  amount  of 
discontent  in  Germany,  and  as  such  it  is  highly  significant; 
but  what  will  happen  if  the  Social  Democrats  become  strong 

^  Cf.  Bamberger,  "  The  German  Crisis  and  the  Emperor,"  New  Review, 
April,  1892. 

*  Viscount  Bryce  comments  on  this  in  "An Age  of  Discontent," Ct>«/fm/>. 
Rev.,  Jan.,  1891. 

'  Cf.  Bamberger,  supra;  and  this  has  been  increasingly  true  since  he 
wrote. 


308     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

enough  to  exercise  a  controlling  influence  on  politics  is  by  no 
means  clear.  With  their  increase  in  numbers  in  the  Reich- 
stag, their  leaders  have  become  less  violent,  and  power  is 
likely  in  the  future  to  bring  moderation. 

Democracy  would  Involve  Organic  Changes 

The  intricate  connection  between  the  Prussian  and  the 
federal  machinery,  which  works  smoothly  so  long  as  both  are 
in  the  hands  of  a  single  man,  would  hardly  be  possible  if  the 
people  became  the  real  source  of  power.  Suppose,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  Reichstag  succeeds  in  compelling  the  Kaiser 
to  select  a  Chancellor  who  enjoys  its  confidence;  ^  suppose 
in  other  words,  that  the  Chancellor  really  becomes  politically 
responsible  to  the  Reichstag,  but  that  in  Prussia  the  king 
remains  free  to  choose  his  ministers  as  he  pleased.  It  is  clear 
the  government  can  be  made  to  work  smoothly,  only  on 
condition  that  the  spheres  of  action  of  the  Chancellor  and 
the  Prussian  cabinet  become  independent  of  each  other,  and 
this  will  involve  a  practical  abandonment  by  the  latter  of 
all  interference  in  federal  matters. 

Again,  suppose  that  the  Landtag  should  also  acquire  the 
power  to  make  the  ministers  responsible  to  itself;  and  with 
its  present  organization  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  such  a 
privilege  would  be  won  by  the  Prussian  House  of  Represent- 
atives, without  being  obtained  by  the  Reichstag  as  well. 
In  this  case,  the  functions  of  the  Chancellor  and  the  Prussian 
ministers  might  continue  unchanged  for  a  time ;  but  even  if 
the  same  party  controlled  both  bodies,  so  that  the  executive 
officers  were  its  instruments  both  in  Prussia  and  the  Empire, 
it  is  not  probable  that  they  would  long  hold  themselves 
responsible  to  two  separate  assemblies.    The  Reichstag,  as 

^  The  new  Chancellor,  Prince  Maximilian  of  Baden,  has  asserted  in  the 
reply  to  President  Wilson,  and  in  his  speech  to  the  Reichstag,  that  this  is 
now,  and  will  continue  to  be,  the  case. 


COMMENTS  ON  THE  POLITICAL  SYSTEM        309 

the  representative  of  a  wider  public  opinion,  would  grad- 
ually assume  the  decisive  authority  in  national  questions, 
and  hence  Prussia  would  either  become  merged  in  the  Em- 
pire, or  else  her  government  would  be  confined  to  local 
affairs.  In  cither  event,  the  Chancellor  would  probably 
cease  to  be  in  any  degree  a  Prussian  officer,  and  would  ac- 
quire a  purely  federal  character.  The  Bundesrath  also 
would  suffer  a  severe  loss  of  influence  if  the  Chancellor  be- 
came responsible  to  the  Reichstag;  and  it  has  shown  its 
appreciation  of  this  more  than  once  in  objecting  to  the  crea- 
tion of  responsible  federal  ministers.  The  Chancellor  would 
no  longer  speak  to  it  as  the  delegate  of  Prussia,  but  as  the 
representative  of  the  Reichstag.  In  short  the  Bundesrath 
would  fall  to  the  subordinate  position  occupied  by  the  upper 
chamber  in  all  countries  with  a  parliamentary  form  of  gov- 
ernment. It  would  not  only  lose  the  legislative  authority 
it  now  wields,  but  it  would  hardly  be  suffered  to  retain  the 
power  to  make  executive  ordinances  and  regulations,  and  so 
direct  the  policy  of  the  administration.  Until  such  changes 
occur,  popular  government  in  Germany  can  hardly  be 
considered  on  a  permanent  foundation. 


CHAPTER  XII 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 


The  spirit  of  the  French  Revolution  was  in  its  essence  hu- 
manitarian. It  disregarded  the  narrow  distinctions  of  race 
and  country,  proclaimed  the  universal  brotherhood  of  man, 
and  offered  to  all  the  world  the  blessings  of  its  creed.  Yet 
the  great  political  movements  to  which  it  gave  rise  have 
brought  about  an  increase  of  race  feeling  so  great  that 
peoples  of  different  blood  can  no  longer  live  peaceably  to- 
gether under  the  same  government,  and  the  various  branches 
of  a  race  are  unhappy  until  they  are  all  covered  by  a  single 
flag.  Race,  in  other  words,  has  become  a  recognized  basis  of 
nationality;  and  this  has  produced  in  Europe  two  new 
states,  and  loosened  the  bonds  of  two  old  ones.  The  ties  of 
blood  have  united  Italy  and  Germany;  while  England  has 
gravely  debated  a, plan  for  a  partial  separation  between  the 
Saxons  and  the  Celts,  and  Austria  has  become  very  seriously 
disintegrated  under  the  strain  of  racial  antipathies. 

Provinces  and  Races  of  Austria 

In  order  to  understand  the  institutions  of  Austria,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  something  of  its  pecuUar  geography  and 
ethnology.  The  official  designation  of  the  western  half  of  the 
monarchy  —  which  for  convenience  I  shall  call  simply  Aus- 
tria —  is  "  the  Kingdoms  and  Lands  represented  in  the 
Reichsrath,"  ^  and  the  name  implies  the  utter  lack  of  unity 

1  Cf.  Staalsgriindgesetz  iiber  gemeinsame  Angelegenheiten  (Dec.  21,  1867),  i; 
Ulbrich,  Oesterreich,  in  Marquardsen,  p.  14.  Gumplowicz  contends  that 
the  use  of  the  name  Austria  for  the  western  half  of  the  monarchy  is  correct. 
Das  Oesterreichische  Staatsrecht,  p.  45,  note  42. 

310 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  3 1 1 

in  the  nation.  Austria  is,  in  fact,  a  sort  of  residuum,  con- 
sisting of  all  the  territory  which  belonged  to  the  Empire  at 
the  time  of  the  compact  with  Hungary,  and  did  not  form  a 
part  of  that  kingdom.  The  country  has  a  most  irregular 
outline,  touching  the  Lake  of  Constance  on  the  west,  ex- 
tending on  the  north  into  the  heart  of  Germany  by  means  of 
the  province  of  Bohemia,  stretching  one  long  arm  eastward 
above  and  even  beyond  Hungary,  and  another  far  to  the 
south  along  the  coast  of  the  Adriatic. 

This  curiously  shaped  state  is  divided  into  seventeen 
provinces,  all  enjoying  extended  political  powers,  and  al- 
most all  the  theatre  of  struggles  between  two  or  more  of  the 
different  races.^  Some  idea  of  the  number  of  distinct  races 
in  the  Empire  can,  indeed,  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  on 
the  assembling  of  the  Reichsrath,  or  parliament,  it  has  been 
found  necessary  to  administer  the  oath  in  eight  different 
languages.2  Yet  these  include  only  a  small  part  of  the 
tongues  and  dialects  that  are  spoken  in  the  land.  Among 
the  many  races  that  inhabit  Austria  there  are,  however,  only 
five  important  enough  to  have  a  marked  influence  on  poli- 
tics. These  are:  first,  the  Germans,  who  comprise  scarcely 
more  than  a  third  of  the  population,  but  possess  a  much 
larger  share  of  the  wealth  and  culture.  They  are  scattered 
more  or  less  thickly  all  through  the  country,  and  predomi- 
nate along  the  Danube  and  in  the  provinces  immediately 
to  the  south  of  it.  Second,  the  Bohemians,  or  Czechs,  who 
are  the  next  most  powerful  race,  and  compose  a  majority  of 
the  people  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia.    Third,  the  Poles,  who 

>  I  call  these  divisions  provinces  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  Technically, 
some  of  them  are  termed  kingdoms,  others  grand-duchies,  arch  duchise, 
duchies,  counties,  etc.  Cf.  Staatsgrundgesetz  iiher  Rciclisvertretung,  i; 
Geller,  i.  78. 

»  "Austria:  its  Society,  Politics,  and  Religion,"  Baroness  de  Zuylen  de 
Nyevelt,  Nat.  Rev.,  Oct.,  1891. 


312     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

form  a  compact  mass  in  Galicia.  Fourth,  the  Slovenians 
and  other  Slavs,  Kving  chiefly  in  the  southern  provinces  in 
the  direction  of  Triest  and  Dalmatia.  And  fifth,  the  ItaUans, 
who  are  to  be  found  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Tyrol,  and  in 
the  sea  ports  along  the  Adriatic.  The  numbers  of  the  vari- 
ous races  in  Austria,  according  to  the  census  of  1910,  are  as 
follows : 

Germans 9,950,266 

Czechs  and  Slovaks 6,435,983 

Poles 4,967,984 

Ruthenians 3,518,854 

Slovenians 1,252,940 

Serbs  and  Croats 783»334 

Italians 768,422 

Others 647,157 

28,324,940 

The  Constitution 

The  division  of  the  people  into  several  different  races  is 
one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  Austrian  poHtics,  and 
we  shall  return  to  it  later;  but  first  the  political  organization 
of  the  country  must  be  explained.  When  this  was  re- 
modeled after  the  war  with  Prussia,  five  statutes  —  all 
bearing  the  date  of  December  21,  1867, — were  passed,  and 
termed  the  Staatsgrundgesetze,  or  fundamental  laws  of  the 
state. ^  They  are,  in  fact,  the  constitution  of  Austria,  and 
can  be  changed  only  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  both  houses  of 
Parliament.^ 

1  Ulbrich,  pp.  ii,i6,Gumplowicz,§§2S-27.  These  five  laws  are  commonly 
cited  by  their  titles,  which  indicate  their  contents.  They  are  as  follows: 
(i)  Staatsgrundgeselz  iiber  die  Reichsvertretung  (R.  G.  B.  141).  (2)  St.  G. 
iiber  die  allgemeinen  Rechte  der  Staatsbiirger  (R.  G.  B.  142).  (3)  St.  G.  iiber 
das  Reichsgericht  (R.  G.  B.  143).  (4)  St.  G.  iiber  die  Richlerlichegewalt  (R.  G. 
B.  144).    (5)  St.  G.  iiber  die  Regierungs-  und  Vollzugsgewalt  (R.  G.  B.  145). 

2  That  is  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  the  members  present.  One  hundred 
members  constitute  a  quorum  of  the  lower  house  in  other  cases,  but  for  this 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  3 1 3 

The  Emperor 

The  powers  of  the  Emperor  are  legally  much  the  same  as 
in  other  constitutional  monarchies.  The  fundamental  laws 
declare  that  he  governs  by  means  of  responsible  ministers,^ 
and  by  statute  all  his  acts  must  be  countersigned  by  a  min- 
ister of  state.2  Practically,  however,  the  ministers  are  the 
servants  of  the  crown,  and  not  of  the  parliament,  and  hence 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  can  really  use  his  powers  with  great 
freedom.  This  result  is  due  to  the  incessant  quarrels  be- 
tween the  different  races,  which  are  too  bitterly  hostile  to 
combine,  while  no  one  of  them  is  strong  enough  to  rule 
alone  —  a  state  of  things  that  makes  it  easy  for  the  govern- 
ment to  play  them  off  against  each  other,  and  have  its  own 
way.  In  theory  the  parliamentary  system  is  in  force,  but  in 
practice  the  Emperor  is  so  far  from  being  a  figurehead  that 
since  the  present  constitution  was  adopted  he  has  actually 
refused  to  sanction  a  bill  passed  by  both  houses  of  ParHa- 
ment.^  Moreover,  there  was  a  parliamentary  deadlock  from 
1897  to  1904,  during  most  of  which  the  government  was  car- 
ried on  without  parliamentary  assistance,  by  virtue  of  a 
provision  in  the  constitutional  laws  which  authorizes  the 
crown  to  make  ordinances  that  have  provisionally  the  force 
of  law  when  the  Reichsrath  is  not  in  session.^ 

The  Reichsrath  or  parliament  of  Austria  consists  of  two 
chambers,  of  which  the  upper  one,  called  the  Herrenhaus  or 
House  of  Lords,  is  composed  of  the  princes  of  the  imperial 
family,  of  the  archbishops  and  prince-bishops,  of  the  heads 

purpose  the  presence  of  one  half  the  members  is  required.    St.  G.  Reichsver- 
treiung  (as  amended  by  the  Act  of  April  2,  1873),  §  ^5- 

'  St.  G.  Regierungsgewalt,  §  2. 

»  Law  of  July  25,  1867,  i  (R.  G.  B.  loi). 

*  This  was  the  bill  on  Monastic  Orders  passed  by  the  Reichsrath  in  1876. 

*  St.  G.  Reichsvertretimg,  §  14. 


314     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

of  those  noble  landowning  families  to  which  the  Emperor 
grants  an  hereditary  seat,  and  of  members  whom  he  ap- 
points for  life.i  The  lower  chamber,  called  the  House  of 
Representatives,  is  elected  for  six  years,  but  can  be  dissolved 
at  any  time  by  the  crown.^  The  members  were  formerly 
chosen  by  the  provincial  diets.^  This  proved,  however,  to  be 
a  source  of  constant  annoyance,  because  some  of  the  races 
which  were  struggling  for  a  greater  degree  of  independence 
insisted  that  the  Reichsrath  did  not  legally  represent  the 
nation,  on  the  ground  that  the  fundamental  laws  had  never 
been  properly  enacted,  and  whenever  one  of  those  races  ob- 
tained control  of  a  diet,  it  would  refuse  to  allow  the  repre- 
sentatives to  be  chosen.  The  trouble  with  the  refractory 
diets  was  finally  brought  to  an  end  on  April  2,  1873,  by  an 
amendment  to  the  fundamental  law  in  the  Reichsrath, 
whereby  the  diets  were  deprived  of  all  part  in  the  matter, 
and  the  election  was  placed  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  pro- 
vincial voters.  The  House  of  Representatives  was  formerly 
elected  by  a  highly  complicated  system  of  five  different 
classes  of  voters;  but  in  1896,  additional  members  of  the 
House  were  added,  to  be  elected  by  universal  suffrage,  and 
in  1907,  the  classes  of  voters  were  abolished  altogether  and 
there  was  substituted  a  universal  suffrage  for  all  men  over 
twenty-four  years  of  age  and  resident  within  their  districts  a 
year,  the  seats  being  at  the  same  time  increased  to  five 
hundred  and  sixteen.  These  seats  are  divided  among  the 
different  races  roughly  in  proportion  to  the  taxes  they  pay, 
the  districts  being  arranged  to  comprise  so  far  as  possible 
only  racial  groups  that  are  essentially  homogeneous  —  in 
some  places,  such  as  Bohemia,  where  the  population  is  par- 

'  St.  G.  Reichsverlrelung,  §§  2-5. 

2  Id.,  §§  18,  19.    This  power  has  been  used  frequently. 

'  Id.,  §  7- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  3 1 5 

ticularly  mixed,  separate  constituencies  being  created  for 
the  electors  of  each  race.^ 

The  powers  of  the  Reichsrath  extend  only  to  matters  fall- 
ing within  its  competence,  and  that  is  limited  by  the  privi- 
leges vested  in  the  provincial  legislatures.  These  privileges 
are  secured  by  the  fundamental  laws,  which  declare  that  all 
matters  not  specially  placed  under  the  control  of  the  Reichs- 
rath are  reserved  for  the  diets  of  the  provinces.^  Austria, 
therefore,  while  theoretically  a  unitary  state,  has  in  practice 
very  much  the  aspect  of  a  confederation. 

The  Provinces 

Some  of  the  provincial  diets  are  turbulent  bodies,  and  it 
has  often  required  a  stern  exercise  of  authority  to  keep  them 
within  bounds.  The  power  of  the  Emperor  to  control  them 
is,  indeed,  very  great.  Not  only  do  their  measures  require 
his  sanction,^  which  is  often  refused,  but  he  also  appoints  the 
presiding  ofhcer,  who  arranges  the  order  of  business,*  can 
forbid  the  consideration  of  any  matters  not  within  the  com- 
petence of  the  diet,*  and  when  so  directed  by  the  crown  can 
close  the  session  or  dissolve  the  diet  at  any  time.^  This  right 
is  used  very  freely ;  and  it  has  not  infrequently  happened  in 
periods  of  great  excitement,  when  a  diet  has  become  a  centre 
for  political  agitation,  that  a  session  has  been  closed  almost 
as  soon  as  it  was  opened. 

It  has  been  said  that  although  Austria  is  virtually  a  federal 
state  so  far  as  legislation  is  concerned,  yet  as  regards  the 

'  Ogg,  The  Governments  of  Europe,  pp.  469-472. 

"^  St.  G.  Reichsvertretung,  §§  11,  12. 

^  E.g.,  The  Landesordnung,  of  Feb.  26,  1861,  for  Lower  Austria,  §  17. 

*  Id.,  §§  4,  10,  36.  This  officer  in  most  of  the  provinces  is  called  the 
Landmarschall;  in  others  the  Landeshauptmann,  PrdsUent,  or  Oberstland- 
marsckall. 

*  Id.,  §  35. 

*  Id.,  §  10. 


3l6     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

executive  branch  of  the  government,  which  in  the  Empire  is 
the  more  important  of  the  two,  it  is  centralized,  because  the 
provincial  executive  is  not  responsible  to  the  diets. ^  To  a 
great  extent  this  is  true;  for  numberless  matters  that  form 
a  part  of  the  general  administration  are  in  the  hands  of  a 
statthalter  or  Landesprasident,  appointed  by  the  crown,  and 
independent  of  local  control. ^ 

The  Race  Question 

We  have  seen  how  many  different  races  there  are  in  Aus- 
tria, and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  each  of  them  is  not 
only  anxious  to  be  entirely  free  from  control  by  others,  but 
if  strong  enough  wants  supremacy  for  itself.  It  is,  therefore, 
clearly  impossible  to  content  them  all,  and  the  policy  has 
been  a  sort  of  makeshift  that  contents  none  of  them.  The 
most  powerful,  the  richest,  the  best  educated,  and  the  most 
widespread  of  the  races,  is  the  German,  which  assumes  that 
Austria  is,  and  ought  to  be,  essentially  a  German  country. 
This  people  would  like  to  see  its  own  tongue  the  official 
language  in  all  the  provinces ;  but  although  the  most  power- 
ful of  the  nationalities,  it  has  been  weakened  by  a  division 
into  Liberals  and  Clericals,  and  still  more  by  the  tendency 
of  the  Liberals  to  fight  among  themselves. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  other  races  do  not  agree  to 
the  assumption  that  Austria  is  essentially  German.  On  the 
contrary,  they  are  incessantly  striving  for  greater  recogni- 
tion of  their  own  rights.  The  most  important  of  them,  be- 
cause the  most  numerous  and  the  most  aggressive,  is  that  of 
the  Czechs  of  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  They  demand  what 
they  call  the  restoration  of  the  Crown  of  Saint  Wenceslaus 

'■  Karel  Kramar,  "  La  Situation  Politique  en  Austriche,"  Ann.  de  I'Ecole 
Libre  des  Set.  Pol.,  1891,  p.  662. 

^  Cf.  Law  of  May  19,  1868  (R.  G.  B.  44). 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  3 1 7 

which  means  a  union  of  Bohemia,  Moravia,  and  Silesia  as  a 
separate  kingdom,  connected  with  the  rest  of  Austria  only 
by  a  tie  similar  to  that  which  binds  Austria  and  Hungary 
together. 

The  next  most  influential  race  is  that  of  the  Poles,  who 
have  the  advantage  of  forming  a  compact  mass  in  a  single 
province,  and  who  have  had  the  wisdom  to  understand  the 
true  basis  of  political  power  in  Austria.  They  see  that  their 
fortunes  must  depend  on  the  goodwill  of  the  crown,  and 
hence  they  are  ready  to  vote  with  the  government  on  im- 
portant measures,  in  consideration  of  favors  at  home.  Al- 
though they  are  divided  in  Galicia  into  an  aristocratic  and 
democratic  party,  they  present  a  united  front  at  Vienna; 
and  as  it  is  known  that  they  are  ready  to  assist  any  govern- 
ment that  treats  them  kindly,  all  parties  are  willing  to  buy 
their  support  with  concessions. 

The  other  important  races  in  Austria,  the  Italians  and  the 
southern  Slavs,  have  had  their  hands  pretty  well  filled  by  the 
quarrels  among  themselves  and  with  the  Germans.  The 
Italians  from  the  southern  Tyrol  would,  indeed,  like  their 
part  of  the  province  separated  from  the  rest;  but  the 
Slovenians  and  the  other  Slavs  have  been  for  the  most  part 
too  anxious  for  help  from  the  central  government  to  pursue 
an  active  policy  of  disintegration. 

The  problem  of  race  in  Austria  is  extremely  difficult.  Two 
methods  of  dealing  with  it  can  be  imagined.  One  of  them  is 
the  creation  of  a  centralized  government,  in  which  the  Ger- 
mans, Hke  the  Magyars  in  Hungary,  should  play  the  part  of 
the  dominant  race  and  force  the  rest  of  the  people  to  adopt 
their  language,  their  habits,  and  traditions.  Such  a  solution 
might,  perhaps,  have  been  possible  at  one  time  if  the  Ger- 
mans had  possessed  the  vigor  and  tenacity  of  the  Magyars, 
if  they  had  acted  solidly  together,  and  if  they  had  been  con- 


3l8     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

sistently  supported  by  the  crown.  But  an  attempt  to  carry 
out  this  policy  has  long  been  hopeless.  The  other  method  of 
dealing  with  the  problem  would  have  been  that  of  breaking 
up  the  Empire  into  a  confederation  based  upon  the  different 
nationalities.  But  this  would  have  been  like  trying  to 
divide  a  cake  among  several  children,  one  of  whom  wanted 
the  whole  of  it,  while  another  claimed  a  half,  and  three  or 
four  more  were  crj-ing  for  a  quarter  apiece.  The  fact  is  that 
the  races  are  not  separated  by  sharp  geographical  bound- 
aries. Except  in  Galicia  ^  and  the  southern  Tyrol  the  races 
are  almost  everj'where  more  or  less  intermingled,  few  dis- 
tricts being  inhabited  solely  by  one  nationaHty,  and  the 
whole  of  no  race  living  in  a  separate  region  by  itself.  Yet  in 
any  part  of  the  country  where  it  predominates,  and  some- 
times where  it  does  not,  each  race  would  like  to  be  supreme. 
Clearly  some  compromise  is  unavoidable.  Whether  any 
middle  course  between  centrahzation  and  disintegration  can 
be  successful,  it  is  hard  to  say;  but  whatever  poUcy  is  pur- 
sued, it  is  clear  that  no  durable  solution  of  the  problem  can 
be  reached  until  the  people  have  learned  to  regard  it  as 
permanent  and  legitimate.  This  sounds  tautologous,  but 
it  is  really  important. 

Hungary :  the  Races 

There  are  four  leading  races  in  Hungary,  the  Magyar,  the 
Slav,  the  German,  and  the  Roumanian. ^  The  oldest  of  these 
is  the  Roumanian,  which  claims  to  have  sprung  from  the 
Roman  colonists  and  the  Romanized  natives  near  the  mouths 

'  Even  in  Galicia  the  Ruthenians,  who  belong  to  the  poorer  class,  claim 
distinct  racial  rights. 

^  By  the  census  of  19 lo,  the  numbers  of  the  races  in  Hungary  were  as 
follows:  Magyars,  10,050,575;  Germans,  2,037,435;  Slovaks,  1,967,970; 
Roumanians,  2,949,032;  Croats  and  Serbs,  2,939,633;  Others,  941,842. 
Total,  20,886,487. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  319 

of  the  Danube,  and  the  members  of  the  race  certainly  speak 
a  language  that  has  a  close  aflfmity  with  Latin.  They  live 
in  the  eastern  part  of  the  kingdom,  and  are  especially  nu- 
merous in  Transylvania.  By  religion,  they  belong  partly 
to  the  Orthodox  Greek  Church,  and  partly  to  the  so-called 
United  Greek  Church  —  a  body  formerly  Orthodox  Greek 
which  has  become  united  to  the  Roman  Church,  but  has 
retained  the  married  clergy  and  the  right  to  pronounce  the 
liturgy  in  the  vernacular. 

The  Slavs  are,  no  doubt,  the  next  most  ancient  race  in 
Hungary,  although  the  precise  time  of  their  migration  into 
the  country  is  obscure.  They  are  now  broken  up  into  two 
distinct  branches,  that  of  the  Slovaks  in  the  north;  and 
that  of  the  Croats  and  Serbs,  who  inhabit  Croatia,  in  the 
southwest,  and  extend  along  the  whole  southern  border  of 
the  kingdom.  Croatia,  indeed,  whose  population  is  almost 
wholly  Slav,  was  never  completely  incorporated  in  Hungary, 
and  although  subject  to  the  Hungarian  king  after  1 102, kept 
its  national  institutions,  and  was  governed  by  means  of  a  ban 
or  viceroy  and  a  separate  diet  of  its  own.  The  Slavs  are 
divided  into  Catholics,  and  Orthodox  and  United  Greeks. 

The  Teutonic  hordes  that  swept  over  Hungary  at  the  time 
of  the  downfall  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  the  west  have  left  no 
permanent  traces,  and  the  Germans  who  live  there  to-day 
are  descended  from  the  more  peaceful  immigrants  of  later 
times.  They  are  found  in  considerable  numbers  in  the  cities 
throughout  the  centre  of  the  land  from  west  to  east,  but  no- 
where do  they  form  the  bulk  of  the  population,  except  in 
certain  parts  of  Transylvania. 

The  Magyars,  who  live  chiefly  in  the  vast  plains  that 
cover  the  centre  and  west  of  Hungary,  although  a  minority 
of  the  whole  people,  are  the  most  numerous  and  by  far  the 
most  powerful  of  the  races.    They  have  ruled  the  country 


320     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

ever  since  their  first  invasion  at  the  close  of  the  ninth  cen- 
tury, and  in  fact  they  regard  it  as  peculiarly,  and  one  may 
almost  say  exclusively,  their  own.  The  fact  that  the  Mag- 
yars are  not  Aryans  has  probably  been  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  their  failure  to  assimilate  the  other  races,  but  in 
some  ways  it  has  been  a  source  of  strength.  It  has  pre- 
vented them  from  looking  for  support  and  sympathy,  Hke 
the  Germans  and  the  Slavs,  to  their  kindred  in  neighboring 
countries,  and  thus  by  making  them  self-dependent  has 
increased  their  cohesion  and  intensified  their  patriotism.^ 

The  Hungarian  King 

The  monarch,  who  bears  in  Austria  the  title  of  Emperor 
and  in  Hungary  that  of  King,  presents  to  the  Parliament  be- 
fore his  coronation  a  diploma  containing  a  promise  to  main- 
tain the  fundamental  laws  and  liberties  of  the  land ;  and  this 
is  published  among  the  statutes.  He  has  the  ordinary  pow- 
ers of  a  constitutional  sovereign,  but  these  are  somewhat 
more  carefully  guarded  than  usual,  on  account  of  the  anom- 
alous position  in  which  the  country  has  stood  so  long.^  In 
his  case  the  requirement  of  a  countersignature  is  no  mere 
formality,  for  the  cabinet  is  far  less  subject  to  the  control  of 
the  crown  than  in  Austria,  and  is  in  fact  really  responsible  in 
the  parliamentary  sense  of  the  term. 

The  Hungarian  Parliament 

The  Parliament  (Orszaggyiiles)  is  composed  of  two  cham- 
bers, which  bear  the  ancient  names  of  the  Table  of  Magnates 
(Forendihar)  and  the  Table  of  Deputies  (Kepviselohar). 

1  Ulbrich,  pp.  149-153. 

*  The  right  to  bear  the  title  of  Apostolic  King  was  conferred  by  Pope 
Sylvester  II  in  1000  upon  Stephen  of  Hungary,  the  royal  convert  to 
Christianity. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  3  21 

The  Table  of  Magnates,  as  the  name  impUes,  is  an  old  and 
aristocratic  body.  The  Table  of  Deputies  is  a  representa- 
tive chamber  containing  four  hundred  and  fifty-three  mem- 
bers. Of  these  forty  are  elected  by  the  diet  of  Croatia,  and 
take  part  only  in  matters  that  affect  their  province;  for 
Croatia  has  a  right  to  regulate  a  large  class  of  subjects  in  its 
own  diet,  and  is  to  that  extent  independent  of  the  legislature 
at  Buda-Pesth.  Hence  there  are,  as  it  were,  two  parlia- 
ments, a  smaller  one  which  attends  to  all  matters  that  relate 
to  Hungary  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  name,  and  another, 
formed  by  the  addition  of  the  members  from  Croatia,  which 
deals  with  the  subjects  that  concern  the  whole  kingdom. 
The  Table  of  Deputies  for  Hungary  proper  contains,  there- 
fore, four  hundred  and  thirteen  members,  and  these  are 
elected  on  a  limited  suffrage  which  favors  the  Magyars. 

Although  the  Magyars  form  less  than  one  half  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Hungary,  they  are  more  energetic,  more  aggressive, 
and  better  organized  than  the  other  races;  and  the  restricted 
suffrage,  the  oral  voting,  and  the  arrangement  of  electoral 
districts  tell  so  strongly  in  their  favor,  that  except  for  the 
forty  members  from  Croatia  they  hold  all  but  about  a  score 
of  the  seats  in  Parliament.  Moreover,  they  have  long  been 
the  ruling  caste,  and  have  the  habit  of  command.  They  feel 
that  Hungary  belongs  to  them,  and  although  since  1848  they 
have  admitted  men  of  other  blood  to  a  share  of  political 
power,  they  do  not  intend  to  let  the  control  slip  from  their 
own  hands.  No  Kne  is  drawn  between  the  races  in  the  sense 
of  excluding  any  person  from  civil  or  political  rights  on 
account  of  his  birth.  The  test  of  citizenship,  the  quaHfica- 
tions  for  the  franchise,  are  the  same  for  every  one;  and  in 
fact  the  Magyars  do  not  want  to  keep  the  other  races  dis- 
tinct and  in  subjection:  they  propose  to  absorb  them  all, 
and  make  Hungary  a  homogeneous  nation  of  Magyars. 


322     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

With  this  object  they  have  insisted  on  proclaiming  Magyar 
the  national  language.  It  must  be  exclusively  used  in  Parlia- 
ment, except  by  the  members  from  Croatia  who  are  allowed 
to  speak  in  their  own  tongue.  It  is  the  official  language  of 
the  administration,  the  courts,  and  the  university,  and  it 
must  be  taught  in  the  public  schools. 

This  does  not  apply  to  Croatia  whose  people  were  too 
homogeneous  and  too  strong  to  be  treated  in  quite  so  high- 
handed a  manner.  The  field  left  to  the  local  authorities 
there  includes  education,  police,  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice, and  a  large  part  of  the  ordinary  civil  and  criminal  law. 
The  province  has  its  own  organs  of  government,  the  most 
important  of  which  is  the  diet,  or  legislature.  This  body 
must  be  summoned  every  year,  but  can  be  adjourned  or  dis- 
solved at  pleasure  by  the  king,  and  requires  the  royal  sanc- 
tion for  the  validity  of  its  acts.  In  saying  this,  however,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  powers  of  the  king  are  really 
exercised  by  the  Hungarian  cabinet  at  Buda-Pesth.  Croatia 
is  thus  an  integral  part  of  Hungary,  but  has  retained  a  con- 
siderable amount  of  autonomy,  and  differs  in  this  from  every 
other  part  of  the  kingdom. 

The  Dual  Monarchy 

The  first  connecting  link  between  Austria  and  Hungary  is 
the  monarch  himself,  whose  functions  in  the  two  countries 
are,  however,  carefully  distinguished.  He  begins  his  reign 
with  two  separate  coronations  —  one  at  Vienna,  where  he 
takes  the  oath  before  the  Reichsrath,  the  other  at  Buda- 
Pesth,  where  he  is  crowned  with  curious  symboUc  rites,  full 
of  oriental  pomp.  This  dualism  is  carried  out  even  in  his 
title;  for  the  Magyars  are  great  sticklers  about  form  in  mat- 
ters that  involve  a  recognition  of  Hungary's  equality  with 
the  rest  of  the  monarchy.    By  an  order  of  Novermber  14, 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  323 

1868,  he  is  styled  "  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Bohemia, 
etc.,  and  Apostolic  King  of  Hungary."^  The  Emperor-King 
has  the  command  of  the  joint  army  and  navy;  supervises 
the  administration  of  matters  common  to  both  countries, 
and  has  power  to  make  ordinances  in  regard  to  them.  He 
appoints  for  the  direct  control  of  these  matters  joint  min- 
isters for  Foreign  Affairs,  for  War,  and  for  Finance. 

The  Delegations 

The  deliberative  body  of  the  dual  monarchy  is  one  of  the 
most  extraordinary  poHtical  inventions  of  modem  times.  It 
consists  of  two  delegations  ^  —  one  from  Austria,  the  other 
from  Hungary  —  each  composed  of  sixty  members,  of  whom 
twenty  are  chosen  by  the  upper  and  forty  by  the  lower  house 
of  each  parliament.^  The  delegations  are  reelected  annually, 
and  must  be  summoned  to  meet  by  the  Emperor  at  least 
once  a  year.  In  everything  that  relates  to  their  sessions  and 
procedure  the  most  scrupulous  regard  is  paid  to  the  equality 
of  the  two  countries.  Their  meetings,  for  example,  are  held 
alternately  at  Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth,='  and  the  proposals  of 
the  government  are  laid  before  both  bodies  at  the  same  time. 
In  the  Austrian  delegation  all  the  proceedings  are  in  Ger- 
man; in  the  Hungarian,  in  Magyar;*  while  all  communi- 
cations between  the  two  are  made  in  both  languages.  It 
seems,  indeed,  to  have  been  the  object  of  the  Hungarian 
statesmen,  not  only  to  maintain  the  equaHty  of  the  two 

1  Cf.  The  Austrian  Law  of  Dec.  21,  1867,  §§  6-35;  Ulbrich,  pp.  20-22; 
Gumplowicz,  §§  104-107. 

^  One  half  as  many  substitutes  are  elected  in  the  same  way. 

^  This  is  not  required  by  the  Act  of  Dec.  21,  1867,  which  provides  (§  11) 
simply  that  the  meetings  shall  be  held  where  the  crown  appoints,  or,  as  the 
Hungarian  Law  (§  32)  says,  where  His  Majesty  is  residing. 

*  An  exception  is  made  in  favor  of  the  Croats,  who  are  allowed  to  speak 
their  own  language. 


324     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

nations,  but  also  to  keep  them  apart,  to  avoid  all  appearance 
of  a  common  parliament,  for  the  delegations  debate  and  vote 
separately  except  in  a  single  case.  If  they  disagree  about 
any  measure,  and  after  the  third  exchange  of  communica- 
tions an  accord  is  not  reached,  either  delegation  may  de- 
mand a  common  session.  Here  again  the  equality  of  the  two 
countries  is  carefully  preserved,  for  the  two  presidents  take 
turns  in  presiding,  the  journal  is  kept  in  both  languages,  and, 
what  is  far  more  extraordinary,  it  is  especially  pro\'ided  that 
the  same  number  of  delegates  from  each  country  shall  take 
part,  the  side  which  has  most  members  present  being  re- 
duced by  lot  until  the  two  are  equal.  In  the  joint  session  no 
debate  is  permitted,  and  the  only  business  transacted  is  the 
taking  of  a  vote  on  the  matter  about  which  the  delegations 
have  failed  to  agree.  The  procedure,  therefore,  is  a  peculiar 
one.  The  two  bodies  debate  and  vote  separately,  except  in 
case  of  a  deadlock,  when  they  vote  but  never  debate 
together. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  delegations  are  prac- 
tically confined  in  their  action  to  voting  supplies,  and  exert- 
ing a  control  over  the  administration.  Those  subjects,  which 
in  other  federal  governments  fall  within  the  province  of  the 
central  legislature,  are  regulated  in  the  dual  monarchy  by 
concurrent  statutes  of  the  two  parUaments,  and  thus  nearly 
everything  in  the  nature  of  positive  law  must  be  enacted 
separately  in  Austria  and  Hungary.  In  substance,  therefore, 
the  whole  joint  legislation  of  the  monarchy  is  a  series  of 
treaties,  partly  permanent  and  partly  temporary,  which  can- 
not be  changed  or  prolonged  by  any  common  legislature,  but 
only  by  the  contracting  parties  themselves.  We  have  thus 
a  unique  case  of  almost  absolute  legislative  decentraHzation, 
combined  with  a  certain  amount  of  administrative  centrah- 
zation,  the  laws  on  matters  of  common  interest  being  en- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  325 

acted  by  the  separate  legislatures,  and  only  their  execution 
being  entrusted  to  the  organs  of  the  federal  government. 
Hence  the  work  of  the  delegations  consists  mainly  in  the  con- 
trol of  the  common  administration,  and  in  granting  the 
annual  appropriations. 

The  Customs  Union 

Except  for  a  few  insignificant  matters,  such  as  the  lease  of 
state  property,  the  sale  of  old  material,  and  the  profits  of  the 
powder  monopoly,  the  only  direct  source  of  revenue  belong- 
ing to  the  joint  government  is  the  customs  tariff,  which  rests 
upon  a  treaty  between  the  two  countries  made  for  ten  years 
at  a  time  in  the  form  of  identical  acts  of  the  two  parlia- 
ments. These  laws  establish  a  uniform  tariff  for  the  whole 
monarchy,  and  provide  that  neither  country  shall  lay  any 
duty  on  goods  coming  from  the  other,  except  to  the  amount 
of  his  own  excise  on  the  same  commodity.  The  duties,  how- 
ever, although  paid  into  the  common  treasury,  are  not 
collected  by  the  joint  government,  but  by  the  separate 
countries,  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  each  other's 
customhouses,  except  the  right  of  mutual  inspection. 

The  Joint  Ministers 

There  are  three  joint  ministries  —  those  for  foreign  affairs, 
for  war,  and  for  finance.^  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
is  at  the  head  of  the  diplomatic  corps,  and  has  entire  charge 
of  the  foreign  relations  of  both  countries,  for  the  separate 
halves  of  the  monarchy  hold  no  direct  communication  with 
other  nations.  He  consults  frequently,  however,  the  premiers 
of  Austria  and  Hungary,  who,  in  turn,  are  often  interpel- 

1  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  formerly  bore  the  title  of  Imperial 
Chancellor,  but  the  Magyars  thought  this  savored  too  much  of  a  consolidated 
state,  and  in  187 1  it  was  changed. 


326     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

lated  and  make  statements  on  the  subject  in  their  respec- 
tive parliaments.  He  also  gives  to  the  delegations  such 
information  as  he  thinks  best;  but  from  the  secret  nature  of 
diplomatic  negotiations  his  reports  are  necessarily  far  more 
meagre  than  those  of  the  other  ministers. 

The  next  department  of  the  joint  administration  is  that  of 
war,  and  here  again  is  found  the  strange  mixture  of  federal 
union  and  international  alliance  that  is  characteristic  of  the 
relations  of  Austria  and  Hungary. ^    The  regular  army  and 
the  navy  are  institutions  of  the  joint  monarchy,  although 
they  are  governed  by  separate  standing  laws  of  the  two 
states,  which  are,  of  course,  substantially  identical.    These 
laws  determine,  among  other  things,  the  number  of  the 
troops,  and  pro\dde  that  the  men  shall  be  furnished  by  the 
two  countries  in  proportion  to  population;  but  the  contin- 
gent of  recruits  required  from  each  country  is  voted  annually 
by  its  own  parliament.    After  the  recruits  are  enlisted  they 
are  commanded  and  paid  by  the  joint  administration.    The 
Emperor,  as  commander-in-chief,  appoints  the  ofhcers,  and 
regulates  the  organization  of  the  army.    The  minister  of  war, 
curiously  enough,  is  not  required  to  countersign  acts  of  this 
nature,^  but  he  is  responsible  for  all  other  matters,  such  as 
the  commissariat,  equipment,  and  military  schools.    Besides 
the  regular  army,  which  belongs  to  the  joint  government, 
there  are  mihtary  bodies,  called  in  Austria  the  Landwehr, 
and  in  Hungary  the  Honveds,  which  are  special  institutions 
of  the  separate  halves  of  the  monarchy.    These  troops  are 
composed  of  the  recruits  that  are  not  needed  for  the  con- 
tingents to  the  regular  army,  and  of  the  men  who  have 
already  served  their  time  in  it. 

The  third  department  of  the  joint  administration  is  that 
of  the  finances,  which  caused  no  Httle  trouble  when  the  com- 
1  Cf.  Ulbrich,  pp.  23-25.  "  Law  of  Dec.  21,  1867,  §  5. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  327 

pact  was  made  in  1867.  After  a  good  deal  of  discussion  it 
was  finally  settled  that  Hungary  should  contribute  twenty- 
nine  and  a  half  millions  of  florins  a  year  towards  the  interest 
on  the  existing  debt,  and  that  Austria  should  pay  the  rest, 
enjoying,  however,  the  benefit  of  any  reorganizations,  or  in 
other  words  repudiation,  she  might  make  —  a  privilege  of 
which  she  subsequently  took  advantage  in  the  form  of  a  tax 
on  the  national  creditors.  In  regard  to  the  current  expenses 
of  the  joint  monarchy,  it  was  finally  arranged  that  they 
should  be  defrayed  so  far  as  possible  out  of  the  joint  revenue, 
and  that  any  balance  should  be  paid,  sixty-three  and  six- 
tenths  per  cent  by  Austria  and  thirty-six  and  four-tenths 
per  cent  by  Hungary,  that  ratio  being  based  upon  the  sums 
raised  by  taxation  in  the  two  countries. 

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina 

Curiously  enough,  there  is  a  district  which  forms  part 
neither  of  Austria  nor  of  Hungary,  but  is  ruled  directly  by 
the  federal  officials.^  The  district  did  not  belong  to  the 
monarchy  when  the  compact  of  1867  was  made,  but  was 
acquired  in  1878,  after  the  Russo-Turkish  war.  At  that 
time  the  Great  Powers  met  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  and 
agreed  to  protect  Turkey  against  the  grasping  ambition  of 
Russia  by  lopping  ofif  pieces  of  her  territory  for  the  benefit 
of  one  another.  Austria's  share  of  the  booty  consisted  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and,  although  these  provinces  re- 
mained until  1908  under  the  nominal  suzerainty  of  the  Sub- 
Ume  Porte,  the  administration  of  them  being  alone  confided 
to  Austria-Hungary  they  were  virtually  annexed  for  all  pur- 
poses to  the  dominions  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg.  Now  it 
would  have  been  impracticable  to  di\dde  the  territory  be- 
tween Hungary  and  Austria,  and  neither  half  of  the  mon- 

*  Ulbrich,  pp.  27-28. 


328     GREATER  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 

archy  would  have  consented  to  its  annexation  as  a  whole  by 
the  other.  Hence  the  only  possible  course  was  to  rule  the 
provinces  in  common  as  a  subject  land.  The  two  parlia- 
ments, therefore,  passed  laws  providing  that  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  provinces  should  be  organized  and  carried  on 
by  the  monarch  and  the  joint  ministers,  reserving,  however, 
to  the  cabinets  of  Hungary  and  Austria  a  right  to  an  in- 
fluence in  the  matter,  that  is,  a  right  to  be  consulted  in 
regard  to  it.  Finally,  after  these  provinces  had  been  def- 
initely annexed  in  1908,  they  were  given  a  diet  of  their  own 
to  deal  with  local  affairs. 

The  Character  of  the  Union 

If  France  has  been  a  laboratory  for  political  experiments, 
Austria-Hungary  is  a  museum  of  political  curiosities,  but  it 
contains  nothing  so  extraordinary  as  the  relation  between 
Austria  and  Hungary  themselves.  The  explanation  of  the 
strange  connection  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  two 
countries  are  not  held  together  from  within  by  any  affection 
or  loyalty  to  a  common  nation,  but  are  forced  together  by  a 
pressure  from  outside  which  has  made  the  union  an  inter- 
national and  military  necessity.  The  union  has  been,  there- 
fore, unavoidable,  and  it  is  very  little  closer  than  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  for  which  it  exists. 
There  is  a  common  army,  a  common  direction  of  foreign 
affairs,  and  a  terminable  customs  union,  which  is,  after  all, 
the  most  convenient  method  of  defraying  part  of  the  cost  of 
the  military  establishment.  There  is  no  single  authority 
that  has  power  to  settle  anything,  but  every  measure  in- 
volves a  negotiation  between  the  two  delegations  or  the  two 
parliaments,  and  government  becomes  in  consequence  an 
endless  series  of  compromises  between  bodies  belonging  to 
different  races  which  are  jealous  of  each  other.    Moreover, 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  329 

the  source  of  legislation  lies  in  the  two  parliaments,  and  to 
these  the  joint  ministers  have  no  access.  It  is  in  fact 
specially  provided  that  they  shall  not  be  members  of  either 
cabinet.  They  are  unable,  therefore,  to  lead  the  parlia- 
ments; and  that  the  parliaments  cannot  control  them  was 
clearly  shown  in  1878,  when  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  was  carried  through  against  the  wishes  of  both 
legislatures.  The  ministers  of  Austria  are  at  least  nominally 
responsible  to  the  lower  house  of  the  Reichsrath,  and  those 
of  Hungary  are  actually  responsible  to  the  Table  of  Dep- 
uties, but  the  joint  ministers  are  not  in  fact  directly  re- 
sponsible to  any  legislative  body. 


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